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FALL 1983

A Journal of World Affairs

ORBIS

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Foreign Policy Research Institute

in Association with the Graduate Program in International Relations
University of Pennsylvania

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ORBIS: A Journal of World Affairs **(ISSN 0030-4387)**

Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Association with the Graduate Program in International Relations, University of Pennsylvania

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ORBIS (ISSN 0030-4387) is published four times a year by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. **Editorial and business offices:** 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104. **Subscription rates,** per year: $18.00 for individuals, $45.00 for institutions. Special student rate, $15.00. (Outside U.S.A., add $4.00 per year.) Single copy, $8.75. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, PA, and at additional mailing offices. **Postmaster:** Send address changes to ORBIS, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

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ORBIS
A Journal of World Affairs

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forum

THE CHURCH AND FOREIGN POLICY

In recent years, the Roman Catholic Church has increasingly involved itself in the formulation of national foreign and strategic policies. The contributors to this "ORBIS Forum" examine a number of areas where the political influence of the Church has been felt most forcefully. The contributors are: **Ernest L. Fortin,** *Professor of Theology at Boston College;* **Keith B. Payne,** *Vice-President and Director of National Security Studies at the National Institute for Public Policy;* **Manfred R. Hamm,** *Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation; and* **Alex Alexiev,** *a member of the professional staff of The Rand Corporation.*

CHRISTIANITY AND THE JUST-WAR THEORY

by ERNEST L. FORTIN

In a world that seems to be held together by little more than a common fear of a common destruction, it was practically inevitable that the limited or just-war theory should regain some of the credit that it lost when, following the breakdown of medieval Christendom and the emergence of the modern sovereign state, it was largely abandoned in favor of what now goes under the name of international law. The presumed advantage of the new approach to the problem of foreign relations was that it did not depend for its efficacy on the moral character of the nation or the virtuous dispositions of its rulers. "As often as reason is against man," Hobbes once remarked, "so often is man against reason." Since few people can be trusted to behave reasonably when their private interests are at stake, one might indeed be tempted to look for a solution whose successful implementation was not contingent for the most part on the acquisition of virtue. Reliable institutions, designed without regard for the needs of others and for the sole purpose of promoting the welfare and prosperity of one's own nation, would automatically bring about a world order from which the specter of war would be banished altogether. Human beings could remain as they are as long as the laws under which they lived were what they ought to be. To help others they had only to think of themselves. In the interest of morality, but without the benefit of its assistance, nature had seen to it that a lasting peace would one day

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be achieved regardless of whether or not people were ready to curb their aggressiveness or renounce their worldly ambitions. Progress in the direction of that morally desirable goal was assured, not by the deliberate pursuit of moral purposes, but by the free interplay of essentially immoral and self-regarding passions. As a result of their incessant preying on one another, human beings had created a precarious situation from which they could extricate themselves only by desisting from any further attempt at aggrandizement at the expense of their fellow human beings. Wars would diminish in frequency and intensity, not because their irrationality offended mankind's moral sense, but because they were proving ever more costly, destructive, and detrimental to the material well-being of the warring nations. A hidden teleology at work in the historical process was sufficient to guarantee that the antagonisms which characterize human intercourse would constrain even the worst offenders to adopt a civic constitution recognizing everyone's rights and granting to each individual and nation as much freedom as is consistent with the freedom of others. As Kant finally put it:

> The friction among men, the inevitable antagonism, which is a mark of even the largest societies and political bodies, is used by nature as a means to establish a condition of quiet and security. Through war, through the taxing and never-ending accumulation of armament, through the want which any state, even in peacetime, must suffer internally, nature forces them to make at first inadequate and tentative attempts; finally, after devastations, revolutions, and even complete exhaustion, she brings them to that which reason could have told them at the beginning and with far less sad experience, to wit, to step from the lawless condition of savages into a league of nations. In a league of nations, even the smallest state could expect security and justice, not from its own power and by its own decrees, but only from this great league of nations, from a united power acting under decisions reached under the laws of their united will. . . . All wars are accordingly so many attempts (not in the intention of man but in the intention of nature) to establish new relations among states, and through the destruction or at least the dismemberment of all of them to create new political bodies, which, again, either internally or externally, cannot maintain themselves and which must thus suffer like revolutions; until, finally, through the best possible civic constitution and common agreement and legislation in external affairs, a state is created which, like a civic commonwealth, can maintain itself after the fashion of an automaton.[1]

Chastened by two world wars and the persistent threat of a nuclear conflagration, many of our more thoughtful contemporaries have begun to entertain serious doubts about the practicality of the modern position. In that connection, the much publicized pastoral letter on nuclear deterrence issued earlier this year by the Roman Catholic hierarchy comes as a timely reminder that matters pertaining to war and peace cannot

[1] Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent," trans. L. W. Beck, in *On History* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), pp. 18-19.

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safely be divorced from considerations of morality. If the lively debate sparked by the bishops' letter suggests anything, however, it is that its noble attempt to reaccredit the just-war theory is not without difficulties of its own, which need to be clarified before a genuine consensus among all interested parties can be reached.

One of these difficulties stems from the fact that the argument that the letter develops, and through which it seeks to influence public policy while it is still in the process of being shaped, is of specifically Christian origin and is liable to appear to impartial observers as a matter of party allegiance. The classical philosophers occasionally spoke of wars as being just or unjust but never made any real effort to elaborate what could properly be described as a just-war "theory." Their main focus was on domestic policy, where principles of justice are both easier to recognize and more readily applicable. Although fully aware of the constant impingement of foreign affairs on the internal life of the nation, they seem to have concluded that, most of the time, necessity rather than choice was the controlling factor in the polis's dealings with other nations. It was more important to them that the citizens of a particular city develop such habits as would help them to moderate their appetite for conquest. Plato even went so far as to suggest that a decent city differs from a gang of robbers, not in how it acquires its property or its wealth, but in what it does with them once they have been acquired. Accordingly, external matters were most often left to the discretion of wise and prudent rulers. The solution was chancy at best, inasmuch as one can never be sure that the city will have such rulers at its head when it most needs them. It was nevertheless regarded as not only the best but the only viable solution to the nagging problem of international relations. Neither in Plato nor in Aristotle do we find anything that quite compares with, say, the famous question "On War" in Thomas Aquinas's *Summa of Theology*.[2]

The one possible exception to this rule among the ancient philosophers is Cicero, who as a statesman as well as a philosopher, could hardly avoid coming to grips with what had long been the dominant fact of Roman political life, namely, its military conquests, and whose works do contain something like a just-war theory. Not surprisingly, it is from him that the Church Fathers inherited the notion of the just war, although their use of it went well beyond what he originally intended by it. It is doubtful whether Cicero himself was convinced of the unimpeachable justice of Rome's conduct toward other nations. He certainly knew that there was little historical evidence to support the contention that her wars were waged only in self-defense or for the defense of her allies. If

[2] II-II, 40,

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such had been the case, these allies would have been returned to independent status as soon as the danger was over and Rome would never have established herself as the mistress of the civilized world. Anyone who reads Cicero's *Republic* carefully comes away with the impression that the just-war theory that it expounds was nothing more than a subtle critique of Roman expansionism, written by someone who appears to have been more concerned with what the conquest of the world would do to the conqueror than with what it would do to the conquered nations.[3]

Second, it should be noted that the Catholic bishops' version of the just-war theory represents a significant departure not only from the teachings of the classical philosophers but from the spirit and the letter of original Christian doctrine. The pastoral letter credits St. Augustine with having supplied that doctrine with its central insight, which is that the New Testament command of love must be interpreted in such a way as to include the defense of the innocent. Stated in the simplest possible terms, to allow one's family, one's friends, or others for whom one is responsible to be tyrannized or massacred by an unjust aggressor is not an act of love. Unless I am mistaken, however, the bishops' detailed account of the just-war theory owes much more to the Spanish and Dutch theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than it does to any of their predecessors. The result is a conception of the just war that is more juridical or legalistic in tone than the one advocated, for example, by Augustine or Thomas Aquinas, both of whom seriously doubted whether matters as complex as these could be legislated with any degree of precision, if only because decisions pertaining to them are necessarily affected by the immense web of ever-changing and usually unforeseeable circumstances in the midst of which they have to be taken. The Spanish and Dutch theorists obviously thought they could be so legislated. From that point of view it is interesting to note that, by the time we come to Grotius, the four pages that Thomas devotes to the just war had been expanded into a 740-page book. But then these theorists were faced with the immediate problem of justifying Spanish imperialism and at the same time of putting an end to the brutal treatment meted out to the American Indians by the *conquistadores*. Well-intentioned as it may have been, their theory ran the twofold risk of granting to war a stronger legal sanction than it might otherwise have had and of depriving statesmen of the flexibility required for the discharge of what, in his memo to the U.S. bishops, Cardinal Casaroli called their "awesome responsibilities."

[3] For a brief but careful and penetrating analysis of the classical position, see T. L. Pangle, "The Moral Basis of National Security: Four Historical Perspectives," in K. Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Wichita: University Press of Kansas, 1976), esp. pp. 308-17.

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This much being said, one has to admit that the problem of warfare has always been fraught with greater urgency for the Christian theologian than it was for any of the philosophers of classical antiquity. Given the force of the biblical teaching concerning the sacredness of life, it is understandable that from the beginning some Christians should have been reluctant to engage in bloodshed or condone the use of arms. When the ghost of Hamlet's father urges his son to "revenge his foul and unnatural murder," he is careful to add: "murder most foul, *as in the best it is,*" thereby calling attention to the peculiarly loathsome character of any deed that has as its object the taking of another person's life. Killing is of course not the same thing as murder and one does not normally look upon a soldier who kills in the legitimate exercise of his duties as a murderer. Yet, in view of the fact that war inevitably results in the death of persons who do not deserve to die and are not meant to die, the line between the two cannot always be drawn with absolute clarity. True, the Hebrew Scriptures contain more than their share of violence and bloody massacres; but these were holy wars, undertaken at God's command and for the sake of overcoming his enemies. The issue was whether the Christian, living as he did under a new dispensation, was free to indulge in a practice that was no longer ordered by God or ostensibly carried out in fulfillment of his mysterious designs. Is an act of war in any way compatible with Christian love and thus at least permissible within Christian ethics?

As far as the early Church is concerned, the record is spotty and probably less clear than the bishops seem to indicate. It is perhaps unfortunate that the drafters of their letter should have had no choice but to rely for their information on a variety of works published during the 1960s and early 1970s, often by scholars whose evaluation of the materials at hand bears traces of their pacifist leanings. More recent studies have done much to redress the balance, and there is reason to think that work currently in progress will corroborate their findings.

Be that as it may, one looks in vain for any thematic treatment of the question in the literature of the pre-Constantinian period, and all signals point to the fact that for most people the issue was somewhat theoretical. For one thing, there was no regular involuntary conscription in the Roman Empire; for another, many of the early Christians belonged to the class of slaves or freedmen, none of whom was eligible for military service. The situation changed slightly when pagans began to convert to the new faith in larger numbers, but even then no uniform solution prevailed. Some Christian writers, Tertullian and Origen in particular, voiced strong opposition to warfare and advocated or leaned toward pacifism as the only legitimate Christian response to aggression, albeit for different

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reasons. Violence is one of them, but only one. Equally prominent were idolatry or emperor-worship (which was generally restricted to superior officers) and the danger of immorality, a phenomenon not uncommonly associated with the military life. Others adopted a more moderate stance, forbidding Christians to enlist in the army but allowing professional soldiers to remain in it even after their conversion to the faith, since it would not have been feasible for most of them to do otherwise. Desertion was punishable by death and the soldier who abandoned his service forfeited all the benefits of property or money to which he was entitled upon retirement. Besides, military service did not necessarily involve one in acts of violence. For long stretches of time the Empire was at rest or compelled to wage war only sporadically and on a limited scale. More often than not, soldiers worked at peaceful jobs. They doubled as police officers and served as messengers, ushers, or accountants for their local commanders. One of them even brags about having done nothing but write during his entire twenty-five years of service. Nor for that matter was there any great incentive to join the army since the pay was not very good. Interestingly enough, the enrollment jumped the moment salaries were increased.

I will make one final remark on this subject, which has to do with the discrepancy that one detects between what Christians said and what they actually did. Tertullian, whose stand on the issue is based on the biblical injunction against killing, nevertheless looked upon participation in war as a potentially virtuous act and is himself a major witness for the presence of Christians in the army. Christians are known to have been included in the famous Thundering Legion under Marcus Aurelius, for otherwise the claim that they were responsible for its successes could not have been made with any degree of credibility. Agbar, the king of Edessa in Syria, converted to Christianity and made it the official religion of his realm, something that would hardly have been possible if it had deprived him of all recourse to military power. Diocletian singled out the Christians in his army as the prime target of his persecution, another indication of the fact that Christians served as soldiers, small as their number must have been. In short, the opposition to military service, to the extent it existed, was not adhered to in practice. Throughout that period, it was considered normal to profess one's loyalty to the Empire, but the implications of that loyalty were never made fully clear. One gathers from these observations that the Christian position on war, assuming that one can even speak of a Christian position, was not so much contradictory as immature or undeveloped.[4] What was needed was a

[4] See, on these and related matters, L. Swift, "War and the Christian Conscience I: The Early Years," in H. Temporini and W. Haase, eds., *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, II, 23, 1 (Berlin and New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1979), pp. 835-68.

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more thorough examination of the question, of the kind that later writers would provide.

The first such attempt dates from the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth centuries and takes the form of what is sometimes referred to as the Christian idea of progress.[5] It developed the idea that the advent of Christianity had signaled a decisive turning point in the political as well as the spiritual history of the human race. With the spread of the new faith and its eventual recognition by the imperial rulers, harmony would slowly be restored throughout the world and human beings would never again be faced with the excruciating dilemma of having to take up arms against one another. As Isaiah had predicted, swords would be turned into plowshares and justice and peace would at last forge a lasting alliance (Isaiah 2:4). The accession of Constantine to the imperial throne, his toleration of Christianity, and his own subsequent conversion to it were all signs pointing in the same happy direction. Under the aegis of the new emperors, the Kingdom of God was about to be inaugurated not just in heaven, as some less worldly minded apologists for the Christian faith had announced, but here on earth.[6]

The argument was as appealing as it was shallow. Its naiveté was exposed less than a century later when Rome was suddenly faced with a new and more powerful threat stemming, not from the centrifugal forces at work within it, but from mounting pressures on its borders. The death blow came in 476 when the Empire was finally overrun by barbarians, but its extreme vulnerability was brought home to everyone in 410 when the city of Rome itself was occupied by Alaric and his Goths for a brief period of two weeks. The reaction of the pagan elite was swift and to the point. The blame for the disaster was promptly laid at the door of Christianity, which was held to be inimical to the welfare of the state on the ground that it disparaged military valor and deprived the city of its only reliable means of defense against its enemies. Rome, whose security had always rested on its military prowess, could no longer count on the strength of its once invincible armies. Its present plight was no mere quirk of chance. It could plausibly be ascribed to the rapid growth of a peace-loving religion and its recent proclamation as the official cult of a nation that had formerly been "dedicated to Mars."[7]

The challenge was a serious one. It struck at the very heart of the Christian faith and brought into full daylight a problem that had been submerged rather than solved by its earlier defenders. There was no denying the transworldly character of the Christian Scriptures, their

[5] See T. E. Mommsen, "St. Augustine and the Christian Idea of Progress," reprinted in *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959), pp. 265-98.

[6] For a summary of the recent discussions of this issue, see E. L. Fortin, "Augustine's *City of God* and the Modern Historical Consciousness," *The Review of Politics*, vol. 41, 1979, pp. 323-43.

[7] See Augustine, *City of God*, IV, 29.

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profound silence on problems of a properly political nature, their manifest indifference to the distinction between regimes, their all but total disregard for the necessities of social life, and their emphasis on an elusive Kingdom of God that was supposedly taking shape within history but whose promises could only be fulfilled outside of it. For anyone who took their message at face value, even the most glorious human achievements paled into insignificance. Others might be preoccupied with the fate of empires; the Christian, who had a better world to look forward to, could afford to "let the world slip."[8] Kingdoms, after all, were clay and it was paltry to be Caesar. In the words of a prominent fourth-century Greek Father:

> Neither renown of ancestry, nor strength of body, nor beauty, nor stature, nor honors bestowed by all mankind, nor kingship itself, nor any other human attribute that one might mention, do we judge great; nay, we do not even look with admiration upon those who possess them, but our hopes lead us forward to a more distant time, and everything we do is by way of preparation for the next life.[9]

Little wonder that the new religion, which did so much to discourage public-spiritedness or at any rate so little to encourage it, should have been targeted as the prime cause of the deterioration of the Empire's political fortunes and of its present inability to hold its enemies at bay.

Augustine's just-war theory is part of a larger endeavor the aim of which was to counter the pagan objection by demonstrating that, for all its seemingly radical apoliticism, the New Testament ideal was by no means irreconcilable with the requirements of dutiful citizenship. The premise on which the argument rests is that Christianity, unlike Judaism, presents itself first and foremost not as law but as a faith or a set of teachings that do not of themselves call for or encourage the formation of any kind of political community. It simply presupposes the existence of civil society and takes for granted that Christians will continue to structure their temporal lives in accordance with its needs. Precisely because it had no political program of its own, it could adapt itself to any regime. They were all imperfect anyway — Augustine refers to them as "compacts of wickedness" — and they were all racked with inner tensions; but they were not totally bad, either, for otherwise their chances of survival would have been minimal. More important, they could be improved. It was indeed possible to live as a Christian in a more or less immoral society as long as one did one's best to refrain from any involvement in its patent injustices. The alternative was to withdraw from society altogether — an enticing solution to which some extremists were

[8] William Shakespeare, *The Taming of the Shrew*, Induction, scene 2, 146.

[9] Basil the Great, "Address to Young Men," in A. Pegis, ed., *The Wisdom of Catholicism* (New York: Random House, 1949), p. 10.

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occasionally drawn — but then no one would have been left to bear witness before others to the truth of the Gospel. It was not up to the individual to decide when or to whom the offer of God's mercy was to be made. This explains why Christians were to be found everywhere, mingling freely with the rest of the population, sharing their customs, their dress, and, within prescribed limits, their general way of life.[10] The only practices to which they were opposed were the ones that reason itself denounces as vicious or immoral and that are the real cause of the decline of states. By making of civil obedience a religious as well as a moral duty (Romans 13:1), their faith fostered law-abidingness, patriotism, and every form of public virtue.

Nor was it fair to say that Christianity condemns war and breeds contempt for military valor. As Augustine rightly saw, there was no consistent teaching on war to be found anywhere in the New Testament, for the simple reason that the question is never directly addressed by any of the sacred writers. The letter to the Romans did make it clear, however, not only that Christians had to obey their rulers but that these rulers had been ordained by God for the express purpose of inflicting his wrath on evildoers (Romans 13:4). If, as one must suppose, their duties often entail the use of force, the Christian who carries out his orders is bound to become involved in acts of violence.

The few texts that could be invoked in support of nonviolence were either beside the point or subject to qualification in the light of other texts that run counter to them. Christ, who occasionally speaks with soldiers, does not rebuke them for their profession or urge them to lay down their arms, but actually commends them for their righteousness. As was mentioned earlier, the commandment "Thou shalt not kill" is really a modified version of the more precise "Thou shalt not murder" and blurs the distinction between these two notions, which the original text is careful to maintain. The soldier, unlike the murderer, is not someone who takes the law into his own hands. He does not exercise the right of private judgment or try to determine for himself who ought or ought not to be allowed to live. There is a difference. Christ does say elsewhere that "he who lives by the sword will die by the sword," but he could not have intended this as a universally valid maxim inasmuch as, without ever having held a sword, he himself died a violent death.

As for the famous injunction to requite evil with good, it must be interpreted within the general context of one's relations with all of one's fellow human beings. The situations envisaged in the New Testament are typically one-on-one situations rather than situations in which the

[10] See Augustine, *City of God*, XIX, 17.

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welfare of a third party is at stake. One ought to be ready to forgive personal offenses (Augustine, who is stricter than Thomas Aquinas on this point, goes so far as to forbid killing in self-defense), but one is surely not required to love the criminal more than his innocent victims, especially when one bears a special responsibility for their safety.

One could infer from all of this that the New Testament is less concerned with external actions than with the internal dispositions with which they are to be performed. It seeks to ensure that war, if it must be waged, will be carried out with a benevolent design and without undue harshness. Human beings are compelled at all times to do what is most likely to benefit others. In some instances, peace and the correction of wrongdoers are more readily and more perfectly achieved by forgiveness than by castigation, whereas in other instances one would only confirm the wicked in their evil ways by giving free rein to injustice and allowing crimes to go unpunished. What Christianity reproves is not war itself but the evils of war, such as love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable hatreds, wild resistance, and the lust for power. By yielding to these evils, human beings lose a good that is far more precious than any of the earthly possessions an enemy could take from them. Instead of increasing the number of the good, they merely add themselves to the number of the wicked. Just wars are therefore permissible, even though they must be undertaken only out of necessity and for the sake of peace.

On its own grounds, the foregoing theory is open to at least two serious objections to which there are unfortunately no neat answers. The first is directly related to the question of self-defense. The clearest instance of a just war is that of the war embarked upon for the sole purpose of protecting oneself or one's borders against an unmerited attack. This obviously presupposes that the borders to be defended are just in the first place. Yet, in light of what Augustine says about the origin of nations and empires, it is hard to believe that such borders are ever completely just or natural. There was surely nothing sacred about the borders of the Roman Empire, which had been secured by force of arms and at the price of untold miseries visited upon weaker or less belligerent nations. Rome itself was but a mammoth larceny, long unpunished only because of its might. From this larger perspective, its position was not morally superior to that of its enemies. If, in addition to that, one bears in mind that the state of war inevitably gives rise to situations in which the ordinary rules of justice are suspended, one might well conclude, as Augustine does, that war is part of an order of things that, no matter how one looks at it, leaves much to be desired and is suited only to the condition of a wounded or inherently imperfect nature.

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The second problem concerns the tacit but questionable assumption that a war can be just on one side only. This much would seem to be implied in Augustine's statement to the effect that "when we wage a just war, our adversaries must be sinning."[11] If Rome's cause was just, then that of the invader was unjust. Still, there was plenty of evidence to show that the barbarians were often acting out of necessity and under pressure from powerful hordes to the east before whom they had little choice but to flee. Besides, in the course of the negotiations, Rome apparently had few qualms about breaking faith with them and even indulging in the most unspeakable treacheries. Thousands of barbarians who had been serving in the Roman army were mercilessly butchered once the reaction against them set in, and others, who had been promised asylum, were reduced to the most abject slavery upon their arrival.[12] Rome, too, bore its share of the responsibility for the evils that had recently befallen it. Augustine all but says that it was only getting what it deserved. The problem is not unlike the one that came up centuries later in the wake of the Spanish conquest of the New World. Even assuming that wars of civilization are permissible and that the Spaniards had every right to wage war on the American Indians, one hesitates to fault the original inhabitants of the conquered lands for defending themselves.

All in all, Augustine's theory left much unsaid, although probably not unthought. If anything can be said to have motivated it, it is the conviction not that wars can ever be completely just but that under certain more favorable circumstances they might become a trifle less unjust. There are limits to how far one can go in establishing a nation's right to the territory over which it rules or in laying down rules for the defense of that territory. As Thomas Aquinas would later say, the art of warfare (*militaris*) belongs pre-eminently to the sphere of political prudence, duly informed by a proper regard for the requirements of the common good. The contingency of its matter is such that its exercise can never be governed by universal moral and legal principles, save of the most general kind.[13]

For Augustine, the choice was between civilization and barbarism, and it was in the light of this distinction that the decision to support one side or the other had to be made. No one, not even Cicero, had fewer illusions about the justice of the Roman Empire. If his heart was still with it, it is because he thought that the prospects for justice, slim as they always are, were greater within it than outside of it. No

[11] Ibid., XIX, 15.

[12] R. Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace* (New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960), pp. 99-100.

[13] See Aquinas, *Summa of Theology*, II-II, 50, 4.

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doubt, individual human beings are capable of a higher degree of moral perfection than society at large, but their chances of attaining that perfection will be enhanced in proportion as the life of their society is itself guided by principles of justice and moderation. Without justice in the soul, there will never be justice in the city or in the city's relations with other cities and nations. The paradox with which we are finally confronted was all too familiar to the political thinkers of the premodern period: good government makes for good citizens, but it is itself made by good citizens. That was the ultimate reason that so many human societies had neither.

It was left to the great theorists of the modern age to come up with what was supposed to be a more workable solution to the problem by removing ethics from the realm of politics and by attempting to derive the common good from the enlightened self-interest of the individual members of society. Kant, in whose works the new view achieved perhaps its finest expression, went further than anyone else in proclaiming that the perfectly just society was possible. The paradox this time was that the perfect society could theoretically be made up entirely of "devils," albeit "intelligent" ones.[14]

It took nothing less than the horrifying prospect of a nuclear holocaust to cast doubts on the wisdom of the modern approach and to reawaken our interest in the discarded alternative to it. One can be grateful to the U.S. bishops for their unique effort to remoralize the issue of warfare and rethink it in terms of the situation created by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The novelty of their letter, however, is not so much that it revives and updates the old just-war theory as that it seeks to combine it with its opposite. This much is evident from the enormous stress that the letter places on matters of legality and strategy. It comes as something of a surprise that in the final analysis so little should be said about peace in a document published under the heading, "The Challenge of Peace." To be sure, the letter contains a long section on peace, but that section is itself devoted mainly to problems of arms negotiation, arms control, arms reduction, the establishment of a national peace academy, "reverence" for the United Nations, the improvement of relations between the superpowers, the positioning of missiles, and a host of other similarly mundane, procedural, or technical matters. One searches in vain for a genuine discussion of peace, based on a profound analysis of the human soul, such as the one that accompanies Augustine's treatment of the just war. In defense of their position, the bishops have argued that the old just-war theory, with its one-sided emphasis on morality, is in-

[14] Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," first supplement, trans. L. W. Beck, in *On History* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), p. 112.

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adequate to the needs of the age and that it must be supplemented by considerations of a more political nature. If so, one might be inclined to think that, in its own way, their letter does as much to hallow the divorce between ethics and politics as it does to overcome it. The bishops clearly want the best of both worlds. It remains to be seen whether these two originally antithetical worlds are suited to each other or how well they can get along together.

THE BISHOPS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

by KEITH B. PAYNE

Any formulation of nuclear doctrine and strategy necessarily entails a consideration of the issue of morality. Nevertheless, many professionals in the fields of nuclear strategy and arms control have tended to consider moral questions side-issues and the domain of a handful of specialists.[1] This situation, however, will change now that the National Conference of Catholic Bishops has entered the U.S. strategic debate with its pastoral letter, "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response."[2] The letter is long and at times makes use of intentional ambiguity; but its rejection of the traditional U.S. approach to nuclear policy and deterrence is clear. This approach is predicated upon threatening nuclear retaliation to a Soviet attack against the United States or its allies. Following the lead of Pope John Paul II, the bishops indicate that nuclear deterrence is morally acceptable only under certain specific conditions. Those conditions, as presented in the letter, are, unfortunately, inconsistent with U.S. deterrence policy.[3] The bishops, for example, have clearly rejected nuclear first use, an option maintained by the United States and NATO to deter Soviet nuclear or nonnuclear attack against NATO Europe.

Unfortunately, the bishops' pastoral letter reflects a particular set of assumptions that are associated with the antinuclear movement and that are certainly not beyond dispute: (1) In the nuclear age defense is impossible; the offense will always get through. (2) A limited nuclear war is virtually impossible; once nuclear weapons are employed, esca-

[1] See, for example, William V. O'Brien, *The Conduct of Just and Limited War* (New York: Praeger, 1981), and "The Churches and The Bomb: After Nineteen Years, Let Us Begin," *Worldview*, December 1964, pp. 11-13.

[2] See National Conference of Catholic Bishops, "The Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, the Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," *Origins*, May 19, 1983. (Hereafter, NCCB, *1983 Pastoral Letter.*)

[3] On June 12, 1982, Pope John Paul II addressed the UN Special Session on Disarmament, stating: "In current conditions 'deterrence' based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable." Quoted in L. Bruce van Voorst, "The Churches and Nuclear Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs*; Spring 1983, p. 836.

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lation to unlimited nuclear destruction will be rapid. (3) So-called war-fighting strategic capabilities (e.g., counterforce capabilities) are destabilizing — that is, they increase the probability of war.

These are not moral judgments, nor are they subject to moral analysis — they are technical and political considerations. Unfortunately, the pastoral letter appears to have been informed by one particular politico-technical view of these issues; and the validity of the bishops' moral conclusions are, ultimately, dependent upon the validity of these preliminary, amoral assumptions.

Given the bishops' assumptions that defense is impossible and escalation virtually inevitable, for example, it is easy to conclude that the use of nuclear weapons cannot be in accord with just-war doctrine. St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas developed the doctrine of just war to govern why and when recourse to war is permissible (*jus ad bellum*), and also to govern how war is to be conducted (*jus ad bello*). Under just-war doctrine, recourse to war is legitimate only under certain conditions. War is viewed as an unfortunate but sometimes necessary means to restrain evil and protect the innocent.

The pastoral letter argues that nuclear use (inevitably escalating to unlimited nuclear war) could virtually never be compatible with just-war criteria for resorting to or waging war. These criteria are discrimination, proportionality, and probability of success.

The principle of discrimination directly prohibits intentional attacks on noncombatants and nonmilitary targets. The pastoral letter emphasizes that the destructive potential of nuclear weapons has brought about a unique challenge to the principle of discrimination. It argues that nuclear weapons and strategies for their use are inherently indiscriminate. Even "limited" strikes against military targets would inflict casualty levels that "would be almost indistinguishable from what might occur if civilian centers had been deliberately and directly struck."[4] The problem is not one of intention or strategy, but nuclear weapons' technology and geography: "This problem is unavoidable because of the way modern military facilities and production centers are so thoroughly interspersed with civilian living and working areas."[5] The U.S. policy of avoiding intentionally targeting civilian centers and noncombatants does not satisfy the principle of discrimination, according to the letter, because even the use of highly accurate, "discriminating" nuclear weapons would entail the grave threat of escalation, which could result in massive civilian casualties.

The principle of proportionality applies to both the decision to engage in warfare and the waging of war. As is the case with the

[4] NCCB, *1983 Pastoral Letter*, p. 18.
[5] Ibid.

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principle of discrimination, the bishops maintain that the destructive potential of nuclear weapons has rendered proportionality of special significance. This is said to be the case because "today, it becomes increasingly difficult to make a decision to use any kind of armed force, however limited initially in intention and in the destructive power of the weapons employed, without facing at least the possibility of escalation to broader, or even total, war and to the use of weapons of horrendous destructive potential."[6]

In regard to *jus ad bellum*, an assessment must be made that the evil to be committed (in terms of the prospective damage inflicted and costs incurred by war) is proportional to the good to be realized by taking up arms. Proportionality is a requirement even in the decision for self-defense: "The response to aggression must not exceed the nature of the aggression."[7] The letter concludes that the possibility of unlimited escalation that could result from recourse to nuclear war renders it disproportional to the good to be achieved.

In regard to *jus ad bello*, the principle of proportionality must be applied to waging war. The military means employed must be proportional to the military objectives to be served. This principle prohibits destructive actions not justified by military necessity, and it obviously entails judgment and interpretation. The bishops emphasize, however, that even a primarily "counterforce" nuclear strike with obvious countermilitary intentions would not satisfy the principle of proportionality: "The location of industrial or militarily significant economic targets within heavily populated areas or in those areas affected by radioactive fallout could well involve such massive civilian casualties that in our judgment such a strike would be deemed morally disproportionate, even though not intentionally indiscriminate."[8]

Finally, the principle of probability of success must also be considered in a decision to resort to war. This principle is intended to guard against an irrational resort to arms when the outcome would be disproportionate or futile. The bishops believe that nuclear use would affront this principle, given the possibility of escalation, the difficulties of limiting nuclear war, and the massive civilian destruction that would be likely to result from any nuclear exchange. As the letter observes: "One of the criteria of the just war tradition is a reasonable hope of success in bringing about justice and peace. We must ask whether such a reasonable hope can exist once nuclear weapons have been exchanged. The burden

[6] Ibid., p. 11.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., p. 18.

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of proof remains on those who assert that meaningful limitation is possible."[9]

In short, the bishops conclude that the use of nuclear weapons — particularly because of their destructive potential and the possibility for escalation following even a limited use of nuclear weapons — is inconsistent with just-war principles and doctrine.

Given their view concerning the immorality of the operational use of nuclear weapons, the bishops faced a dilemma. Deterrence appears to be the only method currently available for maintaining peace in a nuclear-armed world, and Pope John Paul II has declared deterrence to be acceptable (if accompanied by the pursuit of disarmament). Yet nuclear deterrence clearly is the intended effect of a threat to *employ* nuclear weapons. The dilemma for the bishops was how a state could threaten an immoral action (i.e., employing nuclear weapons) for the morally pristine purpose of ensuring deterrence. As the bishops noted: "The political paradox of deterrence has also strained our moral conception. May a nation threaten what it may never do? May it possess what it may never use?"[10]

If the bishops placed themselves in opposition to deterrence because it is predicated upon the threat of a morally unacceptable action, they would, in effect, be rejecting the one strong foundation for avoiding war. The effect of their stand would be to increase the probability that what they oppose, nuclear war, would occur. The difficult task confronting the bishops was to determine how to maintain the stabilizing effect of nuclear deterrence without acknowledging the acceptability of a threat to employ nuclear weapons.

The solution to this dilemma involved accepting the possession of nuclear weapons but rejecting plans for using them. The pastoral letter explicitly rejects targeting civilian centers — consistent with the just-war requirement of discrimination. It also rejects targeting military assets — consistent with the bishops' acceptance of the judgment of the antinuclear movement that such a "counterforce" orientation is destabilizing, and prone to escalation beyond appreciable limitation. In short, targeting either military or civilian assets for deterrence purposes is declared off limits by the bishops. Indeed, the pastoral letter is silent concerning what type of nuclear threat would be permissible in support of deterrence. Unfortunately, the bishops found it too "awkward" to address that question.[11] Given the adamant language against nuclear use, however, the implication of the letter is that all types of nuclear use are eshewed. As the letter

[9] Ibid., p. 16.
[10] Ibid., p. 14.
[11] See van Voorst, "The Churches and Nuclear Deterrence," pp. 827-52.

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states: "Our no to nuclear war must in the end be definitive and decisive . . . [and] there must be no misunderstanding of our profound skepticism about the moral acceptability of any use of nuclear weapons. It is obvious that the use of any weapons which violate the principle of discrimination merits unequivocal condemnation."[12]

The non-use of nuclear weapons is the bishops' solution to the deterrence dilemma. The deterrent effect of the possession of nuclear weapons is expected to sustain stability. Yet there would be no explicit threat to use, and indeed no plan to use, the weapons in support of deterrence. The Soviets' uncertainty about whether these weapons would be employed would, it is hoped, have a deterrent effect; yet the United States would not employ these weapons under any circumstances. Thus, according to the bishops, deterrence should stem from the Soviet leadership's uncertainty about the possibility of U.S. nuclear use rather than an immoral threat explicitly made by the United States. The solution to the deterrence dilemma suggested by the pastoral letter, then, is deterrence through a grand bluff.

The letter, again following the lead of Pope John Paul II, admonishes that the possession of nuclear weapons, and hence even deterrence by bluff, is acceptable only as an interim step toward arms control, disarmament, and an overarching international authority. The bishops endorse deep reductions in nuclear weapons; and as a first step toward disarmament, endorse a freeze ("halt") in the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons.

Based upon their interpretation of just-war criteria, the bishops are in opposition to the U.S. policy of an explicit nuclear first-use threat, planning for nuclear retaliation in the event of a Soviet first strike, planning for the limited use of nuclear weapons, counterforce targeting, attempting to "prevail" in a nuclear war should it occur, and modernizing nuclear forces (e.g., MX, Trident, B-1B, Pershing II, and GLCMs). In general, the bishops oppose the traditional U.S. position of providing an explicit nuclear threat in support of its deterrent policy.

However, the bishops are not in opposition to all aspects of U.S. policy. They do, by implication, endorse the Reagan administration's efforts to achieve deep force-level reductions in START; and the just-war doctrine's requirement for discrimination is in line with the U.S. policy of not intentionally targeting civilian population centers. Nevertheless, the bishops' concept of deterrence by bluff (as an interim step toward disarmament and a new international order) is in direct contrast with U.S.

[12] NCCB, *1983 Pastoral Letter*, pp. 14, 19.

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and Soviet policies and supporting those policies with credible preparations for employing nuclear weapons.

This solution to the deterrence dilemma reflects shortsighted escapism and, if actually implemented, would both increase the probability of a nuclear war and ensure the maximal level of destruction should that war occur. The "morally" acceptable approach to deterrence suggested in the pastoral letter, if adopted by the United States, would make more likely the most immoral of outcomes, a nuclear holocaust in which there would be no possibility for defense, discrimination, proportionality, or Western success (by any definition).

The effectiveness of deterrence to maintain stability is not simply a function of the capability to pose a threat, but the opponent's perception of the credibility of that threat. The effect of the pastoral letter, if endorsed officially, would be to destroy the credibility of the U.S. deterrent.

The bishops endorse the stabilizing effects of nuclear deterrence, but their admonitions would only eviscerate the threat upon which deterrence is predicated. If the United States indicated an absolute refusal to employ nuclear weapons, even in retaliation, the Soviets would see little risk in pursuing highly provocative behavior. In the context of an acute U.S.-Soviet crisis, wherein the Soviet leadership would confront questions of direct military confrontation and nuclear use, what deterrent to Soviet aggression would be available to the United States if it had virtually disavowed the employment of nuclear weapons? A definitive answer to this question cannot be offered. What is clear, however, is that the United States must provide the strongest deterrent barrier to war feasible, and effectively withdrawing the threat upon which that deterrent is based would only undermine that objective. If the Soviet leadership can be relatively certain that the United States will not employ nuclear weapons in response to aggression against itself or its allies, the ultimate mainstay of the U.S. deterrent against war would be severely weakened. In short, the bishops' recommendations would serve only to increase the probability of nuclear war by degrading deterrence stability.

The bishops repeatedly observe that the barrier to nuclear war must be strengthened; one theme of the pastoral letter is that we must "say no to nuclear war . . . we must reject nuclear war."[13] That desire is not unique to the bishops; it is shared by nuclear strategists and defense professionals of all stripes. The question is not whether nuclear war should be opposed or supported — no reasonable person advocates nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The real question is how best to establish an

[13] Ibid., p. 14.

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effective barrier to nuclear war. Despite the fine intentions and the sincerity of the bishops, their recommendations would only weaken that barrier. Ironically, in their search for a morally acceptable approach to deterrence, the bishops would increase the probability of war.

Is there a more acceptable solution to the moral quandary of deterrence — a readiness to commit an evil in the hope of preventing an even greater evil? One potential solution to this deterrence paradox exists that is superior to the deterrence by bluff suggested in the pastoral letter — an approach to deterrence that could both accommodate the principles of just war and also maintain an effective deterrent. Choosing between those two objectives clearly must be avoided if any feasible alternative exists. Unfortunately, the politico-technical assumptions regarding nuclear war (noted above) on which the bishops' subsequent moral assessment was based excluded the possibility that their analysis could have moved in a more fruitful direction. Had the bishops accepted as a politico-technical assumption the existence of a great potential for limiting damage in nuclear war through strategic defensive forces, for example, their subsequent analysis could have been strikingly different.

Offensive targeting discrimination, combined with a commitment to damage limitation, would go beyond the theory of deterrence expressed in the pastoral letter. Redirecting the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship toward serious preparations for strategic defense could establish the conditions necessary for an approach to deterrence that would be both effective and, arguably, compatible with the principles of discrimination, proportionality, and probability of success. In addition, in contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union gives considerable attention to strategic defense. Consequently, unlike the pastoral letter's recommendations, the approach I am suggesting has some relevance to what might be endorsed by the Soviet Union.

Effective strategic defenses and discriminating offensive targeting could satisfy the bishops' primary objection to an explicit and planned nuclear threat as immoral on the ground that even the limited and discriminating use of nuclear weapons could escalate to a total conflagration that would exclude the possibility for discrimination, proportionality, or success. A commitment to targeting discrimination and a much more defensively oriented strategic relationship could give operational reality to the current U.S. policy of avoiding the intentional destruction of noncombatants and civilian centers. It would also provide the basis for complying with the principle of proportionality in both *jus ad bellum* and *jus ad bello*. Regarding the "probability of success" principle: a defensive-countermilitary approach to strategic planning would provide a much greater chance for the successful functioning of deterrence

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than would the approach envisaged in the pastoral letter. In the event that deterrence fails — a possibility the bishops do not address in their suggested approach to deterrence — a defensive-countermilitary orientation would at least hold out the possibility of successfully saving scores of millions of lives and preserving U.S. allies. This, of course, would be a limited success, but it certainly would constitute a worthy, morally pristine objective. In contrast, the deterrence by bluff formula of the pastoral letter presents no option other than an indiscriminate, disproportional holocaust in the event that deterrence fails. Indeed, the bishops' recommendations, and particularly their endorsement of a comprehensive freeze, argue against a commitment to strategic defense and discriminating countermilitary capabilities.[14]

Finally, a defensive-countermilitary approach to deterrence can be viewed as part of a medium- to long-term solution to the problem of living in a nuclear-armed world. The bishops suggest that deterrence by bluff is an interim measure to be employed only until the goal of nuclear disarmament and a reordering of international authority can be realized. If deterrence by bluff is to provide for Western security until those goals are realized, such a deterrent structure must be sufficiently sturdy to stand for decades, if not longer. The probability that either nuclear disarmament or the establishment of a centralized international authority will occur within the foreseeable future is so low as to be irrelevant. Anyone can suggest less dangerous and more peaceful world orders, and we all appreciate the vision; unfortunately, as has been repeatedly demonstrated, the problem is not imagining better worlds, but getting from here to there.[15]

In summary, the bishops suggest that the United States abandon its now-traditional approach to deterrence and rely upon a deterrent that is highly questionable, until a new world order, which is unlikely ever to be achieved, is achieved. Fortunately, such a course of action is not the only potential means for establishing a morally acceptable deterrent. A defensive-countermilitary approach to strategic planning should provide a more effective deterrent and accommodate the principles of just war. Such a "defensive" solution to the moral dilemma of deterrence could not, of course, be achieved immediately — a defensive transition would take years to achieve. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly more feasible and closer to realization than the disarmament and new-world-order solutions the bishops suggest. Unfortunately, it appears that the bishops'

[14] Ibid., pp. 16, 18.

[15] See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

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preliminary assumptions and perhaps predispositions did not permit them to explore such a solution to the moral question of deterrence.

THE EUROPEAN CHURCH AND ARMS CONTROL

by MANFRED R. HAMM

Over the past several years, the national hierarchies of the Catholic Churches on both sides of the Atlantic have tackled the explosive issue of whether nuclear deterrence and doctrines developed in its support can be defended on moral grounds. But the origins of the debate differ greatly in the United States and Western Europe. The common goal of all Church establishments, however, has been to limit the damage that the controversy over the morality of deterrence and war might inflict on the unity of their churches. While the precise outcome of the debate is still uncertain, there are indications that a new consensus is emerging that contradicts earlier church pronouncements and brings the Roman Catholic Churches into serious conflict with the defense policies of their respective governments.[1]

In the United States, Church leaders confronted nuclear heresy on the part of a growing number of their peers. A small but vocal group of "peace bishops" was becoming increasingly active in support of the freeze movement, which posed a serious challenge to the defense policies of the Reagan administration. These bishops rendered moral judgments on nuclear deterrence that deviated substantially from the Church's pronouncements at Vatican II, which had essentially not committed itself on the issue of whether nuclear war is morally justifiable. Some repudiated specific weapons programs, such as the MX missile deployment, while other, more radical colleagues called upon Catholic workers in the defense industry to refuse work on nuclear weapons projects.[2] Thus, when the National Conference of Catholic Bishops established a six-member commission headed by Archbishop Joseph L. Bernadin of Chicago to draft a pastoral letter on war and peace, it did so in an attempt to restore a consensus and to rein in dissident bishops.

By contrast, European Catholic bishops reacted to mounting pressures from their flock that had been engendered by the peace move-

[1] For contrasting views, see William V. O'Brien, "The Peace Debate and the Catholic Bishops," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1982, pp. 219-22; Monika K. Hellwig, John Langan, S.J., James V. Schall, S.J., and Francis Winters, S.J., with a response by William V. O'Brien, "American Catholics and the Peace Debate," *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1982, pp. 120-42; Francis X. Winters, S.J., "Did the Bishops Ban the Bomb? Yes and No," *America*, September 1983, pp. 104-8.

[2] See the interview with the archbishop of Seattle, Raymond Gerhardt Hunthausen, in *Der Spiegel*, April 16, 1982, pp. 173-83, entitled "Atomrüstungschreckliches übel."

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ment. NATO's 1979 decision to modernize its arsenal of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) furnished the catalyst that ignited the lingering *Angst* about war and nuclear weapons in the hearts of many Europeans. Remarks by officials in the Reagan administration, including the president himself, on how to fight a limited nuclear war seemed to confirm the worst fears of those who had viewed Presidential Directive (PD) 59, issued during the Carter years, with great suspicion as a new doctrine intended for nuclear warfighting limited to the European continent. In the past, Europeans had always skirted the awesome questions of whether and how to actually use nuclear weapons once war had erupted and conventional defenses were faltering. By raising these questions in the midst of rapidly deteriorating East-West relations after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and repression in Poland, the Reagan administration fueled general public anxiety about the imminence of war even further.

In view of the growing momentum of the antinuclear movement in their countries, the Catholic bishops in Europe could no longer remain silent on moral issues related to nuclear deterrence and warfighting. But their willingness to join the debate and to take issue with the basic tenets of flexible response, NATO defense planning, and INF deployment varied greatly, depending on the strength of the peace movement in their respective countries. Yet it also reflected their general attitude toward passing moral judgment on political issues as well as their self-ascribed role in society.

Thus, it is not surprising that the French and Italian Catholic bishops remained relatively aloof.[3] Since they had virtually no peace movement to cope with, the Italian bishops did not initiate an internal debate of their own. Their restraint also conformed to the historical pattern of deferring to the papacy on questions of doctrine that is in sharp contrast to the behavior of the Dutch Catholic Church. Only two Italian bishops spoke out against the proposed stationing of 112 cruise missiles at Comiso in Sicily. One was Bishop Dante Bernini, the president of the Italian bishops' conference; the other was Bishop Luigi Bettazzi, the international president of the Pax Christi movement, which has been at the forefront of Catholic involvement in the peace movement in the United States and many European countries. Its former chaplain in Britain, Monsignor Bruce Kent, for instance, is now the general secretary of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), a radical movement advocating unilateral nuclear disarmament in Britain.[4]

[3] "The Pain of Being Christian in a Nuclear World," *The Economist*, February 5, 1983, pp. 19-22.

[4] Ibid., p. 21.

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In France, a country nominally outside NATO's military structure that has its own independent nuclear deterrent, the *force de frappe*, and that will receive no INFs, the peace movement, with its strong left-wing component, has been contained by the openly pronuclear policies of socialist President François Mitterrand and a strong public consensus on nuclear weapons. The French bishops are preparing a document on the nuclear arms race which, however, will be significantly different from that of the U.S. and European churches, according to the Reverend Gerard Defois, who is overseeing the preparation of the French episcopate's letter.[5] French bishops are not expected "directly to condemn and judge from the exterior" the policies of political and military leaders. This is in line with statements by Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger, the archbishop of Paris, who observed that the French bishops do not treat the nuclear weapons issue "independent from the condition of the national consciousness," and who considered "the problem of armaments a typical problem of collective morality, . . . of the moral conscience of the Frenchmen."[6] The French pastoral letter is likely to come closer to the draft statement of the West German bishops, which said that "nuclear deterrence is not a reliable instrument for preventing war in the long run," but also defended "the choice of the whole range of arms" to prevent nuclear war. Father Defois termed deterrence "but provisional security" in an interview with the newspaper *Le Monde* and acknowledged that real security can only be achieved by harmonizing existing political conflict.[7] The French bishops' reluctance to become involved in the controversy over nuclear strategy is evident in Cardinal Lustiger's statement that the critique of the U.S. bishops is predicated on a strategic theory on which even specialists disagree.[8] Thus, unlike their U.S. counterparts, French clergymen are not arrogating the right to pass moral judgment on specifics of nuclear strategy. Consistent with their role in French society, the bishops are also expected to back the government's nuclear policies or, at least, to eschew a pronouncement on the nuclear arms build-up.

West German and Dutch bishops have not had the luxury of relative calm in their countries. Having originated in the Netherlands, the antinuclear movement has been strongest in northern Europe and the United Kingdom. In these countries, the bishops encountered a dual threat to the moral authority of their churches: irrelevance and loss of control. The Dutch bishops opted for the U.S. solution and supported the anti-

[5] E. J. Dionne, Jr., "French Bishops to Back Nuclear Deterrence Policy," *New York Times*, July 9, 1983.

[6] Interview with Jean Marie Kardinal Lustiger, "Der Klassenkampf führt zum Gulag und zu Pot Pol," *Der Spiegel*, January 31, 1983. My translation.

[7] E. J. Dionne, Jr., "French Bishops to Back Nuclear Deterrence Policy."

[8] Interview with Jean Marie Kardinal Lustiger, p. 117.

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nuclear movement. The German episcopate tried to cling to traditional doctrine but ultimately issued a pastoral letter in April 1983 that substantially reverses earlier promulgations and represents a sudden departure from the former conservatism of the Catholic Church in West Germany.

The threats of irrelevance and loss of control were mutually reinforcing. First, to continue to stay aloof from the debate on the role of nuclear weapons would have meant relinquishing to the Protestant churches exclusive moral authority on questions of war and peace. Most synods of the Lutheran and Calvinist churches of northern Europe had issued statements that bestowed theological blessing on the antinuclear movement, and Protestant clergymen are often leading activists in the peace movement. In Germany, for instance, regional church groups composed of clergy and laity issued appeals against INF deployment with a distinct unilateralist flavor,[9] such as "Christians for Disarmament" (1976), the "Appeal to Evangelical Christians" (1980), and the "Peace Manifesto 1982" authored by six prominent Protestant pastors and leading figures in the West German peace movement. It called for a recision of NATO's 1979 dual-track decision on INF deployment, complete worldwide disarmament starting in Central Europe, and alternative security strategies that did not rely on nuclear weapons. In August 1982, the leaders of West Germany's Reformed (Calvinist) Church, representing some 2.5 million of the country's Protestants, raised an individual's position on nuclear weapons to the level of *status confessionis*, making it the litmus test for whether one is upholding or betraying Christ's gospel. This position was subsequently endorsed by the World Alliance of Reformed Churches.[10]

Second, there was a growing realization among Catholic bishops, particularly in West Germany, that continued silence on the nuclear issue might well be counterproductive in that it was eroding the episcopate's control over both laity and clergy. Repeated attempts to discipline certain antinuclear clergymen had failed to stem their active support of the antinuclear movement and, in some instances, had backfired.[11] Furthermore, a growing number of Catholics were marching in antinuclear demonstrations, publicly repudiating official Church positions on the nuclear issue. In West Germany, Catholic organizations began to stake out positions of their own and they set out openly to defy their church leaders.

[9] For a discussion of these appeals see: Günther Schmid, *Sicherheitspolitik und Friedensbewegung, der Konflikt um die Nachruestung* (München; Olzog Verlag, 1982).

[10] "The Pain of Being a Christian in a Nuclear World," p. 20.

[11] Joseph Kardinal Ratzinger reprimanded, among others, a Jesuit, Father Bischlager, for celebrating a peace mass in a square in Munich without proper permission and in violation of Church rules. He demurred and was then prohibited from celebrating mass in public. He subsequently lost his professorship in moral philosophy and then resigned from the order. Similar cases abound. *Der Spiegel*, January 11, 1982.

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The greatest threat came from the so-called Initiative for a Church from Below, comprised of forty-three critical groups within the Catholic Church, which arranged an alternative program paralleling the events at the Eighty-seventh Day of German Catholics in September 1982 to which the episcopate had invited former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in a desperate attempt to attenuate the surge of antinuclear sentiment among the rank and file. The bishops even went so far as to deny U.S. Bishop Leroy Matthiesen, an ardent opponent of nuclear weapons, the opportunity of addressing the gathering.[12]

The incidents surrounding the Eighty-seventh Day of German Catholics culminated in a mass rally on September 4, 1982, under the motto "Turn Around — Disarm" (the German word *entrüsten* can also mean to become outraged). It featured a number of well-known dissident theologians and left-wing Catholic peace activists as well as the Nicaraguan minister for cultural affairs, Father Ernesto Cardenal, and was attended by some 50,000 demonstrators, many of them professional activists. This was the first time grassroots discontent had been expressed so vehemently and visibly. It graphically underscored the extent to which Church leaders had lost touch with the concerns and sentiments of a significant segment of their flock. Before this massive outpouring of discontent, expressions of dissent had been sporadic and were largely confined to the three branches of the Federation of German Catholic Youth (BDKJ), which had gradually turned from a reliable bastion of the Church establishment into a group of skeptical critics.[13] This demonstration of disobedience certainly left an indelible mark and spurred efforts by the episcopate to regain the initiative in the nuclear debate.

In Holland, the Church has been notorious for disregarding directives from the Vatican and, as a consequence, it was not surprising that the Dutch Catholic Church spurned Pope John Paul II's admonition not to get involved in politics.[14] For years, the Dutch Catholic Church had been a member of the Inter-Church Peace Council (IKV) that spearheaded the antinuclear movement in the Netherlands. It galvanized latent pacifism and neutralism into a potent force in Dutch politics and succeeded in stalling the government's review of the NATO deployment decision. The Dutch section of Pax Christi, with a membership of 20,000, had long been at the forefront of the antinuclear movement within the Dutch Catholic Church. In 1980, it issued a brochure, "The Roman Catholic Church, Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament," in which it urged

[12] "In Eigenregie," *Der Spiegel*, July 26, 1982.

[13] "Hänschen Piep," *Der Spiegel*, November 9, 1981.

[14] Recall the rows over abortion, annulment of marriages, contraception, and ecumenical cooperation. The Dutch Church has a remarkable record of insubordination to the Vatican and the rulings of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.

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the Dutch bishops to take an antinuclear stance and become politically relevant in their pastoral work. In April 1981, after the IKV had issued the slogan "Help rid the world of nuclear arms; let it begin in Holland," Pax Christi requested the Conference of Dutch Catholic Bishops to adopt the slogan and to condemn stationing INF in the Netherlands, while simultaneously endorsing unilateral disarmament. The Dutch bishops have refrained thus far from publishing their own pastoral letter but work is reportedly under way.[15] They apparently had few problems with the draft version of the U.S. letter on which they were asked to comment. Given their past tendency to mingle religion and politics, one might expect the bishops to follow the lead of their U.S. counterparts. Significantly, however, there now seems to be some backlash in the Dutch Catholic Church against the uncompromisingly antinuclear agenda of the IKV in which it participates. The IKV had founded some 400 local Church organizations dedicated to antinuclear lobbying and organizing demonstrations. In the process, its original pastoral mission has been lost. Recently, some bishops in the Dutch Catholic Church have voiced their dismay about the increasingly political character of the IKV and its advocacy of unilateral disarmament. The newly appointed auxiliary bishop of Rotterdam, Ronald Bär, has accused Pax Christi of violating the pope's recommendation to maintain a strict separation of faith and politics and stated that the Church is not a peace movement.[16] Whether this viewpoint will prevail in the deliberations on a pastoral letter is uncertain.

While church attendance is down considerably from what it was twenty years ago, and many nominal Catholics do not follow the Church's positions on such questions as abortion and divorce, the Church's pronouncements still carry enormous weight in societies where members are imbued with Christian ethics. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Church to uphold the values of this tradition and to resist the temptation of trying to win the support of those in Western societies whose materialism and purely materialist notion of survival has driven them out of the pews and to embrace pacifism and unilateral disarmament. Over the years, some church organizations like the World Council of Churches have succumbed to this temptation, embracing the overriding importance of sheer physical survival embodied in such statements as "better Red than dead." It promulgated the moral duty of a Christian to accept a ceasefire on the enemy's terms and to resort to nonviolent forms of resistance instead of employing nuclear weapons in his self-defense.

But the Catholic Church is not a member of the World Council of Churches, and it has consistently stressed that peace without justice

[15] "Neutralism in Europe, The Dutch Qualm Disease," *The Economist*, June 5, 1982, pp. 43-45.
[16] "The Pain of Being a Christian in a Nuclear World," p. 21.

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is not true peace; that tactical pacifism erodes the sense of justice, duty, and sacrifice; and that as long as justice is being denied by totalitarian ideologies, it is the right and duty of peoples to defend their physical survival and freedom with proportional means. Thus, until less than a decade ago, when the debate on morality and nuclear deterrence was rekindled, there was a consensus on how to preserve peace in an imperfect world marked by a profound conflict between Christian values and democratic ideals on the one hand and their antithesis, Soviet totalitarianism, on the other. The Catholic Church considered nuclear deterrence morally tolerable if based on a balance of forces and if accompanied by sincere endeavors to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons.[17]

Church leaders also acknowledged that nuclear weapons were not the sources of international tensions and conflict but merely the expression of a deep ethical crisis. By acknowledging the right to self-defense, Church leaders had also indicated their rejection of the contention that nuclear weapons had rendered morally justifiable self-defense meaningless. And, by recognizing that deterrence must be based on a balance of forces, the Church repudiated claims that the only morally acceptable behavior in the nuclear age was unilateral disarmament. On the contrary, the Church accepted possession of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence as temporary expedients for avoiding war, though not as ends in themselves. Consistent with this position, the Church called for mutual and verifiable arms control agreements.

Roman Catholic theorists in the just-war tradition have evaluated the impact of nuclear weapons of mass destruction on the criteria for *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*.[18] They found nuclear weapons compatible with the conditions for a morally justifiable war, particularly in terms of the principles of proportionality, discrimination, and probability of success. First use of nuclear weapons and concepts such as graduated nuclear escalation were also deemed acceptable within the framework of the just-war doctrine. The Church per se was largely silent on questions relating to the use of nuclear weapons and the specifics of nuclear strategy. There is only one notable exception. In *Gaudium et Spes, Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World*, issued at Vatican II, the Church explicitly condemned a countervalue nuclear warfare strategy and, implicitly, nuclear deterrence based on this strategy when it stated that "any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against

[17] John Paul II, address to the Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly, June 11, 1982.

[18] William V. O'Brien, *The Conduct of Just and Limited War* (New York: Praeger, 1982), esp. chap. 6, "Critical Issues of Just War: Nuclear Deterrence and War and Conventional War," pp. 127-53.

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God and man himself."[19] But the Church did not seek to extend its moral authority to technical questions falling under the purview of military planners and devoid of moral content.

The recently issued pastoral letter of the U.S. bishops deviates significantly from this earlier position. Instead, it is predicated on a number of political and technical assumptions concerning nuclear war and strategy.[20] Most important, however, by stating that a deterrence posture predicated on the explicit threat of a nuclear response to aggression is immoral, the bishops undercut the credibility of deterrence, which is based not only on the possession but also the intent to use nuclear weapons. Instead of cutting the Gordian knot of the supposed moral dilemma posed by nuclear weapons, they risk bringing about the very tragedy they seek to avert so assiduously — nuclear war. By calling for a nuclear freeze, the removal of theater- and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and a no-first-use posture, they recommend a defense policy that ensures strategic destabilization and undermines the United States' ability to meet its collective defense commitments. Finally, by rejecting strategic defense, they deprive U.S. strategic planners of the only viable approach to a damage-limitation strategy that may reduce the horrors of nuclear war, strengthen deterrence, and resolve the moral dilemma associated with exclusive reliance on offensive nuclear systems for deterrence.

When the direction of the U.S. bishops' thinking became apparent with the release of the draft of the pastoral letter, the Reagan administration immediately tried to contain its potential damage to U.S. defense policy. Judge Clark and Secretary Weinberger rushed letters to Archbishop Bernadin explaining the moral foundations of their defense policy, and Secretary Shultz, when traveling in Europe, called on the Holy See seeking papal intervention. The Vatican did not act swiftly. Only when a clash between religion and state in the United States appeared inevitable, in the early weeks of January 1983, did the Vatican convene an impromptu meeting between ten representatives of the Holy See and twenty church delegates from the United States and Belgium, Holland, Britain, France, and the Federal Republic. The summit opened on January 18 in the magnificent synod hall at the San Damaso gate under the chairmanship of Cardinal Casaroli, the pope's secretary of state, and in the presence of the conservative German Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith.

[19] *Gaudium et Spes, Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World,* Documents of the Second Vatican Council. no. 78.

[20] National Conference of Catholic Bishops, "The Pastoral Letter on War and Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," *Origins,* May 19, 1983. Excerpts from the letter were published in *New York Times,* May 5, 1983.

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The pope told Cardinal Bernadin in an audience before the official opening of the conference that he himself had always maintained that deterrence with nuclear weapons is acceptable only if it serves to avert war, a statement that is quite at variance with the central thesis of the U.S. bishops — that the threat inherent in nuclear deterrence is immoral per se. In other words, the pope told the American that the Church would not give up its traditional just-war doctrine. The Holy Father also denounced civil disobedience (such as partial withholding of income taxes on grounds that they are used to finance the defense budget, which is practiced by the Archbishop of Seattle, Raymond G. Hunthausen) as an appropriate way to promote arms control and disarmament.[21]

But this last-ditch effort by the Vatican to impose discipline on the U.S. episcopate met with only partial success. In fact, Archbishop Bernadin had announced before the conference that the meeting would not substantially influence the staunchly antinuclear position of the U.S. bishops. They did not budge from their fundamental assumption that even the intent to use nuclear weapons without actually implementing their use is immoral. Yet they conceded, in response to pressures from their European counterparts, that continued possession of nuclear weapons may be acceptable under certain conditions, the most important being that no steps be taken to plan for or initiate their operational use. Nevertheless, this represents a radical departure from the just-war doctrine that had provided the theoretical and theological framework used to accommodate nuclear weapons in the past.

Failure to force U.S. bishops to retract their nuclear heresy has since challenged European bishops in their own attempts to draft pastoral letters in that the U.S. bishops' position has become the gospel of the peace movement in their own countries. While pastoral letters are not binding pronouncements of the national churches and often take somewhat different positions so as to take into account cultural and political differences, nevertheless the European bishops were compelled to approximate as much as possible the high antinuclear standard set by their U.S. brethren. Perhaps the most striking example of the way the European bishops were dragged along is provided by the German bishops, who, within a period of a few months, managed to make a virtual about-face and went even further in their pastoral letter of April 1983.

While the German bishops had contemplated issuing pastoral guidance to their flock on the question of nuclear weapons for some time, as late as last fall this guidance would have amounted to no more than a biblical-theological pronouncement on war and peace without refer-

[21] "Gerechter Krieg," *Der Spiegel*, January 24, 1983.

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ences to the specific concerns of the peace movement. Only then, and undoubtedly in view of the direction of the debate in the United States, did the German bishops resolve to appoint a committee of three professors of theology[22] to prepare a draft for their consideration in January. This draft went through three revisions. The release of the final version was postponed until April so as to avoid interfering with the general elections in March 1983.

The discussions of the pastoral letter were also influenced by a rare promulgation of the ten Catholic bishops in the GDR condemning any type of war planning, including for conventional war, and expressing doubt about whether there could be a just war, given the destructiveness of modern means of warfare. This statement was the Catholic bishops' response to growing criticism of their silence first voiced in early 1982 by a group of concerned Catholics in Halle. The East German bishops had also denounced the arms race in the East and West, the lack of recognition given to conscientious objectors to military service, and had stated that resort to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in war could not be justified on any grounds.

Even though the German bishops shunned the issue of whether the concept of nuclear deterrence is still suitable for avoiding war or morally legitimate considering the devastation wrought by even a limited use of nuclear weapons, in their pastoral letter the bishops took issue for the first time with the most fundamental concepts and assumptions of West German defense policy. They acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is morally tolerable only to the extent that it is necessary to safeguard security while arms control and disarmament efforts are under way. And, contrary to the U.S. bishops, they do not directly comment on the use of nuclear weapons. But the bishops no longer content themselves with general observations. This time, they not only deliberately stipulate a broad moral mandate but also the specific aspects of defense policy by defining precise criteria by which to judge the moral rectitude of such policy.

First, they postulate that existing or planned weapons systems may neither enhance warfighting capabilities nor render war more likely. With this statement, the bishops clearly indicate a preference for the school of thought that considers nuclear warfighting capabilities destabilizing by making nuclear war more controllable and, by extension of the argument, more likely. They do so without thoroughly evaluating the widely held contention that such capabilities would result in just the

[22] "So gelaufen," *Der Spiegel*, April 25, 1983, pp. 22-25. The professors were Karl Lehmann, Franz Böckle, and Karl Kertelge. The seventy-page document presented by the German bishops is entitled *Gerechtigkeit schafft Frieden* and was released by the archbishop of Cologne, Cardinal Höffner, on April 17, 1983.

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opposite effect. Moreover, they implicitly deny the possibility that such weapons could make nuclear weapons use conform to the principles of just war, which could resolve the moral dilemma of deterrence and weapons use.

Second, the episcopate contends that the types of weapons systems and their deployed number may not exceed what is minimally required for a viable deterrence posture. This statement is meaningless unless read in conjunction with the first principle. Then it comes to read: Deterrence must be maintained at the lowest level of armaments, and the weapons mix must not contain nuclear systems that lend themselves to nuclear warfighting. The bishops do not rule explicitly on INF deployment, and their equivocation is designed to resolve the tremendous tension between the need for deterrence on the one hand and the tenuous moral justification for nuclear weapons use on the other. Not unlike the U.S. bishops, they place great trust in the deterrence effect of the mere possession of nuclear weapons because of the incalculable risk to the aggressor associated with their possession, but they stop short of categorically denying the morality of their use or the threat of using them. Instead, they deal with the problem of nuclear weapons use by posing the rhetorical question: "Are weapons that are to serve the objective of avoiding war usable in a meaningful way if judged by the principle of proportionality?"[23] Having denied the moral permissibility of a deterrent that includes weapons systems with warfighting capabilities, the bishops seem to answer their own question in the negative — that is, in the same way as the U.S. bishops.

Finally, the bishops argue that weapons deployment policy must be compatible with effective and mutual arms control, arms reduction, and disarmament. This principle is compatible with the broader principle that deterrence based on nuclear weapons is only an interim solution. When read together with the preceding two principles, the bishops suggest clearly that certain categories of weapons do not meet this criterion. But they do skirt the critical question of whether INF deployment pursuant to the two-track decision conforms with this general guidance, something the U.S. bishops had flatly denied.

The West German bishops go out of their way to distance themselves from the ideological overtones of many leftist antinuclear activists in the peace movement. They admit that peace is not only threatened by the momentum of the arms race but also by totalitarian regimes that disregard and deny elementary human rights in their sovereign domain. This statement is a pale reflection of a more forceful

[23] My translation is based on excerpts from the pastoral letter reprinted in *Der Spiegel*, April 25, 1983.

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statement issued by the Central Committee of the German Catholics in November 1981, which stressed that "the adversaries in the East-West conflict do not proceed on the same assumptions and do not subscribe to the same ethical and political norms. The degrading nature of life under a totalitarian regime must give rise to the same fundamental concerns as the possible consequences of the escalating arms race."[24] In their pastoral letter, however, the bishops admonish policymakers in the West to take into account "the experiences and anxieties, the interests and values of the other side." The former two seem to allude to Germany's two invasions of the Soviet Union during this century. The latter two signify a clear-cut departure from the earlier stress on totalitarianist ideology and expansionism as contributing just as much to war and international tensions as the arms race. In their appeal for recognition of legitimate interests and values,[25] the bishops unfortunately contribute and bestow merit to the widespread tendency of portraying the East-West conflict as a classical great-power struggle in which ideological differences play a subordinate role or are simply used as a window-dressing for the purpose of legitimizing a certain course of action. Implicitly, they also reject the notion that in addition to defending its security, the West is defending a morally superior socio-economic system, a truly "just" cause.

Regrettably, efforts on both sides of the Atlantic to come to grips with the moral dimensions of strategy in the nuclear age have created more problems than they have actually solved. The Catholic Churches have succumbed to the lure of bolstering their short-term relevance at a critical juncture in the public debate on nuclear weapons by evaluating moral questions in the light of political and technical assumptions regarding nuclear war and deterrence that have no moral standing. They have thereby compromised their own moral authority in areas where their actual competence really lies, at least inasmuch as their pronouncements on questions of faith will increasingly be subjected to the pressures and interpretations of day-to-day politics.

THE KREMLIN AND THE VATICAN

by ALEX ALEXIEV

The substantial evidence of direct Bulgarian involvement in the attempt on the pope's life unearthed by the Italian investigative organs has given

[24] Central Committee of the German Catholics, "On the Current Peace Discussion," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 17, 1981.

[25] "Auch ein Feind hat legitime Interessen," Interview with Joseph Kardinal Ratzger, *Der Spiegel*, May 9, 1983.

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rise to speculations about tacit Soviet approval, if not outright complicity, in what has already been called the crime of the century. The implications of such Soviet involvement, if substantiated, are so profound and disturbing that many in the West have questioned presumed Soviet motivations. Most Western analysts searching for the likely rationale for Kremlin complicity have focused on the alleged determination of the pontiff to fly to his homeland and galvanize resistance to the Soviets were they to invade Poland before the establishment of martial law in December 1981. Such a possibility must have been a serious and perhaps in itself sufficient reason for Moscow to wish that a Polish pope did not exist at the time. It should be recalled that from the Soviet perspective the situation in Poland at the time could only have been seen as grim. With the Polish communist party in a state of near collapse and regime authority floundering in spring 1981, a direct Soviet suppression of Solidarity may have seemed to be Moscow's only alternative. While this is a plausible motivation, focusing on it alone obscures the much broader impact John Paul II's election and policies have had on the Soviet bloc and contributes but little to our understanding of the determinants and evolution of Soviet attitudes toward him. A more detailed examination of these factors is thus likely to provide us with additional clues about why the bishop of Rome, whose political relevance Stalin once dismissed derisively by asking, "How many divisions does the Pope have?" may have come to be perceived as a major threat by the Soviet Union.

The Pope's Challenge

From the day of the election of Karol Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II it was clear to Moscow that he would be a formidable opponent. During the tenure of his predecessors, Paul VI and John XXIII, the Vatican had pursued a policy characterized by willingness to compromise and an apparent desire to accommodate the Soviets. Indeed, it appeared at times that the Vatican was more interested in not antagonizing Moscow than in a vigorous defense of the rights of believers living under communist rule. In the person of Wojtyla, however, Kremlin leaders were faced with a convinced and outspoken opponent of communist totalitarianism and a man with a proven record of standing up to the regime in defense of the human rights and dignity of his people. Soon after his appointment, the pope made it clear that the plight of believers in the Soviet bloc was a special and lasting concern of his. His early policies included considerably increasing the broadcasting time of Radio Vatican in several East European and Soviet languages and appointing a number of representatives

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of these countries to important positions. Undoubtedly more consequential from a Soviet point of view was the pope's bold and unprecedented venture into the political realm, where he openly took issue not only with the communist social system, but with Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe as well. This was most dramatically demonstrated during his triumphant visit to Poland in June 1979, which Moscow now believes gave rise to Solidarity. Speaking before Polish audiences collectively numbering some six million, the pope made it clear that he considered himself responsible for the other peoples of Eastern Europe also, which he called "the brother peoples and the neighboring peoples," and added emphatically that he had come "to speak before the whole Church, before Europe and the world, of those often forgotten nations and peoples . . . to cry with a loud voice and to embrace all these peoples together with his own nation."[1] Without mincing words he categorized the Christian worldview as diametrically opposed to the Marxist one, criticized the communist system for allowing "evident privileges for some and discrimination against others" and castigated regime control of the media and censorship by telling an audience of half a million at Gniezno that it is "sad to believe that each Pole and Slav in any part of the world is unable to hear the words of the Pope, this Slav."[2] Peace and social harmony, the pope said, could be achieved only on the basis of "respect for the objective rights of the nation, such as the right to existence, the right to freedom";[3] and, in the presence of the Polish party boss Gierek, he declared that the task of the Church is "to make people more confident, more courageous, conscious of their rights and duties."[4]

In what could only be interpreted by Moscow as a blatant attack on Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, John Paul II further asserted that "no country should ever develop at the cost of another, at the cost of enslavement, . . . conquest, outrage, exploitation and death"[5]; and, on another occasion, he implicitly rejected the Soviet-controlled Warsaw Pact alliance by saying that the validity of alliances depended on whether they led to increased well-being and prosperity for the member states. The pontiff's remarks in front of millions of people without question represented an unprecedented challenge to the legitimacy of the communist system and Soviet interests in Eastern Europe and could have been perceived only as a grave provocation by the rulers in the Kremlin.

[1] *New York Times,* June 4, 1979.
[2] *Washington Post,* June 4, 1979.
[3] Ibid., June 3, 1979.
[4] Ibid.
[5] *Soviet Analyst,* June 28, 1979, p. 16.

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The Church Defiant

While the pope's influence on the events in Poland from the time of his visit to the imposition of martial law is fairly well documented, the revitalizing effect of his activist policies on the Church in other East European countries, though not so well known, has also been considerable and has led to an increasingly assertive attitudes by the Catholic clergy and believers vis-à-vis the regime authorities. In Czechoslovakia, for example, despite successive waves of religious repression, the Catholic Church is experiencing a remarkable revival, which has included a widespread underground religious life with tens of thousands of participants and a *samizdat* press.

The pope has been accused by the authorities of actively supporting and encouraging these illegal activities and of consecrating three secret bishops for the underground Church.[6] In a bold effort to help the Church regain some control over its affairs, the Vatican issued a decree in March 1982 prohibiting any political activities by ordained priests, which was seen by most as a direct attack on proregime Catholic organizations through which the authorities often controlled the Church. This has been particularly true of the regime-subservient Czechoslovak organization Pacem in Terris, in which close to a third of all priests had been co-opted or forced to participate. As a result of the Vatican edict, only some 5 per cent reportedly continue as members — an eloquent testimony to the pontiff's authority.[7] Church leaders in Czechoslovakia have stood firmly behind the pope on this issue, resulting in a campaign of intimidation and invective against them. Even the normally timid East German Catholic Church, following a meeting of its bishops with John Paul II in which he admonished them to take a firmer stand, has recently unequivocally condemned the progressive militarization of their society and some aspects of Soviet military doctrine.

In addition to Eastern Europe, Moscow has had many reasons to be concerned about the nefarious influence of the Polish pope. This influence has been felt most acutely, but not exclusively, in the Catholic areas along the Soviet western border. In Lithuania, a homogeneously Catholic nation with a long record of historical and cultural ties with Poland, the election of Wojtyla was greeted with elation. The pope, who speaks Lithuanian, has taken advantage of every opportunity to emphasize his special concern for Lithuania where, he has said, half of his heart resides. The Church there, which has been experiencing a dramatic revival

[6] *Neue Zuercher Zeitung,* October 1, 1982.
[7] *Die Presse* (Vienna), January 19, 1983.

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since the early 1970s, has become even more active in its struggle for survival under the Soviet regime and has emerged without question as the most militant and determined Church in the Soviet Union.

Within weeks of Wojtyla's election, Lithuanian priests organized the Catholic Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Believers with the expressed objective of assisting the Church hierarchy in publicizing and resisting the violation of the constitutionally recognized rights of believers. Its first official act was to send a letter to the pope declaring its unconditional loyalty to him and asking for his blessing of its cause. Faced with increasing repression and harassment by the regime and the KGB, the Lithuanian Church has organized many of its traditional activities in the underground. A secret seminary, clandestine orders of nuns, a secret lay Catholic society, and a flourishing *samizdat* press consisting of half a dozen publications are operating in what has become known as the Church of the Catacombs. Moreover, as the Church has taken an increasingly uncompromising attitude toward the regime and become more willing to stand its ground, its influence among the population has increased.[8]

Open defiance of the regime through unauthorized religious processions, demonstrations, and mass petitions of all kinds has become commonplace in Lithuania. In 1979, for example, a petition demanding the return of a church in the city of Klaipeda confiscated by the authorities was submitted to Brezhnev and the United Nations. It was signed by 149,000 believers, an unprecedented number given a total Lithuanian population of approximately three million. In another case, fifty-nine of the sixty official Church representatives in all six dioceses, supported by the overwhelming majority of Lithuanian priests, signed a statement in May 1981 declaring their determination to defy Soviet regulations harmful to the Church and arguing that the Church is responsible only to the pope and in effect does not recognize the state's jurisdiction over its ecclesiastical affairs.[9] The pope has firmly, if quietly, supported the Lithuanians' struggle. He has, for example, refused to appoint regime-approved church officials, who are considered collaborators by most believers. It is also widely rumored that in 1979 the pope bestowed the cardinal's hat *in pectore* to Bishop Stepanovicius, a man recognized by most Lithuanians as the head of their Church, even though he has been prevented from carrying out his pastoral duties and has lived in internal exile for over twenty years because of his opposition to the regime's policies. Last

[8] It is worth noting that in the Soviet Union as a whole, the fastest growing religious communities (such as Catholics, Baptists, and other Evangelicals, as well as the secret Moslem brotherhoods) are also the ones that have, by and large, opted for a policy of non-cooperation with the regime and have not shied away from open confrontation.

[9] *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church,* June 29, 1981.

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summer the pope was able to push through the reinstatement of another bishop who, like Stepanovicius, had been exiled internally for twenty years.

No less troublesome for the Kremlin has been John Paul II's perceived impact on the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Eastern Rite. The Uniate Church, as it is also known, has for centuries commanded the allegiance of the people in the western Ukraine, which was incorporated into the Soviet Union following the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939. The western Ukraine has always been a hotbed of Ukrainian nationalism and anti-Sovietism, with the Church playing a major role as a national symbol. As a result, it became a target of the relentless Soviet drive to extirpate Ukrainian nationalism and was the only Church in the Soviet Union to be outlawed outright. Its churches were closed, its priests jailed or deported, and its members forced to recognize the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church. Ever since that time, Ukrainian Catholics, forbidden the practice of their faith, have been persecuted and victimized like no other religious community in the Soviet Union. Their tragic lot was made even worse by the apparent lack of interest on the part of John Paul II's predecessors, who seemed to have completely abandoned them in the interest of good relations with Moscow. This situation has changed under Wojtyla's leadership. Having expressed his concern for the Ukrainian Catholics from the beginning of his tenure, the pontiff convened the first synod of Uniate bishops in spring 1980, which openly called for the restoration of the Church, prompting a bitter riposte from the sycophantic patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church and a charge of interference in internal Soviet affairs from the regime. The pope's sympathetic attitudes and moral support have contributed to the resurgence of a new spirit of hope and defiance permeating the Ukrainian Catholic community. Like the Lithuanians before them, last September the Ukrainian Catholics organized their own group, the Initiative Group for the Defense of the Rights of the Church, and boldly petitioned the government to allow the reopening of Uniate churches and monasteries. Despite particularly brutal KGB suppression, an underground Church with as many as 500 priests and three bishops is reported to be flourishing in the Ukraine. John Paul II appears to be firmly in support of the Ukrainians' uphill struggle. As recently as February 1983 he convened yet another synod of the Uniate bishops dedicated to an examination of the state of the underground Church and urged them to intensify their efforts in connection with the upcoming hundredth anniversary of Christianity in the Ukraine in 1988.[10]

[10] *Reuter* (Vatican City), February 13, 1983.

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There is also evidence of a revival of the Catholic Church in other areas of the Soviet Union. Last year the cathedral of Aglona, a holy place of pilgrimage for Latvian Catholics every August 15 that attracted an average of 20,000 pilgrims in the 1970s, was jammed with some 70,000 of the faithful, while in Byelorussia the authorities have alleged that illegal services and Bible schools for children were being conducted by "extremist" priests "carrying out instructions from foreign bosses."[11]

It has now become clear that in the Polish pope long-suffering Soviet Catholics have found a determined champion, and that what Pope Pius XII used to call the "church of silence" no longer exists. There is also little doubt that John Paul II has approved of and perhaps even encouraged the increasingly militant attitudes of Soviet Catholics. "The faithful will have only as much freedom as they manage to win for themselves," he is reported to have told the Lithuanian clergy, according to the underground organ of the Church.[12]

While the pope's influence has undoubtedly been strongest among the Catholics in the Soviet bloc, it has had much broader ramifications. One aspect of John Paul II's worldview that must be particularly disconcerting to Moscow in its political implications is his implicit rejection of the political division of Europe and Soviet domination of its eastern half. By emphasizing its common Christian roots, he has consistently stressed the spiritual unity of Europe — East and West — and has gone further, arguing for the opening not only of state borders, but also those of the (political) "systems." In a highly significant gesture, the pope has declared the Slavic apostles Cyril and Methodius, who were instrumental in the spread of Christianity among the orthodox Slavs, co-patron saints of Europe along with St. Benedict, thus symbolically overcoming the centuries-old division of European Christianity. While this papal action has been largely ignored in the West, it has been bitterly attacked in the East as a "factor in the activization of clerical anti-communism, and the growing ideological claims of the Church."[13]

The pope's expressed vision of a Europe united on the basis of Christian ideals, however unrealistic given existing political realities, is the logical antithesis of Soviet totalitarian ideology and thus an ideological challenge to its very legitimacy. Moreover, the pope sees the communist system and its atheistic philosophy as an implacable enemy of the human spirit and a cause of suffering and insecurity for individuals and nations alike. What has distinguished him from his predecessors is that he has not been satisfied merely to identify the problem, but has called on his

[11] Ibid., September 22, 1982.
[12] *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church,* July 30, 1980.
[13] Cited in *Neue Zuercher Zeitung,* June 16, 1979.

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followers to stand up to it. In a succinct exposition of this aspect of his philosophy, he wrote in an address to the United Nations session on disarmament in June 1982:

> The spirit has prime and inalienable rights. It justly claims them in countries where room is lacking for one to live in tranquility according to one's convictions. I call upon all fighters for peace to enter into this struggle to eliminate the real causes of men's insecurity.

It is this determination to act forcefully in accordance with his convictions, armed with the moral authority of his position and his tremendous personal charisma, that has made John Paul II a dangerous ideological opponent for the Kremlin.

Moscow Lashes Out

The reaction to the pope in the Soviet news media has faithfully reflected Moscow's increasing apprehension over the pontiff's policies and influence. In the initial period between Wojtyla's election in fall 1978 and his visit to Poland in June 1979, Soviet reporting on John Paul II was scant and generally restrained. Though Soviet readers were occasionally reminded that the Vatican occupied an important place among "religious centers and organizations abroad that actively participate in the struggle of world imperialism against socialism and communism," criticism of the pope himself was rather subdued and dealt mostly with his conservative theological views and his alleged failure to attack the evils of capitalism on his various travels in the Third World. This kid-glove approach was promptly discarded after John Paul II's visit to his homeland. On the first day of the visit, Moscow television informed viewers that the event was being used by "certain Church leaders" for "anti-state purposes,"[14] while Foreign Minister Gromyko was reported to have feared that the pope's pilgrimage to Poland would "have the same effect on the masses as the Ayatollah Khomeini had in Iran."[15] After the visit, an ever more strident campaign was orchestrated by professional agitators and in the news media attacking the Catholic Church and castigating the pope as an inveterate opponent of socialism.

This campaign took particularly virulent forms in the areas inhabited by Soviet Catholics. Moscow has been particularly concerned about religious dissent in areas such as Lithuania and the Ukraine because of the traditional symbiotic relationship between the Church and nationalism there. Unlike the Russian dissident movement, which is almost

[14] *New York Times,* June 4, 1979.
[15] *Soviet Analyst,* June 28, 1979, p. 7.

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exclusively centered in the intelligentsia and has very little popular support, religious dissent is broadly based and has strong nationalist overtones and therefore the potential to become a mass opposition movement. In Lithuania the authorities have accused the Church of attempting to transform itself into a nationalist political force and have assailed unnamed "fanatical agents of the Pope." In the words of a top KGB official, these religious fanatics under the influence of the Vatican's "vile fantasies" become conductors of the hostile strivings of the anti-communists.[16] Simultaneously, a campaign of physical intimidation and assaults on priests, as well as of desecration, looting, and burning of churches has taken place. Three activist priests have been murdered, following vicious attacks on them in the news media, under circumstances that suggest KGB involvement. In the Ukraine the pope has been personally attacked for his support of believers and for allegedly trying to divide and set against each other the Ukrainian and Russian people.[17] The Vatican has also been accused of "malicious anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda," conducted by "dyed-in-the-wool anti-Soviets and Nazi remnants."[18] The vilification campaign reached an early peak with the publication of a particularly inflammatory attack on the pope in the literary political journal *Polimya* in March 1981. In it, Wojtyla, characterized as a "militant anti-communist" and a "cunning and dangerous ideological enemy," stands accused of having both known of and acquiesced to an alleged Nazi-Vatican plan to exterminate the Polish people, including the clergy, during World War II. This "malicious, lowly, perfidious and backward" "toady of the American militarists," the author further informs us, struggles against socialism in the interest of his "overseas accomplices" and his "new boss in the White House."

The attempt on the pope's life in May 1981 marked another watershed in Moscow's campaign against him. Immediately following the event, Soviet propagandists were mainly concerned with steering any suspicion of complicity away from the Soviet bloc and launched a typical disinformation campaign, aiming to show that reactionary imperialist circles and the CIA in particular were behind this ghastly deed. In at least one case Soviet ingenuity went so far as to claim that the CIA wanted to eliminate the pope because of his friendliness toward the Soviet Union.[19]

[16] *Komunist* (Vilnius), November 1981.

[17] *Nauka i religiya*, no. 11, 1982.

[18] *Radyanska Ukraina*, March 26, 1981.

[19] Novisti Press Agency (in Russian), May 27, 1981. Soviet efforts to link the CIA to the assassination attempt have been intensified since the arrest in Italy of the Bulgarian, Sergei Antonov, in late November 1982. See, for instance, the Radio Moscow programs of January 11, February 8, and February 9, 1983, and Tass, December 16, 1982, and January 10, 1983. The CIA has also been accused of sponsoring the Red Brigades and organizing the murder of Aldo Moro. *Mezhdunarodniy terrorizm i TsRU* [International terrorism and the CIA] (Moscow: Progress Publishing House, 1982), pp. 252-62.

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The media offensive against the pontiff, however, was resumed again once it became evident that he would survive the attack and has been conducted with mounting shrillness to the present. The renewed propaganda effort has involved an attempt to present John Paul II as the organizer and actual driving force behind the Solidarity movement in Poland and a massive drive to destabilize the socialist bloc, and to portray him as a puppet, if not an actual agent, of U.S. imperialism.[20] "The anti-socialist activity of the reactionary forces of the Catholic Church is attested to by the developments of recent years in People's Poland," opined a recent Soviet commentary, which continued bluntly: "The notorious anti-socialist force Solidarity, which came to symbolize the crisis provoked by the anti-socialist forces on instructions from overseas, was born not in the wave of disorders that swept the country in the summer of 1980, but in the Catholic Church."[21] The theme of U.S. manipulation of the pope was sounded time and again as, for instance, in a hard-hitting article in the Czech journal *Tvorba*, widely reprinted in the Soviet media. "It is known," the article stated, "that the American president, during his June sojourn in Rome, enjoined John Paul II to assume a more resolute posture in connection with the situation in Poland, to interfere more into the internal affairs of that country. As a reward, Ronald Reagan has shown his readiness to raise financial support, which the Roman Catholic Church would distribute among the opposition in Poland."[22]

The frantic efforts by the Soviet and East European news media to prove that there is a link between the Vatican and various U.S. reactionary groups bears a disturbing resemblance to the antireligious campaigns of the early 1950s in Eastern Europe, when hundreds of priests were sent to labor camps and jails after having been convicted as U.S. spies in show trials.

"The subversive activities of the Vatican," however, are not limited to Poland but directed "against all socialist countries and first and foremost against the Soviet people," argues one Soviet author, who then proceeds to document the "ideological sabotage" carried out by the Vatican. Among other things, the Vatican is accused of organizing special anti-Soviet centers, which are said to "train and send propaganda specialists" and smuggle "subversive literature" into the socialist countries.[23] The pope's advocacy of European unity is also attacked as part of the

[20] In its propaganda effort, Moscow has often resorted to the practice of having particularly slanderous attacks published first in the press of its East European clients and then widely reprinted and disseminated by the Soviet propaganda machine.

[21] Tass, December 19, 1982.

[22] *Tvorba*, August 11, 1982.

[23] V. Makhin, "Religiya v ideinom arsenale antikomunizma" [Religion in the conceptual arsenal of anticommunism], *Politicheskoye samoobrazovanie*, December 1982, pp. 117-18.

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"anti-communist campaign for the defense of human rights" and an attempt by the "anti-communist forces of Polish clericalism to activate destabilizing forces in the other socialist countries."[24] In addition to the massive media campaign against the pope, there are disturbing signs that the Soviet regime under Andropov is stepping up the direct repression of the Catholic Church. Last January the KGB arrested the most prominent Lithuanian religious dissident and a founding member of the Catholic Committee, Father Svarinskas, who has already spent twenty-four years in Soviet camps, and the organizer of the Ukrainian Initiative Group, Yosif Terelya. Father Svarinskas' arrest and subsequent trial for "slandering the state," which earned him a seven-year jail sentence, caused a storm of protests throughout Lithuania; 36,000 Lithuanian Catholics were reported to have signed petitions protesting his arrest.[25] These and a number of other arrests of priests and Catholic activists indicate that for the first time in many years the Soviets are again prepared to use show trials in an effort to silence dissent. A further disquieting note has been added by an acrimonious article in the Lithuanian party organ accusing the clergy of "criminal connections" with the Nazi occupiers and the Gestapo during World War II.[26]

Yet neither the attempt on his life in May 1981 nor the seditious propaganda campaign against him preceding and following it appear to have intimidated the pope or to have forced him to retreat from his determined struggle on behalf of the believers under communism. In yet another move likely to be seen as a provocation by Moscow, he recently appointed three new cardinals from the Soviet bloc. One of them, the Latvian Bishop Vaivods, a veteran of the Soviet Gulag, is the first cardinal in the Soviet Union. Moscow, evidently, was neither consulted nor informed beforehand of the pope's choice.

The pope's single-minded determination to speak out against the injustices of the communist system were demonstrated again during his second trip to Poland last June. "I have come to share your suffering," he told his compatriots on the day of his arrival, and in later statements he openly defended Solidarity as well as the banned rural union. The pontiff also boldly called on Jaruzelski to keep the promises of the Gdansk agreement and with characteristic bluntness insisted that it was not for the Polish regime to concede the right to free trade unions, which he said came from God, but merely to safeguard it.[27]

[24] Cited in *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, June 16, 1982.
[25] *Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania*, April 3, 1983.
[26] *Sovetskaya Litva*, February 8, 1983.
[27] *The Economist*, June 25, 1983.

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The Soviet news media reacted to the second visit with uncharacteristic restraint, perhaps meant to indicate lack of concern and indifference. The entire coverage of the event in Tass consisted of two matter-of-fact sentences. Much more revealing of true Soviet attitudes was an article published in the organ of the Ukrainian Communist party on the day of John Paul II's arrival in Poland. In an unusually strident tone, it accused the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Vatican of striving to convert the Eastern Slavs to Catholicism, of being willing tools of imperialist reaction, and even of attempting to provoke a world nuclear conflagration.[28]

It should come as no surprise, then, that the Kremlin's attitudes toward the pope some four years after his election and close to two years after the attempt on his life continue to be unremittingly hostile and increasingly confrontational. The fact that the successful repression of Solidarity by the Polish military dictatorship in December 1981 apparently did not alleviate Soviet concerns, as the preceding pages illustrate, demonstrates that for Moscow John Paul II was and continues to be much more than a merely Polish problem. The pope realized clearly what a serious challenge he presented for the Kremlin. As early as 1979, during his visit to Poland, he told an audience: "I'm sure there are people out there who are already having a hard time taking this Slavic Pope." Hard enough, it seems, to prompt an exasperated Kremlin to cry out, as Henry II once did regarding the Archbishop of Canterbury: "Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?"

[28] O. Vovk, "Anatomy of Anticommunism: Yesterday in SS Formation, Today at the Pulpit," *Radyanska Ukraina*, June 15, 1983.

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
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STRATEGIC PURPOSE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

by Martin Shubik and Paul Bracken

The world debt crisis of the early 1980s has sparked considerable interest in the international economic system. Lesser developed countries (LDCs) have accumulated debts of approximately $700 billion and East European states have about $85 billion outstanding. (See Table I for sample estimates.) The fears — some might even call them threats — associated with such large borrowings are that a debt default by one large borrower, perhaps Mexico or Brazil, might precipitate a chain reaction among the others, causing a deep and permanent contraction in world trade and finance. While most prudent observers doubt the likelihood of such a scenario, and we agree, the mere fact that the world economic system could get into such a position so quickly, along with the demonstrated inability of most major governments to shape the events that led to this crisis, should cause concern.[1]

Derivative scenarios play on slightly different fears. Borrowing nations might form a debt cartel to enhance their bargaining power in negotiations with lending nations. Or debtor states might not "take their economic medicine" as prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and lending banks, leading to a sharp decline in international liquidity and resultant slower world economic growth.

These and other fears have been addressed in several forums and are among the vital concerns of most governments. But another aspect of the debt crisis has received little attention and thought. How long can questions of strategic purpose be divorced from major international economic developments such as the debt crisis? The conventional wisdom for managing the debt crisis is symptomatic of the limited conception of economic security relationships, and as such the debt crisis is a useful example of just how narrow some of these policy conceptions really are. By defining policy variables only in terms of economic growth

[1] Overviews of the debt crisis and its origins can be found in Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, "Latin American Debt," *Foreign Affairs,* Winter 1982-83, pp. 344-64; and in Susan Strange, "The Credit Crisis: A European View," *SAIS Review,* Summer-Fall 1983, pp. 171-81.

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TABLE I
FOREIGN DEBT OF SELECTED COUNTRIES
December 1982
(in $ billions)

Country	*Debt*
Mexico	80.1
Brazil	85.5
Venezuela	29.5
South Korea	36.0
Argentina	38.0
Chile	17.2
Philippines	16.6
Taiwan	9.3
Colombia	10.3
Yugoslavia	19.3

SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board and the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company.

rates, wage increases, and investment targets, more important foreign policy and security interests are pushed under the rug, where they remain in a limbo-like existence. The ideas and questions offered in this paper are meant to bring some of these neglected economic and security relationships into the open for more direct discussion and analysis.

Whether or not it is generally recognized, policies concerning trade, investment, debt, markets, and multinational corporations are established in a framework that is almost exclusively economic. Especially in the United States, the style of "free market–government hands off" economics has more of a grounding in the hyperbole of business leaders than it does in the real world. At best the free market covers a specialized segment of the economy. To pretend that the supply and demand for defense permits the same level of discourse as the supply and demand for ice cream cones verges on the suicidal. The lip service paid to free markets, lack of government interference, and unconstrained private enterprise even where it impinges directly upon defense is at best naive and is, in all likelihood, parochially self-serving and nationally dangerous.

The United States needs to re-create at least the infrastructure of institutions that can coordinate the information gathering and control needed between the Departments of Treasury, Defense, and State and the private sector in order to make sure that U.S. private enterprise acts in concert with U.S. public goals and needs. With the exception of a

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periodic determination to impose a strategic embargo on the East-bloc nations, political and economic questions are usually viewed as entirely separate.

The debt crisis is only an illustrative example of the deep disjunction that has arisen between the formulation of strategic purpose and international economic policy. In the 1970s, at the height of the energy crisis, plans and forces were organized to seize Middle Eastern oil installations in the event it became necessary. In addition to the formation of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), a strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) was constructed at considerable expense. Both the RDF and the SPR dominated security analyses of the oil crisis. Yet one of the most obvious features of the world financial system tended to be overlooked in these analyses; if one wanted to coerce OPEC, a better target than the oil fields would be the Swiss banks where their wealth is stored. In 1981 OPEC had more than $354 billion invested in Western economies.[2] While the image of landing RDF parachutists on top of Swiss banks may be absurd, the lack of consideration given to freezing these assets compared to the attention and resources devoted to creating the RDF and the SPR is striking.

The strategic implications of a complex world economic system, where enormous resources are stored in financial as well as commodity holdings, has not received the attention it deserves. Some of the trends and ideas discussed here are unpleasant, but they are nonetheless important to examine. For the next few years it is likely that there will be considerably slower economic growth in the developing world (a consequence in part of the debt situation); at the same time there will be an era of intense strain in Soviet-U.S. relations. The possibility of political upheaval therefore is potentially greater than in previous decades. While Soviet-U.S. relations may not revert to the Cold War status of the 1950s, the added component of numerous unstable LDCs increases the chances of igniting the feared spark of confrontation.

Debt, Aid, and Finance in a Large and Decentralized World Economy

The U.S. conception of interrelated military and economic security was formed in the 1950s and 1960s, at which time the world was divided into East and West. The advent of nuclear weapons seemed both to reinforce this division and to lessen the importance of nonmilitary variables in defining it. The division was reinforced because only the Soviet Union and the United States could mount the diversified tech-

[2] U.S. Treasury Department estimates, as reported in *New York Times,* February 28, 1983.

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nological programs necessary to build effective nuclear forces. Economic factors contributed to these bipolar security regimes in a number of ways, but they were de-emphasized in comparison to more direct military considerations. The bomb, overseas bases, and the Strategic Air Command made up the core of U.S. security policy. Foreign aid, economic stockpiles, and trade embargoes against the Soviet bloc were all judged important, but less so than the tools of nuclear deterrence themselves.

Another way of looking at this period is through the evolution of what has come to be widely known as the American military-industrial complex. The Cold War is often dated from the immediate postwar years when the U.S. military rapidly demobilized, but the Soviet military did not. Throughout the late 1940s, large standing Soviet armies induced grave fears in the West about the security of Western Europe. Not until the Korean War in 1950 did the United States build up its nuclear and conventional military forces to meet this perceived threat. It is much less widely recognized that the American demobilization that occurred in 1946 was both military *and* economic.[3] The nation dismantled its industrial military base with dedicated efficiency. Equally important, it eliminated the elaborate bureaucracy used by the public sector to administer the wartime economy. Whole organizations, with names that are today unfamiliar to most contemporary students of security policy, were disbanded. The Office of Export Controls, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Office of the Alien Property Custodian, the U.S. Commercial Company (used for pre-emptive buying of strategic goods overseas), the Foreign Funds Control Office, and other similar agencies had been directed to serve U.S. security policy during the war. Their legitimacy arose from the grand tradition of a nation immersed in total war in which all of the resources of the state were brought together in an integrated geopolitical expression of strategic purpose. Identical control systems had been set up by the enemy and allies alike as an accepted way of conducting security policy.

Of course, this system was abolished following the war, so that U.S. security demobilization was both military *and* economic. When the Korean mobilization came in 1950, only the most feeble attempt was made to re-establish this control system, largely in the form of the Defense Production Act. Some limited standby legislation was passed to permit more extensive public-sector control of the economy for security purposes, but the sense of much of this legislation was pointed to a national emergency (such as recovery following atomic attack) and not to the day-to-day conduct of security affairs.

[3] We have been aided in our thinking on this point by our colleague Sidney Winter, and also by discussions on economics and national security at the Yale Seminar on Security Policy.

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Throughout the 1950s interest in the relationship between economics and security narrowed further, never disappearing but confining itself to a smaller set of relevant subjects. With the Vietnam War in the 1960s there was an attempt to divorce the two subjects completely, by fighting a war without any vestige of military mobilization or consequent economic controls. Seen in this light, it appears that the United States has the very opposite of an all-encompassing military-industrial complex. What has evolved is a highly specialized collection of weapons suppliers and consumers, with little or no overall geopolitical integration of the nation's many sources of power, like those manifested in the economic control system set up during World War II. With its state-controlled economy, of course, the Soviet Union has chosen a very different evolutionary path.

The strategic implications of debt, finance, and markets are today almost considered to be relics of a bygone era, an age when leaders saw an intimate connection among these subjects. One of the primary reasons for this development is that the bipolar world of the 1950s and 1960s no longer exists. The world has become far more pluralistic in political and economic terms. Yet the bipolar security regime lingers, obliged by strategic technology to involve all nations should the ultimate showdown ever occur. A curious mismatch exists between the pluralistic world economy on the one hand and the bipolar security regime on the other. Security, which in a more geopolitical age was thought to incorporate economic subjects, has appeared to go its own way and have little or nothing to do with the regulation of corporate behavior, trade, and finance.

Markets take up the coordination that once would have been conducted between bipolar powers, using an elaborate public-sector control system. The public-sector economic control apparatus described earlier has its counterpart today in a largely *private*-sector economic control system that relies on international markets, instant communications, and business-to-business contacts to coordinate international economic affairs. In a pluralistic world, markets have become *more* rather than less important.

The growth and dimensions of international market and business activity are not evident to most people. Although most people are aware that world population is growing rapidly, which necessarily stimulates an increased level of exports and imports, the growth in international economic activity far exceeds that needed merely to serve a growing volume of world trade. For example, on an average business day the amount of international trade among all countries approximates $10 billion when the world is not in recession. On the other hand, international

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financial flows on a typical day average around $210 billion. What is all of this money doing? Much of it is in the foreign exchange market; some is used to underwrite trade or balance the books of multinational corporations; and in recent years some has been lent to developing countries on the syndicated loan market. The point is that international economic activity and markets, especially financial activity, have become enormously important.

The combination of a governmental "hands off" attitude toward security aspects of economic affairs, especially international financial affairs, and the increasing importance of markets and associated business issues has led to a strange situation. The strength of a modern democratic country such as the United States is also partially a measure of its weakness. Instinctively, we wish to keep politics and economics separate, even when it is painfully obvious that it is logically and technologically not feasible to do so. There are many areas of policy where this separation mainly serves artificially to distort fundamental issues.[4]

One such example is in the relative shares of public versus private capital flows and their effect on U.S. foreign aid. U.S. aid programs were conceptualized in the 1950s when most countries had virtually no other alternative but to turn to the United States.[5] At that time the problem in the world economy was viewed primarily as consisting of barriers to international capital mobility. The reason for establishing a World Bank was to create capital flows to developing nations that were denied access to most private investment arenas. Academic studies of this period emphasized the higher returns available on overseas investments, which encouraged U.S. companies to operate abroad.

The situation has changed dramatically since that time. In today's international economy, private capital flows vastly outdistance public-sector flows. In 1982, syndicated loans from European, Japanese, and U.S. banks amounted to $82 billion. Direct corporate investment, short-term interbank loans, Eurobonds, and other mechanisms all reinforce this basic trend.

With little difficulty, a country such as Argentina was able to amass $33 billion in incremental debt between 1978 and 1982, about $5 billion of which went to arms purchases. Compared to a foreign-aid grant or a public-sector loan, the funds came with few strings attached to their use. Unlike many aid grants or public-sector loans, syndicated private bank loans can be executed in a very short period of time, without the lengthy bureaucratic approvals of the former. No wonder the Carter

[4] For an extended discussion of related issues, see Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

[5] U.S. foreign aid policies and their evolution are analyzed in Richard L. Hough, *Economic Assistance and Security* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1982).

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administration's attempt to employ economic and trade sanctions against Argentina in the late 1970s over human rights and nuclear proliferation matters proved so ineffective! As international bankers are so fond of saying, money is fungible. It has been argued that attempts at economic coercion may produce behavior directly opposite to that desired. But economic leverage is bound to be even more ineffective when the object of coercion can raise huge sums from a decentralized world market whose private-sector control apparatus is indifferent to strategic purpose.

The Argentine case is an example of the effects of the shifting balance between public- and private-sector capital flows. For the thirty-five-year period between 1945 and 1980, U.S. foreign and military assistance to all the nations of Latin America amounted to $15.3 billion, or about $450 million per year on average.[6] Between 1977 and 1981, U.S. private banks alone lent approximately $80 billion to these countries. Over the same period, aggregate loans from all banks to Latin America amounted to $278 billion. Private capital flows have come to dwarf public-sector flows, and with this imbalance comes a corresponding and inevitable decline in the possibility for using economic resources to achieve strategic purposes. In the late 1970s and early 1980s many of the most important developing countries (from a U.S. security perspective) were benefiting from the private international loan market, a market that ignored strategic considerations in determining the supply of capital.

In the summer of 1982 a precipitous change in this pattern occurred. A sudden withdrawal of credit to the major borrowing countries of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina led to severe liquidity and debt problems in these countries. The unexpectedly long recession in the United States and the world, the oil glut, the maintenance of greatly overvalued currencies in some nations, and the psychological fears produced by the Falklands War came together to dry up the international loan market for those developing countries most in need of further loans to service their existing debt. The result was the world debt crisis. The major borrowing nations needed financing at a time when private financial resources were sharply cut back. The immediate reaction to this state of affairs was that national governments intervened to forestall a potential collapse of the world financial system. This was done through central banks and through an agreement whereby the IMF directed private banks in the ratification of new loans to borrowing nations. The IMF itself could not possibly finance the needed amounts, but relied instead on the private sector to

[6] "Annual Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies," 1981. This annual report is a very useful source of data on U.S. economic and security assistance efforts over many years.

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lend greater amounts through approval of the reform programs of the indebted countries.

The world financial system worked remarkably well in averting an immediate financial collapse following the partial suspension of repayments by major debtors. The logistics involved in coordinating the emergency loans of hundreds of private banks are considerable, and the private sector reacted very quickly to the crisis. However, two features of the debt problem deserve attention. A boom-bust cycle in private international capital flows had developed, and governments expressed little interest in the cycle until a sharp downswing took place. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, when loan activity was increasing to the major debtors, the governments of the United States and most other members of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) adopted a hands-off attitude. This was done with benign intent, not ignorance; it was thought to be a good thing to recycle petrodollars, and it was also regarded as desirable to have strong capital flows going to rapidly growing Third World countries. Of equal importance in this hands-off governmental policy, however, was the simple assumption that the international financial market was exclusively an economic creature with which governments had no business meddling.

While we cannot offer ready answers for such complicated issues, we note that important questions were never asked about the political consequences of a liquidity crisis in developing countries, the intervention into private capital markets for strategic purposes, or the possible behavior of these markets in an international political crisis. It is very curious that as world finance, trade, and debt grew to unprecedented historical levels, there was virtually no interest in assessing the strategic consequences of these trends.

One especially glaring example of the tendency to divorce economic and security issues took place in 1975 during hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Following the first oil shock of 1974, massive OPEC funds were flowing into U.S. and European money-center banks. Senate legislation was proposed to require U.S. banks to make detailed disclosures about these deposits. One prescient fear was that OPEC countries with large deposits in U.S. banks might suddenly withdraw them, causing chaos in U.S. financial markets. Merely the threat of such action could prove catastrophic; it would not be necessary to carry out such an extreme measure. A strong lobbying effort by the banking community, however, arguing that the possibility of sudden withdrawals was so remote as to preclude any need for financial disclosures, worked against any such legislation.[7] Eventually, a much watered down

[7] Anthony Sampson, *The Money Lenders* (New York: Viking Press, 1981), pp. 123-28.

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reporting system was put into effect that preserved the secrecy of the holdings of individual banks.

The bankers' need for secrecy is understandable, as it is crucial to their conduct of business. What is remarkable about these circumstances, however, is not that the bankers were proven wrong about the remote threat of sudden withdrawals (as Iran had demonstrated in 1979), but that they saw no connection between this issue and the RDF and the SPR. Effectively, the private sector made the case that business is somehow above the concerns of national security. The core argument advanced — and accepted — was not that the United States and its allies should refrain from freezing OPEC assets in an emergency, but that nations should not even collect basic data necessary to think about this question. All this hypothesizing was taking place at a time when elaborate and dangerous military contingency plans were being developed to take over the oil fields. Freezing financial assets is provocative, but it is certainly less dangerous than mounting a full-scale invasion of a nation.

A second observation on the debt crisis is that there has been little other than an economic definition of what actually constitutes the crisis. Broadly speaking, the sense one gets from most discussions is that when for one reason or another the major lending banks do not get paid, this leads to some kind of major liquidity and trade collapse in the international economy. But this way of thinking about the debt situation, while certainly not wrong, implies that the crisis takes place only when banks do not get their money or when there is a major shock to the world financial system.

We would make a different point. The real debt crisis is political and has *already* occurred. Unlike the business and economic aspects of the debt situation, the political debt crisis has been poorly managed; indeed, it has been ignored by the private-sector control apparatus designed to manage the purely financial aspects of the problem. The really important debt crisis is the partial surrender of sovereignty by nations like Brazil and Mexico, an acceptance of foreign dictates about how they should run their countries. This loss of power is an interesting reversal of the increased independence given these countries during the upswing in international lending during the late 1970s. At that time, Brazil, Mexico, and others could use the international markets to increase their own economic maneuverability. Now they have to do the reverse, following the directions of an IMF-led consortium of private banks in order to secure needed financing to pay off their old debt.

To look at the world debt crisis in this way suggests a new set of questions which we only touch on. Economic stability is seen as dependent on political stability, rather than the other way around. Signing

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a rescheduling agreement that carries with it severe penalties for domestic growth and improved quality of life may not be as bad as signing a military surrender treaty, but the two documents have much in common. Instead of focusing on whether or not banks are repaid, we should instead look to the literature on war termination and strategic surrender to understand the debt crisis.[8] The tendency for coalitions to be seen domestically as "patriots" or "traitors," depending on their willingness to uphold national sovereignty or to cooperate with foreign adversaries, makes a distinction that already applies to political dynamics in some debtor countries. What will be the political fate of those who sign such submissive agreements? If these signers are removed from the scene, what validity can the agreements have?

The World Economy Is Interdependent, but Not Monolithic

The various debtor nations do not have identical problems, nor did they get into their current situations by any common failures of policy. It is important to understand the differences that exist among the different nations in debt.[9] Brazil borrowed heavily for infrastructure improvement, while much of Argentina's borrowings went for armament purchases and capital flight.

The lending nations are themselves differentiated, however much they might need to present a unified front in debt negotiations. Political factors and regional interests inevitably intervene in the debt management process. Thus, when Japanese banks first cut back precipitously on loans to Brazil, it was U.S. banks, at governmental proddings, that started to make new loans available there, reflecting the United States' special interest in Latin America. Similarly, Britain held up on some consortium loans to Argentina in an effort to force Buenos Aires to end sanctions imposed against British companies during the Falklands War.

The idea that the world is increasingly interdependent is an attractive one, and would seem to apply with special force to the international financial system. A default in one debtor country, however, need not create the chain reaction most feared in disaster scenarios. It is dangerously simplistic to consider only two possible outcomes, either a simultaneous default among all of the biggest debtors or a smooth IMF-led renegotiation in which all parties repay on schedule. With the large

[8] Specifically, we have in mind such works as Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic-Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958); and Fred C. Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). For a useful statement about the politics of the debt crisis, see, also, Henry Kissinger, "Saving the World Economy," *Newsweek*, January 24, 1983, pp. 46-49.

[9] These differences are carefully expounded in Barbara Stallings, "Latin American Debt: What Kind of Crisis?" *SAIS Review*, Summer-Fall 1983, pp. 27-39.

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number of countries in debt difficulty, it is probably too optimistic to expect the latter outcome. But interdependence does not mean that if one or two nations somehow fail to play their expected parts in the rescheduling game that other debtor nations will automatically join them.

If a serious default were to occur, it is most likely to begin with a single nation. It might also be directed at the banks of a single nation, as would be the case if Argentina refused to honor debts to Great Britain. Because of the differentiation among both borrowers and lenders, a great deal of room is left for strategic behavior directed at particular nations or coalitions in this process, in spite of cross-default clauses.

It is important to isolate any shocks that do occur so that they do not threaten the stability of the entire system. Over the past decade, individual shocks have in fact been quickly isolated and managed, protecting the system as a whole. While the world economy may be interdependent, it is also surprisingly resilient. In 1982, for example, the Kuwaiti stock exchange failed. An amount estimated at $94 billion was lost in a scheme involving postdated checks. Kuwait and the surrounding Middle Eastern governments were able to absorb this shock because the financial rules of the game were rewritten overnight by rulers who correctly foresaw the dangers of such a collapse getting out of control.[10] Bank failures, the change from fixed to floating exchange rates, and sudden oil price increases all seem to teach a similar lesson: that the world financial system is robust and capable of withstanding many shocks. Our concern is less with the rules of international finance than with the rulers, those actors who have the power to make rapid changes to avert a crisis that may threaten major parts of the system.

The resilience of the world economy offers new opportunities for strategic behavior without jeopardizing the stability of the entire system. One of the main arguments against national political use of the world financial system for its own strategic purposes is that any tampering in this area threatens the foundations of world economic stability. There is a parallel in this formulation in the rigid division of the world into two blocs, East and West. In its extreme form, this type of thinking interprets any event in world politics as a loss for the East or West. Almost everyone now understands that the world is pluralistic and complicated, but in international economic policy there is still a tendency to speak as if the smallest blunder will produce a world financial collapse. Such thinking paralyzes strategic analysis because it removes all freedom for integrating noneconomic strategic purpose into national economic actions. But

[10] This is a fascinating tale involving a Mr. Jassim Al-Mutawa, who has gone into personal bankruptcy to the tune of $10.5 billion before reaching his thirtieth birthday. See "Jassim, Jassim," *Financial Times,* February 1, 1983, p. 13; *Financial Times,* February 23, 1983, p. 8; and *New York Times,* February 18, 1983.

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whether one likes it or not, an important lesson of the debt crisis has been that governments *do* intervene in the world of private-sector international finance for broader political and strategic purposes.

Secrecy, Transparency, and Responsibility

The debt crisis has focused attention on the fact that many debtor nations use parts of the world economy for strategic purposes, to stimulate domestic growth, obtain funds for arms purchases, or increase their independence from more powerful nations upon which they choose not to rely. Creditor nations, on the other hand, have been dragged into policy issues involving influence and coordination of private-sector affairs, violating long-held preferences about the inviolability of the wall that supposedly separates the public from the private sector. Yet it is reasonable to ask if such complicated policy issues are limited to this particular debt crisis, so that once this problem is solved the world can safely return to a state in which business is left to business and government is left to government.

We believe that the debt crisis is not a unique problem and that the policy issues that it raised and the need to think about contingency plans must become an accepted part of strategic analysis. The problem of defining national purpose in economic policy will not go away.

The exact circumstances leading up to the debt crisis may not be repeated. The surplus of petrodollars and the use of private money-center banks to broker loans based on these funds was a function of the world energy situation of the 1970s. In the 1970s these loans were offered at negative interest rates, making them extremely attractive opportunities. The world economic situation has since changed, with high real interest rates and a drying up of the petrodollar funds. Indeed, the problem today is clearly that debtor nations are having difficulty obtaining loans of any sort, and are paying high interest on those they do obtain.

Nonetheless, when the current recession ends there will be a reversion to strong capital flows and economic ties between the developed and the developing nations. This may not necessarily take the form of activity coordinated through the international syndicated loan market, but may instead be channeled through different mechanisms. Already, many indebted nations are loosening their restrictions on direct foreign investment by reducing taxes or by making it easier to repatriate profits. More joint ventures in the developing world between home-based and foreign corporations could occur. An especially clear recent trend has been the increasing pace of acquisitions of foreign corporations by U.S., Japanese, and European firms. Banks and insurance companies in particular are

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being bought by newly emergent multinational financial services companies.[11]

The development of more extensive direct investment in developing countries, the emergence of true multinational financial services firms, the growing financial orientation of all multinationals, and the increased reliance on markets in a pluralistic world mean that questions of strategic purpose in the international economy are likely to be permanent, even though there is a temporary drying up of the petrodollars that led to the burgeoning debt of recent years. Regardless of how strongly one feels about the desirability of a private sector unencumbered by governmental interference, there are many situations like the debt crisis where it is foolish to pretend that private economic actions can be divorced from broader security and political concerns. It is more foolish still to believe that there is a necessary congruence of interest among the U.S. government, international banks, and multinational corporations.

By examining several distinctive features of the major actors in international economic affairs, it may be possible to understand the underlying tension between the public and private sectors. In the expansion of financial activity by international banks and multinationals, the emphasis has been on privacy and secrecy. President Eisenhower once said that "capital has no country." The strategy of private-sector actors in the world economy has been to search for mismatches and gaps in control systems between national and international legal and financial systems. They have invented Eurodollars, offshore trusts, and other new methods of economic arbitrage between legal and political systems.

Today, large European and U.S. multinationals are the biggest users of tax havens in the Caribbean, where they can book loans and currency transactions to avoid the taxation of West European or U.S. governments. This development is usually considered only in narrow economic terms; much revenue is lost to the Internal Revenue Service, for example. But there are broader implications. As an illustration, the Cayman Islands has become a major conduit for South American capital and a center for Euromarket bookings. In 1964 there were two banks in the Caymans; in 1982 there were 360, with over 8,000 registered companies and more telex machines per capita than any country on earth.[12] Brazil was able to book in excess of $1 billion in Euroloans in the Caymans in 1982 by exploiting the secrecy and availability of capital there.

[11] For a discussion of the business factors driving in this direction, see Theodore Levitt, "The Globalization of Markets," *Harvard Business Review,* May-June 1983, pp. 92-102; and Philip Wellons, "International Bankers: Size Up Your Competition," *Harvard Business Review,* November-December 1982, pp. 95-105.

[12] U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies,* 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, p. 25.

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The United States is by no means the only country with offshore tax and secrecy havens constraining its ability to monitor and control events. Switzerland has long played this role for the rest of Europe. In the Middle East, Bahrain has emerged as a major offshore financial center with $60 billion in banking assets in its branches in 1982.[13] Similar offshore facilities are now being developed in the Pacific and can be expected to grow as Tokyo becomes a great financial center in the 1980s. There is nothing inherently wrong in these trends. If these centers further reduce the transparency of international finance, however, problems could emerge that are far from purely economic. While the $94 billion Kuwaiti stock exchange failure gives evidence of the resilience of financial systems, who would like to test this resilience with a larger speculative collapse of the Saudi Arabian system?

The secrecy that shrouds a great part of international finance allows the system to be used strategically by a nation willing to coordinate its overall dealings with the many private corporations that make up the world financial system. Such has been the long-standing Soviet tactic in its relations with Western corporations. In like manner Brazil hid some of its large debt from concerned parties by running it through secret Caribbean havens. In fact, one of the reasons the magnitude of the debt crisis did not surface until late 1982 was that the information systems used to monitor debt were seriously flawed, depending on self-reporting and bank notifications that excluded much nonbank intermediation, loans to publicly controlled companies, and other major lending sources. It may be that insufficient data and information exist in a form that would allow swift intervention to forestall the financial disasters that are the nightmare of most central banks.

In 1982, Mexico seriously abused the interbank market to gain funds to meet its short-term debt needs. The interbank market is a $1-trillion network of loans extended from one bank to another for periods of time as short as overnight deposits to as long as one year. It is a vital lubricating system of international finance because it supplies liquidity to banks, preventing the system from freezing because of temporary deposit imbalances in one part of the world.[14] In the summer of 1982, Mexico nationalized its private banks, which then had an outstanding interbank position of $6 billion. At the same time authorities declared that no hard-currency exchanges would be permitted, thus jeopardizing repayment to

[13] For a description of the offshore situation in the Middle East, see A. S. Gerakis and O. Roncesvalles, "Bahrain's Offshore Banking Center," *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* January 1983, pp. 271-93.

[14] For descriptions of what is an especially obscure market to nonspecialists in international finance, see "A Jolt to be Remembered," *Financial Times,* March 1, 1983, p. 16; and "Eurobanks and the Interbank Market," *Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin,* September 1981, pp. 351-64.

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those banks that had lent short-term funds to Mexico. The abuse of the interbank market, which is ten times larger than the syndicated loan market, threatened to be the mechanism for a chain reaction of defaults.[15] At the time the loans were made, none of the international banks extending interbank loans to Mexican private banks knew that nationalization was coming, nor did they have any measure of exactly how much money Mexico had been drawing in with this tactic. Although a bank has good information on its own worldwide interbank exposure, competitive pressures prevent banks from sharing this information with one another.

The international financial system is extremely complex and decentralized. The private-sector component of this system emphasizes secrecy and privacy as a matter of course. The result is a system that is opaque as to cause and effect, levels of activity, or ultimate responsibility. There is a fundamental and irreconcilable paradox at work here between money and credit, a paradox that lies at the heart of the international financial system. One of the basic purposes of currency or of coinage such as gold is that it is basically anonymous. Trust lies not in the relationships between individuals but in the object itself. One of the fundamental features of credit, on the other hand, is that it depends upon trust, and trust is not anonymous. But the inherent secrecy of the world financial system creates numerous ways to hide strategic purpose, whether this purpose is to maximize foreign capital flows or to damage the economic security of a state.

In a crisis, such as that of Iran in 1979, the connection among knowledge, responsibility, and authority to act needs to be clear if a nation is to defend its economic security. Yet the secrecy so necessary for operating in the international economy prevents any such clarity. Specifically, the U.S. government had only a crude estimate of Iran's holdings in U.S. banks, and even less information about the exposure of individual banks. Nor had any thought been given to the broader repercussions of freezing the assets of a major OPEC nation. When Iranian assets were frozen in response to the threat of sudden massive withdrawals from the U.S. financial system, it triggered a string of bank declared defaults on Iranian loans, which in turn caused considerable political strain between the United States and its allies. The government freeze included Iranian assets held in the overseas branches of U.S. banks, thereby challenging the jurisdiction of national authorities. It also led to the invocation of cross-default clauses common to international loan agreements and to the freezing of the Iranians' stake in the West German Krupp complex.[16]

[15] "Chase Hits 'Misuse' of Interbank Market," *Financial Times*, March 1, 1983, p. 1.
[16] Sampson, *The Money Lenders*, pp. 243-52.

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When the initial freeze order was put into effect, few officials understood the full dimensions of their actions.

The sudden withdrawal of money from the U.S. financial system by an irrational Middle Eastern government is only one possible threat to economic security, and it is one that might be manageable. The issue is not the resilience of the world economy under most circumstances, but rather the responsibility to move quickly and boldly when the occasion arises. Under current conditions, the lack of transparency in international economic operations and the notion that the U.S. government has no business in private-sector concerns has the effect of reducing the importance of strategic considerations in economic-security policy. Information is a necessary prerequisite for responsible action. The world is a closed financial system and the United States is, in essence, the best (i.e., the safest) game in town. For these reasons, greater integration of economic factors into strategic policy would cost the United States little in terms of foregone business profits and would substantially improve our ability to take responsible, decisive action when necessary. Along with others who have examined the problem of ultimate responsibility for preservation of financial stability, we do not believe that private markets alone can enforce this stability under all of the pressures which could arise.[17]

Implications for Strategy

Changes in the economic structure of the world that have led to greatly expanded levels of trade, credit, and finance over the past twenty-five years have important implications for the way strategies are defined for both public- and private-sector organizations. Often the line between these two groups is blurred, either directly — as with state ownership of major commercial enterprises — or indirectly — through the interdependent control linkages that couple the actions of one to the other. Indeed, tied in with traditional control institutions such as the IMF or the Paris Club of leading industrial nations are new interlinkages arising from the mushrooming growth in international markets and from multinational corporations themselves.

The possibility of using the larger and more complex economic structure found in today's world for security purposes has received surprisingly little attention. Studies of economic security have tended to concentrate on traditional kinds of economic warfare and sanctions that are strongly biased toward some form of commodity control. Food as a weapon, arms embargoes, and controls on high-technology exports have

[17] Charles Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy," *International Studies Quarterly*, June 1981, pp. 242-54.

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all received considerable attention. However, a recommended strategy in this area would be to use financial instruments and flows as a new source of leverage for security reasons.

Before we consider the financial aspects of security and economic warfare, another issue needs to be discussed: the widespread perception that no form of economic sanctions can influence the behavior of a nation-state.[18] The United States would have great difficulty waging any sort of "food war" and has even found it difficult to block sales of components for the Soviet natural gas pipeline. The Carter administration's attempts to enforce its human rights policy through a set of economic and diplomatic sanctions were no more successful than the British actions against Argentina mentioned earlier in this essay. What then can one expect of any new tools such as financial ones?

Most of the discussion about the utility of economic sanctions misses a key point with respect to the economic security of the American people. It is our assessment that acts of economic warfare, especially those involving financial actions, are poor offensive weapons but necessary defensive weapons. Clearly, economic and financial weapons are themselves influenced by political, societal, and legal considerations. When we consider blocking accounts, confiscating assets, or renegotiating financial instruments in our jurisdiction, we have considerable control. When the assets and instruments are overseas, even in Western Europe, our control diminishes quickly. Economic sanctions and financial warfare have important reactive or second-strike characteristics because such usage hinges on provocation, which better enables the United States to overcome pre-existing political obstacles. Had the Iranians not seized U.S. hostages, it would have been far more difficult to obtain the needed European cooperation in blocking Iran's financial assets.

The second-strike aspects of financial warfare are the rule rather than the exception in the United States. It is not widely known, for example, that even during World War II Washington did not move to block the financial assets of the Axis until war had been officially declared. Even though the assets in the United States of both Norway and Denmark were blocked following their submission to German attack in 1940, the United States did not dare to seize German assets. The fear was that Danish and Norwegian overseas assets, both public and private, would be withdrawn to Nazi control, negating the rights of U.S. corporations to sue for them in German courts. More important, it was feared

[18] Different views are offered in the following works: Robin Renwick, *Economic Sanctions* (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1981); Donald L. Losman, *International Economic Sanctions* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979); and Shaheen Ayubi et al., *Economic Sanctions in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1982).

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that the overseas assets of these two countries would be confiscated by the puppet governments and fed to the German war machine.[19]

Comparable second-strike financial asset seizures were employed against China in 1950, Cuba in 1960, and Iran in 1979. While details vary, in each case there was a desire to protect the rights of U.S. citizens and corporations with possible claims in these nations; but there was also a security dimension to the seizures in that the United States did not want to return billions of dollars to countries that were extremely hostile to us. It is useful to remember in this respect that the Soviet Union has been exceedingly careful not to have overseas exposure of assets that could be seized by the United States. In fact, it was the Soviet state bank that invented the Eurodollar market in the 1950s by placing dollars in their own banks set up in London and Zurich, where they would be safe from U.S. jurisdiction under most circumstances.[20]

The reactive nature of U.S. financial warfare suggests certain directions for the security dimensions of the world economy. Instead of asking whether an arms embargo can influence a Latin American dictatorship to forego its human rights abuses, it should be a far higher priority to explore the conditions under which the United States might react to a provocation that threatened the physical or economic security of its people.

Virtually all contingency plans for the world debt crisis have centered on ways out of the crisis. Higher economic growth rates, discounting of loans, involvement of the U.S. treasury, and involvement of international organizations to underwrite more debt have all defined the bounds of policy in managing the debt crisis. There is another side to the coin, however, one that should be considered if the economic security of the United States is to be safeguarded. While plans to forestall a crisis are important, they do nothing to protect the United States in the event of a collapse or a series of defaults in which other nations try to clean out the U.S. banks. The response to such actions is as old as banking itself. Plans to freeze every relevant foreign asset must be thought through beforehand, in order to avoid the rapid flight of many "hostages" before any countermeasures can be taken. World financial collapses have occurred in the past and it would be naive to believe they cannot happen again.

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[19] Yuan-li Wu, *Economic Warfare* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), pp. 95-96.

[20] This began in 1954 when the Soviets sold gold for dollars and held these dollars in Soviet banks in Europe. These banks then began to make dollar denominated loans to various businesses. See Martin Mayer, *The Fate of the Dollar* (New York: Signet, 1981), pp. 115-16. The legal jurisdiction over the Eurodollar market remains extremely complex and uncertain. See Gunter Dufey and Ian H. Giddy, "The Unique Risks of Eurodollars," *Journal of Commercial Bank Lending*, June 1978, pp. 50-61.

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If a collapse were to occur, or if one or two defaults were to take place, the government would have to act quickly and boldly to protect U.S. interests and to isolate the shock. It would be an understatement to say that the U.S. government is inadequately prepared; with its "let the free market rip" philosophy and flawed monitoring systems for determining what foreign assets are under U.S. jurisdiction, it is safe to say that better planning has been given to nuclear war survival than to economic security. The absence of attention to these issues is indicative of the exceedingly narrow scope of most analyses of economics and national security. Indeed, in our literature search the most recent book on methods of seizing foreign assets was written over thirty years ago, a remarkable fact, given the enormous growth in the world financial system over the past several decades.

A major default is not the only circumstance that could force the United States into second-strike financial warfare tactics. Presently, Arab oil producers have about $80 billion invested in the United States. Saudi Arabia has some $160 billion invested overseas. Kuwait has unknown billions invested in U.S. and West European industries. If a coup or invasion in the Middle East took place, would the United States stand idly by as such enormous assets were withdrawn, possibly to be put under the control of major enemies? Is it conceivable that the RDF could be sent to the Middle East without precipitating major attempts to pull assets out of the West? With the Iran-Iraq War continuing, it seems more than prudent to anticipate financial crisis dynamics. Just as in 1940 and 1950, when the United States was forced to act to prevent major assets from falling under the control of the Axis and China respectively, this concern over finances poses an immediate security problem in the fullest sense of the term.

Finally, financial warfare is even relevant in a Soviet-U.S. confrontation. While a nuclear showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union might be thought to dwarf any financial issues, there are cases where economic considerations become important. In a serious nonwar crisis, Moscow might intimidate European powers into acting against U.S. economic interests. The Soviet purpose might be less to destroy the dollar than to sow panic and chaos, reinforced by a precipitous Eastern-bloc default.[21] Another goal might be to force Washington into rigid exchange controls, thereby exposing the divergent interests of the government and multinational banks and corporations and further sowing dissension and disunity. If a prolonged political crisis took place involving

[21] See Paul Bracken, "Mobilization Dynamics in the Nuclear Age," in Richard E. Bissell and Gordon H. McCormick, eds. *Strategic Dimensions of Economic Behavior* (Praeger, forthcoming).

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a nuclear alert but not a nuclear detonation, issues of financial stability and public morale could become critical.

While the above examples of the direct connection between economics and security deal with extremely serious contingencies, there are daily manifestations of the coupling of security and economic issues that are often missed or given less importance than they deserve because of the overly narrow conceptions of economic security. The simple question of the location of "hostages" is very fruitful for understanding international political actions. By hostages we mean those physical and financial assets that are at risk of being blocked, confiscated, or lost. Given the large overseas investments in the modern international economy and the interlinked communication network that moves hundreds of billions of dollars around the globe daily, there are today more hostages than at any time in world history. Some of these would be easy to snatch in a crisis — one thinks of mines in South America or manufacturing plants in Asia. Others are far more elusive because of modern financial transfer technology. For example, multinational corporations can transfer enormous sums of money almost instantly through financial communication networks that can direct resources into safe havens. The point is that a complicated structure of overseas hostages exists with categories, distinctions, and implications that have received almost no attention in terms of economics and security.

Overseas exposure in physical and financial assets can shape political actions even if the threat of seizure or loss is only implicit. For example, British governmental actions in setting oil prices in 1982 must have been influenced by the potential damage to the enormous British stake in Nigeria. If oil prices had continued their slide, revenues to Nigeria would have shrunk even more than they did. The political situation there was, and is, dicey. Political turmoil would have put British assets at risk. An important feature of this example and most others is that it is not just governmental exposure that counts. British governmental loans to Nigeria may be less important than the exposure of British corporations and citizens. Since the privately controlled international economy so greatly outdistances government loans and assistance, it is this sector that offers the greatest risk of exposure. However, this exposure is most difficult to estimate because of the secrecy and opaque nature of private international economic activity described earlier. But it may be just such aggregate exposure that determines strategic actions at the national level, because domestic corporations and citizens have a powerful voice in shaping national policy.

It is not hard to think of examples in which overseas asset exposure, both public and private, is a major force in national strategy.

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The French exposure in Iraq consists of loans, direct investment, export credits, and probably much more that is not centrally recorded because of the secrecy and privacy surrounding international finance. If Iraq were to lose the war to Iran, it would be a financial catastrophe for the French, coming at a time when they are hard pressed economically for other reasons. This seems to be one of the reasons behind the "loan" of five French Super-Etendard fighters capable of carrying Exocet missiles to Iraq. French exposure in Iraq, in the form of billions of dollars of physical and financial assets controlled by both the public and private sectors, may now be so great that Paris may be committed to back Baghdad to the limit of French power.[22]

A clear implication for security strategy from this and other examples is that intelligent actions may require estimates of the magnitude of foreign exposure among nations. It is hard to get such information, even about foreign exposure in the United States. Unless better information systems are established, it will be difficult to assess some of the fundamental forces driving security policy. At a deeper level, more attention should be given to the economic underpinnings of security in the world. Instead of concentrating attention exclusively on a small number of accepted economic security issues, such as food and oil or industrial mobilization capabilities, a broader conception of security and economics is needed, one which takes account of private capital flows and exposure, second-strike economic warfare tactics, and the decentralized interdependent nature of the international economy.

Concluding Policy Issues

Policy differs from strategy by including the full set of organizational and contextual issues necessary for determining particular courses of action. The changes in the world economy and the implications for strategy lead to many policy problems, two of which are raised here. First, there is no organizational focal point in the U.S. government that integrates economic issues with diplomatic and military considerations from a long-range national security perspective. Most outside observers have concluded that there is not even a coherent view taken of international economic policy. Adding problems associated with strategic purpose only compounds existing deficiencies. As argued earlier, these problems are not going to evaporate when the current world recession ends. Rather, the problems are embedded in the fact that the world political economy is growing more pluralistic, while the superpower security regime remains dominated by nuclear weapons. This mismatch —

[22] "French-Iraqi Ties Get Closer," *Wall Street Journal*, August 19, 1983.

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between world political economy and superpower military security systems — is unlikely to change soon.

Since problems of economic security are unlikely to go away, it is time to take them more seriously. One way to do this is to establish suitable authority within the government for dealing with them in a coordinated manner. Realistically, the prospects are not promising. Authority for economic policy is highly fragmented within the government. There is no support for government intervention into areas considered to be the proper domain of private corporations. If one's philosophy is "to let the free market rip," then there is no reason to set up government control organizations to influence events. We are not enthusiastic about extensive government interference in private affairs, but if private affairs produce security problems then it seems silly to cling to an outdated rhetoric. One of the ironic features of current reform proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff is that they focus almost exclusively on the military dimensions of national security. Whether a reform of the JCS would lead to greater military efficiency is an open question, but it should not be viewed as the most important question. An improvement in military efficiency is welcome, but it is less important than the need for an integrated security organization that synthesizes military, diplomatic, and economic factors into a coherent action policy. Without this synthesis, concentration of greater power in the JCS may only lead to disproportionate emphasis on military factors at the expense of economic and political ones.

A second policy issue deals more with U.S. national style in business and economics than with questions of organization. While the United States did erect an enormous public-sector control system to administer an economy for security ends during World War II, it is neither possible nor desirable to duplicate this system today. That the Soviet Union has such a system is immaterial; in fact, it probably contributes so many economic inefficiencies that it may actually work to our advantage. What all of this suggests for U.S. policy is that we should accept the basic private orientation of our economic affairs when designing control systems for managing the economic component of security; but where possible, the government should leverage the large private sector for security ends rather than trying to substitute for it. As an example, the imaginative use of insurance and reinsurance, especially political risk insurance, could be used to target private investments into areas that served a broader strategic purpose. Some of this is done today, but its scale is relatively small compared with what it could be. Privately offered political risk insurance is offered, but it is usually structured for profit rather than for strategic purpose.

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Other government institutions could try to leverage the large private sector rather than remaining wedded to rhetoric of government-funded Marshall plans, which are exceedingly unlikely to receive public or congressional support. In a larger sense, what is needed is a structure for a new partnership between the public and private sectors, where the broader responsibility of the former is backed up by the vitality of the latter. Such a partnership offers a better way to deal with questions of economics and security than recreating an enormous public-sector apparatus.

Finally, there is an issue that is too diffuse to be considered a policy question at all. That is, problems of economics and security need to be thought about, analyzed, and debated at a much broader level than has traditionally been the case in the United States. Security studies must not focus on an increasingly narrower set of problems that lose sight of the most important features of the pluralistic and dangerous world we live in. Questions must be raised at the appropriate level of discussion before any definitive answers can be offered.

President Truman observed the need for one-handed economists. Our paper offers one-handed advice. The U.S. financial-economic control system is inadequate. We need not only to discuss the inadequacies, as done here, but to take steps to build an infrastructure for the 1980s and 1990s that will at least provide standby governmental control. Such a plan calls for coordinated action by Treasury, Defense, State, CIA, and White House and the development of intelligence capabilities. The time to undertake these steps is now.

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LATIN AMERICAN DEBT AND U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY*

by Susan Kaufman Purcell

Approximately one year has passed since Mexico found itself on the verge of default. Since that time almost every major Latin American country has experienced similar problems. Although the magnitude of the Latin American debt crisis has become more apparent, the basic U.S. strategy for dealing with it has remained remarkably consistent: (1) restore economic growth in the United States (and thereby the world), (2) facilitate financial and structural changes in Latin American economies to enhance their ability to benefit from the economic recovery in the United States, and (3) keep adequate amounts of new money flowing into Latin America while steps 1 and 2 are being accomplished. Each of the elements in the U.S. strategy has proved more intractable than anticipated, however, in part because of the degree to which they are interrelated. As a result, the Reagan administration has had to compromise on a number of issues involving each of the component parts of its strategy.

Compromise is perhaps least evident regarding efforts to revive the U.S. economy. President Reagan has generally adhered to his campaign promises to reduce inflation and cut taxes, although he has failed to reduce the large and growing budget deficit, which he also promised to do. To date, the administration's anti-inflation efforts have been spectacularly successful. Inflation, which was 9.2 per cent when President Reagan took office, has been reduced to 3.5 per cent[1] (although one cost was an unemployment rate that reached 10 per cent and only recently has dropped below that level). A tight money policy, combined with the large budget deficit, initially caused short- and long-term interest rates to soar to nearly 16 per cent. Recent increases in the U.S. money supply, however, have reduced short-term interest rates enough to allow a significant upturn in economic growth. Long-term rates, though, have not decreased substantially. Because of fears that interest rates will rise again, in part because of the budget deficit that is expected to reach $200 billion

*This is an expanded version of an article that was published in French in *Politique Etrangère* (Paris), Fall 1983.

[1] *New York Times*, August 20, 1983.

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by the end of 1983,[2] there is some doubt that the economic upturn can be sustained. If it does continue, however, it should not only have a positive impact on OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) economic performance but also on Latin America, which would be able to increase its exports to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.

While the Reagan administration's long-term economic strategy may work, some of its short-term effects on Latin America have been quite negative.[3] The initial deepening of the U.S. recession, and by extension, the international recession, reduced both the demand for and value of Latin America's exports. At the same time higher interest rates in the United States raised the interest that Latin American countries had to pay on their debt, much of which consisted of short-term, variable interest loans from commercial banks. Mexico is a case in point. With a total debt that exceeds $80 billion, 80 per cent of which is tied to short-term rates, every percentage point increase of the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) adds $600-700 million to its interest payments.[4]

Finally, the rapid decrease in the U.S. inflation rate increased the differential between the Latin American and U.S. inflation rates. While the current U.S. inflation rate equals approximately 3.5 per cent, those of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, the principal Latin American debtor nations, are about 571 per cent, 175 per cent, and 100 per cent, respectively.[5] The widening gap between the inflation rates of the United States and the major Latin American debtors made Latin America's dollar debts considerably more costly to repay. The strong U.S. dollar compounded the problem.

Caught in what has been called the "scissors" of rising interest rates and reduced foreign exchange earnings — a sorry situation that was made even worse by a severe cutback in private foreign lending to the region — one Latin American country after another has been obliged to seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The quid pro quo has been the implementation of austerity programs aimed at reducing budget deficits by decreasing public investment, phasing out

[2] Karen W. Arenson, "The Recovery Aside, Jury Is Still Out on Reaganomics," *New York Times*, August 21, 1983.

[3] For a more detailed discussion of the background of the Latin American debt crisis, see Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, "Latin American Debt," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1982-83, pp. 344-64; and Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, "Latin American Debt: Act II," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1983, pp. 17-38. For overviews of the socio-economic and political implications of the debt crisis see Riordan Roett, "The Socio-Political Crisis in Latin America and the Foreign Debt," prepared statement for the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House, Washington, D.C., June 23, 1983.

[4] Kenneth N. Gilpin, "Rise in Rates Hurts Developing Nations," *New York Times*, July 11, 1983.

[5] The sources for these statistics are as follows: for Argentina, *New York Times*, October 5, 1983; for Brazil, *Financial Times*, October 6, 1983; and for Mexico, *Wall Street Journal*, June 22, 1983.

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protection of and subsidies for inefficient industries, increasing the efficiency of tax systems, and holding down wages.

The Reagan administration has strongly supported these IMF-backed austerity programs. High-ranking U.S. government officials have cooperated closely with IMF and Latin American government officials in elaborating the various loan adjustment packages. Also, in December 1982, the Reagan administration agreed in principle to a general expansion of the resources of the IMF from $62 billion to $93 billion, as well as an increase of nearly 50 per cent in the U.S. contribution to the IMF.

The close working relationship between the IMF and the Reagan administration came as something of a surprise to those who remembered the administration's negative attitude toward the IMF in its early days. At that time the administration sought to reduce the role of multilateral lending institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank on the grounds that they were biased in favor of unproductive state sectors and against the productive private sectors of Third World countries. The administration also believed that the multilateral institutions had failed to apply strict conditionality to their loans.[6]

The administration's change in attitude toward the IMF in particular reflected its awareness (following the near-default of Mexico, Argentina, and then Brazil in late 1982) that the magnitude of the debt crisis was greater than was initially believed. In order for the IMF to continue to play its crucial role in helping debtor countries adjust their economies to new economic realities, adequate resources had to be made available to it. Failure to support an increase could have serious consequences for the major U.S. banks, which were heavily exposed in Latin America. By June 1982, for example, loans by the nine largest U.S. banks to Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina equaled 112 per cent of their capital.[7] Any problems faced by the big U.S. banks would affect U.S. and international financial systems as well.

The change in the U.S. attitude toward the IMF was therefore important not only for achieving its second goal of helping Latin American countries adjust, but also for achieving its third goal of keeping money flowing into Latin America. Increasing the availability of financing for Latin America from multilateral institutions, however, represented only part of the rationale for the new U.S. attitude. By late 1982 it had also become

[6] The changes in the Reagan administration's policies toward the multilateral lending institutions are discussed more fully in Susan Kaufman Purcell, "War and Debt in South America," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 3 (America and The World), 1982, pp. 667–72. See, also, Richard E. Feinberg, "The Reagan Administration's Economic Policies and the Third World," *ODI Review, vol. 2, 1982*, pp. 20-45.

[7] Karen Lissakers, "Dateline Wall Street: Faustian Finance," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1983, p. 175.

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clear that U.S. support for the IMF and a good working relationship with it were also crucial for persuading the private commercial banks to continue to provide new money to Latin America.

As the economic situation of Latin America deteriorated, private commercial banks became increasingly reluctant to "throw good money after bad." In contrast to the smaller U.S. regional banks and several European and Japanese banks, which could afford to write off their Latin American loans and withdraw from the area, the major U.S. money-center banks were too heavily exposed in Latin America to follow suit. They had to continue lending enough money at least to enable their Latin American clients to continue to service their loans.

Here is where the IMF-supported austerity programs became crucial for ensuring continued private-bank lending. Without such austerity programs the banks had little hope that Latin American countries would be able to repay even the interest on their loans. The IMF involvement and, more specifically, a signed agreement between the IMF and individual Latin American governments, was therefore viewed as a kind of insurance and a prerequisite for continued private commercial-bank lending. This helps explain the unprecedented behavior of officials from both the U.S. government and the IMF, who combined forces and actively pressured the large commercial banks to maintain and even increase their exposure in Latin America.

Unfortunately for the Reagan administration's strategy, the U.S. Congress had different ideas about how the major U.S. commercial banks should be treated. Believing that legislation to increase the U.S. contribution to the IMF was "a bailout of the banks," an odd coalition of conservative and liberal members of the Senate and House argued for increased government surveillance and regulation of the banks as a quid pro quo for their support of the IMF legislation. Underlying the argument was the widely held view that the banks had helped produce the debt crisis by irresponsible lending practices and by their greedy race for profits. It was believed, therefore, that the banks should be made to "pay" for their behavior in the form of increased government control over their activities.

Although members of the Reagan administration may have shared the view that the banks were not without blame, the administration felt that efforts to impose stiff regulations on the banks would be counterproductive, since these measures would discourage needed commercial-bank lending to Latin America. On the other hand, the government realized that something had to be done to assuage both conservative populists, who were using the situation to vent their antibank, anti-internationalist feelings, and liberals, who were angry with the Reagan admin-

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istration for producing a 10 per cent unemployment rate and for dismantling social programs designed to help the poor and unemployed. The net result was a compromise in the Senate, which in June 1983 finally approved the legislation increasing the U.S. contribution to the IMF in return for regulations that major banks say they can "live with." The regulations include setting aside special reserves to cover loans to foreign borrowers with histories of debt-service problems, as well as more frequent reporting of their banks' activities to federal authorities.

These regulations are considerably more vague and discretional than the regulations originally introduced by bank opponents in the Senate or than the regulations that were narrowly approved by the House of Representatives in early August. The latter regulations would require banks to set aside special reserves to back up loans to countries likely to have repayment problems and would oblige banks to reduce their rate of new lending in highly indebted countries where bank lending is already regarded as "excessive." Finally, banks would be required to lower the fees they charge for rescheduling and to spread them over the life of the rescheduled loans instead of collecting them at the beginning. Because the passage of such regulations would effectively discourage additional lending to Latin America, it is expected that the compromise bill that eventually emerges from the conference committee will drop many of the House provisions in favor of the more broadly worded and discretionary Senate provisions. The price that the Reagan administration will have to pay to get a less punitive set of regulations remains to be seen. The recent warning by the Democratic chairman of the House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee that the IMF legislation is in trouble unless the Republican-controlled Senate passes a housing bill that he favors is an indication of the bargains that may have to be struck.

To date, the Reagan strategy can be regarded as a qualified success. The U.S. economy is growing. Inflation-adjusted GNP rose at an annual rate of 9.2 per cent in the second quarter of 1983[8] and is expected to continue growing through the remainder of the year although at a slower rate, which may be good news since it would be less inflationary. Most Latin American countries have accepted the need for austerity programs and are trying hard to implement them. Additional resources will probably be made available to the IMF, and commercial banks are putting new money into the major debtor countries of Latin America, although in amounts below what the U.S. government would like them to make available. In the first quarter of 1983, for example, new net lending to Latin America went only to Mexico and Brazil and only after a great deal of pressure from the IMF. None of the Latin American

[8] *New York Times*, August 20, 1983.

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countries has declared a moratorium on its debt — although several, including Brazil, have been unable to keep current on their interest payments — and none of the creditors has declared any Latin American country to be in default.

The crisis is far from over, however. All that an optimist can conclude at present is "so far, so good." But a number of things could still go wrong.

First, the continued economic recovery in the United States that is a prerequisite for Latin America's ability to pay its debts is far from assured. Unless action is taken soon to reduce the large and growing U.S. budget deficit, interest rates — which are lower than they were a year ago but are still high — will rise even more, sabotaging the revival in the automobile and housing industries and discouraging private investment. At existing rates interest payments for 1983 by Latin American and Caribbean countries are expected to reach nearly $40 billion, compared with projected merchandise exports of $96 billion.[9] Higher interest rates would require these countries to use even more of their export earnings for debt servicing. This would leave little or no money for necessary imports and investments. It does not take much imagination to conclude that this situation would not be long tolerated by Latin Americans or their governments.

Several suggestions for reducing the U.S. budget deficit have been made. One, supported by President Reagan, involves further reductions in nonmilitary spending. Democratic congressmen and senators in particular, whose traditional support comes from blacks, women, and other groups that would be most affected by such spending cuts, strenuously oppose this course of action. Together with other critics of the president's planned increase in military expenditures, they advocate instead decreased military spending, a suggestion that President Reagan has rejected. A third alternative is to offset the large budget deficit by a tax increase. While a compromise may be reached during the next year over military and nonmilitary spending, it seems fairly certain that taxes will not be increased until *after* the November 1984 presidential election.

It should be pointed out that the issue of the impact of the large budget deficit on the economic recovery has become the subject of considerable debate. Some administration officials, such as Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, maintain that there is no obvious connection between large deficits and high interest rates. Those who disagree include Martin Feldstein, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, who argues that projected increases in the deficit are the main cause of high interest rates. The split within the administration further decreases the

[9] Kuczynski, "Latin American Debt: Act II," p. 24.

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likelihood that Congress or the president will act decisively to reduce the deficit in the absence of a crisis situation.

Second, it seems unlikely that Latin American governments will be able to continue implementing indefinitely the austerity programs they have adopted. Two of the three largest Latin American debtor countries — Brazil and Argentina — are currently in transition from military to civilian rule. When they were last governed by civilians, it was during or immediately following a period of substantial economic growth, which allowed their elected governments to espouse populist rhetoric and pursue policies that involved the substantial distribution of goods and services to their constituents. Whether the new civilian governments of Brazil and Argentina will be able to govern effectively with empty coffers and projections of low or negative economic growth for the foreseeable future remains to be seen. Mexico, the remaining large debtor country, is in a somewhat better situation since it is not undergoing a major transition in its form of government. Nevertheless, even Mexico's experienced political leaders lack experience in governing under conditions of extreme and prolonged austerity. Like their Brazilian and Argentine counterparts, their style of governing has involved populist rhetoric and large amounts of government spending. For this reason it is fair to say that in an important way austerity will present unaccustomed political challenges for all of the major Latin American debtor countries.

In fact, the political tensions caused by declining wages, rising prices, and growing unemployment have already begun to surface in Brazil, which is in its third year of recession. Strikes have occurred in the oil refineries of São Paulo and Bahia and in the metalworking plants in São Paulo. In addition, calls by union groups and opposition party leaders for a moratorium on repayment of Brazil's $90 billion foreign debt have been finding increasing favor among businessmen, prominent economists, and legislators in the government's own party. Mexico, whose austerity measures have been in place for less than a year, and where the wealth generated by the oil boom of the late 1970s provides a kind of economic cushion for labor and middle-class groups, has not yet experienced serious unrest. A recent demonstration in Mexico City and some unrest in the countryside, however, may indicate that more difficult times lie ahead. In Argentina, a potential electoral victory by the Peronists gives organized labor a large stake in postponing wage demands and avoiding disruptive strikes until after the elections scheduled for late October. After that time the political tensions produced by the austerity program will be harder to contain.

Because of the factors just described, no one really knows whether political institutions in the region are strong enough to survive

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the demands and conflicts that will inevitably surface. Chile is a particularly good case in point. As long as economic indicators were positive, General Pinochet seemed invincible. The recent and precipitous economic decline, however, casts considerable doubt on his political future. What seems fairly clear is that if Latin American governments are faced with a choice between continued austerity or growing political unrest, both civilian and military regimes will opt for increased public spending, even if it means printing money to do so.

Third, despite pressure from the U.S. government and the IMF, private commercial banks will not provide the amounts of new financing for Latin America that will probably be required over the next several years. The IMF believes that $20 billion in new financing from the commercial banks, or $5 billion a quarter, will be needed by Third World countries this year to sustain a 2-3 per cent economic growth rate in OECD countries and a 4-5 per cent growth rate in developing countries. The IMF and the BIS (Bank of International Settlements) also estimate that new lending by commercial banks must grow by 7-8 per cent for a considerable number of years to sustain an economic upswing. Yet, in the first quarter of 1983, new lending by commercial banks to developing countries equaled only $500 million. The comparable quarterly figure for 1981 was approximately $16 billion, which highlights the magnitude of the decrease in new commercial-bank lending to the Third World as a result of the debt crisis.[10]

To a certain extent, the high levels of commercial-bank lending to Latin America that characterized the 1970s were an aberration resulting from a combination of factors that will not be repeated. Private commercial-bank lending to Third World countries was able to surpass official lending from governments and multilateral lending institutions, for example, because of the petrodollar surplus. Following the oil price increases of 1973 and 1979, commercial banks found themselves awash in petrodollars that had to be recycled. They turned to the more advanced developing countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, which had relatively large populations and were experiencing faster rates of economic growth than most of the OECD countries. The two Latin American countries that were to become the largest Third World debtors — Brazil and Mexico — were particularly attractive because of their political stability. Mexico's future also seemed especially bright because of its huge petroleum reserves and its shared border with the United States. Brazil's lack of petroleum was offset by its territorial expanse, varied resource base, export potential, and large population.

[10] Paul Lewis, "Loan Cuts and Third World Debt Worries," *New York Times*, July 21, 1983; and Paul Lewis, "Few Loans for Nations in Third World," *New York Times*, July 19, 1983.

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From the point of view of the Latin American countries, it made sense to borrow large sums of money from the banks, despite the fact that the loans were at commercial rates. Because so much money had to be recycled, interest rates were low. Furthermore, high rates of inflation in the United States seemed to ensure that it would be relatively easy to repay dollar loans. In fact, if interest rates remained low or declined even more, and if inflation increased, interest rates might even become negative.

In addition to the economic advantages, there were several political considerations that encouraged the Latin American countries to borrow large amounts of money from the commercial banks. By the 1970s many Latin American governments were spending well beyond their means, in part because they were committed to ambitious and costly development schemes and in part because such high levels of spending contributed to political peace. Foreign borrowing, particularly under the advantageous terms then available, constituted a more attractive way of closing the gap between expenditures and income than a change in policy or increased domestic taxation, which at best would prove difficult and at worst, politically destabilizing. Foreign borrowing was also considered a more attractive source of development funds than foreign investment, since the former allowed complete discretion regarding the way monies could be spent, while the latter often came with strings attached.

The factors that attracted the commercial banks to Latin America's advanced developing countries no longer exist. World recession helped produce an oil glut and caused the petrodollar surplus to disappear. At the same time the severe decline in Latin America's economic growth rates increased the possibility of a default on existing loans to the region. The result was a reluctance to make new loans to Latin America, as evidenced by the dramatic reduction in new lending by commercial banks to the area and a growing inclination to return to the "good old days" of official financing of Third World development.

From the point of view of the Latin American borrowers, loans from commercial banks at commercial rates have also lost much of their attraction. The spectacular decline in the U.S. inflation rate, combined with high interest rates, have made such loans prohibitively expensive, even if the commercial banks were willing to make the necessary new money available to Latin America, which they are not. Like the commercial banks, the Latin American debtor countries support an increase in official financing of Third World development. Unlike the banks, however, they want official financing to supplement commercial lending rather than substitute for it.

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If any of the above possibilities — an economic slowdown in the United States, a relaxation of austerity measures in Latin America, or inadequate private commercial-bank lending — becomes a reality, Latin America will not have enough money to abide by its current debt servicing commitments. If all three possibilities become a reality, an entirely new and more drastic approach to the debt crisis will be in order.

Arguments are already being made to the effect that the current crisis cannot be solved with the kind of incrementalism represented by the Reagan administration's strategy. In the view of these critics, there is no way that the lesser developed countries (LDCs) can service their existing debts. It is therefore necessary to take more imaginative and dramatic steps now to avoid default and a collapse of the international financial system later.

Perhaps the best known of these plans are those that have been advanced by Felix Rohatyn and Peter Kenen. Rohatyn advocates swapping the commercial banks' old loans for long-term, low-interest bonds to be issued by an IMF or World Bank affiliate or some other institution that would then provide massive debt relief to the LDCs. Kenen proposes the creation of an International Debt Discount Corporation that would give the commercial banks a one-time opportunity to sell their LDC loans to it at a 10 per cent discount. Both the Rohatyn and Kenen plans are voluntary and involve the purchase at a discount of the commercial banks' Third World debts by some kind of official international institution. Two other proposals — those of Norman Bailey and Richard Weinert — also involve transforming commercial debt into official debt. Instead of setting a fixed, discounted interest rate for such debt, however, the latter plans propose to tie interest rates on any bonds that would be issued to an individual LDC's ability to pay, or, more specifically, to LDC export earnings.[11]

The strength of these plans is that they might prevent default in the short run by keeping official funds flowing to Latin America and other Third World areas. Their weakness is that they would probably convert the Latin American countries into even worse credit risks than they now are and thereby discourage future private lending to the region. Because such schemes entail both predictable and unpredictable risks, they are probably best reserved for worst-case scenarios.

In the meantime what will probably happen is that the U.S. economic recovery will continue. It will not, however, produce a spectacular increase in Latin America's export earnings for a number of reasons. First, the U.S. economic recovery will not generate equivalent

[11] Linda Sandler, "Is Discounting Sovereign Debt the Way Out?" *Institutional Investor,* July 1983, pp. 73-77.

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recoveries in the OECD countries and particularly, in non-Latin American LDC countries.[12] While the U.S. looms large as a trading partner for all Latin American countries, only Mexico sells as much as two-thirds of its exports to the United States. Brazil, in contrast, depends more on European and Third World markets. A U.S. recovery will therefore have less of a positive impact on Brazil's export opportunities than on those of Mexico.

Even if the markets existed for Latin America's exports, Latin America would be unable to export enough to take advantage of them because of its diminished capacity to import. Many of Latin America's manufactured exports require one or more imported parts. The shortage or outright unavailability of dollars, both in the public and private sectors, has undermined Latin America's ability to produce these goods for export.

Without a significant increase in Latin America's export earnings, it will become increasingly difficult for the countries in the region to service their debt. Whatever new money comes from private commercial banks will not eliminate the shortage of dollars needed to purchase necessary imports. At best, it will only enable Latin America to continue to pay some of the interest on its debt. It is also doubtful that expanded IMF or other official lending will solve the problem. In 1982, for example, total World Bank and other multilateral lending equaled only $10 billion. Even if the proposed $40 billion increase in the IMF's lendable resources is approved, it would cover less than a year's interest payments owed by Third World countries.[13]

To date, whatever success Latin American debtor countries have had in meeting their debt obligations has resulted in great part from efforts to implement IMF-sanctioned austerity programs requiring significant reductions in government spending that have freed funds for use in servicing existing debts. Yet the poor export outlook, domestic political pressures, and a growing sense among many Latin Americans that there is no light at the end of the "debt tunnel" will probably require Latin American governments to begin relaxing their austerity programs within a year or two. This would further decrease their ability to service their debts under existing terms.

Such a series of developments could perhaps lead to a declaration of default or a moratorium on the part of one or more Latin American countries. This option is already the subject of broad public discussion in Brazil. In Mexico and Argentina such discussions are still limited mainly to intellectuals and opposition party leaders.

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[12] Paul Lewis, "Lopsided Economic Recovery," *New York Times*, July 13, 1983.

[13] Richard S. Weinert, "International Finance: Banks and Bankruptcy," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1983, pp. 143-44.

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It is more likely that outright declarations of default or moratoria will be avoided, since less costly alternatives exist. First, ways will be sought to increase further the lending capabilities of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, as part of a general transition from the predominance of private commercial-bank lending characteristic of the 1970s to a predominance of official lending by governments and multilateral institutions by the late 1980s. The OECD governments — particularly the U.S. government because of its special relationship with Latin America — will have to make additional financing available to Latin America, as it did for Mexico and Brazil during 1982. The new loan guarantees by the Export-Import Bank for up to $1.5 billion for Brazil and $500 million for Mexico, which were announced by the United States in August, are probably the first of a number of such efforts.[14] The fact that the loans are trade-related is particularly significant, since it reflects a growing awareness that there cannot be a solution to the debt crisis that is divorced from an increase in Latin America's ability to export.

Ultimately, however, new schemes will have to be worked out to reduce the debt burden of the Latin American countries. To a certain extent this is already being done through a series of agreements that reschedule principal payments. What will probably follow are rescheduling of interest, after a period during which Latin American governments first announce, as some have already begun to do, a series of delays in meeting interest payment deadlines. The private commercial banks will strenuously resist such rescheduling of interest since it would devalue their assets and thereby affect their future lending capabilities. But ways can probably be found so that rescheduling or postponement of interest payments will affect only current income and therefore only that year's profits, rather than the bank's assets. While none of this would represent a perfect solution to the problem, it would at least be an equitable one in that all would share the costs of what will undoubtedly continue to be a very painful and anxiety-ridden transition to a new, slower-growing international economic order.

[14] *New York Times*, August 18, 1983.

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SOURCES OF THE AL-FATAH MUTINY*

by Adam M. Garfinkle

In early June of 1983, fighting broke out between opposing factions of the dominant group within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasir Arafat's al-Fatah. That the fighting took place in Lebanon, within Syrian-controlled territory, between members of an ostensibly united organization dedicated to "liberating" part or all of Palestine by defeating or destroying Israel, while Chairman Arafat himself resided in Tunis, gives some indication of how complicated the whole affair was. The events are still too recent for us to know with certainty important details about the roles of the Arab states — notably Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan — in trying to shape, manipulate, or stop the mutiny. Nevertheless, these events have not taken place in a historical vacuum; some facts are clear, and certain suppositions seem safe to make.

The catalyst that precipitated the mutiny and the subsequent fighting was a relatively minor matter: Arafat's appointment of two loyal subordinates to military commands in Lebanon's Beka'a valley met with the disapproval of some local PLO officers on the scene. But this quarrel over personalities reflected a much deeper division between Arafat and his closest advisers on the one hand, and a number of Fatah members in Lebanon on the other. These differences existed in sotto voce before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982, but the PLO's ineptitude as a military force in that war sharpened the subsequent search for flaws in the organization.[1] Ignominy in battle has a way of generating acrimony in politics.

The rebels, led in the field by Sa'id Musa Muragha (or "Abu Musa," as he is known in his "revolutionist" incarnation) and in Damascus

* I am grateful for the assistance of three Research Interns at the Foreign Policy Research Institute for the collection and organization of data pertaining to this essay. They are: Elizabeth Arnold, Aaron Gershowitz, and Patricia Saperstein.

[1] Of the casualties Israel suffered during the month of June 1982, over 85 per cent were inflicted by Syrian forces. PLO forces were dispersed, forced into disorderly retreat, and taken prisoner in embarrassing numbers.

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by Nimr Salih (Abu Salih), complained of Arafat's chronic absenteeism from the field of battle, the high living of some of his closest compatriots, and his undemocratic arrogation of PLO authority. But most of all, they opposed what they believed to be Arafat's traitorous moderation, illustrated by his meetings with Israeli doves, his flirtation with the Reagan Plan (which specifically precludes an independent Palestinian state), and his related attempts to seal a political deal with Jordan's King Hussein in order to enter negotiations with Israel under U.S. aegis. The rebels feared that the appointment of the two Arafat loyalists to commands in the last refuge of PLO military power, immediately following the Lebanese-Israeli accord of May 7 which the PLO formally opposed, presaged a PLO evacuation of all of Lebanon. Such a step they regarded as a sign of Arafat's impending final "capitulation" to the United States and Israel.

By mid May, two main factions had coalesced and had begun jockeying for logistical position in the Beka'a valley and in the environs of Damascus. From the very start, the Syrian regime of Hafiz al-Asad aided the rebels, at first somewhat passively and later with alacrity. There were reports of Libyan intrigues on the side of the rebels as well. Heavy fighting erupted in June, and the rebels routed Arafat loyalists, killing many of them and pushing the rest toward Tripoli. After more than a month of alternate fighting, maneuvering, negotiating, truce making and truce breaking, the schism took on an air of permanence. So too did the split between Arafat and the Syrian regime; he was expelled from Syria — and thereby kept from direct contact with his loyal forces in Lebanon — on June 24.

Despite the efforts of outside mediators, or perhaps because of them, no significant progress has been made in settling any of the divisions that have arisen. Given the various forces at work, it is unlikely that the rift will ever be healed completely. Even in the unlikely circumstance of a resolution, the conditions required to bring it about will leave both al-Fatah and the PLO very different organizations from what they were originally.

The al-Fatah mutiny and its lingering aftermath throw light on a number of subjects germane to the intelligent conduct of U.S. Middle East policy. A short list includes: (1) the nature of the PLO and al-Fatah as organizations; (2) the character of support for the PLO by the majority of the Palestinian people; (3) the relationship between the PLO and al-Fatah on the one hand and the Arab states on the other; and (4) the long-term impact of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on the evolution of Palestinian nationalism. An understanding of these four subjects, seen in the light of the mutiny, suggests certain judgments about U.S. policies over the past eighteen months. Those policies, conceived and implemented by the Department of State and endorsed enthusiastically by the president,

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rested on certain assumptions, some of which were at considerable variance with reality. Because of them, the United States did not anticipate the mutiny, did not understand correctly the Syrian role in it or the implications for U.S. policies in the region, and did not see the opportunity that the whole affair presents to recast, and thereby save, the Reagan Plan, which even the administration now (wrongly) believes to be dead.

It will not be easy to undo the damage of the past year's policies; the wholesale shifting of U.S. diplomatic personnel alone is not likely to be of much help unless a more realistic and less casual approach to U.S. diplomacy is developed.[2] Although it appears that the balance of power in the Reagan administration's foreign policy has shifted from the State Department to the National Security Council, there is still no guarantee that desirable changes will be made. The unsuccessful have been turned out, but their successors are short on experience with the Middle East and, depending on the outcome of the 1984 presidential elections, they may be short on time as well.

This essay briefly recounts the history of the PLO and its beleaguered chairman, without which the events of the past year are unintelligible. Next, it relates the proximate background of the mutiny from the bunkers of west Beirut to the battlefields of the Beka'a valley, and sketches the main events of the mutiny itself. Finally, the essay outlines U.S. policy options in the face of a new constellation of local forces, and suggests the best next step toward peace.

Historical Notes

"Palestine" lies at the heart of the contradiction that bedevils contemporary Arab politics. It represents at once the failure of the Arabs to confront and vanquish fully their alien foes; yet the persistence of the conflict has served the ruling elites of the Arab states well as a symbol of their political legitimacy. The linkage between Palestine and the politics of the Arab states lies in the special character of modern Arab nationalism. Arab nationalist intellectuals, holding as an ideal Golden Age the unified Arab Muslim empire of the tenth century, long sought to blame Europe for latter-day divisions, poverty, and strife among the Arabs. This historical vision of unity and greatness has given modern inter-Arab politics an unusual quality: despite the parochial interests of each state and its ruling elite, Arab leaders grant their counterparts rights of interference in each

[2] The reference here is to the replacement of Nicholas Veliotes as assistant secretary of state, NEA, with Robert Murphy, former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia; the replacement of Ambassador Philip Habib by Robert McFarlane; and the general downgrading of the State Department's control over policy in general. For a slightly contorted view of the background to this, see the cover feature on Judge Clark in the *New York Times Magazine* of August 13, 1983.

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other's affairs inconceivable in other regions of the world where peoples of similar culture reside side by side.[3] It is regarded as right and proper for Arab leaders to pass judgment on their fellows, as long as the ultimate aim is the promotion of Arab unity and the defeat of "Western imperialism."

From the beginning, the Arabs blamed the Palestine problem on the British and the Zionists, presumed erroneously to be an integral part of the European imperial conspiracy. Arab nationalists built into their ideology the concept that European imperialists and their Zionist conspirators prevented the reunification of the Arab world and the assumption by the Arab nation of its rightful place among the great powers. When, in the years immediately following World War II, a number of Arab states became politically independent — as did Israel — Palestine became the central Pan-Arab issue. The more dramatic vision of the triumph of Arab nationalism held that the battle over Palestine would unify the Arab states, defeat the Zionists, thrust the imperialists from the area as their Crusader ancestors had been ousted in centuries past, and mark the dawn of the renaissance of Arab civilization.

But the rhetoric of renewal and the reality of Arab capabilities differed dramatically. Local Palestinian Arab forces proved inept, and the invading forces of the Arab states were as much concerned with inter-Arab competition — Syrian nationalists versus Egyptian monarchists versus Hashemite Emirs — as with seizing Palestine for the Palestinians. The invasion failed completely, except for the occupation of part of Arab Palestine by King Abdallah's Transjordanian forces. But rather than turn this area, which came to be known as the West Bank, over to the Palestinians to rule as they saw fit, Abdallah kept it for himself.[4] Even as the leaders of the other Arab states assailed Abdallah for this selfishness, most of them were made to pay the price for failure in 1948-49. In Egypt, for example, King Farouk's monarchy was overthrown in 1952 by a group of junior officers who had participated in the Palestine War of 1948 and had been humiliated by the corruption and venality of their government.

Although the Arab governments of 1948-49 had discredited themselves with the Palestine issue, their successors still could not let go of it. The Palestine cause was taken up by the new generation of Arab nationalists, epitomized by Gamal 'abd an-Nasir's Egypt. After the Suez War of 1956, Nasir stood at the height of his power and shook the rest

[3] See Daniel Pipes, "How Important Is the PLO?" *Commentary,* April 1983, especially pages 18-19; and David Pryce-Jones, "Requiem for Arafat," *New Republic,* August 15 and 22, 1983, pp. 19-21.

[4] Abdallah's occupation of part of Arab Palestine was a politically complex affair. For a brief account, see my "Negotiating by Proxy: Jordanian Foreign Policy and U.S. Options in the Middle East," ORBIS, Winter 1981, pp. 850-51, and for a more complete account, see the sources cited therein.

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of the Arab world to its foundations. But Egypt's power and prestige were diminished by the 1958 Iraqi revolution, the dissolution of the United Arab Republic in 1961, and Egyptian intervention in the Yemeni civil war in 1964.

As was the case in 1948, Nasir and his challengers tried to capitalize on the Palestine issue as they vied for regional pre-eminence and sought to deepen their domestic legitimacy. In 1964, Nasir founded the Palestine Liberation Organization and set up its headquarters, radio station, and paramilitary organization in Cairo. But it was not long before pawnlike competitors of the PLO arose elsewhere. After the Ba'athist coup of February 1966, the Syrian government greatly increased its support for a small, more militant challenger to Egypt's PLO, Yasir Arafat's al-Fatah. Between February 1966 and May 1967, Syria and Egypt escalated the use of their respective Palestinian organizations against Israel, thereby creating much of the tension that led to the June 1967 War. Once again, parochial Arab competition garbed in the pan-Arabist ideology of the Palestine issue led the Arabs to disaster.

Arab defeat in June 1967 had a profound impact on Middle Eastern politics. First, the Arab states on whom the Palestinians had depended for their salvation were discredited, the Egyptian-sponsored PLO along with them. In their place arose the revolutionary fedayeen movement, which had continued the "armed struggle" from Jordanian territory even after the guns of the Arab armies had fallen silent. By 1969, the fedayeen had captured the imagination of the Palestinians and disgruntled intellectuals throughout the Arab world; in that year al-Fatah seized the organizational corpse of the PLO and reversed the putative flow of Arab liberationist ideology — the "liberation" of Palestine was no longer seen as the final triumph of the Arab revival, but rather as its galvanizing first act.

The fedayeen stole the thunder of the Arab states, but they were still heavily dependent on them in many ways: for a territorial base, for money, for weapons, and for a variety of diplomatic "favors" outside the Middle East. What independence they had derived from exploiting the competition among their patrons and the weakness of their hosts. In this way, the PLO remained a creature of the Arab states, though in a somewhat less direct way than before 1967. The support that the PLO received was crucial, however, even if its independence was modest, because between 1967 and 1974 the PLO failed almost completely in building any significant following among the masses of Palestinian people either in the West Bank, Israel proper, Jordan, or Lebanon.

A second consequence of the 1967 War was that the Israeli occupation of Syrian, Egyptian, and (de facto if not de jure) Jordanian

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territory changed the stakes between Israel and its immediate neighbors. For the first time, the more parochial interest of these Arab states merged to a considerable degree with those of the Palestinians themselves. "Palestine" was no longer a cudgel with which to wage inter-Arab battles but was intertwined with the most practical of issues. In retrospect, this merging of the abstract pan-Arab aspects of the Palestine problem with the concrete interests of the Arab states is what ultimately drove some of them — especially Egypt — to moderate their position on the Arab-Israeli question as a whole.

A third effect was that Israel's occupation of the West Bank forced many Palestinians to flee the area and become refugees for either the first or second time. While large numbers fled across the river into Jordan's East Bank, many others despaired of taking a second helping of Jordanian occupation and chose instead to go to Lebanon. Their arrival set the stage for the disintegration of the fragile Lebanese political system some eight years later and, ultimately, led to the events of the summer of 1982.

Finally, the War brought the superpowers into the politics of the region as never before. The superpowers wre interested mainly in the state-to-state dimension of the Arab-Israeli crisis, but the simultaneous re-emergence of the Palestinian facet of the conflict vaulted the "Palestine problem" into world political consciousness for the first time since 1948. Still, two other events were required to bring the Palestine problem to the position of centrality within the Arab-Israeli conflict that it holds today. The first was the Jordanian civil war of 1970, and the second was the October War of 1973 and the changes that ensued.

Between 1968 and 1970, al-Fatah and the smaller splinter organizations that together made up the new PLO erected a state-within-a-state in Jordan, forcing Hashemite authority into retreat. During the War of Attrition (1969-70) begun by Egypt, the PLO maintained military "fronts" against Israel in both Lebanon and Jordan, provoking Israeli retaliation against both. In August 1970, when Egypt and then Jordan agreed to U.S.-sponsored initiatives to end the fighting and start negotiations for a political settlement, the PLO turned its guns on its hosts in Jordan. Just as the 1967 War had fused the Pan-Arabist ideologies of the Arab states with their own parochial problems, the U.S.-brokered diplomacy of 1970 threatened to sever them anew. The PLO itself was divided. The relative moderates of al-Fatah believed that the fedayeen movement could magnify its importance by joining, at a safe political distance, the Egyptian and Jordanian negotiating program.[5] Implicit in this position was

[5] By the term "relative moderate" I am trying to avoid the misconception that as of the early 1970s there were important elements in the PLO favoring compromise with Israel. There were not. The differences between moderate and rejectionist had to do with tactics, not goals. Moderates favored mixing diplomacy with armed struggle; radicals preferred the revolutionary purity and catharsis of violence. Moderates were willing to deal with all of the Arab states; radicals wished to overthrow the more conservative among them. The moderates were open to relations with both superpowers and to interim victories; the radicals were not.

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the prospect of an eventual compromise with Israel. But the more radical splinter groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), sought to destroy the prospects for negotiations by destroying the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan and, at the same time, enhance the power of the radicals in the PLO at the expense of al-Fatah. In opposing Egyptian and Jordanian policies, the PLO radicals found friends of the moment in Syria and Iraq. In their romantic revolutionary hubris, they provoked a Jordanian civil war which Arafat tried in vain to prevent. The fedayeen lost badly. Promised Iraqi help never materialized and a half-hearted Syrian intervention — part of a slow-motion coup d'état completed by Hafiz al-Asad in November — was thwarted by U.S.-Israeli intimidation and Jordanian armed force.

After the PLO's defeat in Jordan and its final, ruthless expulsion a year later, the PLO turned in earnest to the politics of weakness — terrorism.[6] The PLO terror campaign of 1971-73 was directed against both Israeli civilians and the PLO's Arab enemies in the Middle East and in Europe. It was more successful in Europe; the Arab states clamped down hard on their Palestinian residents and on PLO activity, well aware that what had happened in Jordan might happen in their own countries.

As the novelty of terrorism began to wear off, and as the Palestinian issue grew tiresome to much of the international community, war erupted again in the Middle East. The October War was a military demonstration fought for political effect. It brought Saudi Arabia into the core of an Arab politico-military coalition against Israel, since the Saudis were finally able simultaneously to absorb the costs of an embargo and to finance a war. The fawning of the Western world at the feet of the Arab oil parvenus in 1974-75 added a new dimension to the diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As the marginal and central concerns of the Arab states had been joined by the 1967 War, so were the marginal and central Middle Eastern interests of the Western democracies joined by the 1973 War and the accompanying dislocation of the international petroleum market. The Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, promoted the Palestinian issue in the West with great success. West European — and other — countries quickly forgot their solemn avowals to Israel and recognized the PLO. Yasir Arafat appeared at the United Nations, gun in holster, in 1974; the next year, in a spasm of Orwellian hypocrispeak, the General Assembly condemned Zionism as a form of racism. Saudi

[6] This expulsion in 1971, from the forests of Ajlun, was the source of Black September, not the civil war of the previous year, as is commonly thought.

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Arabia portrayed its oil policies as being politically motivated, even though far less dramatic economic factors explained Saudi policies quite thoroughly.[7] Nevertheless, frightened people are not as sensitive to the nuances of political theater as calmer souls: thus was born the supposed link between Arab oil largesse to the West and "progress on the Palestine issue," which — defined more honestly — meant U.S. pressure on Israel.

In one sense, these international successes of the PLO were ironic. Whatever their rhetoric, Egypt and Syria had not spilled blood on behalf of the Palestinians, and certainly not on behalf of the PLO. They fought on behalf of their own national interests, narrowly construed, and when, after the fighting, U.S. diplomacy opened up prospects for a political settlement, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria all showed interest. U.S. diplomacy achieved small but significant successes between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Syria in 1974, with prospects of deeper progress ahead. This again brought the PLO to a difficult choice. As in 1970, the relative moderates took an interest in U.S.-brokered diplomacy while the radicals were bent on foiling it. By the autumn of 1975, Egypt and Syria, erstwhile allies in war, had diverged sharply in their approaches to peace. The PLO's relative moderates looked cautiously to Egypt; most of the radicals fell in with Syria.

The twelfth Palestine National Congress (PNC), held in the autumn of that year, demonstrated the split clearly. The moderates pushed through a program calling for the establishment of a "national authority" in any part of liberated Palestine, the so-called Phased Program.[8] To the radicals, this program implied compromise with Israel and repudiation of the goal of liberating all of Palestine. The 1974 PNC also called for the continuation of international diplomacy; the radicals urged the revolutionary purity of "armed struggle." Finally, the PNC urged good relations with all the Arab states, including the newly wealthy and powerful ones like Saudi Arabia; the radicals, however, looked upon Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other conservative states as representing all that was squalid and reactionary in the Arab world. Not surprisingly, the radicals bolted the PNC and even took a few disgruntled members of al-Fatah with them, forming what became known as the Rejectionist Front. The possibility of ultimate compromise with Israel that had been dimly implicit in 1970 was still far from explicit in 1974, but it was nearer the cognitive surface

[7] See Eliyahu Kanovsky, "Deficits in Saudi Arabia: Their Meaning and Possible Implications," in Colin Legum and Haim Shaked, eds., *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, vol. 2, 1977-1978 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), especially pages 340-49; and Douglas J. Feith, "The Oil Weapon Demystified," *Policy Review*, Winter 1981, pp. 18-39.

[8] For a brief analysis, see Aaron David Miller, *The PLO and the Politics of Survival*, Washington Papers, no. 99, vol. 11 (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 33-34.

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even among those who could not bring themselves to speak aloud about compromise solutions.

Al-Fatah's gradual ideological moderation did not have intellectual first causes; there were more important concrete institutional factors at work. Al-Fatah's budget depended increasingly on Saudi Arabia, and while the Saudi view of the Palestinian issue was in no way moderate, the Saudis preferred the more traditional nationalists of al-Fatah to the Marxists of the PFLP. Moreover, as U.S. peace diplomacy progressed in the 1974-76 period, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and, at times, Syria pressed the PLO to moderate its position and participate in a political process aimed toward peace. As part reward, part incentive for the PLO's moderation, the Arab states recognized the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" at the Rabat Summit of October 1974.

Though the PLO mainstream tried to play the diplomatic game with the Arab states in the period following Rabat, divisions among the Arabs made such tightrope walking exceedingly difficult. First, Egyptian policy under Anwar es-Sadat was much too conciliatory for the rest of the Arab world and the relative moderates within al-Fatah to associate with in earnest, as was demonstrated by the terms of the 1975 Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement and, two years later, by Sadat's dramatic trip to Jerusalem. But this was not the only problem. After their expulsion from Jordan, PLO headquarters were transferred to Lebanon, where veteran PLO politicos joined Palestinian refugee communities formed in 1948 and 1967. By 1975, the PLO had helped local Lebanese Muslim radicals throw Lebanon into civil war.

During the civil war, the PLO and Syria tried to use each other for their own purposes. Sometimes these "uses" brought al-Fatah and the Asad regime together, at other times it drove them apart. The PLO's main interest lay in protecting the autonomy of the PLO's second state-within-a-state in southern Lebanon adjacent to the Israeli border. This goal naturally led to alliance with Lebanon's anti-status quo Muslims. Syria's main interest lay in maximizing control over both the government in Beirut and the PLO (partly through Damascus's wholly owned PLO subsidiary, as-Saiqa), the better to associate Syria's goals vis-à-vis the Golan Heights with the Palestinian question writ large. Syria opposed the victory of the Lebanese Muslim left in the civil war and it opposed PLO "military" forays into Israel that threatened to bring the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) that much closer to Damascus via the Beka'a valley. This brought the PLO and Syria to blows and, interestingly, also resulted in a quiet un-

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derstanding between Israel and Syria over their respective security concerns in Lebanon.[9]

With the Syrian army in Lebanon sitting astride the PLO's home away from home, and Egypt effectively out of the Arab war camp after 1977, Arafat's dependence on Syria grew. The PLO tried to offset this dependence by cultivating ties with Saudi Arabia and even Iraq, by increasing its political standing on the West Bank, by cautiously reopening a political dialogue with Jordan, and by going "over the head" of the Asad regime directly to Syria's benefactors in Moscow. None of this, however, could really efface the proximity of Fatahland to Syrian power. It was ironic that the PLO enjoyed as much breathing space as it did in southern Lebanon because of Syria's fears of coming to blows with Israel!

Between the calming of the Lebanese civil war in 1976 and the Israeli invasion of 1982, PLO diplomacy was thwarted by circumstances and by illusion. The PLO could irritate Israel but it could not really jeopardize its security. It could not provoke war between Israel and Syria even if it wished to do so. It could not respond boldly to repeated U.S. overtures during the Carter administration for fear of splitting the organization and arousing Syrian (and also Saudi) ire. So the PLO did what was available to it: it enhanced its international status, tried to preserve maximum intergroup harmony (made easier by the continued accumulation of weapons and money), traded favors with other "liberation" organizations, and worked to deepen its base of operations in Lebanon. The illusion was that ultimately the United States would recognize and deal with the PLO and thus relieve its paralysis.

The PLO's Lebanese state-within-a-state was far more sophisticated than that which it had built in Jordan and, thanks to Arab oil money, far more wealthy. The freewheeling Lebanese economy, which was well organized to accommodate intercommunal competition, seemed to mesmerize the PLO. After a time, Lebanon became the de facto home of the PLO leadership, some of whom had become successful local entrepreneurs and property owners. The opportunity for officials at all levels to threaten, bribe, and plunder the local Lebanese population was almost limitless during and after the civil war. Although it was not Palestine, it had definite advantages, at least for those who were well connected to the PLO hierarchy.

[9] The full story of the "red line" policy, particularly the role played by U.S. diplomacy, has yet to be told — it will probably have to await the next volume of Henry Kissinger's memoirs. In the meantime, see the account of former Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin in *Yedi'ot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), September 30, 1977, and interviews, one of Shimon Peres and one of Menachem Begin, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), May 5, 1981, p. I5, and May 6, 1981, p. I2.

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Beirut, Damascus, Tunis

While the PLO was treading water politically between 1977 and 1982, Menachem Begin's Likud coalition, offspring of the Revisionist Zionist schism of the 1930s, came to power with very different notions about the West Bank and Gaza from its Labor predecessors. Labor had been willing to consider territorial compromise in the West Bank in return for peace with Jordan and a solution to the Palestinian problem as part of that peace. The Likud, however, looked upon the West Bank and Gaza not as Israeli occupied territory, but as liberated territory never again to be subject to "alien" Arab rule. The fact that the overwhelming majority of the population in these areas was Arab did not worry Likud members; the same had been true of Israel proper between the time of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the War of 1948. The Likud government embarked upon a settlements policy in the West Bank which was oriented not primarily to security considerations, but to long-term demographic ones. The scale of the program was larger than Labor's earlier modest efforts, and the intent was clearly to absorb the territories as a whole for the long term.

It did not take long before the local population realized what was happening to them, and support for the PLO in the West Bank was galvanized as never before. The PLO had not previously been very popular in the West Bank for a number of reasons, some of them dating back to the family feuds of the Mandate period.[10] After Rabat, PLO popularity grew considerably, as was evidenced by the 1976 municipal elections in the West Bank. This was in part because Israeli authorities had prevented any alternative Palestinian voice from developing by banning regionwide Arab political organizing. But it was only with the coming of Likud policies that support for the PLO on the West Bank approached unanimity.

Throughout the period of Israeli-Egyptian-U.S. negotiations that led ultimately to Camp David and the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, West Bank Palestinians waited hopefully; but for the most part, they were disappointed by what they saw. Their disappointment was reinforced by a campaign of PLO intimidation through assassination and a campaign of Likud intimidation through increased settlement activity. As Israel appeared to succeed in its goal of making peace with Egypt without yielding sovereignty on the West Bank, violence on the West Bank became more commonplace and more serious.

[10] For background, see Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, 1917-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979); and the two-volume work by Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National Movement* (London: Frank Cass, 1974 and 1979). For a briefer account, see my chapter "Genesis," in A. Z. Rubinstein, ed., *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Perspectives* (New York: Praeger, forthcoming 1984).

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Some members of the Israeli cabinet evidently believed that the rising militancy and violence on the West Bank was more the consequence of the PLO's international image and its stable residence in Lebanon than a response to new Israeli occupation and settlements policies. The reluctance of the local population to support and participate in the Camp David-wrought transitional autonomy scheme, more specifically, was thought to be solely a consequence of PLO intimidation that emanated, ultimately, from Beirut. Some reasoned that if the PLO were dealt a blow in Lebanon, then the West Bank's worrisome turn toward radicalism could be reversed, thereby opening the way to a successful conclusion to the autonomy negotiations along lines acceptable to Israel.[11]

Though there were clearly several immediate objectives for the initial Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982, and numerous legal justifications deriving from PLO violations of a July 1981 ceasefire, these factors cannot account for the full scope of Israeli operations; only the destruction of the PLO's independent base of operations in Lebanon, with an eye keenly trained on the impact in the West Bank, can explain them in full. Israel's military objectives in the south were achieved in a matter of days; equally rapid was the defeat of Syrian forces trying to protect not the PLO but the strategic integrity of Syria itself. The final expulsion of the PLO from west Beirut was far more time-consuming, but this had less to do with Israeli military mastery in Lebanon than with U.S. diplomatic mediation and the perturbations it caused within U.S.-Israeli relations.

The Reagan administration was not of a single mind over Israeli policies in Lebanon either before or after June 6, 1982.[12] Before the Israeli invasion, however, differences within the administration revealed themselves on other matters — AWACS, for example — as State Department officials labored to preserve the ceasefire that Ambassador Philip Habib had managed to seal in July 1981. With the beginning of the war, other clear differences emerged. Secretary of State Haig saw the Israeli action as an opportunity to advance a broader solution to Lebanon's problems and perhaps even to speed movement in the autonomy negotiations, which had been stalled by Israel's withdrawal schedule from Sinai, elections in both the United States and Israel, and the assassination of President Sadat in October 1981. Haig reasoned that the United States, though it did not promote or condone the Israeli invasion, did not wish to pay the

[11] See the analysis by Ze'ev Schiff, "What Prevented War in the North," *Ha'aretz,* May 23, 1982, p. 9, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), May 26, 1982, p. I1.

[12] The following account parallels the longer narrative by this author that appeared as "U.S. Diplomacy in the Middle East's Double Crisis of 1982," *Grand Strategy: Countercurrents,* May 15, 1983, pp. 4-6.

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price to stop a determined Israel. Thus, it made more sense to think about the future uses of the invasion than to recriminate over the past. The Israeli invasion might reverse the Syrian and PLO occupations of the country. If the Lebanese problem could be unfrozen, and if the PLO's demise might make Israel more forthcoming in the autonomy talks, then perhaps the invasion might lead to progress in the long run.

Other members of the administration were more concerned about how Israeli actions would be received by the Arabs, the Saudis in particular. There was concern that Israel's actions dragged the prestige of the United States along with them and compromised U.S. interests in the Arab world. To save these interests, Washington must now put maximum distance between itself and the Israelis, not only in words but in deeds. A corollary to this view was that Israeli action would drive the Arabs in general and the PLO in particular away from moderation and conciliation toward extremism and terrorism.

These specific differences were girded by even deeper, more fundamental disagreement. Some held that U.S. relations with the Arabs were more important in the long run than U.S. relations with Israel, and therefore that Washington should press Israel in order to improve its relations with the Arabs. Haig valued Israel more as an ally and felt that in the absence of good relations with Israel, no U.S. policy in the area could succeed. Haig never accepted the zero-sum postulation that relations with the Arabs could only be improved by pressing Israel. On the contrary, he reasoned, a serious deterioration of U.S.-Israeli relations would bring with it a diminution of U.S. leverage on Israel; as a result, the Arabs would lose interest in Washington in proportion to its diminished ability to deliver Israeli concessions. Finally, Haig contended that U.S.-Arab dealings over oil or the defense of the Persian Gulf need not be dictated by the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The improvement of U.S.-Arab military cooperation with the emergence of the Iranian threat seems to have borne this out.

It was Haig's idea that the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon be linked to the eventual exit of all foreign forces from Lebanon, Israeli and Syrian forces included. But first it was necessary to settle the matter of the PLO. By the end of the second week in June, this seemed to be within reach. Israel had eavesdropped on Yasir Arafat's radio communications in Beirut and had learned that the PLO was willing to leave the city without house-to-house combat.[13] Israel informed the State Department that it did not envision a need to enter west Beirut, and that it depended instead on U.S. diplomacy to achieve the desired result. But

[13] See Hedrick Smith, "P.L.O. Reportedly Willing To Lay Down Its Weapons," *New York Times*, June 18, 1982.

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the U.S. fell afoul of the Reagan administration's penchant for speaking with more than one voice. As Secretary Haig attempted to parlay the threat of an Israeli attack into a peaceful PLO withdrawal, others suggested that policy had not yet been decided, that Israel had *pledged* not to enter west Beirut at U.S. insistence, and that changes in U.S. policy were imminent, an impression solidified by Haig's abrupt resignation shortly thereafter.[14] With this the PLO changed its mind about an early exit from west Beirut, hoping to exploit the widening rift between Israel and the United States. Clearly, the only way to force the PLO to leave was through Israeli military pressure, and with each bombing run, U.S.-Israeli relations plummeted further. Secretary Haig's resignation on June 25 intensified the breach.

Throughout much of July and most of August, as the PLO practiced hostage taking on a grand scale, the United States and Israel were embroiled in an argument over the most expeditious way to get the PLO out of Beirut. Whereas the Israelis were convinced that only heavy military pressure could force the PLO to negotiate seriously, Washington worried that Israeli bombings would compromise the very basis of U.S. mediation as it filtered through the many levels of Lebanese mediators to the PLO. The United States had to wrest promises of restraint from Israel and see to it that they were kept. But by mid August, parts of the Reagan administration were happy to play up U.S.-Israeli disagreement for the purpose of mending presumedly injured relations with the Arabs. The administration also hoped to be able to parlay its new image into broad Arab support for refurbished U.S. policies on the central Palestinian issues. Thus was born the Reagan Plan, as it came to be known, which, for all its substantive merit, came into being for the wrong reasons and was made public at the wrong time.[15]

In the end, the Israelis increased the military pressure on the PLO despite U.S. remonstrations, and by August 15, the beginning of the end of the PLO's residency in west Beirut could be seen. After an anxious week spent finding hospitable destinations for exiled PLO fighters and arranging a Multi-National Force (MNF) to oversee the evacuation, the PLO exit began on August 21, ending on September 2. The agreement reached between Israel and the PLO (with Lebanese and U.S. go-betweens) was far from perfect, however. The PLO did not hand over its

[14] See Steven R. Weisman, "Officials in White House Tie Move to Mideast, Soviet Debates," *New York Times,* June 26, 1982; and Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan's Advisors Said to Be Divided On Lebanese Crisis," *New York Times,* June 21, 1982.

[15] An early indication in print that something was afoot was Bernard Weinraub, "U.S. Finds 'Profound Differences' in Assessing Relations with Israel," *New York Times,* August 8, 1982. As the headline indicates, the motives behind the initiative were tied to administration determination to punish Israel for its actions during the siege of Beirut, and thereby enhance its image in Arab eyes. For details, see Morton Kondracke, "Shultz's First Move," *New Republic,* October 4, 1982, pp. 13-16.

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heavy weapons to the Lebanese army as it had promised, and after the assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel on September 14 and the premature exit of the Multi-National Force, Israel did not stay out of west Beirut as it had promised. The massacre of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps by Christian Phalangist troops on September 15 and 16, while the camps were under the "protection" of the IDF, was the gruesome aftershock of a war without heroes.

What happened at Sabra and Shatilla did not really change the main verdict of the war so much as it changed the flow of the mercurial Israeli-Phalangist relationship and altered the reaction and judgments — moral and political — to the war inside Israel. In addition, the massacres hurt Yasir Arafat's credibility inside the PLO. Part of the agreement worked out between Israel and the PLO included written promises given by the United States to the PLO that Israel would not enter west Beirut and that the MNF would protect Palestinian civilians left in Lebanon. After the massacres, Arafat, by now a resident of Tunis, blamed the United States; but many of the defeated, demoralized, and horror-stricken PLO fighters, those in exile and those still in Lebanon behind Syrian lines, chose instead to blame Arafat for ever having trusted the Americans. To deflect the attack on him, Arafat met with President Asad in Damascus in what was generally (but prematurely) described as a reconciliation. The public proceedings of the day were an orgy of anti-American abuse.[16]

The mutiny of the summer of 1983 was a delayed consequence, inevitable in retrospect, of the reshaping of local politics in the wake of the Lebanese War. The fallout from Sabra and Shatilla was really the least of Arafat's problems. His main problem, stemming from the loss of Lebanon as a semi-independent base of operations, was that the Arab states, for whom Palestinian politics always posed both dangers and opportunities, vied with each other anew for influence over the organization. Of particular importance in this regard was the conflict between Syria and Jordan.

Syria's interest in the Palestine issue is rooted in the fact that Syrian nationalists, in their grandest dreams, not only consider Lebanon to be a part of "greater Syria" but also consider Palestine to be "southern" Syria. At the very least, Syria has pretensions to strong regional influence. Syria's Pan-Arab ambitions are, if anything, strengthened by the rule of a heterodox Muslim minority — the Alawites — who dare not appear to be less patriotically Arab than their Sunni countrymen. Also, Damascus holds the Palestinian issue hostage for the sake of the Golan Heights, fearing to be left isolated either to fight or to negotiate with Israel. On a

[16] See Henry Tanner, "In a 'Reconciliation,' Arafat Has Long Talk with Asad," *New York Times*, September 20, 1982.

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different level, the Syrian feud with Jordan means that if Syria were to stop trying to control the Palestinian national movement, the Jordanians might prevail, as they have been trying to do since the 1930s.

Jordan's concern with the Palestine issue is, on one count, a mirror image of Syria's: Amman cannot cede the issue to the Syrians for fear that Damascus would use the movement against Jordan as it tried to do in 1970. More fundamental is the Palestinian demography of Jordan itself.[17] To ignore the West Bank today and thus avoid confrontation with Israel is not a realistic option for King Hussein, although some beduin chiefs and traditional east bankers urge this course of action. It is a policy that would alienate Jordan's body politic to a very dangerous degree. Moreover, Jordan is desirous of peace as long as peace does not entail greater risks to the monarchy than does the status quo. But a settlement with Israel that means something more than surrender through disengagement demands involvement in the Palestine issue, like it or not.

In recent years, Syria has held certain advantages in the competition by virtue of its physical proximity to the PLO stronghold in Lebanon, its willingness to funnel weapons to the PLO, and its general ideological commonality with the PLO mainstream. Whereas Jordan's ideal terms for a settlement certainly preclude an independent Palestinian state and include normal relations with Israel, Syria's (ostensibly) do not. But Jordan has advantages, too. Its government rules more Palestinians than any other, and it has historically grounded institutional ties in the West Bank far stronger than those of any other Arab state. Moreover, Jordan has much better relationships with the United States, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia than does Syria; those PLO moderates who understand the role that these countries play in the region are sensitive not to exclude themselves from relations with them.

The war in Lebanon aided Jordan in the competition in a number of ways. First, it dispersed the PLO away from Syrian-controlled territory and thus loosened Syrian control. Jordan was helped further by the widening Fatah-Syrian cold war. Arafat and Asad had not been particularly fond of each other since they ordered their soldiers to kill each other during the Lebanese civil war. But Syria's agreement to a quick ceasefire with Israel in the summer of 1982 and its obvious disinclination to help the PLO in its time of greatest peril brought Arafat's blood to a boil. It seems, too, that the Asad regime used its power over residual PLO units in Lebanon to stack the PLO deck in favor of as-Saiqa and other groups willing to do business with Damascus, and against Arafat.

[17] Jordan's Palestinian population is socially and politically heterogeneous based on approximate time of arrival in Jordan. For a short discussion, see Peter Gubser, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983), pp. 15-18.

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Syria welcomed back to Damascus Abu Nidal's renegade Black June group, whose most refined talent seemed to be the murder of Palestinian moderates. In late September, PLO Chief of Staff Saad Sayel (Abu Walid) was gunned down behind Syrian lines in the Beka'a valley. News reports said that radical Lebanese Shia Muslims (Amal) had been responsible, but others saw the hand of the Syrian mukabarat (secret police). Sayel was at one time a colonel in the Jordanian military and reportedly traveled frequently to Jordan to see family and friends, and was identified with Fatah's most moderate wing.

A second advantage to Jordan was that, contrary to the predictions of many, the war did not radicalize either the Arab states, the Palestinian community, or the PLO, but instead brought forth a certain moderation, as was demonstrated by the Fez Summit of early September 1982 and by the strong support on the West Bank for a PLO-Jordanian negotiating condominium in the wake of the Reagan Plan. The turn toward moderation not only buoyed the Jordanian role but implied as well the return of Egypt to a more prominent role in inter-Arab politics. President Hosni Mubarak was quick to see this implication and was eager to praise the Reagan Plan. Egyptian-Jordanian relations, which had been broken formally but not operationally, grew closer.

The Saudi position in all this maneuvering was more complicated. On the one hand, Riyadh had a modest interest in promoting both moderation in the PLO (because this meant enhancing the power of the least pro-Soviet elements) and a settlement with Israel (because this might simplify Saudi Arabia's relations with the United States). Riyadh also had its share of disagreements with Damascus. But though the Saudi and Syrian regimes disagreed about the Gulf War, about the Americans and the Russians, about religion, and about the Fahd Plan–Fez Plan Arab consensus, Riyadh still refused to pressure Damascus or to help the Jordanians overcome Syrian obstructionism. This Saudi timidity derived from its fear of Syrian violence, its lingering jealousy over the Hashemite role in Palestine, and, perhaps, unlikely ties of kinship between the al-Saud and Syria.[18] Saudi intercession between the PLO and the United States in March and April 1983 had the effect of complicating and injuring Hussein's attempt to forge a deal with Arafat. The Saudis did not back Jordan so much as provide the PLO a separate channel to Washington, the effect of which was to undermine both the king's credibility with Arafat and the centrality of the Jordanian role.[19]

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[18] Crown Prince Abdallah's mother was from a northern Arabian tribe in the Syrian desert and one of his wives is Syrian. If Abdallah takes the Syrian side in Saudi inner councils, the al-Saud must pay attention to him.

[19] See the account in Karen Elliott House, "Hussein's Decision," part 1, *Wall Street Journal,* April 14, 1983, pp. 1, 6.

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A third shift set off by the war was the new tilt of U.S. policy, particularly the Reagan Plan, which, of course, established Jordan at the center of the most important U.S. diplomatic initiative in years. This shift did not necessarily benefit Jordan, however, because U.S. policy evoked strong Syrian opposition — backed, it seems certain, by the Soviet Union.

King Hussein moved swiftly to take advantage of new circumstances. He encouraged the United States privately to devise a major initiative, and he led U.S. officials to believe that he would support new initiatives actively.[20] Soon after the Reagan Plan was announced, the king spoke positively about it and was more explicit than he had been in years about a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, a revival of Hussein's March 1972 United Arab Kingdom plan.[21] Hussein diplomatically avowed that he saw much common ground between the Fez Plan and the Reagan Plan (though in fact there was little), in order to establish himself as the pivot between the Arab capitals and Washington. Finally, the king certainly encouraged West Bank moderates to bring the case for a Jordanian solution to the PLO and Chairman Arafat, though they needed little encouragement.[22]

By joining the political competition after the war in Lebanon, Hussein did not deceive himself that it would be simple to create a PLO-Jordanian agreement in the face of internal PLO divisions and Syrian opposition. The aim, it seems, was not to win the competition outright but to create difficult choices for others that might, in the long run, prove beneficial. It forced the West Bankers to choose between Jordan and the Reagan Plan and the Americans on one hand, or radical slogans and rejectionist politics backed by Syria on the other — all this while Israeli bulldozers were changing the face of the West Bank. It forced Arafat to risk splitting the PLO for good — a long-sought Jordanian goal[23] — and provoking Syrian violence against al-Fatah, or to jeopardize what standing he had among the Palestinian masses with another demonstration of political nihilism. Arafat could go to Hussein, or take the chance of losing the last opportunity to recover part of Palestine; in addition, he might be able to put the United States to the test at a time when U.S.-Israeli relations

[20] Marvine Howe, "A Fresh Initiative for Palestinians Urged by Hussein," *New York Times,* August 30, 1982.

[21] The transcript of Hussein's interview with the BBC on September 14, 1982, appears in the *New York Times,* September 15, 1982; see, also, "Hussein Urges Talks with PLO Aides on the West Bank," *New York Times,* September 22, 1982; and his interview in the *Wall Street Journal,* November 11, 1982.

[22] That was not all. Hussein also granted a general Palestinian amnesty from 1970. See "Hussein Said To Have Given PLO Guerrillas Amnesty," *New York Times,* October 8, 1982.

[23] See the analysis in my "Jordan and Arab Polarization," *Current History,* January 1982, pp. 24-25.

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were poor.[24] It forced the United States to confront the Begin government with which it was already spatting. It gave an opportunity to the Israeli Labor party to restate its political platform, which called for a Jordanian solution, in the hope that Israeli domestic politics might move closer toward Labor, a party much less dangerous to Jordanian interests than Likud in a number of ways.

Yasir Arafat has become a consummate politician over the years, a quality that no doubt owes something to the exigencies of political dependency and weakness. Whatever Arafat's personal views may be, he has learned to maneuver within the ideological crosscurrents of the PLO and the wider Arab world. From his history of power brokering, he has earned a reputation for shrewdness that may be little more than well-clothed indecision. In any case, Arafat saw the writing on the wall after Beirut, and he positioned himself with the conservative Arab states because in his estimation, that was to be the near-term focus of diplomatic attention. The war had hurt the PLO's radical groups who issued brave but quixotic statements during the siege of Beirut (some of them from far away!) while Arafat stood as the pivot of a dramatic international negotiation. The war had bloodied and weakened Syria. Hoping to capitalize on his enhanced personal prestige, Arafat spoke as a victor in the language of the radicals even while he consulted with Saudi Arabia and Morocco and appealed to President Mubarak for help. Most important of all, of course, Arafat entered into lengthy talks with Jordan over a possible PLO-Jordanian entry into the Reagan Plan. These contacts started from afar soon after the unveiling of the Reagan Plan, and led to preparations for a direct Arafat-Hussein summit in Amman.

But Arafat misestimated his room to maneuver. Signs of a deeply fracturing PLO were not long in emerging. There had been disagreements and fire-fights before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, of course; the Fahd Plan of August 1981 had been one such occasion. After the war, the Fez Summit, which essentially reiterated the Fahd Plan in a slightly less benign fashion, became an object of disagreement within the PLO. On September 23, the PLO's rejectionist elements held a press conference in Damascus to denounce the Fez Summit declarations and Arafat's accession to them on behalf of the PLO. The main issue was article seven of the declaration, which seemed to contain an implicit recognition of Israel's right to exist. For the first time, however, a Fatah executive council member joined the Marxist groups and the Syrian as-Saiqa in opposing Arafat. The Fatah member in question was none

[24] A vivid example of the breach in U.S.-Israeli ties took place at the United Nations on September 30, 1982. Secretary of State Shultz called upon Israel to yield land for peace. Moments later, Israeli Foreign Minister Itzhak Shamir ruled out any further "territorial amputation" of Israel. See Bernard D. Nossiter, "Israel Must Yield, Shultz Says at U.N.," *New York Times*, October 1, 1982.

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other than Nimr Salih. Clearly, while it was the Fez Summit that was being denounced, Salih and the others had something else in mind, as did their Syrian sponsors. Referring to the controversial seventh point, Salih said: "The endorsement of this clause has opened the way for the Jordanian regime to exercise the role assigned to it by American imperialism . . . liquidating the Palestinian cause and bypassing the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."[25]

Despite this opposition, Arafat met with King Hussein in Amman from October 8 to 12, and while the talks were inconclusive, they were intense and serious. In an October 12 press conference in Amman, Arafat announced that he saw positive elements in the Reagan Plan and had some emotional, kind words for Egypt. Not surprisingly, Arafat's trip to Amman evoked strong comment from Damascus. Syrian information minister Ahmed Iskandar Ahmed said that Arafat was not authorized to speak on behalf of the PLO. Shortly thereafter, the Syrians fabricated a statement ostensibly issued by five PLO groups stating as much. But the absence of as-Saiqa from the five groups, and the fact that two of the five groups later denied ever having said any such thing, was extremely suspicious. Asked whether there was an open breach between Arafat and the Syrian regime, an aide to the chairman simply remarked: "We have trouble with lots of people."[26]

Finally, to add to the PLO's difficulties, there were serious new logistical problems in keeping an already argumentative organization together in its dispersed exile. Physical communications were difficult and morale was poor among PLO rank and file, especially those outside of Lebanon. No longer did the PLO have the international press at its disposal in Beirut, a journalist's paradise; instead the PLO was headquartered in two different places — Damascus and Tunis — neither one of which offered the access or amenities of Beirut.[27] No longer did the PLO have its own port, its own economy, its own control over guns and forged passports. Even worse than the problem of getting money and weapons was the difficulty of finding something worth buying or shooting at.

In sum, the war in Lebanon had the effect of telescoping a number of important trends and relationships among the regional actors. It sharpened the Jordanian-Syrian rivalry; and U.S. policy and the reaction

[25] Donald Neff, "4 Palestinian Groups Object to Arab Plan," *Washington Post,* September 25, 1982.

[26] Thomas L. Friedman, "Arafat-Hussein Talks Seem Inconclusive," *New York Times,* October 12, 1982; Friedman, "Arafat Now Sees Positive Aspects in Reagan Plan," *New York Times,* October 13, 1982; James F. Clarity, "Five Factions Within PLO Oppose Any Confederation with Jordan," *New York Times,* October 14, 1982; and Clarity, "A PLO Official Says Arafat Is Firmly in Control," *New York Times,* October 15, 1982.

[27] See the analysis by Thomas L. Friedman, "PLO and Arafat After Lebanon: In Search of a Base and a Strategy," *New York Times,* December 2, 1982.

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of West Bank Palestinians to new developments seemed to run in the direction of Jordan, the conservative Arab states, and the moderation of the PLO. But this evoked its own antithesis. Syria attempted to assert its control over the PLO by making common cause with the radicals; its method was to undermine Fatah itself through cooptation, intimidation, and assassination. Syria also used its ability to obstruct progress in Lebanon to foil the development of Fatah-Jordanian ties and, consequently, the Reagan Plan. This latter tactic did special damage to U.S. policy in the region.

In September and October 1982, U.S. diplomats reported optimistically that Syria had agreed in principle to leave Lebanon. Ambassador Habib spoke of an Israeli-Syrian agreement "in terms of weeks, not months"; and most pundits imagined that getting the Israelis to leave would be the major problem.[28] Of the many reasons that might explain the apparent hardening of Syria's position, one might very well have been Damascus's determination to keep the Reagan Plan off the immediate diplomatic agenda. Were the Reagan Plan to become the focus of regional diplomacy, it would set into rapid motion all those trends that favored the Jordanian position. In addition to providing Damascus an incentive to resist, American diplomacy also committed a sin of omission. At a time when Syria was weak, isolated and vulnerable to an aggressive diplomacy, Washington proffered neither carrot nor stick.

In contrast to the acceleration of local political trends, the PLO's capacity to respond swiftly to events — never very good to begin with — deteriorated with exile. Arafat was in a poor position to balance and play off the rapidly increasing centrifugal tendencies within the PLO. As a consequence, the genuine but fleeting determination of the United States, led by an unusually unanimous inner circle that was prepared to press Israel hard if necessary, went to waste from the Arab point of view.

Algiers, Amman, Baalbek

Within a few months after its exit from west Beirut, the PLO was in a deeply divided condition. Its highly touted "military option" had been discredited in war, and its reliance on Syria and the Soviet Union now looked even less appealing than before. But the sort of political strategy that was required to carry on after Lebanon demanded bold new initiatives for which there was no consensus. Forging a link with Jordan and the United States, with the certain support of Saudi Arabia and the probable support of Egypt, appeared to be the only real diplomatic game

[28] For Habib's comments, see William E. Schmidt, "Habib Said to Assure Egyptians of Pact on Lebanon," *New York Times,* October 1, 1982.

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in town, but the price for playing it was steep. Getting on the wrong side of the Asad regime would jeopardize Fatah's residual strength in Lebanon, and expressing genuine moderation might risk the fealty of the Palestinian community that had been there from 1948-49, the firmest support the PLO had among Palestinians anywhere. Annoying the Asad brothers was also dangerous. Finally, of course, there was the semblance of organizational unity to preserve, a precious commodity for any movement made weak by a lack of real mass support. Thus, while the war changed things considerably, it did not change enough to thaw PLO diplomacy, stuck between the feuding Arab states and its own intra-PLO ideological cleavages. Whatever al-Fatah gained from its relatively greater freedom from Syria and its enhanced international image in some quarters, it lost in the havoc of dispersed exile, the arousal of Syrian ire, and the miscalculations of Chairman Arafat.

The PLO's continuing problems were vividly demonstrated by the events leading to the February meeting of the Palestine National Congress (PNC) in Algiers and then by the Arafat-Hussein negotiations of April. Together, the events of this period form the most relevant prelude to the mutiny.

All PLO factions shared one central interest in the reconvening of the PNC: to show the world that it still existed. Arafat's al-Fatah had a further aim, however, and that was to mold a PLO consensus that would allow Arafat to go with the flow of regional diplomacy, even if it meant closer association with Jordan, Egypt, and the United States. But Sabra and Shatilla had reduced Arafat's credibility, and his jet-setting and secretive diplomacy fueled both resentment and opposition that the Syrians, clearly, were intent on exploiting. Arafat hoped that the tight reins on his maneuverability evident during his October meetings with Hussein might be loosened if he could persuade a majority of the PLO executive committee and then the PNC to endorse — or at least not oppose — his diplomatic probings.

Preparations for the PNC were a classic example of "turf" politics. Most PLO officials expected the PNC to convene sometime in October. To control the proceedings more effectively, Arafat wanted the PNC to be held anywhere but Damascus, the traditional meeting place. Arafat originally preferred Amman, but dropped this site proposal as an unnecessary provocation to the Syrians. The radicals preferred Damascus. Arafat suggested Tunis, but this still displeased the other organizations. After many months of haggling, Algiers was finally selected as a site. This argument over a venue and the jockeying for key committee assignments delayed the PNC until February.

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During the intervening period, other signs of PLO divisions were evident. Arafat continued his moderately inclined diplomacy, meeting in Amman with King Hussein briefly in November and again for four days in December. In the meantime, President Mubarak's key adviser on Arab-Israeli matters, Osama el-Baz, made at least two visits to Amman during times when high-level al-Fatah delegations were known to be in town.[29] Egyptian governments under Sadat and Mubarak had urged the PLO to form a provisional government or a government-in-exile, but the PLO had always balked at such a suggestion. It is hard to say if Fatah-Egyptian deliberations ever got very serious but Khalid al-Hasan, Arafat's close political adviser, said on November 19:

I believe that the PNC will not make a decision on the issue of recognition [of Israel]. . . . Such issues can be discussed either after the establishment of the state or if a provisional government is formed. . . . I am personally in favor of the formation of a provisional government. . . . This will be discussed at the PNC.[30]

Arafat's negotiations with Hussein were hastened along by the king's impending trip to Washington at the end of December. To prepare, Arafat spent four days in Amman from December 14 to 18, after which a joint statement announced that Jordan and the PLO had pledged "to pursue political moves together on all fronts."[31] These talks did not concern themselves with principles of confederation, for confederation had been loosely agreed upon in earlier talks. In mid November, al-Hasan had remarked with an air of finality that: "It has become clear that the future relationship will be a confederation" between Jordan and Palestine.[32] But there were important and contentious details to work out in attempting to bring the PLO into a once-removed relationship with the United States through Jordan. If this were not enough to alarm the radicals and annoy the Syrians, al-Hasan accompanied the king when he went to Washington, stayed in the same hotel with the Jordanian delegation, had frequent conversations with the king, and gave hopeful-sounding interviews to U.S. journalists.[33]

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[29] Butrous Ghali, the Egyptian foreign minister, accompanied him on one of the trips on December 9, 1982. See FBIS, *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), December 9, 1982, p. F1, and November 30, 1982, p. D6.

[30] "Khalid al-Hasan on Issues Facing Palestinians," Monto Carlo Radio (in Arabic), November 19, 1982, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), November 23, 1982, p. A3.

[31] See *New York Times*, December 15, 1982.

[32] FBIS, *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), November 23, 1982, p. A3.

[33] See, especially, David Ignatius, "Evidence of Progress in the Middle East," *Wall Street Journal*, December 30, 1982. But it is hard to interpret the meaning of al-Hasan's moderation in the broader PLO context. While Khalid al-Hasan was speaking one way, his brother Hani, another Arafat adviser, was telling a Saudi newspaper: "We will not let anyone live unless Zionism topples. Our revolution was not born, nor did it proceed in order to recognize Israel. Our goal is as clear as daylight and is unquestionable. We are here to regain the land, all Palestinian land, all the Palestinian towns, Jerusalem, Nablus, Haifa, Gaza, Safad. These are our towns, dear to us, and of equal rank." *Al-Riyadh*, November 21, 1982, quoted in Kenneth W. Stein, "The PLO After Beirut," *Middle East Review*, Spring-Summer 1983, p. 17.

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The U.S.-Jordanian summit of December 1982 was at least potentially momentous. The king told the president that Jordan would declare its readiness to join the Reagan Plan, after which the United States pledged to seek an Israeli settlements freeze. Once this accord could be presented as a fait accompli, Hussein was hopeful that the PNC would give Arafat a freer hand to pursue his diplomacy, if not actually endorse it. Hussein also hoped to convince the seven-member Fez Summit committees, which were charged with explaining the Arab case to the major powers, to support him as well, particularly if the United States would press Riyadh to help out. President Reagan gave the king written protestations of U.S. sincerity and determination, and promised to do his best to convince Congress to provide the military supplies Jordan sought from the United States. The only thing delaying this sequence of events was, as far as Washington and Amman were concerned, a simple matter — an agreement to remove all foreign forces from Lebanon. Reagan promised the king that this would be accomplished by March.[34] Clearly, the Israelis could not be pressed to halt their settlements and at the same time negotiate concessions over Lebanon; but the State Department held this to be an insubstantial obstacle at the time.

After the king returned to Amman, Arafat began to talk glowingly of PLO-Jordanian confederation and implied to an Austrian interviewer that a basic deal had been made between Arafat and Hussein as long ago as the Rabat Summit of 1974.[35] Al-Fatah also set up a special committee charged with coordinating political and media activities in the United States; the committee consisted of prominent al-Fatah moderates (Khalid al-Hasan, Isam Sartawi) and ex officio members residing in the United States (Edward Said, Ibrahim Abu Lughod, and Walid Khalidi).[36] This committee was of special significance if one can credit speculations that U.S.-Jordanian and prior PLO-Jordanian negotiators had agreed that a future Palestinian-Jordanian delegation would consist of non-PLO Palestinians controlled by the PLO — a formulation similar to that worked out in 1977 in preparation for a Geneva conference that never took place.[37]

The U.S.-Jordanian scheme might have influenced the Fez Committee and the PNC, but it never materialized. As soon as the Asad

[34] See Karen Elliott House, "Hussein's Choice," part 1, p. 1. See, also, Eric Pace, "Jordanians May Reach Out to Arafat Again," *New York Times,* October 3, 1983.

[35] See Arafat's remarks to the Viennese journalist Gudrun Herunter, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), January 5, 1983, p. A5, and October 30, 1981, p. A9.

[36] Ibid., p. A7.

[37] See, for example, "Reagan's Next Middle East Move," *Foreign Report,* January 6, 1983, pp. 1-2; and, for an account of preparations for Geneva in 1977, see Harvey Sicherman, *Broker or Advocate: The U.S. Role in the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1973-1978* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1978), pp. 54-57.

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regime understood what had happened in December, first in Amman and then in Washington, it determined to stop it. Syrian tactics varied. One scheme reportedly involved an attempt by Syrian agents, led by Ali Duba and Mohammed al-Khouly, to assassinate Arafat.[38] Another, which took place just after the Hussein-Arafat summit of December, was the "demonstration" murder of several al-Fatah soldiers near Tripoli, Lebanon, by members of Rifaat al-Asad's special forces.[39] Still another was the Syrian seizure of all weapons from the Soviet Union intended for the PLO.[40] The easiest way to foil the Hussein-Arafat connection, however, was simply to deny the United States a quick diplomatic success in Lebanon and in this, Damascus found a willing accomplice in the Soviet Union. Moscow accelerated Syria's rearmament, introducing for the first time SAM 5-A missiles with a range sufficiently great to concern the operations of the U.S. Navy in the eastern Mediterranean.

It was almost impossible for Damascus to forego taking advantage of U.S. diplomatic maladroitness. By dropping the Reagan Plan into the Lebanese morass, Washington gave the Syrians, who were excluded from it, and the Israelis, who opposed it, an incentive to use the Lebanese crisis to delay the Reagan Plan and ultimately to defeat it. That U.S. policymakers had failed to anticipate the Syrian reaction to December's diplomacy and continued to believe that the Lebanese mess could be quickly solved is one indication of how little forethought went into the decisionmaking process.

Both al-Fatah and the Jordanians had taken the U.S. pledge to get the Israelis out of Lebanon as a litmus test of U.S. determination. The longer it took — and here Syrian pressure on the Gemayel government was a crucial factor — the more time PLO opponents to the Fatah-Jordanian confederation notion had to defeat it. If this were not trouble enough, the Saudis, rather than backing Jordan, helped Syrian policy in Lebanon by counseling Gemayel to give Israel what it wanted with respect to security, but nothing of what it wanted with respect to political normalization and recognition. Saudi threats to cut economic ties were taken seriously in Beirut; the net effect of Saudi diplomacy was to delay the completion of the negotiations for several weeks. With respect to the Reagan Plan, the Saudis offered themselves to the PLO as an alternative to alliance with Jordan, confusing and complicating an already delicate business. The result was that the Algiers PNC rejected the Reagan Plan

[38] "Reagan's Next Middle East Move," p. 2. See, also, the earlier report of Arafat's fears of Syrian plots against his life in *Ma'ariv*, March 5, 1982.

[39] Reported in the Hebrew daily, *Davar*, December 20, 1982, cited in Stein, "The PLO After Beirut," p. 14.

[40] See Eric Rouleau, "Yasir Arafat Starts Difficult Rapprochement with Syria," *Le Monde*, May 5, 1983, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), May 6, 1983, p. A2.

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and essentially repudiated Arafat's diplomatic program, while the Fez committee refused any explicit endorsement of a central Jordanian role, perhaps at Saudi insistence.

The Algiers PNC was a triumph for the rejectionists. Since Arafat could not prevent this, he may have hoped that by sounding uncompromising enough, he could quietly win approval to pursue his diplomatic program. But this plan exceeded Arafat's capabilities. It was clear from the PNC that the relative moderates believed that time was working against them and that if any of Palestine was to be saved, it would have to be done through the Jordanian-U.S. route to a political settlement. If this required explicit recognition of Israel's right to exist and de facto repudiation of the National Covenant, as Palestinian moderates in the United States and the West Bank had urged, then so be it.[41] Such a choice would necessarily elevate PLO ties with Egypt, relieving the PLO somewhat of its anxious dependence on Syria. This was the minority view, however. The radicals argued that accelerated Israeli settlements should not stampede the PLO into desperate action. They also contended that the key to political recovery was the resuscitation of the PLO's military option for which it was Syria and the Soviet Union that the PLO needed, not the "reactionary" Jordanians and the "imperialist" Americans. The radicals — Habash, Hawatemeh, Jibril — gave long speeches at the PNC to thunderous applause; Sartawi, the PLO's most articulate moderate, was not even allowed to speak. He was heard to quip, however, that "if Beirut was a victory for the PLO, then after the next such victory, the PNC will be meeting in Fiji."[42]

The repudiation of Arafat was not just a non-Fatah, radical affair, as it had been in the past. A left wing of Fatah, led by Farooq Qadumi, head of the PLO's political department and its acting "foreign minister," seems to have reached a tactical accord with the radicals to hold Arafat in check. On the second day of the PNC, Qadumi gave a rabidly anti-American speech, barely veiling his criticism of Arafat.[43] Suffering from defeat and the trauma of Sabra and Shatilla, moderates were reluctant to put any faith in U.S. diplomacy. Nabil Shaath, an associate of Arafat, said:

Most moderates would welcome an American initiative if they thought the U.S. could deliver. But because of the credibility problem it is not worth taking the risk. We would be like the inhabitants of Sabra and Shatilla who believed in

[41] See, for example, Emile A. Nakhleh, "For the PLO: Time To Do the Unthinkable," *Washington Post,* February 8, 1983; and the editorial "The Fateful Cohesion," in the Jerusalem Arabic paper *Al-Quds,* trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), December 2, 1982, pp. I11-12.

[42] One fair account of what happened at Algiers is Patrick Seale's "PLO Strategies: Algiers and After," *The World Today,* April 1983, pp. 139-43. See, also, Eric Rouleau, "The Future of the PLO," *Foreign Affairs,* Fall 1983, pp. 149-51.

[43] *Ibid.,* pp. 139-40.

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American guarantees. The U.S. wants us to stick our necks out — and get chopped.[44]

As often happens, the inevitable ambiguities of the PNC declarations were subject to a variety of self-serving interpretations. Western journalists (and even governments) asserted that Algiers at least did not reject the Reagan Plan outright, although it required a strong imagination to reach this conclusion. Arafat evidently believed that his wings had not been clipped when the radicals thought they had. The radicals apparently believed that Arafat would now come to heel, and he did not. The real verdict of Algiers, combined with the continuing impasse in Lebanon and the Saudi disinclination to lead any Arab consensus, made the failure of the March summit between Arafat and Hussein almost inevitable.

After the PNC, Arafat avoided coming to Amman lest he stir up the wrath of his enemies. But Hussein desired a face-to-face meeting to discuss new developments and he took the occasion of the nonaligned summit in New Delhi in early March to do so. According to Karen Elliott House of the *Wall Street Journal,* who interviewed Hussein at length in April, Hussein learned in New Delhi from one of Arafat's associates, Ahmed Sidqi al-Dajani, that Arafat still wanted to cooperate in the Reagan Plan with Jordan, but that he needed additional Arab cover to protect himself from Asad. Throughout March, Hussein kept the pressure on Arafat and urged Washington to reason with Riyadh. Meanwhile, Hussein himself had to endure pressures from the United States (which urged him to move more quickly and favorably), from the Soviet Union (which urged him to turn aside), and even from the British (who warned Hussein against succumbing too soon to U.S. prodding). An emissary from King Fahd urged the king to "be patient."

Arafat failed to arrange any additional cover among the Arabs or within the PLO. After delaying his Amman appointment for many days in March, flitting around the world while sending messages and emissaries to Jordan, he finally showed up on March 31. During the first week of April, Arafat and Hussein spent three days in what were described by the king as "brutal talks." Eventually they reached an agreement on paper, though Arafat strongly resisted its binding clauses for fear of their consequences. At one point, Arafat is said to have complained to Hussein: "You're asking me to kill myself," a clear reference to the likely Syrian reaction, and asked that the PLO be let back into Jordan.[45] Hussein set stringent conditions, foremost among them that Arafat live up to his agreements before bringing his minions back to Jordan.

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[44] Quoted in Seale, "PLO strategies," p. 142.

[45] Karen Elliott House, "Hussein's Decision," part 2, *Wall Street Journal,* April 15, 1983. For details, see Rouleau, "Yasir Arafat Starts Difficult Rapprochement," pp. A2-A3.

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Arafat signed the document but pleaded for a forty-eight-hour grace period to consult with "other PLO officials" in Kuwait. Hussein agreed, but Arafat did not return as promised. Instead, five days later, two messengers arrived with a new draft agreement. The king did not need to read it. Although he had received telephone calls from both Saudi Arabia and Morocco claiming that the changes made were merely cosmetic, the king knew better. References to the Reagan Plan were removed and new references to the PLO were inserted; indeed, the changes were radical. The next day, on April 10, Hussein announced that the talks had failed and that there was nothing more he could do. He then took steps to make life harder for the PLO on the West Bank;[46] the United States, through Secretary Shultz, deliberately played down the role of the PLO, suggesting that if the PLO could not lead, then others would take its place. Though still smarting from the rejection of his own organization, and from the murder of Isam Sartawi on April 10 at the hands of Abu Nidal, Arafat claimed that he was interested in further talks with Jordan, a maneuver akin to juggling in a prone position.

Hussein later complained that the United States was in part responsible for the breakdown of the talks because it did not demonstrate a willingness to push Israel.[47] From the U.S. point of view, blame lay with the failure of the Arabs to mend their own affairs through decisive action. Until the Arabs came around, it was pointless for Washington to press Israel when Israel had first to be persuaded about Lebanon. Both of these interpretations, however, were somewhat myopic. More to the point, the premature introduction of the Reagan Plan precluded rapid progress in Lebanon, which, in turn, delayed and ultimately doomed the necessary precondition of the Reagan Plan's success — a PLO-Jordanian political deal — at the hands of Israeli negotiating tenacity and resolute Syrian opposition.

A related U.S. diplomatic error was to imagine that Saudi Arabia's interests and capabilities would help the process along instead of hinder it. But some illusions die harder than others. Saudi Arabia is a de facto ally of the United States, as is Jordan; like Jordan, Saudi Arabia is a socially and politically conservative state. But Saudi conservatism is religiously based and does not translate into genuine moderation on Arab-Israeli questions. To the extent that Riyadh evinces moderation in this regard, it is because the conflict is subordinate to other concerns, not because it thinks like the Hashemites. In early 1982, Joseph Sisco, former assistant secretary of state for the Near East and South Asia (NEA), pre-

[46] Rouleau, "Yasir Arafat Starts Difficult Rapprochement," pp. A2-A3, and Trudy Rubin, "King Hussein Moves to Put Jordan in Order," *Christian Science Monitor,* April 13, 1983.

[47] This view has been parroted by various scholars. See, for example, Fred J. Khoury, "The Challenge to U.S. Security and Middle East Policy," *American-Arab Affairs,* Summer 1983, pp. 16-17.

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dicted that "Saudi fence-sitting could undermine the most important American peace initiative in years,"[48] and in November, Henry Kissinger remarked that "it has been a consistent error of some of our policymakers to expect Saudi Arabia to deliver an Arab consensus. Saudi Arabia is in no position to do so."[49] By January, U.S. disappointment with the Saudis was becoming clear[50]; in March, President Reagan assured King Hussein through Ambassador Habib that he was "sending a stern letter to King Fahd insisting that now is the time to give full political and financial support to King Hussein and help push Mr. Arafat toward the peace process."[51] But by then it was too late.

Last but not least, the State Department accepted too easily the postulate that unless Hussein could bring the PLO along, he was justified in keeping his distance from U.S. policy. But perhaps the only way the United States could have persuaded Arafat to get on board was to make certain Hussein's ship weighed its anchor first. Moreover, in the long run it might have been better if the PLO had been excluded deliberately in favor of a Hashemite–West Bank alternative. Indeed, Kissinger later claimed that this was the original concept of the Reagan Plan before it was reshaped by the NEA bureaucracy.[52] Hussein probably could not have been forced into open cooperation without the cover afforded by Arafat and the PLO, but the possibility that he could have been forced was never less than the chance that the PLO as a whole would be any help to U.S. policy. Still, in its obsession with the PLO, NEA never seriously considered such thoughts. When the al-Fatah mutiny broke out less than a month after Hussein's resounding no, Assistant Secretary Nicholas Veliotes told a congressional subcommittee that the mutiny was bad for U.S. policy because it might prevent the PLO from taking a positive, united, supportive stand in favor of the Reagan Plan and a PLO-Jordanian condominium![53]

The Mutiny

After the breakdown of Arafat's talks with King Hussein, it was clear that while Arafat professed to want to continue the dialogue, it

[48] See Joseph Sisco, "Arabs: Is Reagan Tenacious?" *New York Times,* October 27, 1982.

[49] "After Lebanon: A Conversation," *The Economist,* November 13, 1982, p. 34.

[50] Thomas L. Friedman, "King Fahd Disappoints U.S. on Lebanon, Jordan Negotiations," *New York Times,* January 23, 1983.

[51] House, "Hussein's Decision," part 2, April 15, 1983, p. 1.

[52] More likely, no serious thought was given to Jordanian-PLO relations and certainly no effort was made to get Hussein to come alone. See Kondracke, "Shultz's First Move," p. 14; Kissinger's comments in "After Lebanon: A Conversation," pp. 28-29; and the report by Richard Strauss and Ken Wollack, "Shultz Tries to Salvage a Failed Mideast Policy," *Los Angeles Times,* May 3, 1983. The PLO is still worried that Washington will succeed in bringing in King Hussein without the PLO. See the interview with Hatem Hussaini in *American-Arab Affairs,* Summer 1983, p. 56.

[53] See Veliotes's remarks in the *New York Times,* June 3, 1983.

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would have to be under new rules imposed on him by PLO realities. Unlike the draft agreement that Arafat had signed and repudiated in April, future arrangements would have to hold a more explicit role for the PLO. It was equally clear that Hussein would accept no such thing.[54] Despite the flurry of activity[55] surrounding Secretary Shultz's shuttle mission to the Middle East in late April and early May, few in the region expected that Shultz could accomplish enough in Lebanon to bring Hussein and Arafat together once and for all. But the view in Washington was that, somehow, he might. It was no secret that the unspoken primary purpose of Shultz's mission was not to reach a Lebanese accord per se, but through it to breathe life into a rapidly fading overall policy. But again, U.S. diplomacy held within itself a contradiction. If Shultz succeeded in bringing Israel and Lebanon together, it would decrease, not increase, the chances of saving the Reagan Plan through Jordanian or joint Jordanian-PLO accession. An Israeli-Lebanese accord that met even some of Israel's security and political concerns would redouble Syrian opposition to the whole process, especially its pressure on Arafat to keep away from the Jordanians and the Americans. This is, of course, exactly what happened.

The Israeli-Lebanese accord, however, should in theory have helped heal the Syrian-Fatah rift. Al-Fatah had no more interest in an Israeli-Lebanese accord than did Syria: on this issue, at least, Arafat and Asad saw eye to eye. Neither wanted a political demonstration of Israeli war gains, neither wanted Saad Haddad more firmly ensconced in southern Lebanon (although for different reasons), and neither desired a government in Beirut increasingly close to Israel, Egypt, and the United States. Indeed, the accord at first seemed to bring Asad and Arafat into tactical alliance. On May 4, as the accord was in the offing, Arafat and Asad met in Damascus for the first time in eight months. According to PLO sources, the meeting "turned a new page in Syrian-PLO relations."[56] Suddenly Arafat the moderate of winter became the radical of spring. Qadumi gladly participated in the image revamping, telling a Kuwaiti audience: "I would like to reassure you that Chairman Arafat is still Chairman of the PLO. He has been accused of being a moderate. Can you imagine a person who was the first to carry a gun to fight the Israelis being a moderate?"[57]

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[54] See the remarks by "a senior PLO moderate" in Trudy Rubin, "As Reagan Plays Down PLO Role, Moderate Arabs Support It," *Christian Science Monitor,* May 2, 1983. Al-Fatah's central committee passed a resolution saying as much on April 25. See Warren Richey's account, "Jordan Awaits Concrete Results from Shultz Diplomatic Mission," *Christian Science Monitor,* May 2, 1983.

[55] This included sending high-level Jordanian missions to a number of Arab capitals in late April. Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan al-Qasim and Information Minister Adnan Abu-Odeh, who is a Palestinian, went to Riyadh, Kuwait, and elsewhere.

[56] See the coverage in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), May 4, 1983, p. A1, and May 5, 1983, pp. A1-A2.

[57] Quoted in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), May 5, 1983, p. A2.

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The May 4 meeting took place in the context of a buildup of Syrian and Syrian-controlled PLO forces in Lebanon, Soviet warnings of impending Israeli "aggression," and a buildup of Soviet forces in Syria as well.[58] Between May 7, when the draft agreement between Israel and Lebanon was essentially finished, and May 16, when it was signed, Syria mounted a multifaceted campaign to intimidate the Gemayel government into not signing the document or, failing that, to deflect a formal Lebanese request for a Syrian troop withdrawal.[59] The campaign included Syrian encouragement of the Druze in their shelling of Christian areas of Beirut, and perhaps even their participation in it.[60] U.S. officials still expressed optimism about an eventual Syrian withdrawal and characterized Syrian behavior as "tactical."[61]

The PLO participated fully in the Syrian-engineered buildup in Lebanon in late April and early May, and this altered PLO-Syrian military relations on the ground. Throughout late 1982 and early 1983, Syria had fostered a war of attrition against Israeli forces in Lebanon by using Druze, leftist Lebanese Muslims, and anyone else willing to pick up a gun and fire it at IDF targets. Most incidents were carried out independently of Syria, but most originated from behind Syrian lines. The Syrians made no effort to stop them. PLO forces in Lebanon participated little in these activities and Damascus kept Arafat's men under close supervision, severely limiting their arms supplies. When the Syrian campaign against the Gemayel government commenced in April, it involved the movement of hundreds of al-Fatah soldiers from Syria proper into the Beka'a valley and unlocking some arms and ammunition caches for them. While the possibility of large-scale fighting with Israel existed, this was not Syria's intention. Even while it intimidated the Lebanese, Syria wished to prevent a major — unwinnable — war with Israel.

Arafat, it seems, intended to make a different use of these new circumstances. Having been prevented from taking the diplomatic path with Jordan, and being much too far away in Tunis, Arafat apparently sought more elbow room for himself in Lebanon proper. But Israel controlled the south, Gemayel and the MNF had Beirut, and the Syrians were in the north and the east. The only answer was Tripoli, a city in the Syrian occupation zone that Syria had never subdued. In order to sharpen his

[58] See "Israelis Reporting a Soviet Buildup," *New York Times,* April 29, 1983; and Bernard Weinraub, "Syrians and PLO Increasing Forces Based in Lebanon," *New York Times,* May 11, 1983.

[59] R. W. Apple, Jr., "Lebanese, in Syria, Seeks to Persuade Assad on Pullout," *New York Times,* May 13, 1983. The article quotes a Syrian official as saying that a formal withdrawal request from Beirut "would be a considerable embarrassment for us."

[60] See Thomas L. Friedman, "Lebanese Say Syria Opposes Draft; Gemayel Vows Not to Be Deterred," *New York Times,* May 7, 1983.

[61] See Drew Middleton, "Syria's Buildup Called a Tactic for Talks," *New York Times,* May 12, 1983.

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control over his own troops now in Lebanon under the Syrians, Arafat used the May 5 "alert" of PLO and Syrian forces to replace two PLO commanders in the Beka'a valley who had gotten too used to dealing with the Syrians and whose loyalty was therefore suspect. In their places, Arafat put two of his loyal friends: Abu Hajim and Haj Ismail. This change was announced on May 7.

One of the newly demoted commanders, Colonel Abu Musa, was a particularly popular fellow who had developed a warrior image the previous summer. He opposed the appointment of Haj Ismail in particular, for it was well known that he had run from battle, abandoning his troops during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Abu Musa was later joined by Nimr Salih, whose al-Fatah executive committee activities had been frozen in January because he was far too friendly with the Syrians. A number of other junior officers on the scene also supported Abu Musa.

On May 9, Abu Musa issued an order to all Fatah commanders in the Beka'a valley instructing them to take all subsequent orders from him alone. Hearing this, Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), Arafat's top military commander, attempted to isolate the mutineers and seize Abu Musa, but the attempt failed. The next day, Arafat dismissed Abu Musa and his friends from their military positions altogether; Abu Salih was stripped of his Fatah credentials as well. The mutineers refused to acknowledge these decisions.

At first it seemed that Abu Musa's rebellion was of a highly personal nature; he simply coveted his former military rank and authority and did not wish to relinquish them to one of Arafat's incompetent lackeys. Also, Abu Musa was a former Jordanian army officer who had deserted in 1970 during the civil war; he had no fondness for Jordan or its beduin-led military, and Arafat's frequent trips to Amman surely displeased him. But the political turning point in the revolt seems to have occurred when Abu Salih joined the rebels. Abu Salih was better able to articulate the rebels' specific grievances against the al-Fatah hierarchy, and he added both a broader ideological dimension and a portentous interpretation to recent events. The rebels now saw Arafat's military appointments, coming as they did simultaneously with the breakthrough in the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations, as a prelude to a PLO evacuation of all of Lebanon, a capitulation to the United States similar to the agreement to evacuate west Beirut in the summer of 1982. Arafat's moderately tilted diplomacy of recent months, which many PLO fighters disliked but were powerless to oppose, was taken as evidence of his nefarious intent. This claim of impending evacuation, which was probably sincerely believed by many if not most of the rebels, struck a resonant note among the 20,000 or so Beka'a valley fighters since there was nowhere else for most of them to

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go. Arafat's contemptuous dismissal of Abu Musa, and his continuing peripatetic diplomacy had the effect of strengthening the grassroots opposition to him in the valley.

Even as Arafat assumed the mutiny was settled, it grew rapidly throughout May. As it did, it acquired a more specific political content. On May 16, the "revolutionary movement" within al-Fatah issued an eight-point statement that repudiated both the personal conduct and the political line of its leaders. Its eighth point reaffirmed the proposition that "resuming the popular armed revolution is the only and inevitable way to revolution."[62] In a later interview with David Hirst of the *Manchester Guardian,* Abu Musa was more direct. He said:

> The problem is not just the promotions. It has deep political roots. After our evacuation from Beirut, various projects — the Reagan plan, the Fez plan, "confederation" with Jordan — were put forward. They don't serve the Palestinian cause. They won't bring an independent Palestinian state. That is as clear as daylight. The Fez plan put aside the military option and chose the political solution — in the shadow of an Arab world that has never so conspired against the Palestinian cause.

Asked if he believed in complete liberation or a West Bank state, he answered:

> There is no homeland with partition. The homeland is all the homeland. Therefore there must be complete liberation of the whole land of Palestine. But we have no objections to liberating a portion of it and establishing a national authority, provided, that is, that there is no reconciliation, no recognition of Israel, and we are entitled to continue the armed struggle in the future for complete liberation.

Hirst asked Abu Musa if this meant that "you're against Arafat's diplomacy of the last 10 years?" to which Abu Musa answered "yes." Hirst persisted: "You want to go back to the Palestine National Charter?" to which Abu Musa also responded "yes."[63]

As Abu Salih became more intimately involved with the revolt, and the revolt appeared to gain strength, the Syrians became more active participants. Asad clearly concurred with the rebels that Arafat needed his wings clipped, though their rationales may have differed somewhat. Despite Arafat's sudden conciliatory tone toward the rebels and eleven visits to the Beka'a valley in what dimly resembled a U.S. Midwestern primary campaign, Abu Musa and Abu Salih, now buoyed by Syrian support, refused to be co-opted. Arafat promised to clean up PLO corruption and financial irregularities, as well as abolish networks of political favoritism. He also promised a more open leadership. But the basic

[62] See the text of the statement in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), May 17, 1983, p. A4.

[63] See the *Manchester Guardian,* July 4, 1983, p. 13, parts of which were reprinted in the *Washington Post,* July 13, 1983. See also Abu Musa's interview with the London Arabic paper *Al-Hawadith,* FBIS, *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), June 12, 1983, pp. A2-A5.

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political demands of the rebels — rejecting international diplomacy, rejecting the Reagan and Fez plans in clear unfettered language, and giving half the power on Fatah's inner councils to the rebels — Arafat rejected. He also accused both the Syrians and the Libyans of aiding the rebels, and appealed to the other Arab countries and to Moscow for support.

Although the Syrians did not start the mutiny, they knew of its origins and simply could not pass up an opportunity to whittle Arafat down to size once and for all.[64] On May 28, the rebels, with admitted Syrian assistance, seized Fatah offices in Damascus. In early June, again with Syrian help, the rebels seized PLO supplies and warehouses near Damascus. Later in the month, after Arafat loyalists had been decisively outnumbered and outmaneuvered by the rebels, heavy battles erupted around Baalbek and Shtura as the loyalists tried to escape their predicament. Rebel guns hammered Arafat's positions from behind Syrian lines and the loyalists were pushed out of the valley in the direction of Tripoli, where their safety was indirectly (and somewhat ironically) ensured by Muslim fundamentalists who had managed to keep the Syrians at bay for years.

Arafat's response to his dwindling position in June was twofold. First, he offered a continuing stream of concessions to the rebels, declaring a willingness to do just about anything but resign — all to no avail. His concessions seemed only to embolden the rebels and Asad to press for more. Second, PLO radio, now situated in Baghdad and still loyal to Arafat, began a futile but imaginative propaganda campaign. It held that Syrian attempts to push the PLO northward in Lebanon was a prelude to a *Syrian* capitulation to the United States, and a *Syrian* withdrawal from Lebanon.

Third, the Syrians suspected Arafat of trying to foil Asad's war of nerves against the Lebanese government by provoking a major war between Syria and Israel. To play this wild-card role, however, Arafat needed help. Announcing an alliance with what remained of the Lebanese Muslim left, an Arafat aide declared: "It is a signal to the Syrians. They want to make a little war within our organization, we will make a big war for them."[65] Whether Arafat was capable of provoking war between Syria and Israel is uncertain. What was less problematic was Arafat's ability to spark trouble inside Syria from the 300,000 Palestinians there. Thus, when the Fatah-Syrian war of words led Arafat to charge publicly

[64] Rouleau, "The Future of the PLO," pp. 142-43, 153. Interestingly enough, despite Syria's close ties with the Soviet Union, the leftist press in the Middle East and Europe has supported Arafat throughout the mutiny. See, for example, the article by Simon Malley "O.L.P.: Le Chantage Syro-Libyen," *Afrique-Asie*, July 17, 1983, pp. 8-10.

[65] See Herbert H. Denton, "Arafat Says PLO, Leftist Lebanese Join," *Washington Post*, June 14, 1983.

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that Syria was attacking the Palestinian revolution, Syria responded decisively. Six plainclothes policemen picked up Arafat in Damascus on June 24 and put him on an airplane bound for Tunis. They told him not to come back.

By early August, Arafat had effectively lost all control over the Beka'a valley and had lost, essentially, his private army. The mutiny, if that was all there was to it, had been successful. Arafat, chairman of what liked to call itself a military organization, had no soldiers to command except in Tunisia, South Yemen, and other far off, irrelevant places. Arafat could reassert control over his forces only by handing himself over to the Syrians, and even this might ultimately result not in the restoration of his nominal PLO leadership, but in his untimely demise.

Looking only at Arafat's traditional bases of support — his guerrilla soldiers and the Arab states — one might have concluded that Arafat was finished. But this was not so. In response to Arafat's expulsion from Syria, support for him among Palestinians in Jordan, the West Bank, the gulf, and elsewhere reached its zenith. His military base was gone, but his political strength had never been greater. As one Palestinian observer put it: "Arafat is king. If Abu Musa walked through a Palestinian refugee camp, the only people who would follow him would be his own bodyguards." Clearly, Arafat's popularity owed little or nothing to the PLO's military aspect. West Bank Palestinians, the community leaders at least, were not troubled in the slightest by Arafat's loss of the PLO's phantomlike military prowess. His popularity stemmed from the fact that he is the symbol of Palestinian hope; and he is a symbol of considerably more attractiveness not despite, but because of, his pragmatic turn toward realism and moderation after Beirut.

Arafat's loss of one constituency in the Arab states and his growing strength among a more important one represents something of a revolution — so far unheralded — in Palestinian national politics. For perhaps the first time, the Palestinian people are telling their leaders what they want, instead of the other way around. Arafat's personal dilemma stands as an illustration that the interests of the PLO as an organization — prisoner to the internecine squabbles of the Arab states and to an ideology of radical nihilism — and the interests of the Palestinian people are not at all the same. If Arafat realizes his true choice at this juncture, his political career as a leader, not of the PLO but of the Palestinians, could be just beginning.

To transform his base of political power from the PLO-cum-organization to the Palestinian people, Arafat has no choice but to turn to those who currently represent and rule the majority of Palestinians at the local levels: the political scions in the West Bank and Gaza, the

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Palestinian notables of the east bank, and the Hashemite hierarchy itself. This means, in short, Arafat's return — this time without an army and without quixotic pretensions — to his Jordanian option. At this point, Arafat has little to lose and much to gain from such a step. Whatever he stood to lose in April, and sought to save by ducking the big decisions, he has lost anyway. If Arafat wishes to represent the Palestinian people, he will have to adopt their priorities as his own, or someone else will. Hussein has more than once hinted that he might bypass the PLO and work with the West Bank political community to stop the Israeli bulldozers before it is too late. The only presently available way to do this is through the Reagan Plan and all that it entails.

Arafat surely knows this; the question is whether he is at last prepared to help his people, or whether he would rather remain a Third World celebrity. His lame effort to compete with Abu Musa in helping the Syrians and the Druze to bring down the Gemayel government during Lebanon's mini-civil war in the Shouf in September seemed to indicate that Arafat had yet to find his true courage. But, on October 9, he suddenly called "for a resumption of the dialogue with Jordan at all levels. We have to transcend all misunderstandings and be united — Palestinians and Jordanians."[66] Still, in the absence of a concerted U.S.-Jordanian diplomacy designed to attract Arafat and the rump of al-Fatah to Jordan once and for all, the result of this latest overture may come to naught.

U.S. Policy

Over the past eighteen months, U.S. Middle East policy has miscalculated in many ways. It has underestimated Syrian opposition to U.S. policies, overestimated Saudi support for U.S. policies, and grievously miscalculated the malign impact that U.S. policies in Lebanon and toward the Palestinian–West Bank question could have on each other. U.S. policymakers imagined, too, that the PLO, as it was constituted before the al-Fatah mutiny, was able or inclined to come to a decision on the Reagan Plan that could have been of service to U.S. objectives. Waiting for the PLO to assent to the Reagan Plan was like waiting for Godot.

Only a fundamental reshaping of the PLO, or its effective displacement, could have secured U.S. interests. Since the mutiny may help Jordan to achieve a long-sought goal — the weakening and disintegration of the PLO as it has been constituted since 1969 and the cooptation of its moderately inclined elements into the Jordanian political orbit — it is to be welcomed. Jordan could perhaps fuse these moderate

[66] Thomas L. Friedman, "Arafat Moves to Play His Jordan Card," *New York Times,* October 10, 1983.

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elements with pro-Jordanian Palestinians on the west and east banks to form a new Palestinian political voice. Only in this way can Hashemite Jordan protect itself in the long run from its own demography, and only in this way, too, can legitimate Palestinian interests be carried into a negotiation with Israel that has a chance to succeed. If it is Yasir Arafat's destiny to become a figurehead, better a figurehead of use to Jordan than to Syria.

Besides a renewal of the Jordanian option, with Yasir Arafat cast in the new and improbable role of a selfless pragmatist fighting for the rights of his people, there are two other conceivable policy options. One is to do nothing, quietly to abandon the Reagan Plan, leaving Israel to work its own way on the West Bank unopposed. The long-term liabilities of such a policy are hard to judge with certainty, but they probably outweigh the short-term political advantages. Such an option might bring serious long-term problems to U.S.-Arab relations, the dangers of new wars, the recrudescence of Palestinian terrorism increasingly aimed at U.S. targets, and, according to some, the ultimate weakening of Israeli security on the outside and Israeli society on the inside.

The other option is to try to forge a larger agreement between Syria and Israel, a sort of de facto entente over Lebanon and Golan. Indeed, some pundits and editorialists have reasoned that the more control Syria has over the PLO, the easier and more likely that Damascus can and will deliver the PLO, provided its own parochial interests are fulfilled in a settlement.[67] The problems with this option, however, are daunting. The Alawi regime may not be able to afford peace, its political base being as narrow as it is, and even if it tries, there may be insufficient overlap between Israeli and Syrian interests to lead to a stable arrangement at this time. Even if the United States could help construct a tacit Israeli-Syrian entente over Lebanon and Golan, the West Bank would still be an issue. Despite its grandiose pretentions, Syria cannot negotiate on behalf of the West Bank and Gaza any more than could Egypt. At the risk of repeating the obvious, to solve the West Bank problem there must be an Israeli-Jordanian deal, not an Israeli-Syrian one.

On balance, the United States would be wisest to try to crack the Syrian nut last, and to use the al-Fatah split to resuscitate the Arafat-Hussein connection toward a negotiated settlement. The Jordanians, for their part, see the opportunity created by the mutiny. In August, and

[67] The Syrian option was at one time put forth by Amos Perlmutter, but he has since had less hopeful things to say about Syria. See his "Begin's Rhetoric and Sharon's Tactics," *Foreign Affairs,* Fall 1982, and "Begin and Arafat: A Time To Act," *Washington Post,* August 16, 1983. See, also, William B. Quandt, "Involve Syria in Peace," *New York Times,* June 30, 1983. On a much less inclusive scale, Secretary Shultz imagined that a PLO evacuation of Lebanon might be *easier* now that Syria was calling the PLO's shots. See "Syrians Could Facilitate PLO Pullout," *Washington Post,* June 30, 1983.

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again in September, Jordanian emissaries approached Arafat to sound him out on the prospects of reviving his negotiations with King Hussein. Reportedly, Arafat pleaded for time to decide.[68] It must be admitted, however, that such a tack cannot be parlayed into solving U.S. problems in Lebanon — just as a deal with Syria could not solve the West Bank problem. If one thing is clear from the errors of the past year, it is that by trying to do too much too quickly, U.S. diplomacy created for itself a double bind; the two prongs of its policy became mutually preclusive, success in one endeavor automatically making success in the other impossible. It is the humble beginning of wisdom to separate them again.

* * *

Author's Postscript

At this journal goes to press, Arafat and his followers have fled from their combat with mutineers backed by Syria in and around the city of Tripoli. As usual, Palestinian civilians bore the brunt of the casualties. Hani al-Hassan was in Amman negotiating with the Jordanian government while Arafat told journalists that the aim of the talks was a compromise between the two sides that would allow "closer coordination" between (what was left of) al-Fatah and the Hashemite monarchy. Although Arafat physically survived Tripoli, he has been gravely weakened politically. He is in no position to drive a hard bargain with King Hussein, and the king is too experienced a man not to realize it. Side trips to Cairo, no matter how dramatic, cannot change this. If Arafat refuses in the end to alight in Amman, there is a chance that Jordan, together with pro-Jordanian forces in the West Bank, may attempt to supplant him once and for all. If, on the other hand, Arafat finally agrees to Hussein's terms, then dramatic new opportunities for Arab-Israeli reconciliation — and new dangers of intra-Arab warfare — may arise. Either way, the denouement of the al-Fatah mutiny has been a critical watershed likely to cast a long shadow on the politics of the region.

[68] Pace, "Jordanians May Reach Out."

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A QUESTION OF PRIORITIES: A COMPARISON OF THE CARTER AND REAGAN DEFENSE PROGRAMS*

by Samuel F. Wells, Jr.

In 1980 the world witnessed a rare political phenomenon: both major candidates in a U.S. presidential election favored increases in defense spending. For the first time since the escalation of the war in Vietnam, the two major parties debated the size and emphasis of an increase, rather than whether or how to cut the defense budget. The debate reflected a new consensus on the need for strength.

No one doubted Ronald Reagan's commitment to the Republican platform plank that called for "the position of military superiority that the American people demand." President Carter, on the other hand, professed a "dramatic change" in opinion about the means and ends of Sovier power, which forced him to support substantial increases in defense spending. Despite references to his success in promoting real increases in defense outlays since taking office, President Carter appeared to many potential voters as a man shifting to meet a new popular attitude. In this atmosphere the public perception of his record on defense hurt Jimmy Carter more than a comparison of his and Ronald Reagan's programs for rearming America.[1]

Now, past the halfway mark of Reagan's first term and near the end of congressional debate over the fiscal year 1984 defense budget, perception rather than reality may again prove decisive. The Soviet attack on Korean Air Lines flight 007 with the loss of 269 lives has temporarily muffled the defense spending debate. But as the 1984 election campaign heats up, the military budget and strategy will quickly return as leading political issues, with claims and counterclaims about what Ronald Reagan has really done for the nation's security. Liberal opponents will assert that

* The author would like to thank Myra S. McKitrick for extensive assistance in the preparation of this article and to express appreciation to Peter Braestrup and Thomas H. Etzold for their comments on an earlier draft. The views expressed here are the author's alone.

[1] *New York Times*, August 3, 1980.

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U.S. strength has been undermined by an economic policy that has weakened social cohesion in order to buy a fleeting and irrelevant military superiority and by creating worldwide insecurity through devious plans for "fighting and winning" a nuclear war. Conservative critics will claim that the actual Reagan record has been little better than could have been expected under Carter's last defense plan and that the administration has failed dismally in its responsibility to sell an expanded program to the American public. Sustaining an objective view through the coming debate will not be easy. It must start with a factual analysis of recent defense programs that develops two broad comparisons: President Carter vs. President Reagan, and Reagan's rhetoric vs. his administration's program.

The Carter and Reagan defense programs appear to differ largely in scale, because both call for increased dollar amounts and both include such policies as fighting limited nuclear wars, projection of power to nontraditional areas lacking in support facilities, maintenance of the All-Volunteer Force, and modernization of the strategic triad. But significant differences develop in the estimate of the Soviet threat, the strategy designed to meet this challenge, and key items in the weapons procurement agenda. The Reagan defense program does not simply add 5 per cent to Carter's spending projections.

While it is interesting to speculate about the differences we might find between Carter and Reagan defense programs of similar size, the more important point is that Jimmy Carter would not have submitted a defense budget of Reagan's magnitude, even if he had faced the favorable circumstances enjoyed by the new president. Nor does it seem likely that he would have remained committed to substantial defense increases as the economy stumbled and deficit projections skyrocketed. Indeed, one can imagine his using the economic distress as justification for cutting his own defense budget requests. Carter's record on defense spending, from early campaign statements to lame-duck displeasure over congressional additions to the fiscal year (FY) 1981 defense budget, suggests that he did not feel that the nation's defenses required special or urgent attention. The biggest flaw in the criticism that unfavorably compares Reagan's performance to Carter's last projections is the failure to recognize the key element of political bargaining: that commitment to the integrity of the program and an unquestioned willingness to support it through the congressional process, often at the expense of other priorities, is at least as important as the budget request itself.

The analysis that follows establishes a budgetary framework for comparing the strategies and defense programs of the two administrations and for judging the Reagan administration's goals and prospects for success. (In order to provide as fair a comparison as possible between

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fiscal years, all percentages are in real terms; specific comparisons are made in constant dollars. All budgetary figures are for Total Obligational Authority (TOA) unless otherwise stated. The amount requested for TOA most clearly represents the president's intentions for the current budget, and it is the most reliable single figure to use in budgetary analysis. Outlays, while measuring expenditures estimated for the fiscal year, are at least one-third dependent upon spending decisions made in prior years.)

Early Carter

In his second televised debate with Gerald Ford in October 1976, Carter charged that "our country is not strong anymore, we're not respected anymore." Military power, he claimed, is only one aspect of strength and respect. Another source is "strength from doing what is right," and in this, U.S. foreign policy had been tragically lacking. An open, honest, and moral foreign policy would serve the country far better than an arms race or the aggressive transfer of U.S. weapons abroad. Citing waste in the Pentagon, Carter vowed to cut defense spending by $5 to $7 billion.[2]

Having campaigned on the premise that relations with the Soviet Union needed to be strengthened, the new president wasted little time in enunciating a strategy in two major speeches of May 1977. "Our humane vision leads us to seek broad cooperation with Communist states for the good of mankind," he told the NATO ministers, and to those gathered for Notre Dame's commencement: "I believe in détente with the Soviet Union. To me it means progress toward peace." In view of his promise to reduce defense spending, Carter announced cuts in the Ford defense budget for FY 1978 almost immediately after assuming office. These adjustments resulted in a net reduction of $2.8 billion, but allowed a small increase in real terms in Total Obligational Authority (TOA) of .3 per cent, thus continuing — albeit gradually — the upward trend that Ford had begun in FY 1976, after nearly eight years of decline.[3]

The decisions in Carter's first full budget flowed from Presidential Directive (PD) 18, a document outlining the administration's foreign policy objectives and assumptions, and from the Consolidated Defense Guidance, which established a framework for specific decisions on force structure and weapons systems. For general purpose forces the

[2] Ibid., October 7, 1976.

[3] Jimmy Carter, "The Military and Political Challenges of the 1980s," speech to the Conference of NATO Countries, London, May 10, 1977, *Vital Speeches of the Day*, June 1, 1977, p. 482; "A Democratic Foreign Policy," Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana, May 22, 1977, ibid., June 15, 1977, p. 516. See, also, Patrick Towell, "Carter vs. Reagan Defense Debate Turns on State of Mind," *Congressional Quarterly Defense Policy Report*, August 8, 1980, pp. 1-8.

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documents fixed the requirements of meeting an intense, large-scale attack in NATO's central region, while retaining a capability to resist a minor, yet related, confrontation in areas such as the Middle East. For planning purposes the administration emphasized the requirements of "initial defense" in response to Soviet plans for a short war. In the strategic realm defense officials proceeded on two assumptions: "first, that deterrence might fail; and second, that U.S. forces must be given the capability to frustrate any ambition that an enemy might attempt to realize." In what came to be known as the Countervailing Strategy, the Defense Department acknowledged that a clear distinction between warfighting and deterrence was no longer possible and that the objective of both must be "to ensure that the Soviets could never calculate the costs of a nuclear exchange as worth the risk" at any level of engagement.[4]

The FY 1979 budget, the first to reflect fully Carter administration policies and planning, provided for $6 billion less in outlays than that projected by Ford in 1977, thereby redeeming Carter's campaign pledge. At the same time the president argued that the commitment made to NATO in May to increase spending by 3 per cent would be met. Carter's request for FY 1979 TOA, however, told a different story. While not reflecting what is actually to be spent in the fiscal year, TOA does directly influence the future pace and direction of the defense program and therefore most accurately reflects a president's intentions. The January 1978 figures projected a real growth in TOA of only 1.9 per cent. Since this projection was based on extremely optimistic inflation assumptions, which were never borne out, TOA actually declined in real terms by .4 per cent during FY 1979.[5]

The FY 1980 budget, designed in an atmosphere of growing inflation and economic difficulties, proposed slightly less growth in TOA than projected a year earlier, and substantially less than that predicted by Harold Brown in 1977. It also emphasized the president's intention to lighten the burden of defense spending on the economy to 4.7 per cent of GNP by 1984 — which would be the lowest point in nearly thirty-five years. This second budget of the administration, presented in January 1979, would be the last expression of those Carter views that were expected to prevail on election night, 1976. Events in the months following the submission of the FY 1980 budget would present the president with a situation demanding increases in the defense budget that the early Carter would never have countenanced.[6]

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[4] Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979* (Washington: GPO, 1978), p. 54. See, also, Harold Brown, *Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 55, 81-82.

[5] Towell, "Carter vs. Reagan Defense Debate," pp. 3-4.

[6] Lawrence J. Korb, *The FY 1980-1984 Defense Program: Issues and Trends* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), p. 7.

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Late Carter

Although it sent shock waves through the American political establishment, the Iranian revolution had no immediate influence on plans for defense spending. While preparing to defend the SALT II treaty before Congress, the administration confirmed that the president's policy of increasing defense expenditures by 3 per cent per year remained adequate. But as the SALT debate developed through the summer, it became increasingly clear that the treaty would face many powerful opponents in the absence of a greater monetary commitment to defense. Former President Ford, Henry Kissinger, Senator Henry Jackson, and other influential political leaders joined with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in calling for a sustained 5 per cent increase in defense spending as a quid pro quo for support of SALT II. Nevertheless, the administration stuck with its 3 per cent figure throughout August and September. This spending level included a 1.5 per cent pay increase for the military and civilian employees of the Department of Defense and assumed a 4 per cent inflation rate. As inflation continued on a course that would bring it to an average of 13.3 per cent for the year, Defense Secretary Brown was actually forced to make cuts in his proposed procurement programs.[7]

Beginning in late August 1979, a series of events underlined the limits of U.S. power. Under pressure from Senators Richard Stone and Frank Church, the administration acknowledged the presence of a brigade of several thousand Soviet combat troops in Cuba. The indecisive handling of this episode effectively killed the SALT treaty. Even more serious was the seizure of American hostages in Iran on November 4. This bold symbolic action fully revealed the unsettling consequences of the loss of the United States' anchor in the Persian Gulf ten months earlier. Almost simultaneously the CIA released an alarming assessment of the growth in Soviet military power that predicted a spending rate for defense of 13-15 per cent of Soviet GNP by 1985.

In response, Carter announced on December 5 the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which had been approved as part of PD 18 in August 1977. One week later, the president revealed that his defense budget for FY 1981 would contain new funds for the RDF and other initiatives sought by the Senate, which amounted to a 5 per cent real increase in defense spending. These figures were $13 billion, or 8.9 per cent, higher than projected by Carter himself one year earlier. Backed by a public increasingly eager to devote more resources to defense, Carter's FY 1981 defense budget nearly doubled the funds available

[7] Lawrence J. Korb, *The FY 1981-1985 Defense Program: Issues and Trends* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), p. 26.

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for air and sea lift, tripled the funds for foreign military aid and support, and accelerated the naval shipbuilding program.[8]

The administration had recognized, according to Harold Brown, that "despite our needs and preferences, we cannot now count on world stability" and that the United States might very well be facing a "critical turning point" in its history. Brown contended, however, that the increase in spending and gloomy overview of the international situation set forth in his Posture Statement did "not reflect . . . a single sudden conversion on the part of the Administration." Rather, a "new consensus is forming around the President's leadership."[9]

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, the president declared a new emphasis on the Persian Gulf as a major U.S. interest and a possible theater of war. On New Year's Eve, Carter confessed on national television that "this action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change in my own opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate motives are than anything they've done in the previous time I've been in office." He made clear by the Carter Doctrine and a new-found willingness to brandish U.S. military power that the United States had a vital interest in Gulf security and stability.[10]

The 1980 State of the Union Address gave first priority to foreign affairs — an unprecedented emphasis for this president. In the speech Carter asked whether the Soviet Union "will continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that power for colonial conquest." Postulating a positive answer, he responded with the Carter Doctrine, a proposal for draft registration, and an exhortation on the need to tighten control on sensitive intelligence and "renounce unwarranted restraints" on the CIA. The last proposal was an especially dramatic departure from his contention as a candidate in 1976 that the CIA was itself a significant foreign policy failure.[11]

In addition to initiatives contained in the State of the Union speech, Carter imposed a grain embargo on the Soviet Union, lobbied against U.S. participation in the 1980 summer Olympic Games in Moscow, and "temporarily" withdrew the SALT II treaty from Senate consideration. The defense budget as outlined the preceding December and submitted on January 29 remained adequate in the president's view.

As the first months of 1980 passed, the American public became increasingly aggressive and sought a stronger defense posture.

[8] Ibid., pp. 52-53.

[9] Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981* (Washington: GPO, January 1980), pp. 3, 14, 61.

[10] *New York Times,* January 20, 1980.

[11] State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980, *Vital Speeches of the Day*, February 1, 1980, p. 227. For Carter's earlier views on intelligence, see *New York Times*, October 7, 1976.

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Backed by polls that showed a plurality (46 per cent) of Americans favoring increased defense spending for the first time in twenty years and a solid majority (73 per cent) favoring a U.S. armed response to a Soviet attack in Europe, the Senate authorized over $5 billion more for defense than requested by the administration. By mid-May Congress had established an outlay budget target of $153.7 billion, 7 per cent greater than Carter's original request less than five months earlier. Much of this difference was anticipated by administration officials through FY 1981 supplementals covering the increased costs of fuel, inflation, and operations in the Indian Ocean. But the government continued to underestimate the rate of inflation and fuel cost growth, and the Pentagon failed to fund the legislatively mandated 11.7 per cent military pay raise. In its most disconcerting move, the administration proposed simultaneous reductions — 50 per cent of which would come from operations and maintenance accounts. The decision to cut defense readiness funds, the symbolic nature of many administration responses, and the refusal to compensate for the consistent underestimation of inflation raised basic questions about Carter's commitment to a sustained defense build-up.[12]

Battle of the Defense Budget: Campaign 1980

Public concern about national security guaranteed that defense policy would be a major issue in the presidential election of 1980. In developing the FY 1981 defense budget, administration officials had electoral requirements very much in mind. Amid the escalating rhetoric of the war and peace issue, it became clear that both candidates felt that the maintenance of peace would require increased vigilance and greater appropriations for defense. Where the candidates differed was in emphasis and degree.

President Carter continued to defend his latest defense budget, complete with supplementals, as adequate. Moreover, he had pledged to "consider submitting supplemental requests as necessary to assure [the] program" developed by the Pentagon for FY 1981. Projecting his major opponent as a man of dangerous, hawkish inclinations, Carter in his campaign statements stressed the limitations — as well as the uses — of military power. SALT II, in the president's view, retained a position of central importance; it represented the only alternative to a "massive arms race." The Democrats blamed eight years of Republican priorities and mismanagement for the gap between U.S. capabilities and commitments. Carter supporters claimed, somewhat confusingly, that the president had fulfilled his 1976 promise to cut the defense budget by $5 billion, while

[12] *New York Times*, May 13, 1980; Korb, *FY 1981-1985 Defense Program*, p. 63.

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carrying out his 1977 pledge to the NATO allies to increase defense spending by 3 per cent a year.[13]

Ronald Reagan, on the offensive, accused Carter of cutting the FY 1980 budget by $82 million in order to show an increase of 3 per cent for the subsequent election-year budget. Pointing to the unrealistically low inflation estimates consistently used as the basis for projecting real growth in the federal budget, Reagan disputed the president's claim of steady growth in the defense budget since 1976. The Republican candidate questioned the priorities of the president and his defense secretary, who had de-emphasized the importance of military power at the expense of the nation's ability to support its interests abroad in a crisis. Under the Carter administration, Reagan charged, U.S. military preparedness had declined to "its lowest ebb in a generation."[14]

While Reagan emphasized improved defense as his "number one priority" in the nomination acceptance address, Carter began to have success in portraying Reagan as a man likely to lead the nation on a path to war. The president's announcement of a decision to increase the FY 1982 defense budget by 4.5 per cent in real terms, combined with his claim to be a responsible, experienced world leader, had its intended effect on the voters. Between June and October, polls showed that Carter had replaced Reagan as the man best able to protect U.S. interests overseas. Widespread talk of war dampened the nationalistic enthusiasm of some citizens: between July and October the percentage of those favoring a return to the draft fell from 62 to 48, and the number of those willing to fight for Europe declined by 15 points, albeit remaining a majority (58 per cent).[15]

Some political analysts accused both candidates of feeding hysteria and avoiding issues such as defense strategy and foreign policy. To a large extent such accusations rang true. For all of Jimmy Carter's vacillation between 3 per cent and 5 per cent increases in defense and Ronald Reagan's call for a minimum of 7 per cent, neither candidate shed much light on what increased funds should buy or what specific policies the military should pursue. Nevertheless, the two men held quite different views on the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, especially its military aspects. These differences in perspective would have profound implications for the size and direction of future defense budgets.

Time and again during the campaign, Ronald Reagan asserted the importance of rebuilding American military power and reasserting U.S. interests against the Soviet Union. For him the Soviet Union under-

[13] Brown, *Annual Report, FY 1981*, p. 13.

[14] *New York Times*, May 2, 1980; "Is America Strong Enough?" *Newsweek*, October 27, 1980, p. 50.

[15] *Newsweek*/Gallup Poll of October 15, 1980; *Newsweek*, October 22, 1980, p. 50.

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stood only military force and a willingness to use it. He viewed the United States as having encouraged Soviet opportunism through a demonstrated lack of will and leadership. SALT II was an example of misguided U.S. diplomacy in that it ratified existing arsenals with a distinct advantage for the Soviet Union, and it lacked adequate verification provisions. Reagan believed the United States faced a "window of vulnerability" as early as 1982, and he expressed the fear numerous times that the Soviet Union might be able to carry out a disarming first strike on U.S. strategic forces. To remedy this problem he called for a massive and sustained rearmament to create "a margin of safety" and also for the United States to prepare for conventional conflict with the Soviet Union at any point around the globe. Reagan showed no doubts about the efficacy of military force in achieving U.S. objectives in relations with the Soviet Union, and he believed that if the superpower relationship were put on a more satisfactory footing, U.S. relations with allies and friends in other regions of the world could easily be improved.

By contrast, Jimmy Carter did not view the Soviet Union as the foremost problem for the United States, and he had serious doubts about the utility of military force in international affairs. The president still believed that good relations with the Third World and the advancement of human rights were important objectives for the United States. The pressure of events had forced him to give increased attention to the Soviet Union and to accept an expanded defense effort, yet his preferences lay with other priorities. His secretary of defense had acknowledged that the United States might face a "window of vulnerability" in the 1980s during his defense of the SALT II treaty, but administration leaders generally sought to maintain only an "essential equivalence" with Soviet strategic forces without making an attempt to match every capability of our competitor. With regard to conventional forces, Carter had put additional emphasis on the Gulf, but he still insisted that the United States could not be prepared to combat the Soviet Union in every part of the world and that diplomatic and political policy were also important international instruments.[16]

Differences on the defense and foreign policies necessary to meet the Soviet threat did not determine the 1980 election. Both candidates agreed on the existence of an expanding challenge from the Soviet Union, and both favored increased defense expenditure. While Carter had successfully exploited his opponent's bellicose rhetoric, he could not overcome his own image of being weak and vacillating. Private and published opinion polls indicated that the American people were ready

[16] Harold Brown, testimony on the SALT II treaty, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings*, July 23-26, 1979, part 1, p. 119.

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for a more decisive approach in international affairs and particularly in domestic and economic areas. The general attitude, which was described by two leading analysts as "troubled, aggressive, tough, and resentful," reflected the desire for a change, and Ronald Reagan was the beneficiary of this widespread discontent.[17]

Reagan Amendments to Carter Programs

When he left Washington, Jimmy Carter passed on to his successor a complete plan for defense spending in FY 1982. Harold Brown's last Posture Statement catalogued the achievements of the previous four years while warning that much remained to be done. This most ambitious of Carter's defense plans projected real growth of 5.3 per cent in TOA, higher even than the president's pre-election pledge. The five-year defense plan accelerated the shifting of priorities that had begun with the FY 1981 plan, increasing defense expenditures to 5.9 per cent of GNP by FY 1986. Even more spectacularly, Carter projected that defense would climb from 23.8 per cent of the federal budget in 1981 to 27.9 per cent by 1986.

At the time many analysts considered the FY 1982 defense report to be a political document, the sole purpose of which was to establish Carter's commitment to a stronger national defense. We will never know what Carter's FY 1982 budget would have been had he been re-elected and thus required to support his requests, but his reluctance to accept congressionally mandated increases to the FY 1981 budget as late as December 1980 may reasonably cause doubt about the extent to which the president would have insisted on the FY 1982 budget he proposed.

The new Reagan administration set about making changes in the FY 1981 and FY 1982 defense budgets immediately. After a little more than a month in office, Reagan and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger submitted formal revisions requesting an additional $7 billion (4 per cent) for FY 1981 and $26 billion (13 per cent) for FY 1982. Taken together these revisions projected a 10.1 per cent real annual growth in TOA during fiscal years 1981-86, bringing defense spending to 7 per cent of GNP and 36.8 per cent of total federal spending by the end of that period. (For a comparison of defense budget requests from FY 1979 to FY 1984, see Table I.)[18]

Not surprisingly, the largest increase within the March revisions came in procurement. It totaled a 23.2 per cent increase in real terms

[17] Daniel Yankelovich and Larry Kaagen, "Assertive America," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 59, 1981, p. 702.

[18] James W. Abellera, Roger P. Labrie, and Albert C. Pierce, *The FY 1982-1986 Defense Program: Issues and Trends* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), pp. 4-9.

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TABLE I
DEFENSE BUDGETS FY 1979 — FY 1984

TOA in Current Dollars ($ billions)

Carter	*FY 1979*	*FY 1980*	*FY 1981*	*FY 1982*	*FY 1983*	*FY 1984*
2/78	126.0	137.2	148.6	160.5	172.7	
1/79	125.7	135.5	145.7	155.7	166.8	177.7
1/80	124.8	139.3	158.7	180.0	201.5	224.2
1/81		142.2	171.2	196.4	224.0	253.1
Reagan						
3/81			178.0	222.2	254.8	289.2
2/82			176.1	214.2	258.0	285.5
2/83				211.4	240.5	274.1

TOA in Constant 1981 Dollars[a] *($ billions)*

Carter						
2/78	163.8	178.4	193.2	208.7	224.5	
1/79	150.7	162.6	174.8	186.8	200.2	213.2
1/80	136.0	151.8	173.0	196.2	219.6	244.4
1/81		142.2	171.2	196.4	224.0	253.1
Reagan						
3/81			178.0	222.2	254.8	289.2
2/82			166.2	202.2	243.6	269.5
2/83[b]				191.7	218.1	248.6

[a] Based on the GNP Deflator. The base year, 1981, represents the crossover point in defense budget comparisons between the Carter and Reagan administrations.

[b] The GNP Deflator for 1983 was estimated on the basis of the annual rate for the first two quarters of 1983. (*New York Times*, July 17, 1983).

SOURCES: *Department of Defense Annual Report*, FY 1979 (February 2, 1978); FY 1980 (January 25, 1979); FY 1981 (January 29, 1980); FY 1982 (January 19, 1981); FY 1983 (February 8, 1982); FY 1984 (February 1, 1983); James W. Abellera, Roger P. Labrie, and Albert C. Pierce, *The FY 1982-1986 Defense Program: Issues and Trends* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1981); and *Economic Report of the President* (Washington: GPO, 1983).

over the level projected by Carter for the FY 1981-82 period. Reflecting the emphasis on strategic mobility, procurement for the Marine Corps leaped by 55 per cent. The procurement plans included four more major naval combatants authorized in FY 1982, $1.9 billion for development and procurement of a modernized B-1 bomber, a $658-million down-payment on a large-deck nuclear powered aircraft carrier, 4,432 missiles, and 115 fixed-wing aircraft, all over and above Carter plans. In addition, Reagan programmed a 14.3 per cent pay increase in FY 1982, compared to Carter's planned 9.1 per cent, and sought to increase manpower levels by a total of 35,900 over two years.[19]

[19] Ibid., pp. 21-25.

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By the end of the administration's first summer, economic realities demanded a review of the March proposals. Early in September the Defense Department began to hint that downward adjustments would be made in the FY 1982-84 budgets as a result of the pressures of high interest rates and inflation. "The number of dollars with which we have to work is finite," stated one Pentagon spokesman, "and demands thereon seem to be infinite." Within days the White House announced $13 billion in cuts over the three fiscal years. Savings would come from stretching out procurement of tanks, tactical aircraft, and ships, as well as from the early retirement of the Titan missiles and eighteen ships, de-activation of one army division, and fairly severe cuts in the readiness and sustainability areas.[20]

The Reagan Defense Program

With his announcement in October of a new strategic nuclear modernization program, President Reagan launched the debate over the policies behind the budget figures. The strategic build-up encompassed all three legs of the triad, as well as command and control and strategic defense. At a projected cost of $180.3 billion over six years, the program would consume less than 15 per cent of total defense expenditures during that period, yet it did not include a permanent basing mode for the MX missile. The sharpest departures from Carter policy came in the cancellation of the so-called Multiple Protective Structure basing system for the MX and the reinstatement of the B-1 bomber program. Reagan decided to continue a Carter program that had cut Trident production from three submarines every two years to one per year.[21]

The cost and scope of this program, while not unexpected, served to fuel criticism of the administration for proposing a detailed strategic build-up without first outlining its foreign policy and arms control objectives. Careless statements by senior officials about limited nuclear war, civil defense, and nuclear demonstration shots generated widespread public anxiety and strengthened the impression that the administration was not interested in arms control. President Reagan's announcement on November 18, 1981, that the United States would seek the total elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe when negotiations opened at the end of the month was greeted with skepticism by those who doubted the president's enthusiasm for anything but the return of U.S. military superiority. Not long afterward the administration stepped

[20] *New York Times*, September 2 and 24, 1981.
[21] Korb, *FY 1980-1984 Defense Program*, p. 38; Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress (FY 1983)* (Washington: GPO, 1982), pp. I-39–I-42, II-57–II-63.

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up preparations for the START talks, scheduled to begin the following summer. The vocal peace movement in Europe encouraged similar sentiments on this side of the Atlantic, focusing a great deal of attention on Reagan's nuclear policy. While strategic nuclear forces consumed a relatively small proportion of the budget in any one year, total costs for programs such as the MX, B-1, and Trident, particularly when quoted out of context, appeared staggering.

As 1982 and the unveiling of Reagan's first full budget approached, the plans for a strategic build-up came increasingly under attack. On the one hand, the Pentagon was accused of spending billions on weapons intended only for bargaining leverage at the negotiating table, ultimately to be traded away. On the other hand, arms control advocates charged that the administration was not "serious about arms control" and therefore would not be willing to bring these same weapons into any kind of agreement.

In the annual report accompanying the FY 1983 defense budget, Secretary Weinberger attempted to explain and justify the new defense policies and programs of the administration. The current build-up was necessary for two reasons. First, past Soviet efforts had not been matched by the United States. As Weinberger explained it, "We must now pay the bill for our collective failure to preserve an adequate balance of military strength during the past decade or two." Second, while modernizing our strategic deterrent, "we cannot, in good conscience, increase our reliance on the threat of nuclear weapons to evade the need for restoring our conventional military strength across the board." U.S. strategy remained "defensive" and oriented toward alliances, Weinberger reported. While stressing the continuity of these two strategic fundamentals with the policies of previous administrations, the secretary widened both concepts to an extent not attempted by his predecessors.[22]

The Counteroffensive Strategy

A national policy based upon the defensive use of military force allows only for the reaction to hostile actions, rather than their initiation or pre-emption. However, once the United States is committed to a response, it should be an aggressive one. Weinberger labeled his strategy the "counteroffensive." Upon being attacked the United States should, according to this doctrine, immediately take the initiative by responding with force "at places where we can affect the outcome of the war," striking at both political and military targets of sufficient importance to "offset" the original attack. This war-widening or horizontal

[22] Weinberger, *Annual Report (FY 1983)*, p. I-4.

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escalation strategy would allow economy of force and enhance surprise by attacking the enemy at his weakest points. But, despite contentions that it would conserve resources, this strategy would initially demand greater capabilities across the board, particularly for the navy, which would have to be prepared to threaten the Soviet homeland directly with conventional power projection in addition to its more traditional role of sea control. Weinberger concluded that the nation's diplomatic commitments required a strategy that allowed the United States to defend allied interests by fighting in areas outside the traditional theaters of central Europe and northeast Asia.

Whereas the Carter administration had developed an appreciation for the importance of the Middle East and Persian Gulf as a subsidiary theater during a major war centered in Europe, the Reagan administration hinted that any war with the Soviet Union — whether begun in Europe or not — would be of worldwide dimensions with central Europe being only one theater. Therefore, NATO interests demanded a U.S. capability to distribute its forces over several geographic areas if necessary. The U.S. commitment to defend specific territory abroad would not necessarily be the decisive factor in determining where the United States would choose to concentrate its efforts to defeat the Soviet Union. In short, the new policy implied that alliance commitments would not constrain the creative use of the counteroffensive.

Similarly, the Pentagon would no longer identify a certain number of "wars" that it needed to be prepared to prosecute simultaneously. "Such mechanistic assumptions," Weinberger wrote, "neglect both the risks and the opportunities that we might confront. . . . But even if the enemy attacked at only one place, *we* might choose not to restrict ourselves to meeting aggression on its own immediate front." (Emphasis in original.)[23]

Over the next few months more details of the administration's defense policy became known as portions of the secret Defense Guidance leaked to the public. Concentrating on strategic nuclear policy, these revelations increased the agitation among moderates and liberals about the direction and intention of the president's nuclear policy. Even more criticism was leveled at the administration for failing to outline a foreign policy with the same detail as the Pentagon had provided for defense policy. As the recession deepened, the problem was increasingly seen as going beyond a simple failure to link defense policy to a coherent foreign policy, to a grand refusal on the part of the president to recognize the

[23] Ibid., pp. I-15–I-16. For an interesting comparative critique which argues that the Reagan strategy "increases the possibility of nuclear escalation," see Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier, "Strategy for Survival," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1983, pp. 22-41.

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broadest definition of national security and realign his priorities to provide for a healthy economy and a viable society.

Such criticisms, while not directed at defense policy as such, would nevertheless have the effect of undermining popular support for the rapid pace of the military build-up. Former Defense Secretary Brown, writing soon after submission of the FY 1983 budget, expressed such concerns: "[The defense budget] is of about the correct size, and contains many correct decisions and needed programs," Brown agreed. "But even these are likely to be undermined," he continued, "by the absence of a coherent foreign and security policy and by the inconsistencies of the Administration's economic program." The result, Brown concluded, could be the erosion of support among working class Americans for the essential defense increases.[24]

Some support did in fact erode over the course of 1982, and the debate over economic priorities and the administration's defense policy — particularly in its nuclear dimension — intensified. But the president remained firmly committed to his program for rearming the United States. When the FY 1984 defense budget was unveiled on February 1, 1983, it included "modifications in our original program" to reflect growing deficit projections. In an early January press conference the president claimed that $41 billion had already been cut from his March 1981 program. Within days he decided to cut an additional $8 billion in outlays and over $11 billion in TOA for FY 1984. Nevertheless, Reagan emphasized that "our defense program . . . remains our top priority" and that these and any other cuts to be contemplated in the future would not affect the substance of his program.[25]

With the FY 1984 budget, which incorporates these latest cuts, the administration has established a record of defense appropriations requests we can use to assess the match between rhetoric and spending priorities. By any gauge the Reagan Pentagon is spending significantly more than planned by Carter, even under his FY 1982 plan. The president has placed primary emphasis on the purchase of weapons systems in order to narrow the "investment gap" of the past decade and to provide for extensive modernization of equipment for all four services. The focal point of this procurement effort, in both words and dollars, has been the navy. Other areas to receive at least rhetorical emphasis include readiness, sustainability, and manpower as well as command, control, communications, and intelligence. The administration has itself chosen to highlight these areas, so it is here that we will look at the record now established and compare it to the achievements of the Carter years.

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[24] Harold Brown, "Where Defense Budget Goes Wrong," *Los Angeles Times*, February 11, 1982.
[25] *New York Times*, January 12, 1983.

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TABLE II
FIVE-YEAR SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS

	Total New Ships	*Total Conversions, Acquisitions, Reactivations*	*Average per year*
FY 1980-84	67.0	13.0	16.0
FY 1981-85	97.0	5.0	20.4
FY 1982-86 (Carter)	80.0	19.0	19.8
FY 1982-86[a] (Reagan)	112.0	22.0	26.8
FY 1983-87	133.0	16.0	29.8
FY 1984-88	124.0	21.0	29.0

[a] Figures for FY 1982 Reagan programs taken from FY 1983 Posture Statement.

SOURCES: *Department of Defense Annual Reports*, FY 1980-84.

The 600-Ship Navy

The Counteroffensive Strategy set forth by the Reagan administration requires a significant expansion of naval power. Along with the Strategic Air Command, the navy would provide the initial offensive force projection in addition to battling the Soviet fleet. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has argued that recent advances by the Soviet navy make "regionally limited" naval conflict with the Soviet Union impossible. Testifying in support of the FY 1983 naval budget, Lehman declared that "withdrawal is the only alternative to a major naval force expansion."[26]

Consistently since 1975 the navy has considered 600 ships the minimum required to maintain its ability to perform the missions of power projection, protection of sea lanes, and logistical support. Five-year shipbuilding programs tend to change significantly from year to year, but the Reagan program is the most ambitious in recent times. In January 1977 outgoing President Gerald Ford recommended a five-year plan to build 157 ships, which would have been the biggest investment since 1968, bringing the fleet to about 580 ships by 1985.[27]

In line with his general re-evaluation of defense needs, Harold Brown announced in the spring of 1978 that he considered a fleet of 525 vessels by the mid 1980s to be adequate. Actual shipbuilding plans under Carter, however, consistently failed to meet these objectives. Under the program for FY 1980, the fleet would not quite climb to 525 by 1985

[26] Ibid., April 11, 1982.

[27] Lawrence J. Korb, *The Price of Preparedness, The FY 1978-1982 Defense Program* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), p. 39. An earlier commitment to a 600-ship navy developed during the tenure of Admiral Arleigh Burke as chief of naval operations from 1955 to 1961.

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TABLE III

NAVAL VESSEL PROCUREMENT BUDGETS[a]
($ millions)

	Current Dollars	*Constant 1981 Dollars*
FY 1980	6,062.9	7,275.5
FY 1981	5,410.1	5,897.0
FY 1982 (Carter)	6,229.6	6,229.6
FY 1982 (Reagan)[b]	9,056.6	8,549.4
FY 1983	17,841.3	16,842.2
FY 1984	12,509.9	11,346.5

[a] Vessels include Trident submarines, Poseidon conversions, major combatants, and fleet support. Budgets include new ship construction, conversion, reactivation, and directly related development costs.

[b] The 1982 Reagan budget taken from the 1983 Posture Statement.

SOURCES: *Department of Defense Annual Reports*, FY 1980-84; *Economic Report of the President*, FY 1984.

and would fall to 375 by 1995. The 1980-84 shipbuilding plan provided for 13 new ships per year — an insufficient number to keep pace with requirements over the next ten years. (See Table II for a comparison of the five-year shipbuilding programs for FY 1980-84 through FY 1984-88.) In a move the administration would later regret, this program included a large drop in amphibious capability. The original Carter planning requirement to maintain the capacity to transport 1⅓ Marine Amphibious Forces immediately to any region remained policy, yet procurement for amphibious lift was cut dramatically and some important programs were terminated. Under the FY 1980 program the navy would have only 6 major amphibious ships by the turn of the century. Similarly, the logistic and support-ship inventory would drop by one-third within six years.[28]

The FY 1981 shipbuilding plan, reflecting the events of 1979, restored some of these capabilities to project and supply mobile forces in areas such as the Persian Gulf. The budget included an additional 34 per cent for the navy, and proposed building 30 more ships over the FY 1981-85 period than had been requested a year earlier. Some of these new ships were to be funded, however, at the expense of other naval priorities: two major combatants were dropped from the program. As had his predecessor, Carter proposed an uncharacteristically ambitious naval building schedule as he was leaving office. In his last five-year shipbuilding plan, Carter proposed a fleet of 590 ships by the late 1980s and the maintenance of 12 carriers through the year 2000.[29]

[28] Korb, *FY 1981-1985 Defense Program*, p. 57; Korb, *FY 1980-1984 Defense Program*, pp. 16-17.

[29] Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1982* (Washington: GPO, 1981), p. 153.

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With the March 1981 revisions, President Reagan made immediate changes in both the size and direction of the navy's shipbuilding program. (For a comparison of the naval vessel procurement budgets from FY 1980 to FY 1984, see Table III.) Total new construction for the period 1982-86 would be 112 ships under Reagan, compared to 80 under Carter's last plan. The most significant single change was the preliminary funding for one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.[30]

The FY 1983 budget revealed more details, including the anticipated decision to request funding for 2 large carriers to meet the administration goal of 14 deployable carriers by the late 1980s. Additionally, the navy requested a tactical air complement of 10 F-14 squadrons and 22 F/A-18 squadrons, both to equip the new carrier air wings and to modernize existing ones. Other increases included 5 more Aegis-equipped guided-missile cruisers than proposed by Carter, bringing the total to 25 by the early 1990s; 15 SSN-688 attack submarines funded over the FY 1983-87 period — nearly tripling Carter's request; and a major amphibious construction program including one class of landing craft canceled by Carter and a new class of general purpose amphibious assault ships. And, in another widely publicized move, Reagan requested reactivation of 4 Iowa-class battleships to be fully equipped with modern electronics and Tomahawk cruise missiles.[31]

The FY 1984 naval budget revealed a modest decrease in construction projections, but maintained the goal of 650 ships in 1995 and amphibious lift for 1½ Marine Amphibious Forces. This represented a net drop of 4 combatants from the FY 1983 program — 2 Aegis guided-missile cruisers and 2 destroyers — and the stretching out of the battleship reactivation.[32]

Program goals and maritime policy remained stable, reflecting the continued commitment to fulfill this much-debated aspect of the administration's build-up. To date Congress has approved the plans, but the integrity of the program depends a great deal on actual funding for outlays in FY 1986-88. Over half the total growth is scheduled for these years. Placing such a large proportion of the program beyond Reagan's first term introduces considerable uncertainty about the actual fulfillment of the naval plan. But current evidence supports the conclusion that the administration will vigorously pursue these goals. As recently as August 11, 1983, Reagan declared, "We . . . dedicate ourselves to achieving the

[30] Weinberger, *Annual Report (FY 1983)*, p. III-36.
[31] Ibid., pp. III-19–III-36.
[32] Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984* (Washington: GPO, 1983), p. 159. For an interesting comparison of the navy's budget authorizations with those for the other services over the last six years, see *Armed Forces Journal International*, September 1983, pp. 9, 20.

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requisite naval superiority we need today by building a 15-carrier, 600-ship Navy."[33]

Readiness, Sustainability, and Manpower

"I inherited serious deficiencies in the readiness of our forces, both in manpower and materiel," Weinberger claimed in his first Posture Statement. Therefore, he continued, "my most urgent requests this first year are designed to correct these deficiencies." Carter's last two budgets provided for increases in the operations and maintenance accounts of a little over 11 per cent, which was higher than the average percentage increase for overall defense spending during those two years. This was due partly to the congressional pressures discussed earlier, and partly to Harold Brown's own belated recognition of the cumulative negative effect of prior underfunding. The first Reagan budget request provided for an additional $3.5 billion for FY 1981-82, a real increase of 3 per cent. The next year, in the FY 1983 budget, the administration requested a 6.2 per cent increase in real terms for operations and maintenance, less than half of the average percentage increase requested for that year. The cuts made by Congress and the administration in anticipation of the final authorization of December 1982 maintained this relationship, increasing this item by 4 per cent in real terms while overall spending increased by 8.7 per cent. The most recent budget for FY 1984 seeks to improve operations and maintenance funding by 7.6 per cent, still well below the total spending increase of 10 per cent.[34]

It is difficult to determine whether or not this represents an underfunding of the operations and maintenance accounts, since the overall percentage increase is distorted by the large new requests for procurement. More telling will be the evolution of the five-year plans to reflect the growing inventory of weapons and equipment. Obviously, future operations and maintenance funding will have to rise proportionally to allow for maintenance of materiel currently being procured, in addition to training and current operations. But if present funding trends continue, readiness deficiencies comparable to any in the Carter years could occur.

The Pentagon announced major plans to improve sustainability represented by stocks of ammunition and supplies. The administration claims to have increased these accounts over Carter estimates by 30 per cent for FY 1982 and by 50 per cent for FY 1983. Weinberger contends that by 1986 such increases should result in "our ability to sustain combat

[33] Reagan's statement of August 11, 1983, as quoted by John Lehman, *Washington Post*, September 8, 1983.

[34] Weinberger, *Annual Report (FY 1983)*, pp. I-28–I-29, IV-9.

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by about 25 per cent over the level" left by President Carter. The fact that a cut of more than $1 billion in planned ammunition purchases comprised a substantial part of Weinberger's first package of cuts in September 1981 underlines the point that such accounts tend to bear the brunt of politically mandated reductions in outlays. Furthermore, serious difficulties in achieving these projected increases have recently emerged as a result of rising costs, increased estimates of wartime consumption, and limitations on production capacity for certain advanced munitions.[35]

The Reagan record on manpower policy is remarkable for its inconsistency. A persistent theme in Reagan's campaign against the Carter stewardship of defense was the tragic decline in the standard of living for U.S. military personnel. His administration did in fact move quickly to compensate for years of inadequate pay increases by requesting and receiving a 14.3 per cent pay hike in FY 1982, followed by an 8 per cent increase in FY 1983. Yet in a cost-saving move that surprised many, including the services, Weinberger proposed a freeze on military pay in 1984. Hailing the revitalization of the All-Volunteer Force as "one of the earliest and best successes of the Reagan defense program," the secretary argued that improvements in service morale and recruiting performance justified his decision to eliminate the 7.6 per cent pay increase budgeted a year earlier.[36]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, calling personnel "our top priority," have publicly voiced their disappointment with this expression of administration priorities. Recently, Pentagon officials have indicated that the secretary is considering a new index of military pay comparability that would not be based on the cost of living and would allow greater flexibility in claiming pay equality between the military and civilian sectors. Again, the services have expressed their disappointment with this hedging. Similarly, in opposition to traditional service priorities, the administration has singled out military construction — which includes family housing — as one area to bear cutbacks in both of the major reduction packages.[37]

Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

The importance of deploying communications and intelligence assets that are able to survive and work in a nuclear environment has risen in direct proportion to the emphasis placed on a nuclear warfighting capability. The Carter administration moved decisively in this direction during its last two years, ending with Presidential Directive (PD) 59, which

[35] Weinberger, *Annual Report (FY 1984)*, p. 45.
[36] Ibid., p. 43.
[37] *New York Times*, January 14, 1983; *Army Times*, March 14, 1983.

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officially envisioned limited nuclear conflict. Earlier, PD 53 and 58 had laid the groundwork for this discussion by addressing the survivability and necessary linkages in the nation's total communications network and protection for the national command authority.

Events overseas and at home focused attention on serious vulnerabilities in the U.S. global communications network. In early 1979 the Iranian revolution eliminated the use of U.S. monitoring stations for Soviet missile tests and other vital intelligence facilities. About the same time the administration began to face the defense implications of the breakup of AT&T. The Bell System provided the defense establishment with invaluable national security elements such as hardened communications sites and redundant transmission links. The growing recognition of the need for more sophisticated communications to match a more complex policy, combined with the deficiencies in the current posture and new government responsibility in areas formerly sustained by private business, meant that communications and intelligence functions began to receive a larger share of the Carter defense budget.

Under Reagan, command, control, communications, and intelligence (C^3I) have received more money as part of the overall upward adjustment of defense spending levels. Especially important is the new prominence accorded these elements as the Pentagon refines nuclear warfighting strategies for different contingencies. The concentrated effort to develop a mobile, land-based command post is a good reflection of this new trend. Such a vehicle would provide the center for the direction of political and military operations for the United States after the first forty-eight hours of nuclear war, when present capability provided by the airborne command post would be virtually exhausted.[38]

In budgetary terms communications and intelligence have won significantly greater percentage increases than average in both of Reagan's complete budget requests. The March 1981 revisions added $1.3 billion, or 5.5 per cent, to Carter's budget for FY 1981 and FY 1982, which was just under Reagan's average increase of 6 per cent. For FY 1983, Reagan submitted a real increase of 22 per cent, far above his average requested increase of 13 per cent. The most recent budget asks for an additional 17 per cent, again higher than the 10 per cent average increase.[39]

While most of the programs now funded also received support from Carter — with the notable exceptions of the mobile command post and the extremely low-frequency submarine communication program (dropped by Carter due to environmental pressures) — the new levels of

[38] *Baltimore Sun*, February 25, 1983.
[39] Weinberger, *Annual Report (FY 1983)*, p. IV-8; Weinberger, *Annual Report (FY 1984)*, p. 320.

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resources devoted to these programs will have a very important effect upon their early ability to enhance the overall national security posture.

Prospects for the Future

In assessing the probability that the Reagan defense program will fulfill its ambitious plans, the critical question is this: How effective will the president be in sustaining a healthy coalition for his projected defense build-up while facing diverse competing demands. Economic recovery has developed considerable momentum at home, but serious problems loom ahead in the form of continued high deficits, sluggish allied recovery, and massive debt among key Third World partners. Despite the growing prominence of the nuclear freeze movement and the rising dissatisfaction in Congress with projected defense increases, a remarkable degree of support still exists for consistently growing defense budgets, albeit at levels lower than now preferred by Reagan. In a widely publicized criticism of the administration, the National Governors Association recently called on the president to cut his defense requests, as have Democratic congressional leaders. Both groups, however, continue to support defense increases averaging 4-5 per cent a year — a level only dreamed of in recent, pre-Reagan experience. Despite vocal opposition, strong support for increased defense spending continued through crucial votes in late July. The Soviet destruction of the South Korean airliner in September and the successful U.S. military operation in Grenada two months later quieted most of the critics, and just before adjournment on November 18, Congress passed the Defense Appropriations Act, including $249.8 billion for FY 1984. Described by members of Congress as the largest single spending bill in history, this appropriation was only $11.1 billion below Reagan's request as modified by his own early cuts. It represents an increase of 7.3 per cent over last year's bill in current dollars and is twice as large as the same bill four years earlier.[40]

But 1984 is an election year, and the defense budget can be expected to serve as a convenient focus of attack for those hoping to capitalize on economic distress and fears of a nuclear holocaust. The resulting rhetoric is likely to sidestep the difficult yet essential issues of threat assessment, commitments, and strategy, as well as analysis that places defense spending in a proper economic context.

One contender for the Democratic presidential nomination, for example, recently released a position paper on the FY 1984 defense budget that opened with the statement:

[40] *Wall Street Journal*, July 28, 1983; *Washington Post*, September 14 and 16, and November 18, 1983.

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The proposed FY 1984 defense budget must be reduced. The increase in defense spending proposed by the Administration . . . is excessive and inappropriate in view of the condition of our economy and the severe budget cutbacks the Administration proposes in other areas.[41]

Veteran defense analyst Albert Wohlstetter, among others, warns against accepting such terms for the debate. "Less serious critics hardly think of defense as related to external dangers," Wohlstetter observed recently. Rather, "they treat what the founding fathers called the 'common defense' as if it were only one more domestic interest group clamoring for an entitlement or a larger share of the domestic pie."[42]

On March 23, 1983, the president added his own personal plea to the American people and their elected representatives in Congress to re-examine the assumptions upon which they base an opinion as to the proper size of the defense budget. Assailing his critics for speaking in terms of spending "X billion dollars less," or advocating specific percentage increases, the president reminded the nation that the defense debate is "not about spending arithmetic":

What seems to have been lost in all this debate is the simple truth of how a defense budget is arrived at. It isn't done by deciding to spend a certain number of dollars. . . . We start by considering what must be done to maintain peace and review all the possible threats against our security. Then a strategy for strengthening peace and defending against those threats must be agreed upon. And finally our defense establishment must be evaluated to see what is necessary to protect against any or all of the potential threats. The cost of achieving these ends is totaled up and the result is the budget for national defense.[43]

If one accepts the premise that a given defense budget represents calculations far too important to be determined by the "remainder method" — the methodology for figuring defense budgets during the mid 1950s that led directly to today's reliance on theater and strategic nuclear weapons — then a critique of the FY 1984 defense budget must be based on its planning assumptions.

A Balance Sheet

At the most fundamental level, five central assumptions support the administration's current defense budget. Stated in summary form these are:

(1) As a result of a "decade of neglect," the Soviet Union currently enjoys a "margin of superiority," particularly in conventional

[41] Senator Gary Hart, *A Military Reform Defense Budget for FY 84* (pamphlet).

[42] Albert Wohlstetter, "A Prescription for Disjointed Defense," *Wall Street Journal*, March 16, 1983.

[43] Ronald Reagan, Address on Defense, *New York Times*, March 24, 1983.

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forces, and is well on the way to establishing a similar general superiority in strategic nuclear weapons.

(2) The Soviet Union may be planning for a "protracted" nuclear war. The United States must therefore be prepared for this possibility and plan to emerge from such a situation with a reserve of operational strategic nuclear weapons.

(3) Full-scale conventional war with the Soviet Union is possible. In this case warning would be ambiguous, the dimensions would be worldwide, and the conflict would likely endure beyond the initial hostilities.

(4) Unconventional conflict — commando raids, guerrilla warfare, and counterterrorism — is likely to become more important both as a means of wartime leverage and as a source of instability. The United States must emphasize planning and training for such contingencies.

(5) The United States must begin at once with generous research and development programs focusing on the most advanced technology if U.S. pre-eminence is to be assured into the twenty-first century.

Building on these assumptions, the Reagan administration has developed a comprehensive policy. Senior defense officials had good reason to proceed in building up U.S. military strength as rapidly and as broadly as possible when they first entered office. The need to do so stemmed from both the widespread desire for a more vigorous U.S. policy and the international image left by over a decade of vacillation and introspection following the Vietnam War. But there were problems with the nature of the build-up from the start, and, as a new presidential election approaches, the administration must rethink its policies and refine its justifications.

The first problem to be addressed is that a case about the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat must be made persuasively and without exaggeration. The administration in the past has described the Soviet threat in ways believable only by those previously converted. Although the 1983 Defense Department report on Soviet power was more effective than the initial version, much work with different forms of presentation remains to be done. Through the use of extensive evidence, the administration must now demonstrate the range of Soviet activities and capabilities that pose danger for the United States today and in the years ahead. This approach must include a willingness to talk with the Soviet Union and to negotiate about political, economic, and military issues.

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Second, administration leaders must show that the nation can afford sustained defense spending at roughly current levels. Economic recovery can help reduce deficits through increased revenues, and the president and the Congress must be willing to make the difficult decision for higher taxes. To strengthen the case further, the Defense Department must show the capacity to manage its resources in a more effective manner. Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci designed a series of procurement reforms that offered considerable promise, but their implementation has been stalled. A major effort, coordinated with the key members of Congress, must be made to implement procurement reforms including such steps as the purchase of major items from dual sources, avoiding decisions to stretch out a program at production levels that are uneconomical, and making long-term commitments to prime contractors for major weapons systems.[44]

Third, Reagan must establish greatly improved linkage between defense programs and foreign policy goals. In addition to a more effective presentation of the Soviet challenge, the administration has to show that it has a positive diplomatic program including steps that maintain unity within NATO, provide political education for U.S. and allied citizens regarding nuclear strategy and the problems posed for the United States by a nuclear freeze, and the requirements for an adequate conventional defense. Development of a credible arms control program in which the United States seizes the initiative and places the burden of response upon the Soviet Union is absolutely essential to establish both the seriousness of the threat and the willingness of the administration to advance U.S. interests by means other than military power. An important element of a positive diplomatic program would be the elimination of ill-conceived statements about fighting nuclear war or challenging the Soviet Union at various points around the world. The will power of the administration is no longer in question, but among many of our friends its judgment is. A creative diplomatic strategy and a program of political education are necessary to maintain the support at home for the defense build-up as well as to establish positive relations with our allies.

Fourth, the administration must set priorities within its defense program so that it can deal with the realities of diminished support for increasingly high levels of defense spending. While such choices were not essential in the administration's first two years, they are now and will become even more necessary. Under popular pressure, Congress will not

[44] For a good discussion of why the country can afford increased defense spending and a suggestion of steps to improve defense procurement, see Jacques S. Gansler, "We Can Afford Security," *Foreign Policy*, summer 1983, pp. 64-83. For a positive analysis of the strengths of the U.S. economy and its capacity to support a sustained military build-up, see Herbert Stein, "Tour d'Horizon: A Calm View of Economic Policy," *The AEI Economist*, May 1983, pp. 1-6.

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likely continue to fund at significant levels a revived B-1B and an accelerated Stealth bomber, or an MX missile plus a single-warhead mobile ICBM, or expanded amphibious capability plus four more additional carrier battle groups. Choices will have to be made and defended, and this will require some fairly rigorous negotiations with the military services. But unless this is done, a much greater danger is that Congress, urged on by eminent former officials and presidential candidates, will eliminate major weapons systems without any coherent program for doing so.

The Reagan administration has done more to expand U.S. military strength than any administration since that of Harry Truman, who acted reluctantly under the extreme pressure of the Korean War. The largest expenditures for a military build-up come in the early years of the next administration, and in order to see these expenditures fulfilled, Reagan must begin at the earliest possible date to improve the explanations of the Soviet threat and the reasons for the administration's defense program, as well as to present a more balanced and positive case for advanced U.S. strength. The build-up, begun under Carter and dramatically accelerated under Reagan, contains significant flaws. But these problems can be remedied, and they should not be used to detract attention from the importance of the overall build-up.

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STRATEGIC PLANNING AND NUCLEAR INSECURITY

by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.

Presidential Directive (PD) 59, the United States' nuclear strategy, was the culmination of a decade of hard work by top Pentagon and National Security Council officials. No sooner was it announced in the summer of 1980, however, than the judgment of the head of the Strategic Air Command — namely, that the United States did not have the capabilities to implement the strategy — was leaked to the press. While that statement should have raised serious questions concerning the wisdom of having a strategy that could not be implemented, the statement drew little attention and quickly passed from memory.

After vowing to close the "window of vulnerability," the current administration decided to build the B-1 and M-X nuclear delivery systems. At the news conference announcing the decision in the fall of 1981, top officials were questioned about the strategic plan behind the systems. Was it based on Presidential Directive 59 or its immediate predecessor, National Security Decision Memorandum 242? The response was honest and straightforward: "The strategic plan was to regain the degree of balance that can maintain deterrence," and, "it's based upon the decisions of the man we elected to make decisions." Again, the significance of both the questions and the answers was lost and drew little attention.

At some point in time, and well before a serious nuclear crisis occurs, it would seem logical to examine what we have and where we are going. Should a crisis develop, it will be too late to learn that the capabilities do not match the strategy or that the strategy itself is badly deficient. A crisis has to be the worst possible time to learn that the king's clothes are badly tattered.

The heart of the problem is military strategy — Soviet strategy and U.S. strategy. How can one assess the value of any system, such as the B-1 or M-X, let alone its detailed configuration or basing, without some knowledge of what strategy the system is supposed to support and without a reasonable belief that the strategy makes sense? If the strategy

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is deficient, as well it might be if it does not adequately consider such parameters as principles of military art and the enemy's capabilities and strategy, even a good system or program may be hard to justify.

In 1962 the Soviets set forth their nuclear strategy in a landmark military text, *Military Strategy.*[1] The editor and primary author was Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy, who was given this prestigious but less demanding job following a heart attack suffered when he was chief of the General Staff. Above all, this book emphasized the importance of qualitative and quantitative military superiority, striking first, and preparing the state to fight a nuclear war.

These notions did not fit well with the top-level U.S. thinking at that time and, therefore, the Soviet book and the ideas contained in it were officially denigrated. The concept of Soviet "hawks and doves" was invented and the book was "explained" as merely an "outward sign of the great military debate."[2] The official U.S. national security position was that the Soviets were not out to achieve nuclear superiority and that they recognized, as the United States did, that it was impossible and irrational to think about fighting a nuclear war. *Military Strategy,* however, had been approved by the party. It was developed specifically to support Soviet state policy. The theoretical basis had been established during the high-level reviews conducted in 1957 under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev and Marshal Sokolovskiy and refined in preparation for the Special Party Congress in 1959. When the text was published, an extensive series of supporting articles appeared in *Red State* and in *Communist of the Armed Forces,* whose publication policy is determined by the Central Committee Secretariat. And, in time, the importance of *Military Strategy* as the definitive, official statement of Soviet policy became recognized in the West.

The book was refined and reissued in 1963 and again in 1968. In the Soviet military encyclopedia published in the late 1970s, it is still listed as the key reference on Soviet military strategy. It is not out of

[1] Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy,* edited with analysis and commentary by Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975).

[2] Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 218. As revealed in the Senate *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book 1, Foreign and Military Intelligence* (Washington: GPO, 1976), p. 194, this book was prepared by the CIA clandestine services, that is, the Plans Directorate (now the Operations Directorate) for unspecified political reasons. It appears to represent one side of what may have been a combined CIA, DoD, et al. effort to discredit Soviet strategy and war preparations. This may also help account for the shift in the intelligence analysis described in *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book 4, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence* (Washington: GPO, 1976), p. 80. There is also reason to suspect this effort was the object of KGB deception measures, possibly involving Penkovskiy. The DoD's role in discounting Sokolovskiy's *Military Strategy* can be seen in W. W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 97, citing Secretary McNamara's testimony in the *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964.* An analysis of other important contributing factors is presented in Kenneth Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979).

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date, even today. As the writings on Soviet strategy are examined over time,[3] there is tremendous continuity. Certain aspects are refined, the ever-changing U.S. doctrine is taken into account, but the basic principles of Soviet strategy remain invariant. This becomes especially disconcerting as the hardware developments, exercises, and civil preparations such as provision for survival of the leadership and continued functioning of the economy are examined and seen to be evolving in support of the basic Soviet strategy. That is, Soviet writings on the strategy are increasingly emerging as far more than mere rhetoric.

By 1980, a majority of the national security community had begun to acknowledge that the Soviets had achieved nuclear superiority. And, in 1982, for the first time, the U.S. secretary of defense expressed concern that the Soviets were beginning to appear to believe that they could fight and win a nuclear war.[4] Perhaps, as distasteful as this may be, it would be wise to pause, examine the Soviet view of nuclear war, and consider the implications.

Soviet Preparations for Nuclear War

As summarized in Chapter VII of *Military Strategy* and detailed in many subsequent General Staff publications, the Soviet preparation is a long-term, planned preparation whose objectives are to seize the initiative with a devastating first strike; to "achieve victory in the shortest possible time"; to defend the socialist state and " 'hold out' against massive nuclear strikes of the enemy with fewest possible losses"; if need be, to be able to wage war for a "protracted period of time"; and to maintain "a high moral-political state of the population and bolster its determination to achieve victory."[5] In short, the Soviets are preparing to fight and win a nuclear war with the United States. In examining this preparation and comparing it with the U.S. approach, six aspects stand out.

First, there is the *offensive nuclear* character of their national policy. This character has been explained clearly and consistently over the years by both Soviet military and political (i.e., party) authorities in material written for internal consumption. As expressed in the basic

[3] See, for example, *Index to and Extracts From Voyennaya mysl,* vol. 1 (1963-69) and vol. 2 (1971-73), Defense Intelligence Agency, DDB-2245-1-82, May 1982, vol. 3, System Planning Corporation Report no. 675, September 1979; Ian Greig, *They Mean What They Say* (London: Foreign Affairs Research Institute, 1981); and *Selected Reading from Military Thought 1963-1973,* Studies in Communist Affairs, vol. 5, parts 1 and 2 (Washington: GPO, 1982).

[4] See, for example, Michael Getler, "Soviet Missile Tests Scenario of War," *Washington Post,* June 21, 1982, and "Soviets Stage Integrated Test of Weapons," *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* June 28, 1982.

[5] Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy,* p. 306.

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Officer's Handbook, the most widely distributed book in the Soviet "Officer's Library," for example, "military doctrine is the political policy of the Party," "Soviet military doctrine is offensive in character," and "Soviet military doctrine assigns the decisive role in modern warfare to nuclear missiles."[6] "The destruction of the enemy is achieved primarily by means of the delivery of mass nuclear strikes."[7] The main form of military action will be the strategic offensive: "The offensive is the basic type of military operation, and its goal is total destruction of the enemy. Lenin stated that in conducting combat, 'we must not "knock down" but rather destroy the enemy.' "[8]

In the process of formulating their doctrine and strategy, they had carefully analyzed the impact of nuclear weapons on warfare and concluded that it was of a revolutionary nature. The destructiveness of the weapon coupled with its long-range means of delivery meant that decisive strategic results could be achieved with the opening blow. Therefore, the opening of the war is expected to be characterized by a fierce struggle to "seize the initiative." This is best accomplished with a surprise first strike. It has to be achieved with surprise, because any prudent opponent who saw an attack being launched or about to be launched would pre-empt, and the benefits of striking first would be lost.

The objective is to win the war in the first blow. Gradualism is not a Soviet concept.[9] Maximum force is to be applied to achieve strategic results as quickly as possible. The strategic aim of the war is to defeat totally the real and potential military and political forces of capitalism and at the same time repulse the enemy's attack and recover.

Second is the importance of defense. While the focus in the West, both in preparations and in perceptions of Soviet strategy, is on the offense, this is not the case in the Soviet Union. Offense and defense are equally important, with defense being perhaps the more important of the two. In discussing the importance of combat readiness in 1969, Marshal K. Moskalenko, a former commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, identified the following tasks in this order: guarantee antimissile and antiaircraft defense, solidly defend the state borders, strike hard at all the aggressor's vitally important strategic targets, and utilize the results of these strikes for the total defeat of the enemy. And, through-

[6] *The Officer's Handbook,* ed. General-Major S. N. Kozlov (Moscow, 1971). Published under the auspices of the United States Air Force (Washington: GPO, 1977), pp. 63 and 65.

[7] *Military-Technical Progress and the USSR Armed Forces,* ed. Professor Lieutenant General M. Kiryan (Voyenizdat, 1982). Excerpts translated by Leon Goure and Michael J. Deane, "The Soviet Strategic View," *Strategic Review,* Spring 1983, p. 86.

[8] *Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War (A Soviet View),* General-Major A. S. Milovidov, editor in chief. Translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 106.

[9] Marshal of the Soviet Union M. Zakharov, "Soviet Military Science over Fifty Years," *Voyennaya mysl',* no. 2, 1968, FPD0042, April 25, 1969, p. 51.

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out the years, the most important strategic goals are said to be assigned simultaneously to the strategic nuclear forces and the PVO Strany (national defense) forces.

In addition to active defense, enormous attention is directed toward frustrating the enemy's efforts to destroy Soviet forces. While hardening critical facilities against the effects of nuclear weapons is one important approach, especially in the case of certain command-control centers, the dominant Soviet approach is to make critical targets nontargetable by hiding them, dispersing them, relocating them on the eve of the war, and creating false targets to draw enemy attention and fire away from the real targets. The logic is obvious; with nuclear weapons, knowing the target location is the hardest part of the attack problem.

Third is to "maintain the initiative" until total defeat of the enemy's forces is achieved. The Soviets state that it would be wrong to assume that the enemy will cease operations after the main nuclear strike. It is more likely that the enemy will continue to launch nuclear strikes, will seek to recover his remaining forces, and mobilize to continue his aggressive acts. Therefore, it is essential to maintain the initiative with the delivery of successive nuclear strikes and then utilize the results of these strikes for the total defeat of the enemy. Maintaining the initiative is as important in Soviet writings on military and political strategy as seizing the initiative. The enemy is not to be allowed the opportunity to recover. The Soviets specifically say that there can be no negotiation. The war is expected to be decisive, to resolve once and for all time the conflict between the two social systems: "This would be a war without compromise, for at the basis of the political aims of both sides lies the main contradiction of the modern age, the resolution of which excludes any possibility of a political agreement."[10] No quarter is to be given, except possibly as a temporary expedient to improve the Soviet position. To win the war, it is necessary to complete the total defeat of the enemy by destroying his residual forces and then subjugating him to Soviet will.

Fourth is what might be called the planning scenario. Soviet preparations for war assume "massive nuclear strikes of the enemy" and "extensive use of nuclear weapons." It is easy to discount this as typical military worst-case planning. But, while it may be the worst case, that is not why it is the planning basis. It is the planning basis because it is expected to be the likely situation. Soviet doctrine expects both sides to pursue the most decisive goals, and this involves the mass use of nuclear weapons. There is nothing in the Soviet military doctrine and strategy

[10] Colonel General N. Lomov, "Several Problems of Control in Modern Warfare," *Voyennaya mysl'*, no. 1, 1966, FPD0762/67, August 8, 1967, p. 10.

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literature that suggests any interest in the U.S. concepts of limited or restrained world nuclear war.

Fifth, preparing for war is not merely a military task. It is the first priority of the entire state. In nuclear war, all military, political, economic, and intelligence forces are involved; the war is not just a nuclear strike. The strike is merely the decisive or culminating act of the war. Similarly, preparations touch all aspects of Soviet society—economic, industrial, civil, administrative, medical, and so forth. Again, the preparations are long-term, planned ones that the Soviets have been working hard at for twenty years. This is another dimension of Soviet defense concepts, an indication of their intent to survive a nuclear war and recover as quickly as possible.

Testifying before a congressional subcommittee in 1982, T. K. Jones, deputy undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, described Soviet preparations to survive and recover as a multilayered protective posture that bears scant resemblance to what is understood as "civil defense" in the United States. First-priority protection is provided for the leadership to ensure the continued operation of the country during a nuclear war: "To this end, they have built enough bunkers and supporting communications to outnumber the surviving accurate U.S. weapons, and the bunkers are hard enough to have good odds of surviving if targeted by our most numerous and most survivable but less accurate warheads."[11] Similar findings apply to the Soviet measures undertaken to protect their industrial capacity. These measures were studied and tested in the United States and were found "to reduce the lethal area of destruction of large warheads by as much as 99 percent":

> In one test, two complete factory buildings were set up, one unprotected and the other protected using Soviet methods. The buildings were then subjected to blast pressures equivalent to those present within half a mile of detonation of a 1-megaton weapon. The unprotected factory was destroyed beyond salvage. In just 3 days, the protected factory was cleaned up and its machinery was realigned, recalibrated, and ready to run. The protected factory lost one machine.[12]

There has been considerable disagreement in the West over the extent of Soviet civil defense. Civil defense, like other aspects of Soviet strategy, involves long-term preparation, often difficult to discern because of Soviet secrecy and deception. It was not until the past few years, as the intelligence community became interested in the possibility of leadership targeting and survival, that the extent of actual Soviet preparation began to come to light. This observed preparation is the basis of Jones'

[11] U.S. Senate, *United States and Soviet Civil Defense Programs, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment of the Committtee on Foreign Relations,* March 16 and 31, 1982, p. 54.

[12] Ibid.

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disturbing testimony. And early this year, further credence was added by the testimony of a Russian émigré, Robert Kirshensteyn, who, as chief engineer in the design department for the machine building plants of the Moscow Design Institute, had direct knowledge of the civil-defense programs and policies. His experience did not become public knowledge until 1983, although he had emigrated in 1978.

According to his estimate, 45 million Soviet citizens in urban areas now have in-place hardened shelters. Since 1970, he explained, regulations have prohibited the construction of any new building or the modernization of any building without an approved, certified civil-defense shelter. Industrial plants are duplicated so that if one is destroyed, the other can continue the operation. All ministries have been directed to build special facilities 40 kilometers or so away from their peacetime operating location, for emergency use.[13]

The Soviets believe that the war will be fought basically with the means on hand at the beginning. No longer can one plan on a strategic defense phase as was the case in World War II. It is essential to prepare for war in advance. Part of the preparation for war is to accumulate during peacetime sufficient reserves to achieve the strategic goals of the war, to replenish losses suffered during the initial period of the war, and to maintain the operation of the country and the military forces until critical production can be resumed, which is supposed to happen within three months. Reserves include industrial facilities, stocks of raw material and foodstuffs, electric power, transportation, and so forth, as well as military personnel and equipment. Reserves are so important an aspect of Soviet preparations that they are said to win the war.

Soviet Deception and Disinformation

The sixth critical aspect of Soviet preparations for war is the "political plan" portion of the implementation plan. Loosely translated, the "political plan" is the deception plan that will be used to protect and facilitate implementation.[14] While rarely recognized and seldom understood in the United States, deception is important and can be especially effective.

Military power is relative. So are preparations. What counts is not just how much one nation prepares, but how little (or how incorrectly) another nation prepares. The Soviet force is far more powerful, if that of the United States is decreased. Accordingly, Soviet preparations

[13] *HUMINT*, January 10, 1983, p. 7. See, also, Robert Edward Kirshensteyn, "Civil Defense Program of the USSR," *Journal of Civil Defense*, June 1983.

[14] Interview with the former Czech secretary of the Defense Council, first secretary at the Ministry of Defense, and member of the Central Committee and of the Minister's Presidium, Jan Sejna.

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for nuclear war have two dimensions that are especially important. The first is to hide important indications of true capability, intentions, and preparations from the enemy; the second is to influence the enemy to neglect to prepare for war, or better still to see nuclear war as impossible and to unilaterally disarm. The importance of hiding preparations from the enemy is certainly one of the reasons for the extensive Soviet use of secrecy, which applies to all items of military importance and to most geographical areas of the Soviet state. It is also reflected in the "priority" targets for Soviet intelligence operations of the type usually referred to as "active measures." One of their highest-priority targets is Western groups and individuals that study the Soviet Union. Such groups and individuals are high-priority targets for influence, penetration, and subversion. Discrediting or otherwise destroying people and organizations that are effective in seeing what the Soviets are up to and in bringing that information to the attention of others is a high-priority objective of Soviet active measures.

A major objective of Soviet strategic disinformation is "misleading the enemy concerning the basic questions of State policy."[15] Two of the most important elements of their state policy is achieving military-technical superiority and, in the event of war, of achieving a surprise first strike. The Soviets have long sought to mislead the West regarding their surprise, first-strike objectives. Within months of the first definitive U.S. analysis of Soviet first-strike intentions,[16] the Soviet minister of defense, Marshal Malinovsky excoriated the "slanderous" U.S. analysts who "falsely wrote" of Soviet interests. Soviet strategic disinformation in both areas was greatly increased in the mid 1970s when the Soviets began to proclaim that they were not out to achieve military superiority and that the aim of delivering a first strike was never part of Soviet policy. Simultaneously, they introduced a new theme, that there was a "balance," and that this balance should and would be preserved, and that should it try to upset the balance, the West would only be initiating a new arms race.[17]

There appear to have been several possible reasons behind the initiation of this new strategic disinformation and propaganda offensive in the mid 1970s: namely, to counter the emerging Vietnam "peace dividend" that consisted of the B-1 bomber, the M-X and Trident missiles, and the strategic cruise missile, all of which first emerged in the fiscal year 1975 defense budget; to counter the "reactionary" pro-defense

[15] U.S. House, *Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,* February 6 and 19, 1980.

[16] Herbert Dinnerstein, "The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1958, pp. 241-52.

[17] Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Soviet Disinformation," *Strategic Review,* Winter 1981, pp. 16-26.

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advocates that were beginning more effectively to sound their warnings of Soviet capabilities and intentions; to counter the growing attention placed on the internal Soviet military writings that previously, like *Military Strategy*, had been ignored; and to "prepare the environment" so that the West would misjudge the significance of an extensive deployment of new Soviet strategic missiles about to take place (SS-16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 missiles, and parallel naval and air force developments).

It should be noted that this Soviet disinformation did indeed succeed in influencing U.S. perceptions of what was happening, and this can be seen in numerous intelligence studies during the 1970s, and even today. One of the best examples is a series of Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) analyses of high-level Soviet pronouncements in the mid 1970s. FBIS reached such conclusions as: "Since 1974, the USSR has come to recognize the limitations of military power and the benefits of military balance with the West in achieving national security." This particular analysis concluded by quoting the following excerpt from a 1977 Brezhnev speech as an indication of the progress in the evolution of Soviet thinking: "Maintaining the existing equilibrium is not an end in itself. We are in favor of starting a downward turn in the direction of the arms race and gradually scaling down the level of military confrontation."[18]

Analyses such as this one by FBIS do not appear to have considered the internal Soviet literature, communist ideology, the possibility that the Soviet public remarks were part of a disinformation campaign, alternative motivations, or even what the Soviets mean when they refer to things like "balance" or "arms race." When the Soviets use the word "balance," they do not use it in the sense of equivalence as the West does. Rather, it is used in the sense of the comparative distribution or correlation of forces. That is, when the Soviets speak of balance, they generally mean a "balance" that strongly favors the Soviet Union. Consider, for example, the statement: "The military balance, *which we have now*, is a decisive factor that will be used to eliminate military activity of imperialism throughout the whole world and will be used to prevent any attempt by the United States *to change the balance*."[19] In the case of "arms race," when the Soviets use the concept, it has nothing to do with Soviet arms manufacture. As defined in a recent Soviet dictionary of political terms, "arms race is the arms manufacture on an ever

[18] *President Brezhnev and the Soviet Union's Changing Security Policy*, FBIS Analysis Report FB 79-10009, May 25, 1979.

[19] Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Antonian Hedrlin, "Peaceful Coexistence Policy: Specific Form of Class Struggle," *lidova armada* [People's army], no. 3, 1983, p. 113. Translation by Jan Sejna.

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increasing scale carried out by aggressive circles of imperialist states."[20] The possible effect of this Soviet disinformation can also be seen in top-level U.S. strategic documents, although it is not clear whether in such cases it is the result of Soviet disinformation, self-deception, "assumptions" used to support policy, or all of these acting in combination.

The problem also is reflected in the recently released congressional hearings on Soviet active measures.[21] While widely advertised as significant in revealing Soviet "political" actions against the West and highly touted and quoted at length in almost every conservative newspaper, newsletter, and so forth, the report in several regards is more a whitewash of the problem, bureaucratically self-serving, and illustrative of apparent lack of understanding of the problem, or concern about it, at the FBI, the CIA, and at the House Intelligence Select Committee that conducted the hearings. Insofar as there *are* knowledgeable and concerned people in all these organizations, how does one explain the report? It offers little of significance that is new. It fails to support the president's allegation regarding the Soviet manipulation of the peace and antinuclear movements — so much so that the communists are using the report as evidence of their peaceful intentions.

Why does the CIA, in its statement prepared for the hearings, after acknowledging that the Institute of the USA and Canada (IUSAC) is a major disinformation tool of the Soviet Union, conclude, "Westerners can learn a great deal through contacts with IUSAC staffers. These individuals provide insight and dialogue on U.S.-Soviet relations. Cultivating these relationships could aid in generating a freer flow of opinions, resulting in more enlightened perspectives on both sides."[22] If anything, exactly the opposite is called for. Similarly, in light of the reported Soviet manipulation of information, estimates, and especially arms control negotiations and related matters, how can the FBI conclude that "the American media is sophisticated, and generally recognizes Soviet influence attempts. In addition, Soviet active measures operations are often transparent and sometimes clumsily implemented. The FBI has uncovered no evidence that suggests American policymakers have been induced to adopt policies against this country's interests through KGB influence operations in the United States."[23] In assessing the effectiveness of the Soviet operations, the only reason the CIA and the FBI see that the Soviets must believe their multibillion-dollar-per-year influence operation has some

[20] *Political Terms, A Short Guide* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1982), p. 7.

[21] U.S. House, *Soviet Active Measures, Hearings before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence*, July 13 and 14, 1982.

[22] Ibid., p. 74.

[23] Ibid., p. 227.

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"import" is that Moscow continues to fund the effort and this "suggests a positive Soviet assessment of its results."[24]

Soviet Active Measures is a clear example of what the former deputy chief of the CIA's counterintelligence staff, Raymond Rocca, may have meant when he said two years ago at an intelligence colloquium: "So we come to the real question: How does one get people at the political level, or even at the high or medium-high decisionmaking level, within the intelligence organization to recognize that deception is a real problem?"[25]

The Soviet strategic disinformation effort has been expanded in the 1980s and now includes the false notions that the Soviets are ready to subscribe to U.S. mutual assured destruction (MAD) and mutual vulnerability concepts. Several of the better known disinformation specialists of the Institute of the USA and Canada strongly complained to a small group of influential U.S. academicians and defense specialists in the fall of 1982 that it was a shame for the United States to switch to warfighting concepts at precisely that time when the Soviets had become ready to subscribe to MAD. The main targets of this newest disinformation appeared to be the Trident D-5 and Pershing II missiles and, more broadly, the general movement in the U.S. defense community toward recognizing the need for some warfighting potential.

Perhaps the most important Soviet strategic deception at the present time is their effort to build the belief within the West that the West cannot keep up or catch up, that the military balance that now favors the Soviet Union is immutable, and for the West to even attempt to catch up is a losing proposition. This is reflected in numerous statements to the effect that any action the United States undertakes will be countered by the Soviet Union and lead to a worse situation (for the United States), and, through the positioning of various pieces of evidence (e.g., the pipeline, statements on the economy, military exercises, et cetera), that the Soviet Union is now strong enough to prevent efforts by the United States to redress the balance through the combination of response, force, or influence operations.[26]

Another dimension of Soviet strategic deception is to convince the West that peaceful coexistence (as defined by the Soviets) is the only alternative to nuclear war and that preparation for war is a meaningless pursuit. A strong disinformation campaign with these objectives was initiated in the mid 1950s, as reported by a high-level East European

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[24] Ibid., pp. 56 and 226.

[25] Raymond Rocca, in "Discussion," *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Analysis and Estimates*, ed. Roy Godson (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980), p. 157.

[26] Additional examples are presented in Douglass, "Soviet Disinformation." See, also, Hedrlin, "Peaceful Coexistence Policy: Specific Form of Class Struggle."

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defector.[27] The target of this activity was the intellectual middle class in the West. In 1958, the ranking Soviet ideologist, Mikail Suslov, remarked on how surprised they were by the success of this venture. The following year the Disinformation Department was created in the KGB. And, as a possible indication of its growing importance and effectiveness, it was expanded in the mid 1960s, and again in 1970, at which time it was also organizationally promoted to "Service" status.[28] An important dimension of this campaign that has received considerable publicity over the past two years has been the efforts to create and to influence "peace movements" and antidefense groups, using organizations such as the Institute of the USA and Canada, the World Peace Council, and assorted influence agents. The basic tactic in this campaign has been Lenin's time-honored deception guidance: "Tell them what they want to believe."

An interesting postscript to this and the previously discussed effort to mislead the West was a 1973 British intelligence report on a meeting of high-level East European officials at which the Soviet general secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, explained that détente was really a ruse designed to enable the Soviets to gain superiority. This report was said by William Beecher, the American journalist, to have been suppressed by high-ranking U.S. officials because it ran counter to U.S. détente policy.[29]

Implications

What is disturbing, and what makes all these aspects of Soviet strategy so crucially important, is that U.S. strategy, as viewed from the outside, does not appear to take them into consideration.[30] And further, with a few possibly emerging important exceptions, neither does the acquisition of capabilities or preparations for war, which in the West are almost nonexistent, perhaps because of a widespread sense of futility; nuclear war is irrational, illogical, impossible — in short, the end of the political process. Because the Soviets evidently do not share this view, however, it would seem prudent to consider the possible implications of the expressed Soviet views and supporting capabilities to U.S. plans and programs. One approach to such an effort is suggested in *Table 1: Implications of Soviet Military Doctrine*. In this table, for each of the Soviet concepts previously described, possible implications, related U.S. prob-

[27] Jan Sejna, interviews.
[28] U.S. House, *Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)*.
[29] William Beecher, "Brezhnev Termed Detente a Ruse, 1973 Report Said," *Boston Globe*, February 11, 1977.
[30] See, also, Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "What Happens If Deterrence Fails?" *Air University Review*, November-December 1982.

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lems, and some corrective measures are suggested. This table is intended, not as *the* solution, but rather as an example of one methodological approach. The table is merely a worksheet used to present and relate a variety of concerns, some trivial, some important.

In the process of constructing this table, several insights or possible conclusions emerged. These fall into three main categories: the implications of the difference between the Soviet and U.S. approach — in a sense, the current situation; the problems that must be surmounted to redress the balance that appears to favor the Soviet Union in the current situation; and the types of actions that may be essential to achieve effective change.

The overall assessment of the current situation is that the Soviet Union is far better prepared for war than the United States. The Soviet Union might well survive, with how much damage is quite uncertain; but the United States is almost certain to lose, and lose badly. At best, the United States has a minimum deterrence capability, and the U.S. deterrent rests mainly on the associated uncertainties.

The logic that led to this conclusion is rather straightforward. First, from all appearances, the Soviets are preparing to fight and win a nuclear war. This effort has been under way since the late 1950s and has not diminished or been superseded by other less demanding or less risky objectives. In contrast, the United States is not prepared either to survive or to fight a nuclear war, and because of the lack of many perceived prerequisites to change, which will be discussed in greater detail below, the current modernization hardware programs, such as the B-1 or M-X, are unlikely to change significantly this basic situation.

This is not to say that the Soviets want nuclear war any more than the United States. They, as most people in the U.S. national security community, believe it would be immensely destructive. But there the agreement ends because the Soviets also believe nuclear war is very possible, and because of its potential destructiveness they believe they should prepare for it. Nor is the point that the Soviets are prepared for nuclear war. A nation will probably never be "prepared" for nuclear war — the consequences and uncertainties are too enormous. However, the Soviets are now much better prepared for war than they were in 1970 when their expanded effort in "civil defense" began, and far better prepared than they were in the early 1960s. And, assuming they continue their efforts, they will be still better prepared five years hence.

Second, should a major nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union develop, and if the Soviets are able to implement their evident strategy, the United States, because of its lack of any defenses, has little chance of surviving as a nation. This is particularly

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TABLE 1: IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

	Elaboration	Implications for U.S. Defense Planning	Problems	Hypothetical "What to Do"
I. Nuclear Offense Emphasis	The Soviet military threat is not exclusively nuclear or conventional. It is combined arms at all levels. Nuclear weapons are the decisive component and conventional forces would occupy enemy territory and secure victory. At the same time, the most important aspect of Soviet strategy at both the global and theater levels is their nuclear offensive.	U.S. distinctions such as conventional-nuclear, strategic-tactical, and warfighting-deterrence are artificial and misleading. Plans and strategies for war in Europe, for the use of Rapid Deployment Forces, and for global war do not match the apparent threat. Priorities in the current U.S. military build-up do not conform to the real needs.	The U.S. military services have not addressed nuclear warfighting or combined arms warfare. The navy has been minimum deterrence oriented. The air force still is focused on strategic bombing. The army has been unable to integrate nuclear weapons into its doctrine. All three services are uninterested in continental defense.	Examine the validity of U.S. strategy for strategic and theater warfare and of the U.S. conventional-nuclear distinction in the framework of Soviet strategy and capabilities, e.g., the nuclear role of "conventional" forces in Soviet strategy, what they mean by "exploitation" and "using the results of nuclear strikes," and their doctrine for using nuclear weapons to prevent U.S. involvement in "local revolutionary movements."
II. Seize the Initiative (Surprise First Strike)	This is the Soviet preferred attack option. Launch-on-warning is considered a poor, second-best option. Soviet efforts to achieve surprise will include deception, false diplomacy, disinformation, distractions to confuse U.S. leadership, and covert disablement of critical C³I.	Soviet tactics coupled with the Western propensity to see nuclear war as impossible means that Soviet surprise tactics stand a good chance of being successful. The U.S. cannot plan on tactical warning or on mobilization. An appreciation of what to expect and the essential forces, plans, and training need to be developed in peacetime. Strategy and posture need to have their major components designed for a "no warning" scenario.	The current emphasis on C³I mobility should provide a good foundation for building a survivable "no warning" posture. Major problems are a relative absence of associated meaningful strategy development and strategic planning capability. Civil defense and emergency planning are major problems. It is difficult to identify any national-level planning capability or evident real expertise or interest.	Establish a group of quality senior military analysts within the Soviet Bloc Division of the CIA Operations Directorate to conduct true, all-source analyses of Soviet strategy, intentions, and preparations for war. Develop a Red Team to devise comprehensive attacks on the United States and our allies. This team should have access to all U.S. security information that has been passed to the Soviet Union or otherwise compromised.
III. Decisive First Strike	The first strike is designed to achieve strategic goals. Most immediate strategic goals are to destroy U.S. nuclear capability, political and military control, and, most likely, power, transportation, and other time-critical military and military-industrial targets. The Soviet objective is maximum efficient concentration of nuclear power. Gradualism is not a Soviet concept. There is no evidence of limited Soviet counterforce interest.	The U.S. at present cannot expect to survive. Moreover, U.S. vulnerabilities encourage Soviet decisive first-strike strategy. Need to dissipate force of Soviet strikes with combination of active and passive defenses and to make military forces and political leadership as nontargetable as possible.	The main problem is overcoming a strong emotional belief that there is no way to significantly "ease" the consequences of a massive nuclear strike. The army's apparent lack of interest and low technical competence will hinder development of any effective active defense.	Examine effectiveness and tradeoffs within a system of active and passive defenses. Address the organizational problem of active defense development and command. Establish a defenses program. Stress concealment, mobility, and deception in combination as major survival tactics. Develop program of strategic intelligence countermeasures. Use national reconnaissance assets to assess effectiveness.
IV. Maintain the Initiative (Achieve Total Defeat)	The attack does not end with the first strike. The first strike is just the start. The attack will continue to (1) deny U.S. the chance to recover, (2) destroy residual forces, (3) seize strategic regions, and (4) achieve our *total* defeat. There is no possibility of political agreement in evident Soviet doctrine.	The U.S. cannot simply ride out the attack because the attack is not to end until all forces are destroyed. There may be no time to catch our breath and reconstitute forces. Strategy and forces must be oriented toward nuclear battle management. Strategic target acquisition in the traditional sense (currently nonexistent) is critical.	Neither concepts nor capability for fighting a nuclear war exist. Capability and mind set have been and are single-strike oriented. A steady, long-term approach to preparations is required. This, in turn, requires national-level concern, attention, and long-term planning capability, which do not appear to exist.	Establish a network of mobile strategic nuclear warfighting command centers. Program survivable intrawar strategic and tactical forces for nuclear warfighting operations. Define interface requirements and identify operational problems. Establish a continuing national-level capability to (1) develop nuclear strategy and (2) direct and coordinate long-range planning

V. Defense Importance	Defense is as important as offense. Soviet "defense" includes a wide variety of active and passive measures. Concealment, mobility, deception, and duplication are especially important. Independence and self-sufficiency of major commands and regions are important both to survival and recovery. The most important activity after initial exchange is to neutralize the effect of U.S. strikes.	The importance the Soviets place on defense and the utility of their efforts are not appreciated. Soviet preparations for war and their ability to recover from U.S. strikes have not been examined. This should be a critical input to U.S. strategy formulation, targeting, and a key to understanding how consequences can be "eased."	Major changes in intelligence mind set and collection and analysis priorities are required to understand Soviet preparations and capabilities. But the current system is unlikely to change either its bias or its practice.	Analyze Soviet defense and other war preparations measures. Identify various techniques (specifically, hardening, mobility, concealment, dispersal, redundancy, reserves, and deception) and assess their effectiveness. Identify target-acquisition and targeting problems. Prebriefed targets suddenly may cease to exist when the war starts. Identify and test alternative approaches for strategic target acquisition.
VI. Planning Scenario	The Soviets assume the "worst" case: extensive use of nuclear strikes by the enemy, including against cities. This scenario is the basis for all planning.	U.S. plans and policy must begin to take the worst-case scenario into account—not because it is the "worst" case, but rather because it is the likely case. Given the Soviet objectives, doctrine, and worst-case planning, why expect them to limit their attack and then negotiate?	There is a strong bias against looking at the worst case because it appears too hard to handle. There is also a strong lobby that does not want it made "workable." There does not exist a reasonably comprehensive description of a determined Soviet attack and the resultant environment that various U.S. planning entities should be aware of if their planning is to be effective.	Have Red Team develop a range of scenarios for use by policy, and emergency planning and research, development, and acquisitions organizations. Identify and characterize the environment associated with a range of comprehensive Soviet attack scenarios. Include nonnuclear and forces of special designation as well as nuclear forces.
VII. Preparation for Nuclear War is the First Priority of the Entire State	All improvements and programs (e.g., construction) are evaluated from a nuclear-war perspective. Survival of people, institutions, facilities, supplies, and forces are planned according to their importance to fighting and winning the war and preparations continue apace.	U.S. deterrence concepts (assured destruction of a significant percentage of industry and population) have become invalid. The U.S. can create rubble, but with present plans and capabilities sooner or later will not be able to destroy the Soviet capability to survive and recover with unanticipated rapidity. New approaches to strategic force employment and targeting are required.	The value of preparation is downplayed by U.S. intelligence, military, and influential intellectuals. The dominant assumption is that nuclear war is impossible. A major change in mind set is needed, but will be difficult to bring about.	A major intelligence effort to understand Soviet preparations and vulnerabilities appears essential. It is important to locate all reserves and understand their management. Evaluate all Soviet preparations for survival and rapid recovery and estimate recovery times.
VIII. Strategic Deception	It is best to win without war. Misleading the U.S. about the nature of Soviet capabilities and intentions is needed for the Soviets to achieve superiority, enable first strike, and achieve a war-winning balance.	Soviet deception efforts may be heavily responsible for gross errors in U.S. intelligence estimates. Soviet actions also exacerbate problems associated with the antinuclear and antidefense movements. This is an especially serious problem because of its pervasive influence on all aspects of national security planning. A turnaround in national security thinking and capabilities may be difficult, if not impossible, unless these Soviet efforts are effectively countered.	Soviet deception is still not regarded as a major problem. Identifying Soviet efforts and their effectiveness will be difficult because the data are controlled by the very agencies whose position is that a problem does not exist. Between 1974 and 1976 the U.S. dismantled nearly all its internal security apparatus most capable of dealing with this problem.	Establish a combined counterintelligence (focused on Soviet deception and active measures) and political warfare planning staff within the NSC. Revise debilitating internal directives and reinstate appropriate internal security mechanisms.

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important because, in considering the Soviet view, deterrence has to be regarded as a balance — not a balance of offensive systems, but a balance of capabilities, in which defensive features are as important as offensive ones.

Over the past twenty years, while the Soviet Union has increased its offensive capability enormously, the United States has done little to protect or harden our nation or even alleviate the consequences that would be associated with a nuclear war. Actually, the situation has grown worse because some preparations undertaken in the early 1960s have been allowed to atrophy along with nearly all the continental defense forces. Because the United States has done almost nothing in the defensive area for fifteen years, the balance on the defensive side *totally* favors the Soviet Union. The defensive side has become the Achilles' heel of U.S. deterrence policy and, as such, the area where modest efforts probably have the greatest potential for redressing the "balance." A carefully designed effort in the defensive area, including both active and passive defenses, probably has become far more important than M-X or B-1, and possibly at least as important as Trident. In fact, such an effort can easily be regarded as mandatory. Because of the solely offensive approach to national security that the United States has taken over the past two decades, in the event of nuclear war, it is difficult to see the United States surviving. The United States is now almost totally unprepared for nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

In contrast, it is not difficult to see the Soviet Union, as a result of its defensive measures, not only surviving, but recovering in time to ensure the total defeat of the United States. How much damage the Soviet Union might receive is highly uncertain. And this is probably the essence of the change in U.S. deterrence capability over the past twenty years. In the 1960s, it was based on the certainty of being able to inflict great damage. Now, it is based more on the uncertainty of how much damage the Soviet Union will suffer.

Third, the U.S. strategic offensive deterrent, even considering its numerous improvements, has been gradually degraded as a result of Soviet actions designed to increase their ability to strike first and "tear the nuclear stings from the jaws of the enemy," and to survive whatever nuclear strike the United States might be able to use to retaliate. Over the past decade the Soviets have built an offensive capability that now holds two legs of the U.S. triad at risk, along with the entire U.S. command, communications, and intelligence structure. While most U.S. ballistic missile submarines on station are expected to survive, could they execute a powerful, organized response? And if so, with what reliability, or to what end? How reliable is any weapon system that has not been tested

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in operation?[31] Who would be in command, and how effectively could the command be communicated? What information would be available to the decision process? According to evident Soviet strategy, all these aspects would be targeted by precursor sabotage operations. They would also be struck in the opening nuclear salvo, and are the targets of disinformation and deception measures. In the event of war, very little command, control, communications, and intelligence (C^3I) is likely to survive the first nuclear strike.[32] The dominant U.S. deterrent reduces to the uncertainty associated with the autonomous Poseidon and Trident submarines at sea and their targets.

Regarding these targets, as explained in 1982 by T. K. Jones, it is doubtful that, in responding, the United States can any longer effectively target Soviet command and control, conventional forces, or nuclear reserves. All the United States can effectively target are cities and prebriefed, fixed installations that are relatively soft, which if important to the Soviet Union will probably have been defended, relocated, or duplicated elsewhere. Regarding civilian casualties, he explained[33] that analyses have shown that Soviet defensive preparations will enable them to hold their losses to less than they suffered in World War II (which itself was less than the self-imposed toll of Stalin's forced collectivization of agriculture and his purges before World War II).

In sum, notwithstanding the declaratory statements on selective targeting and prolonged warfighting strategy, notwithstanding National Security Decision Memorandum 242, Presidential Directive 59, and National Security Decision Directive 13, it is beginning to appear that the main deterrent the United States has may be a minimum deterrent, which reduces to a few boatloads of Poseidon or Trident missiles. Perhaps that is not surprising, since the minimum deterrent philosophy has dominated Washington national security policy since 1961 and may still reign supreme. Whether or not the assumptions upon which it is based are or will remain valid in light of Soviet offensive and defensive preparations is a serious question. But, unfortunately, the question is not being addressed. The United States seems almost oblivious to what is happening.

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[31] Walter Pincus, "Scientists Bare Warhead Duds on '60s Polaris," *Washington Post*, December 2, 1978.

[32] C^3I vulnerability is probably the most serious problem associated with the U.S. strategic nuclear offensive forces, so much so that this vulnerability has been a major discussion topic in the media for the past five years. See, for example, Joseph Albright, "Data Bottlenecks Peril N-Warnings," *Atlanta Constitution*, July 31, 1980, and "Message Gap in Our Crisis Network," *Washington Post*, October 19, 1980; Daniel L. Stein, "Would U.S. Communication Systems Work in a Nuclear War?" *Christian Science Monitor*, November 17, 1982, p. 23; Merrill Brown, "U.S. Phonelines Called Vulnerable," *Washington Post*, May 6, 1981; John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1981-82; and Philip Taubman, "U.S. Command Will Be Mobile To Elude Attack," *New York Times*, February 25, 1983.

[33] U.S. Senate, *United States and Soviet Civil Defense Programs*, p. 54.

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There has not been one official comprehensive study of Soviet preparations for war, their ability to recover following a U.S. response, and, consequently, the impact of these preparations on the efficacy of the U.S. deterrent.

Problems Inhibiting Effective Change

In examining Soviet strategy and preparations and comparing this with the U.S. approach, perhaps the most significant problem is that there does not seem to be any sense of strategy within the U.S. national security establishment — that is, what strategy is and what it is not, what it does, how it is developed, and why it is important. There are many statements about U.S. strategy, statements that imply the existence of a strategy or a strategic planning process. There are target lists, weapon employment plans, new weapon systems in development, and statements of "policy." There are catch phrases and nice sounding objectives, such as, "should deterrence fail, our strategy is to restore peace on favorable terms."[34] But there does not seem to be any substance, reality, or meaning behind the words. Perhaps the essence of the problem was most succinctly captured by two well-known, articulate historians, both with a special interest in war, the nuclear age, and the Soviet Union. Richard Pipes explained that "deterrence, whatever its merits, is anything but a strategy."[35] Michael Howard argued "it is not good enough to say that the strategy of the West is one of deterrence, or even of crisis management. It is the business of the strategists to think what to do if deterrence fails, and if Soviet strategists are doing their job and those in the West are not, it is not for us to complain about them."[36]

In considering how the nation might work to change the situation, if that were desired, there are numerous problems that must be recognized and dealt with. First, there is very little real concern or substantive expertise at the national level. Nuclear *war* is not an area to which any U.S. administration has directed much serious attention. Certainly, the suggestion that any administration did not or does not take nuclear war "seriously" will be strongly contested by all administration principals. Every administration *is* serious in its belief in the need to deter nuclear war. But, as emphasized above, war and deterrence of war are two very different things, and war itself, in general, is not addressed seriously or realistically.

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[34] Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress*, February 1, 1983, p. 32.
[35] Richard Pipes, "Rethinking Our National Strategy," *Wall Street Journal*, October 12, 1979.
[36] Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, pp. 282-83.

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How can one regard strategic directives, such as Presidential Directive 59, that can not be implemented as "serious"? After examining Soviet doctrine and capabilities for nuclear war, are statements in current U.S. strategy, such as "should deterrence fail, our strategy is to *restore peace on favorable terms,*"[37] in any sense serious? What is meant by "our strategy is defensive"[38] when the United States has no defense or defensive preparations, and in their absence, can one be serious in claiming the United States is preparing to fight a nuclear war? How can one even speak of fighting a protracted war when the problem of surviving the first massive strike has hardly been addressed?

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the principal national agency responsible for coordinating preparations for nuclear war. Is that agency to be taken seriously? Consider, for example, its designation of first-priority agencies for survival protection in the event of war. The list includes almost every bureaucracy in Washington, including the Environmental Protection Agency. The collection of Federal Preparedness Circulars seems totally devoid of any concept of how nuclear war would begin or how the Soviets state it will be waged, and the agency plans (for example, postage-free change-of-address cards for nuclear emergencies, odd-numbered license plates to evacuate targeted cities first, and even relocation shelters) have recently been ridiculed in the press and by government officials.[39] Every year there are nuclear war exercises to test procedures and equipment (never the decision process). Rarely if ever are the effects of sabotage at the beginning of a war considered, particularly such unpleasantries as the covert waging of biological warfare or assassinations, or the effects of radio-electronic warfare or electromagnetic pulse, or numerous other events that should be anticipated as part of war for the simple reason that if they were, the exercise would rapidly fall apart and come to a halt. Are these exercises serious or realistic? Or do they show the bureaucracy — military and civilian alike — merely playing war games that are neither serious nor realistic?

While occasionally senior officials who are knowledgeable about nuclear war and strategy can be found at the NSC or White House, or on the Cabinet, they are the exception. The rule was probably better described by Roger Molander, the founder of Ground Zero. After working as a junior analyst at the Institute for Defense Analyses engaged in nuclear targeting calculations, he joined the NSC staff. To his surprise and fear,

[37] *Weinberger, Annual Report to Congress*, p. 32.

[38] Ibid.

[39] See, for example, "Dig a Hole," *Time* (special issue on nuclear war), March 29, 1982; Ed Zuckerman, "How Would the U.S. Survive a Nuclear War?" *Esquire*, March 1982; and Knut Royce, "Preparing for Doomsday," *San Francisco Examiner*, July 5 (part 1), July 6 (part 2), and July 7 (part 3), 1983.

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he soon learned that at the NSC he was the in-house expert on nuclear war and that "nobody else around the White House seemed to understand nuclear war issues better than I did."[40]

Because of top-level attention given to such topics as arms control, the nuclear "balance," and new weapon systems, there seems to be an implicit assumption that nuclear war does receive concern and attention, but this is not the case. While arms control, the balance, and new systems might rank third or fourth on the priority scale of interest, nuclear war — consequences, preparation, direction, strategy, and so forth — would probably not even rank in the top fifty. There is little effective national expertise, direction, guidance, or coordination, and the efforts at lower levels in the bureaucracy tend to reflect this lack of attention at the top.

A second and related problem is the lack of any military organization or individuals whose business or expertise is military strategy, particularly nuclear strategy. Today, the U.S. commander in chief, the president, has no professional staff whose business is to prepare for war and develop strategy and recommendations based upon a firm understanding of military principles. There is simply no comparison one can make between the military thinking expertise in the United States and that in the Soviet Union, a country that regards war as a serious matter and nuclear war as a very serious possibility.

In today's environment, it is not inappropriate to describe this situation as a disaster waiting to happen, which may help explain some of the concern over the possibility of war. To place the problem in perspective, would anyone like to see the Washington national security establishment approach a major war with the Soviet Union, a war that almost certainly would start or rapidly become nuclear, in a manner similar to the Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam war, or the Iran raid? Basically, the same system, concepts, and approach to conflict with the communist system that were in vogue at the time of those disasters still dominate the Washington scene today. The bureaucracy is basically the same, except that it wields more power. The influential advisers and those in charge have not changed markedly. Most served in earlier administrations and still seem to support earlier policies, and, although there are important exceptions, the remainder generally appear to be equally inexperienced in the art of war, no more knowledgeable about military science or strategy, and are mainly concerned with Congress, the media, politics, and administration.

[40] Roger Molander, "How I Learned to Start Worrying and Hate the Bomb," *Washington Post*, March 21, 1982.

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Little serious attention in Washington is directed toward understanding how best to prepare for and fight a war. This situation helps to account for the statement in the late 1970s by another member of the NSC staff, Victor Utgoff, that we really might not want the country to have a nuclear war capability because someone might be tempted to use it.

A third problem, which is exacerbated by the first two if not directly fueled by them, is the enormous opposition to improvements — to "thinking about the impossible." The "conventional wisdom" regards preparations for massive nuclear attack, some would even say for a limited nuclear attack, as meaningless. Consider, for example, Admiral Noel Gaylor's remarks in 1979 during the NBC SALT II debate.

> Now, I would like to give you some blunt truths which are based mainly on my past responsibility in actual strategic nuclear targeting.
>
> The first is that both Russia and the United States can destroy each other. This situation is not going to change. Nothing that happens is going to make it any less a fact. It's uncomfortable, but it's a fact.
>
> America, of all the countries in the world, is the most at risk because we have the most highly developed civilization.
>
> Another uncomfortable fact is that there is really no defense against a major nuclear attack, not anti-ballistic missiles, not particle-beam technology, not space weapons, not civil defense. None of them will cut the mustard. The only defense that means anything is to make sure that the attack doesn't happen.
>
> Numbers, in spite of all this argument that you've heard, don't matter very much. And that's because the first few arriving weapons do all the damage that can conceivably be done against either one of these nations.
>
> I have seen these weapons go off. There's not many of us left that have. And I want to tell you that it's awesome.[41]

This is a difficult position to counter, primarily because it reflects the dominant belief, especially of most media commentators. It is the essence of MAD. To suggest that something is possible is to open oneself to the kind of ridicule and vilification in the media that T. K. Jones experienced in 1982 after he tried to explain the value of simple measures that the Soviets had adopted for survival and recovery. The press viciously attacked him and a Senate arms control subcommittee called hearings specifically to pillory him. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, wise in the ways of senatorial arms control politics, appeared with Jones, emphasized that he, not Jones, was responsible for policy, and then tried to reassure the senators (and the press) that the administration rejected the notion "that a nuclear war could be, in any intelligible sense of the word, won by either side."[42]

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[41] "The SALT II Debate," *NBC News National Forum*, July 10, 1979, p. 17.
[42] U.S. Senate, *United States and Soviet Civil Defense Programs*, pp. 67-69.

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Rather than use the opportunity to explain the differences between preparation and nonpreparation, the administration sought primarily to defuse the situation. This, in retrospect, was probably correct. The media covered only Perle's comments and almost totally ignored Jones' defense, which was extremely sobering and which has been referred to at several points in this article. In the process, unfortunately, the possible value of even modest defense measures was severely undercut when Perle, in building his defense, said: "We do not seek nor do we believe that it is possible to obtain levels of protection from the effects of all-out nuclear war that would reduce significantly the unspeakable horror of such an event." Accordingly, the modest civil-defense program only represented "insurance" for "circumstances short of a central nuclear exchange."[43]

There are several problems with Admiral Gaylor's minimum-deterrence logic and the belief that nothing can alter the unimaginable horror of nuclear war or ease the consequences. First, the Soviets obviously disagree and their analyses are in no sense crude or unsophisticated. Their assessment of military science and strategy is sober and studious. The United States does not even have a counterpart capability that can be compared with, for example, the Soviet General Staff, which develops strategy, or its "thinking" components, the Military Science Administration and the General Staff Academy. Second, the problem has not been examined. We assume it is too difficult, that nothing significant can be accomplished, that the living will only envy the dead. There is no comprehensive study of Soviet preparations and, therefore, no objective basis for concluding that the Soviet Union would be destroyed (whatever that means) in the event of war. Third, what is at stake is most significant — the survival of American values and freedoms, a potential savings that could easily total tens of millions of lives and an associated speed-up in recovery that could easily be measured in years, or decades (if ever, should Soviet plans succeed). Fourth, one program cannot do it all. Civil defense, or any other defensive measure or program or offensive systems have to be examined as elements in an integrated strategy. What counts is not the value of civil defense, or active defense, or the B-1, or the M-X in isolation, but rather the cumulative value of a variety of measures brought together in support of a coherent strategy.

Without strong national-level expertise and a professional military organization to formulate effective military strategy, proposed improvements will lack a coherent doctrinal basis. Without administration principals' being able both to articulate their position effectively and stand up to the antinuclear and antidefense lobbies, those lobbies will continue

[43] Ibid., p. 69.

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to block or derail any attempt to deal effectively with the Soviet nuclear threat. The administration's defense of nuclear programs, strategy, and war survival measures, or, conversely, response to the nuclear freeze movement, antinuclear lobby, and minimum-deterrence advocates, has been somewhere between abysmal and pathetic. Even worse, the few who understand various aspects of the problem and do speak out are disowned or censured. The example of T. K. Jones is not unusual. Richard Pipes and Robert Schweitzer, when they were senior NSC officials, also encountered difficulties after they publicly expressed concerns about the Soviet Union and war. Schweitzer was even relieved of his job and sent back to the army. It appears that the only person allowed to call a spade a spade is the president — and one voice does not carry very far.

The source of this problem is far from clear. However, two observations appear to be relevant apropos of the current administration and the possibilities for change. First, nowhere in the national security establishment does there appear to be any critical mass or rallying point; that is, a group of professionals with expertise in the area, with influence or direction in the policy and strategy areas, and who share the president's instincts. While significant change was called for during Reagan's campaign, so much so that President Carter undertook actions to reveal his administration's contributions (PD-59 and Stealth),[44] very, very few professionals with substantive expertise and conviction were brought into the new administration in other than advisory positions. Power was ceded to the bureaucracy and to the old order. Second, the system, particularly at the top, seems to be almost totally reactive to the media, unwilling or unequipped to face up to serious problems of national security (or unconcerned), or basically in agreement with earlier policies and motivations that led to the curtailment of defense programs and to our current predicament (or brainwashed into agreement). As a result, it appears that even those few who are knowledgeable and speak out — the Pipes, Schweitzers, and Joneses — have no support from the upper echelons or from the system itself.

Candidate Improvement Options

Table 1 suggests numerous minor corrective measures. There are, however, two measures that must be pursued if there is to be any meaningful improvement: long-range strategic planning, coordination, and direction using substantive expertise in political and military warfare; and the establishment of an effective military staff equipped to formulate sound

[44] For a discussion of the Carter administration leaks, see "Mediagate," *AIM Report*, ed. Reed Irving, XII-15, August-A 1983, pp. 1-2.

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military strategy and capable of orchestrating military efforts in support of national policy when needed.

Consideration should be given to creating an organization to provide the national-level focus to deal with the problem of the Soviet Union and nuclear war, and, more specifically, to guide and coordinate long-range strategic planning. The need for such an organization has been repeatedly pointed out by professionals who understand the importance of strategy, continuity, and direction as well as the nature of our government and the bureaucracy. Several years ago, for example, a Grand Strategy Board "with the continuing responsibility of formulating national aims and foreign policies for the consideration of the President and the members of Congress" was proposed by one of the few U.S. "strategists," General Albert Wedemeyer, in his book *Wedemeyer Reports!*[45] More recently, a " 'Department of Political Strategy' with overriding authority over its foreign and defence ministries" was proposed by Brian Crozier, a leading British expert on communism and the ongoing "World War III."[46]

Another approach would be to undertake a critical audit of the current NSC staff and functions with the aim of bringing together or creating sections with expertise in such areas as limited and global nuclear war with the Soviet Union, anticommunist political and military strategy in general, and counterintelligence focused on Soviet deception and disinformation that are designed to undermine Western national security programs. This group would then be given responsibility for long-range strategic planning and coordination. Such capabilities and missions could be combined under a deputy special assistant to the president for national security affairs (long-range strategic planning).

The problems the United States faces in the military balance, readiness, strategy and systems acquisition; in NATO and East-West relations; and in Latin America have no short-term solutions. This is why long-range planning and meaningful strategy are so urgently needed. Further, the problems are interrelated. Trade and financial relations directly affect the military balance. The military balance directly affects NATO politics and revolutionary activities in the Third World, and a baseline view of communism — ideology, strategy, tactics — should be common to all. At present, there is no long-term strategic planning operation giving direction and providing the necessary coordination. Such long-term military and political direction and coordination is needed to bring the

[45] Albert Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1958).

[46] Brian Crozier, "The West Must Fight the Political War," *The Free Nation*, July 1982, p. 5. See, also, Brian Crozier, *Strategy for Survival*, (London: Temple Smith, 1978).

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strengths of the United States together in an effective, efficient, and continuing manner.

Consideration also should be given to transforming the current Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff into an effective General Staff or its equivalent and responsive mainly to the president. The disutility of the current organization has been so forcefully commented upon in numerous articles and reports over the past few years[47] that only a few amplifying remarks on the types of changes needed are appropriate.

The first change concerns appropriate education, training, and career development for a cadre of disciplined specialists in the art of waging war at the national level. At present, military strategy is not a major field of training in the various service academies and war colleges. Consequently, the supply of officers with training in military strategy or warfighting is quite limited. This seems only natural, insofar as there is little demand for such training. There is no place where strategy is developed and applied, nor is there any career development. That place should be a General Staff or its equivalent, complete with its own career development and with advancement determined by the "purple suit" staff, rather than by the individual services.

The second change concerns the formulation and application of military strategy by these specialists, and its interface and integration with national or grand strategy as developed and maintained by the type of long-range planning organization described above. Military strategy needs to conform to the national policy, on the one hand, and to the military capabilities of the military services and branches, on the other hand. It must be forward-looking and exert strong influence over determining defense requirements and the acquisition process. Requirements and acquisition need to be determined more by the nation's defense needs than by individual service desires, which is the current approach. This does not mean increased defense spending. It means that the priorities for the available funds are set to make nationally desired strategies realistic and to avoid dislocations, like those that confront the military establishment in areas such as defense of the homeland and command, control, and communications, which currently lack any "home service" advocates.

[47] See, for example, Leonard Wainstein, "The Problem of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," *International Security Review*, Fall 1982, pp. 233-43; Victor H. Krulak, *Organization for National Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: United States Strategic Institute, 1983); and John G. Kester, "The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review*, February 1980, pp. 2-23; Edward N. Luttwak, "The Decline of American Military Leadership," *Parameters*, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 82-88; General David C. Jones, *Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change*, unpublished. For an abridged version, see *Directors and Boards*, Hay Associates' Magazine, February 1982.

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The third change that will be necessary is the development of an appreciation of the capabilities described above by the national leadership and centers of the civilian community—Congress, the media, the business community, academia, and the population at large. There seems to be a fear that General Staffs get nations into war. If this fear does exist, it will need to be dispelled. Political leaders tend to get nations into war, not General Staffs. The business of a General Staff should be to ensure that a country's military capability supports national policy, at the least, to provide for the common defense. Part of preparing for war is understanding the costs and trials of war, which may be why General Staffs tend to be conservative. It is possible that the failure of the United States to maintain a General Staff after World War II led to the excessive reliance placed on nuclear weapons, to the civilian disregard for military science, to the costly defeat in Southeast Asia, and to the current mismatch between capabilities and national policy.

These changes need to be meaningful — a merely cosmetic approach will accomplish little — but the changes can be brought into being gradually. Eventually, certain legislative changes may be required, but numerous changes can be made within the current system. The process cannot be rushed because of the current inadequate supply of trained officers. That training is a high priority and can be initiated immediately. The main obstacle to be overcome is that which will probably be presented by the individual military services and Department of Defense bureaucracies. The required changes represent a major diminution of their respective powers, and they will fiercely oppose any change.

Coincident with the establishment of some national-level strategic planning and coordination mechanism and a command staff with the responsibility and wherewithal for developing and implementing military strategy, a searching re-examination of Soviet and U.S. military strategy is critical. This will involve recognizing the full dimensions of the Soviet strategy that has existed for the past twenty years, but that the U.S. strategic leadership has failed to see, acknowledge, or take into account. This will not be simple because such an effort might well be highly critical of U.S. intelligence and at variance with its analyses — hence the possible need for a semipermanent "B Team." Regarding U.S. strategy, deterrence needs to be redefined as a derivative product stemming from the capability to survive and defeat the enemy's strategy. This will not be simple because of the shibboleths and sacred cows that will need to be sacrificed in the process. Deterrence, like beauty, is altogether in the eye of the beholder, in this case, the Soviet Union. Certainly weapon systems are important. But far more than weapon systems is critical from the Soviet perspective: strategy, leadership, command ability, morale,

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preparation of the state, and so forth. The Soviet assessment of the United States in all these categories at present borders on the contemptuous.[48]

The major observation that emerges from the approach suggested in Table 1 that involves significant changes in forces and defense allocations is the need to provide for the defense of the nation in the event of war, that is, assigning a high priority to assuring our survival. All the actions mentioned above are important if this is to be accomplished. A defense must be designed as part of a coherent strategy. It must take into account the enemy's intentions and strategy. It will need the benefit of long-range planning and interagency coordination; and, if it is to succeed, it will need the support of the public and Congress. In turn, these actions will require realistic defense analyses, options, and plans. Accordingly, as work proceeds on the organizational and analysis actions, parallel efforts of the highest national priority should be started to select and begin building an integrated active and passive defense system.

The actions suggested above, or variants of them, seem imperative as a precondition to developing and implementing programs that can effectively safeguard our national security. There is no shortage of ideas, drive, enthusiasm, or commitment at the operator levels. The problem is identifying understanding, expertise, and support at the political and high decisionmaking levels. Without national-level strategic planning and an organization to develop sound military strategy and responsive capabilities, programs will continue to be driven (or whipsawed) by politics rather than by the real issues. Incidentally, this basic conclusion is not uniquely applicable to nuclear forces and strategy. It applies to other military areas as well, and the types of actions identified earlier will also be of equal benefit to nonnuclear military forces.

The "balance" cannot be redressed by merely buying more offensive nuclear systems. Organization, direction, and strategy must come first, and the time may be appropriate for their development. The growing attention given to the "High Frontier" concepts, which focus on the need for defense of the United States, is a strong indication of concern over past direction and strategy. The recent commendable in-house emphasis placed on extending thinking beyond the first strike, on developing new approaches and capabilities for survivable and endurable C^3I, and on developing coherent nuclear weapon acquisition planning suggests that the system itself is not only willing to accept change, but, in addition, sees the need for it and is striving to change. But it badly needs top-level, intelligent, and articulate understanding, interest, support, and, most of all, a sound military strategy for fighting the war should deterrence fail.

[48] See, for example, Henry Trofimenko, "The 'Theology' of Strategy," ORBIS Fall 1977, pp. 497-515.

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For the United States, it is essential that strategy not be divorced from the realities of our capabilities, which was the failing of Presidential Directive 59. Additionally, strategy must be used to define what is needed. Based on the preceding considerations, I believe this strategy should stress such factors as: national survival, active and passive defenses, nontargetable strategic force elements, a "no-warning" posture (i.e., one that can maintain a high alert level indefinitely), forces designed for nuclear battle management, and new targeting approaches to counter enemy deception, survival, and defense mechanisms. The object here is to accept the validity of the Soviet surprise, decisive, first-strike approach, work to counter it, and at the same time, *and of highest priority,* ensure the survival of American freedoms.

There is certainly no reason the United States cannot devise an effective strategy — providing it is willing to break with the past. The Soviets are not ten feet tall. An effective strategy, however, cannot be developed in the absence of national-level interest and direction, sound military strategy, and the continuity of long-range strategic planning. As the Soviet capabilities for mounting a successful strategic nuclear offensive and their preparations for frustrating an organized U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike continue to improve, it may be wise to take seriously the Soviet advice to their own people: "There is profound error and harm in the disorienting claims of bourgeois ideologues that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world war."[49]

[49] *The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War,* General-Major A. S. Milovidov, editor in chief, Moscow, 1972. Translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force, *Soviet Military Thought No. 5* (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 17.

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THE CONVENTIONAL OFFENSIVE IN SOVIET THEATER STRATEGY

by Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Hines

In recent years Soviet military literature has stressed the importance of avoiding nuclear escalation in the event of a war in Europe. While the Soviets would prefer to achieve their aims without fighting, especially against such a technologically sophisticated enemy as NATO, they know that conditions might arise that would lead to a major war. The Soviets manifest their concern by maintaining a large and expensive military force and by constantly refining an elaborate system of military thought to ensure the development of appropriate operational plans. These actions reflect their assumption that the only responsible security policy is one that strives to secure victory in advance. The Soviets would prefer to achieve a quick victory at the lowest possible level of intensity and thereby reduce uncertainty and minimize the costs of war.[1] They understand, however, that this requires the ability to defeat all opponents at every level. This military posture would enhance the Soviets' capability to limit conflict once it is initiated by enabling them to apply optimum requisite force in a timely way. Moreover, the capability to secure victory at every level not only might avoid escalation through domination of the process, but it might also enable the Soviets to avoid war altogether by so intimidating opponents that they will seek to avoid an unequal, violent struggle through accommodation to Soviet wishes. The Marxist-Leninist concept of "democratic centralism" facilitates the development, deployment, and training of forces adequate to support such an extravagant approach to military force development. Unlike the Western democracies, in the Soviet system resource allocation is made by a few decisionmakers who are not directly affected by the costs such decisions impose on other sectors of society.

The Soviet desire to avoid nuclear war and, in the event of nuclear use, to restrict employment to the lowest possible level of intensity does not represent any major change of heart on the part of Soviet leaders.

[1] "The aim is to teach the military personnel to handle their weapons and equipment unfailingly so as to enable them to win a victory in the shortest possible time and with minimal losses." Grigory G. Borisov, "For Effective Combat Training," *Soviet Military Review*, no. 11, 1982, pp. 14-15. See, also, Jan Sejna, *We Will Bury You* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1982), p. 53. Sejna was the Chief of Staff to the minister of defense in Czechoslovakia and assistant secretary to the Czech Defense Council when he defected in February 1968.

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These have been Soviet goals from the time the leadership came to appreciate the destructive potential of nuclear weapons and the unpredictability of the outcome of a nuclear war.[2] It is true that in the Soviet military literature of the 1960s, most operational discussions of theater warfare assumed nuclear employment. However, writings by the often-quoted Siderenko, Sokolovskiy, and Reznichenko deal with fighting under nuclear conditions and deal little, if at all, with the political and military conditions leading up to nuclear use in what the Soviets call the beginning period of war (*nachalnyy period voiny*). When mentioned, initiation of nuclear use was attributed to the "enemy." Their failure to discuss the issue in any detail is consistent with the position of one Soviet military author writing at the time in the restricted journal *Voyennaya mysl*, who explained that initiation of nuclear use is a political decision.[3]

Nevertheless, many Western analysts, conditioned to think of nuclear weapons in terms of a concept of deterrence that is based largely on socio-psychological and political rather than on military considerations, routinely mistook matter-of-fact writings by Soviet professional military officers concerning the fighting of nuclear war for Soviet state policy concerning the initiation of nuclear war. Such analysts failed to consider several factors that should have caused them to give more credence to Soviet assertions that the burden of "unleashing" nuclear war would be on the "imperialists" (even though the Soviets would seek to pre-empt once convinced of the enemy's intention to launch).[4]

First of all, in the early 1960s and throughout most of the decade, NATO clearly enjoyed a considerable margin of superiority over the Warsaw Pact in nuclear weapons. Those analysts who ascribed to the Soviets a high tolerance or even a preference for nuclear war at that time were, in effect, arguing that the Soviets were eager to escalate a conflict to the very level of intensity at which they would have been at a clear disadvantage.

Second, the Soviets themselves were disinclined to initiate nuclear use because of the virtual certainty that use of tactical-nuclear

[2] Major General Stepan Andreyevich Tyushkevich, "The Methodology for the Correlation of Forces in War," *Voyennaya mysl* [Military thought—hereafter, *V.M.*], no. 6, June 1969, in U.S. Air Force, *Selected Readings From Military Thought: 1963-1973*, Studies in Communist Affairs, vol. 5, Part II [hereafter, *Selected Readings*] (Washington: GPO, 1982), pp. 60 and 65. See, also, Captain 1st Rank Vsevolod M. Kulakov, "Problems of Military-Technical Superiority," *V.M.*, no. 1, January 1964, *Selected Readings*, Part I, p. 221; and Colonel M. Shirokov, "Military Geography at the Present Stage," *V.M.*, no. 11, November 1966, *Selected Readings*, Part I, p. 138. Lieutenant Colonel Allan A. Meyer did an excellent piece of analysis on the evolution of the Soviet view about the role of nuclear weapons in theater war in 1978, revealing the Soviets' dialectic interpretation of events and capabilities over time. See Allan A. Meyer, "A View of Theater War: Reflections Through the Soviet Prism," *History, Numbers and War*, no. 1, Spring 1978, pp. 39-59.

[3] Colonel D. M. Samorukov, "Combat Operations Involving Conventional Means of Destruction," *V.M.*, no. 8, August 1967, *Selected Readings*, Part I, p. 175.

[4] "Sposoby boyevykh deystviy" [Methods of combat operations], *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* [Soviet military encyclopedia—hereafter, *S.V.E.*], vol. 7 (Moskva: Voyenizdat, 1979), p. 502.

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weapons would quickly lead to theater-strategic, then global nuclear war.[5] This pessimism was justified by the very nature of the weapons held by the Soviets themselves. NATO possessed an impressive range of technologically superior and somewhat more numerous tactical nuclear weapons to include a monopoly of deployed nuclear-capable artillery. As a result, NATO enjoyed considerable flexibility in terms of the size, yield, and range of nuclear-capable weapons with which it could respond to a successful Soviet conventional offensive. While this flexibility might have enabled NATO to initiate nuclear use at a relatively low level of intensity, it did little to prevent rapid escalation to larger weapons. For the Soviet Union possessed relatively inaccurate, large-yield operational and theater-strategic nuclear missiles that they would have had to use in massive strikes if they were to achieve optimum destruction of NATO's more numerous nuclear systems and avoid pre-emption themselves. In this, the Soviets' working scenario, Europe would very quickly be engulfed in nuclear war that, in their view, would lead very quickly to a global exchange.

This leads to a third and extremely important factor—geography. Geography would work to the Soviet advantage in a conventional conflict but to their disadvantage in nuclear war. Soviet planners realized that in a conventional conflict immediate proximity to the battlefield would give the Soviet Union the capability to introduce reinforcements and accomplish resupply activities in hours and days.[6] In contrast, reinforcements and supplies from the United States would have to transit 2,000 miles of ocean; and the Soviets estimated the time frames for these activities to be days or weeks.[7] On the other hand, in a nuclear war limited to Europe, proximity to the battlefield would be to the Soviet

[5] "Considering the aggressive plans of the imperialist states' military leaders, one must not exclude the possibility of their unleashing a war. Seizure of the strategic initiative will proceed under the extremely complex conditions of the beginning of the armed conflict, with mutual losses, much destruction, broad zones of radioactivity contaminated terrain, etc." Major General K. Sevastyanov, "Comments on the Article 'Augmentation of Strategic Efforts in Modern Armed Conflict,' " *V.M.*, no. 9, September 1964, *Selected Readings*, Part I, p. 57.

[6] In a 1964 article, Major General Dzhelaukhov examined the importance of strategic reserves in a theater of military operations and both the necessity and methods of destroying them. He pointed out the significance of the "geographic factor" by observing that it is one thing when strategic reserves "are still located in the depth of the theater at a distance of 600-1000 kilometers or more (requiring 3 or 4 days to move them and bring them into battle), and another matter when they are already in the zone of military operations and can be brought into battle within 24 hours." He also noted that "reserves formed on the opposite side of natural barriers still have to overcome them before they can arrive in the area of military operations." Major General Kh. M. Dzhelaukhov, "Combating Strategic Reserves in a Theater of Military Operations," *V.M.*, no. 11, November 1964, *Selected Readings*, Part I, p. 90.

[7] Captain 1st Rank A. Korablev, "Obespecheniye strategicheskoy mobilnosti" [Supporting strategic mobility], *Zarubezhnoye voyenoye obozreniye* [Foreign military review], no. 9, 1981, pp. 7-21. See, also, Major General M. Belov, "Views on NATO's Strategic Mobility," *Soviet Military Review* (hereafter—*S.M.R.*), no. 10, 1980, pp. 39-40. Both articles examine the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force and dual-based units. Relative to the latter, Korablev points out that Reforger experience indicates the United States can airlift "up to 12,000 men (without heavy weapons and equipment) and 1,500 tons of cargo to Europe in 6-8 days." Further, he points out that to airlift a complete airborne division to the Persian Gulf region would require 2 weeks, while another division would require 30-35 days to arrive by sea.

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disadvantage and United States' advantage. The Soviets noted that such a war would "spell complete catastrophe for Europe" (the most industrialized and urbanized sector of the Soviet Union is in Europe), while the territory of the United States "would not suffer."[8] Moreover, as mentioned, Soviet leaders were extremely doubtful that nuclear war in Europe would not lead very quickly to an exchange of global nuclear weapons with the United States. Therefore, a Soviet geographical advantage in reinforcement would be rendered virtually meaningless in an environment in which missiles were flying between continents in minutes.

The final consideration was economic. A Warsaw Pact offensive would impose considerable costs on the economic infrastructure of bloc countries including the Soviet Union. A Pact offensive preceded and accompanied by nuclear strikes eliciting NATO nuclear strikes in response would have led to incineration of the West European "spoils." Thus, instead of offering potential for economic exploitation that would have helped to offset the cost of the war, West Europe would have become an economic burden requiring at least some investment in reconstruction.

Why then, one might ask, did the Soviet military write so extensively about nuclear war when they and their political leadership were convinced that it was in their interest to avoid nuclear use? The Soviets fully realized that NATO relied upon its clear nuclear superiority to deter an attack by the Soviets and, in the event of war, would have been forced to rely on those same nuclear weapons to compensate for inferiority in conventional forces.[9] It is not surprising, therefore, that the Soviets believed NATO would have to initiate nuclear use very early in the conflict to avoid defeat. In fact, it was argued that, should war occur, "the belligerents will strive to seize the initiative and execute military-strategic missions in the shortest time by employing nuclear means from the first minutes of the war."[10] Even after the U.S. adopted the strategy of flexible response, the Soviets saw NATO employing nuclear weapons early. According to Soviet exercise analysis, "the use of nuclear weapons began in a maximum of 4-5 days."[11] The author of this 1967 assessment noted that "the military officials of West Germany . . . argue that in Western Europe, which does not have great strategic depth, it is impossible to tolerate losses of territory, and a 'nuclear threshold' must be crossed as soon as possible."[12] He explained that for the side "successfully de-

[8] Army General S. Ivanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," *V.M.*, no. 5, May 1969, *Selected Readings*, Part II, p. 29.

[9] Major General B. Golovchiner, "Encirclement and Annihilation of Groupings of Defending Troops," *V.M.*, no. 8, August 1964, *Selected Readings*, Part I, p. 43.

[10] Major General N. Vasendin, "Comments on the Article, 'Augmentation of Strategic Efforts in Modern Conflict,'" *V.M.*, no. 9, September 1964, *Selected Readings*, Part I, p. 60.

[11] Samorukov, "Combat Operations Involving Conventional Means of Destruction," p. 175.

[12] Ibid.

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veloping the offensive it will be advantageous to delay the beginning of use of nuclear weapons as long as possible." He argued, however, that the attacker's preference "did not change the conditions" because "in such a case the opposing side might considerably accelerate the beginning of operations with nuclear weapons in order to achieve a change of conditions in his favor."[13]

In summary, then, even in the "nuclear 1960s" Soviet leaders would have preferred to have been able to achieve victory in war with conventional weapons alone—not because they were peace-loving Marxists deeply concerned about the well-being of mankind, as their apologists might argue, but because they were hard-nosed realists concerned about the well-being of the Soviet communist leadership and the Soviet system that sustained them. They concluded, based on cold, self-serving analysis, that the Soviet system was more likely to survive and be victorious in a conventional than in a nuclear war. Similarly, Soviet military strategists writing in the 1960s dwelt at great length on combat involving nuclear weapons because they believed that Soviet forces could not possibly prevent any war with NATO from becoming nuclear. The very structure of the opposing forces made nuclear war virtually inevitable. As professional military thinkers in an autocratic state in which dissemination of information and resources is centrally controlled, Soviet officers were and are essentially unconstrained by concerns about the "nuclear sensitivities" of their own populace or of their allies. Nor did they need to concern themselves with an elaborate concept of deterrence that tended to render serious discussion (and expenditure) on defense largely unnecessary. Soviet officers discussed and trained for the kind of war they expected to have to fight—nuclear war—even though it would have been very much in their interest and hence their preference to execute war at the conventional level where they enjoyed a considerable advantage in available forces, speed of reinforcement, and reduced likelihood of destruction of the social and economic infrastructure of the Soviet Union.

Those Western defense experts who cited Soviet readiness to think about and plan for nuclear war as a clear indication of the Soviets' willingness, if not eagerness, to initiate nuclear use were incorrect. Certainly they were working without some information that has since become available. But even if such information had been available, it probably could not have turned the tide of the prevailing conventional wisdom. For that wisdom was apparently more a projected reflection of NATO's defense posture than it was of Soviet thinking. Western analysts tended to embrace Soviet military writings on nuclear warfighting as irrefutable proof of a Soviet predilection for nuclear war because such writings helped

[13] Ibid.

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to reinforce and validate NATO's own very heavy reliance on nuclear weaponry for deterrence. Conceptually, a clear and simple nuclear threat was a much more satisfying complement to nuclear deterrence than would have been the muddy political and military complexities of a conventional *and* nuclear threat that placed the burden of nuclear escalation on the NATO alliance. This tendency to focus on the aspect of the threat that is most convenient to NATO's defense posture has persisted, even though it has led to increasingly greater disparities between perception and reality. We will discuss this issue at greater length in the section below dealing with the implications of evolving Soviet strategy in Europe.

A Change in the "Objective Conditions"

By the late 1960s or early 1970s, several factors led the Soviets to at least seriously consider that it might be possible to prevent NATO from using nuclear weapons in a war, or at least to keep their use at a low level of intensity. These factors included a shift in the nuclear weapons balance at the global and theater-strategic levels from one of NATO superiority to one of at least parity; a softening of the political and military cohesion of the NATO alliance; an ever increasing Pact superiority in terms of numbers, lethality, and mobility of conventional weapons systems; and an improving Soviet nuclear weapons technology. We will consider these factors in order.

As Soviet nuclear strength grew and approached parity with that of the West, the Soviets perceived that the credibility of a U.S. threat to employ nuclear weapons had decreased. In 1968, Sokolovskiy noted that "until nearly the end of 1960, U.S. leaders adhered to the strategy of so-called 'massive retaliation' . . . and recognized only the possibility of waging a general nuclear war against the Soviet Union." He noted that "in accordance with this strategy, the U.S. government put the main emphasis on the development of nuclear weapons of strategic and operational-tactical designation, deemphasizing the conventional armed forces, especially ground troops." Soviet successes in the fields of nuclear weaponry and rocketry had led, however, to the failure of the strategy of massive retaliation and to the adoption of the concept of flexible response.[14] The Soviets also estimated that they had achieved parity with NATO in theater-nuclear forces, reflected by NATO's official adoption of flexible response in 1967.[15] Consequently, the nuclear context within

[14] Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy* (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1968), pp. 54-57.

[15] G. M. Kornyenko, ed., *O problemakh razoruzheniya* [On problems of disarmament] (Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1980), pp. 118, 263, 264. See, also, pp. 125-26 for a discussion of conventional parity.

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which the Soviets considered the nature of theater warfare had changed. The "correlation of [nuclear] forces" had shifted toward the Soviets, who were determined that the shift be made irreversible.[16] Against this backdrop of a less credible global and theater-nuclear threat, NATO forces deployed in Europe were seen to be vulnerable in ways that offered the prospect of avoiding nuclear escalation in the event of war.

The Soviet strategic offensive plan of the late 1960s "considered the German Army the strongest, best trained, and most highly disciplined force in NATO, with the possible exception of the U.S. contingent."[17] Holland, on the other hand, they viewed as one of NATO's weakest links. They believed that "Holland would declare herself neutral in any conflict with the East, and the Dutch armed forces would not only support this decision but would actively resist any attempt by the Western powers to use Dutch ports or cross Dutch territory."[18] The Soviets, nevertheless, expected Holland to become a battleground: "The Soviet ploy would be to recognize Dutch neutrality at once, and then to 'guarantee' its non-belligerent status by military occupation."[19] In addition, despite continued NATO observance of the principle of neutrality, after 1963 Warsaw Pact operational plans no longer recognized the concept. In Warsaw Pact planning, the occupation of Austria would facilitate operations against the Federal Republic of Germany, and the occupation of Switzerland would ensure that it not become a refuge for defeated Western forces.[20] France had dramatically withdrawn from military involvement with the alliance, and the strategic offensive plan "assumed France would never use her nuclear missiles or her *force de frappe.* The Plan anticipated the capitulation of the French government as soon as the Warsaw Pact armies crossed the Rhine and parachute [forces] dropped around her principal cities."[21]

Because the Soviets perceived significant differences in commitment to the alliance among NATO members, they saw a decreasing likelihood that NATO forces would readily use nuclear weapons. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, NATO is an alliance by choice, and major wartime

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[16] "The history of our time has dispelled the [aggressor's] hopes of conquering nations fighting for independence, nations that can rely on help and support from progressive forces everywhere.

"Experience has shown that capitalist powers, formerly engaging in direct aggression, are now frequently forced to limit the scale on which they use arms and armed forces so as to avoid a strong international reaction in response. The restraining factor here has been the emerging political, economic and military power of the socialist countries and, above all, the rocket-nuclear power of the Soviet Union." I. E. Shavrov, ed., *Lokalnye voyny, istoriya i sovremennost* [Local wars in history and in the present] (Moskva: Voyenizdat, 1981), p. 229. The "irreversible character" of the change in the correlation of forces in the world is covered on p. 284.

[17] Sejna, *We Will Bury You*, p. 114.

[18] Ibid., p. 128.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid., p. 121.

[21] Ibid., p. 130.

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decisions such as nuclear release would require agreement of the allies. The confusion and anxiety likely to characterize the outbreak of war in Europe might sufficiently delay the nuclear release decision to make NATO nuclear use altogether ineffective or inadvisable.[22] Geography alone might cause some NATO members to argue for early release and others to strongly oppose it after even the initial phase of a successful Soviet high-speed conventional offensive. Specifically, allies already deeply penetrated might vehemently resist being rescued by a NATO nuclear counterattack; allies threatened but not yet penetrated might argue just as vehemently for nuclear strikes to halt the Soviet advance.

In the context of this shift in the nuclear weapons balance and a less cohesive NATO alliance, the Soviets had not only maintained but had actually improved their advantage at the conventional level. Given the Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority in conventional forces, the several variants of NATO's strategy of forward defense were seen by the Pact to be vulnerable. Since NATO's strategy called for the early forward deployment of most of its forces "in-theater," the alliance lacked the operational depth and large reserves required to counter major Warsaw Pact penetrations early in the war. Once France had withdrawn from the NATO military structure, most of the forces that would constitute NATO's strategic and operational reserves had to be brought from North America.[23] Obviously, the extent to which reinforcement might be delayed would be largely determined by the Soviet success in manipulating the perceptions of alliance members throughout the prewar crisis period.

The Soviets were also coming to see in emerging conventional technologies the potential for major changes in conventional warfare. Improved weapons lethality and force mobility could not help but have an effect on traditional, but very ambitious, Soviet concepts about the conduct of a strategic offensive.[24] The Soviets were most impressed with the battlefield utility of combat and transport helicopters, the versatility and responsiveness of modern self-propelled artillery, and the speed and

[22] The Soviets assessed over a decade ago that, for the side which "is successfully developing the offensive it will be advantageous to delay the beginning of the use of nuclear weapons as long as possible. . . . In such a case the opposing side might considerably accelerate the beginning of operations with nuclear weapons in order to achieve a sharp change in conditions in his favor. For it is obvious if he doesn't do this at the critical moment, then subsequently it will be all the more difficult to use nuclear weapons with the necessary effect." Samorukov, "Combat Operations Involving Conventional Means of Destruction," pp. 174-75. A NATO decision for nuclear use at that time might appear inadvisable if the Warsaw Pact has been able to destroy a large part of NATO's nuclear forces in the conventional phase.

[23] Dzhelaukhov, "Combating Strategic Reserves in a Theater of Military Operations," p. 90. (See note 6.) See, also, Korablev, "Supporting Strategic Mobility," pp. 7-12, and Belov, "Views on NATO's Strategic Mobility," pp. 39-40. (See note 7.)

[24] I. Krupchenko, "Sposoby razvitiya uspekha v operativnoy glubine silami tankovykh armiy, tankovykh i mekhanizirovannykh korpusov" [Methods of exploitation in the operational depth with forces of tank armies and tank and mechanized corps], *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* [Military-historical journal—hereafter, *Vizh.*], no. 7, 1981, p. 20.

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firepower of the infantry fighting vehicle. In the air, long-range all-weather bombers and fighter-bombers and improved tactical missiles could significantly increase the depth of conventional strikes against enemy nuclear capability and command and control.[25] In addition, improved surface-to-air missiles and antitank guided missiles could greatly enhance the Soviets' ability to defend Warsaw Pact attacking forces. Soviet military planners also recognized that, in the hands of the enemy, these same weapons constituted a major threat to the success of the offensive and would have to be neutralized through some combination of operational changes and further improvements in weapons technology.

In the nuclear sphere, more sophisticated weapons technology was making it possible to place medium- and low-yield weapons into smaller delivery systems while tactical delivery systems themselves were becoming increasingly more accurate. In retrospect, it now appears that the Soviets were sufficiently confident in their mastery of more advanced nuclear technology to emphasize the improvement of their own nuclear artillery capability. It is also likely that anticipated extension of conventional operations concepts created a need and a role for self-propelled, dual-capable artillery that did not previously exist.

In summary, the nuclear parity reached by the end of the 1960s raised the strong possibility of nuclear stalemate in the event of war; the Warsaw Pact had improved its already considerable advantage in conventional forces in Europe; the likelihood of a clear and unified NATO response to crisis had diminished; emerging conventional technologies offered the potential for major improvements in Soviet capability for conducting a conventional offensive; and nuclear weapons technology made it possible for the Soviets to produce smaller nuclear weapons suitable for delivery by a wider range of more accurate tactical missiles and artillery.

Understandably, senior Soviet and Warsaw Pact military theorists realized that between the end of the 1960s and the mid 1970s the Soviet Union had entered a new stage in the evolution of Soviet military thought about theater war. They continued to assert that the "revolution in military affairs" brought on by the advent of nuclear weapons had changed forever the way wars would be fought. Nuclear weapons established the context and imposed special operational constraints on all future military action. But since this "revolution" was dynamic in nature, they realized that, as conditions changed, nuclear weapons did not necessarily have to be used in order to be effective. The sense of turning a corner in the revolution—to the extent that the change might itself be

[25] Ibid.

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revolutionary—was already evident in a secret Czech document written in January of 1968. The author explained:

> The revolution in military affairs is not a closed process. On the contrary, in view of the expected advance of the scientific technical revolution, one can expect further important changes in military affairs in the future, the development of which with regard to the present stage may not be necessarily of a mere evolutionary nature and may not merely complete the existing process.[26]

In October of that year Soviet military scientists Cherednichenko and Sokolovskiy (who edited *Military Strategy*, cited by many Western analysts who propound a Soviet preference for nuclear war) offered a more specific judgment on the timing and nature of changes taking place. They proposed in the restricted Soviet journal *Voyennaya mysl* that "military affairs are entering or have already entered the next stage of their development, and, apparently, it is necessary once again to introduce essential changes into military art."[27] They concluded that "the possibility is not excluded of wars occurring with the use of conventional weapons, as well as the limited use of nuclear means in one or several theaters of military operations, or of a relatively protracted nuclear war using the capabilities of all types of armed forces."[28] By May 1974, then Chief of the Soviet General Staff Victor Kulikov confirmed that "our armed forces have entered upon a new stage of their qualitative development." With "their mobility, strike power, and fire power . . . increased considerably," they were now "abreast of contemporary requirements."[29]

This "new stage" did not involve formulation of new strategic goals but rather the aggressive exploitation of changes in the "objective conditions" that made it possible to pursue long-standing objectives. Those objectives were and still are the establishment of a Soviet "peace and security" in Europe without a major war, through political and economic coercion based on incontestable military superiority at all levels; readiness, in the event of war, to fight and win quickly with conventional means; and, failing that, domination of nuclear escalation at the lowest possible level to reduce the risk of massive nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union.

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[26] "Problems of the Party's Military Policy in the Light of the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," lecture given by Colonel Frantisek Herfut to the highest military functionaries of the Ministry of National Defense, January 1968, p. 4.

[27] Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Sokolovskiy and Major General M. Cherednichenko, "Military Strategy and Its Problems," *V.M.*, no. 10, October 1968, *Selected Readings*, Part II, p. 13.

[28] Ibid., p. 9.

[29] "General Kulikov Asks Alertness Against Imperialists," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), May 10, 1974, p. A2. See, also, "Soviet General Says Pentagon Plans for War," *New York Times*, May 10, 1974.

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Serious pursuit of the capability for conventional victory and escalation dominance was extremely ambitious, even given the promise of improved conventional and nuclear technologies. Several actions were required. First, the Soviets had to continue to develop, refine, and acquire the most advanced military technologies and apply this new capability to the military force structure. The second—and perhaps most difficult—task was to adapt and refine operational concepts for force employment that would better exploit the potential of new technological capabilities. Third, they needed to restructure and develop the armed forces in a way that would best enable them to carry out improved operational concepts. Finally, the Soviets would have to exercise, test, and refine new operational ideas and a new force structure to execute the operations successfully.

From the vantage point of the early 1980s, it is possible to appreciate the unfolding of these phases in what the Soviets call the force development process (*voyennoye stroitelstvo*), since the Soviets seem already to have advanced through most of the cycle. This progress is evident in the writings of Warsaw Pact military scientists who, over the past five years, have been reporting on and discussing significant changes in operational employment of the armed forces. It is also very clear, from information published by the U.S. Defense Department in the same time frame, that the Soviets have been changing and augmenting the force structure to support new operational concepts. In the discussion that follows, we will describe operational changes in the Soviet concept of the conventional theater-strategic offensive and identify some of the more significant modifications the Soviets have made in their force structure to improve execution of these operations.

Operational Changes

As we noted earlier, despite their acknowledgment by the middle of the decade that theater war might have a conventional phase, throughout the 1960s Soviet military planners generally assumed that nuclear weapons would be used extensively early in any conflict in Europe. Hence, Soviet operational concepts and the structure of their forces reflected this nuclear dependency. Movement toward a strategy that would prevent NATO nuclear use and ensure Soviet success with conventional weapons required Soviet military planners to change the way they thought about theater operations and to rethink the types, mix, and quantity of weapons systems required.

To appreciate the nature and scope of the problem, one must consider what nuclear weapons would do for military forces executing a

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major theater offensive. Even though nuclear use requires attacking forces to maintain dispersion and to protect themselves from nuclear effects, in many respects it greatly simplifies the conduct of offensive operations for commanders at every level.

The Soviet commander in the theater of military operations must neutralize NATO's nuclear weapons, superior air capability, and major command and control centers throughout the theater of military operations as quickly as possible. Missile- and air-delivered nuclear weapons solve this problem very effectively. The return on destructive effect from the ability of even one aircraft in six to penetrate to a given target is well worth the investment in aircraft. Inaccuracy of nuclear-armed missiles can be offset by increasing the yield of the warhead.

At what the Soviets call the operational level, army and front (roughly equivalent to a NATO corps and army group respectively), the Soviet commander would expect to face NATO defenses 30 to 50 kilometers deep.[30] The NATO defending force would be expected to have sufficient firepower and mobility to force army and front commanders to expend considerable time and several first echelon divisions to penetrate those defenses before their second echelon and reserves could destroy the integrity of the NATO defense and effect its collapse. The Soviet military scientist Reznichenko,[31] in 1966, pointed out that when nuclear weapons were employed, they effectively replaced first echelon divisions. Nuclear strikes rather than the first echelon make the "penetration"; and *all* echelons—first, second, and reserves—exploit at maximum speed, one echelon relieving another as required to maintain the momentum of the advance.

At the bottom of the tactical hierarchy, the Soviet platoon leader must penetrate a NATO defense dense with antitank guided missiles (ATGMs). NATO ATGMs, from protected positions, can destroy all of his armored fighting vehicles and tanks while still at a distance of several kilometers and while the NATO weapons themselves are still well out of range of the tanks' main guns. Assurance that those ATGMs would be suppressed or destroyed with nuclear weapons would enable the Soviet platoon leader to advance at the top speed the terrain and his equipment would allow, with all hatches closed to minimize radiation exposure.[32]

Soviet military thinkers struggling in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the problem of turning the *possibility* of a conventional-only

[30] A. A. Sidorenko, *The Offensive (A Soviet View)*, trans. and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force (Washington: GPO, 1973), pp. 73, 140.

[31] V. G. Reznichenko, ed., *Taktika* [Tactics] (Moskva: Voyenizdat, 1966), p. 274.

[32] Colonel P. Konoplya, "Preodoleniye oborony, nasyshchennoy protivotankovymi sredstrami" [Overcoming a defense that is dense with antitank weapons], *Voyennyy Vestnik* [Military Herald—hereafter, *V.V.*], no. 6, 1980, p. 39.

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offensive into a *probability* had several important questions to consider. The first, and perhaps most difficult, was: how can one accomplish the required operational tasks using conventional forces against a nuclear-armed enemy? Since complete success in preventing nuclear use could not be guaranteed, how can one enhance the likelihood of survival of Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons through a prolonged conventional phase? What would be the character of a tactical or theater nuclear exchange at the end of the first or second week of a conflict rather than on the fourth or fifth day? Would the nature and size of the remaining target set and the disposition of opposing forces create a need for different methods of employment, different types of nuclear warheads, and different delivery systems?

To solve the first problem, conventional attack against a nuclear-armed enemy, the Soviets would have to destroy enough of NATO's in-theater nuclear weapons rapidly (while ensuring survival of their own) to make initiation of nuclear use appear to NATO leaders less attractive than continuation of a conventional-only defense. Second, once the Warsaw Pact conventional offensive had begun, forces would have to advance very quickly to ensure neutralization of NATO's remaining nuclear weapons, complicate reinforcement of the alliance from North America, and exploit differences in interests among NATO allies. One of the most divisive of these differences could be whether to use surviving theater-nuclear weapons or strategic-nuclear systems controlled by the United States if Warsaw Pact forces were to advance deeply into NATO territory.

To hope to achieve rapid and extensive destruction of NATO nuclear weapons and to attack at the requisite tempo of advance without nuclear strikes, the Soviets had to make major improvements in how the armed forces accomplished the traditional tasks of fire and maneuver. The quality, quantity, degree of integration, and depth of penetration of air, missile, and artillery fire support had to be improved dramatically if nonnuclear fires were possibly to compensate for the absence of nuclear strikes. Demands in maneuver would be even more challenging. Exploitation of nuclear strikes does not really require maneuver as much as it does simple high-speed forward movement. Even with heavy conventional fire support, rapid penetration and exploitation of NATO's defense in a conventional offensive would require greater ability on the part of an army to change direction quickly, select the best avenues of advance, and achieve initial penetration with smaller elements of the attacking force capable of going through or over defensive positions.

The general thrust of the Soviet conventional solution is suggested by a statement made in December 1981 by General Colonel

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Gayvoronskiy, deputy commandant of the prestigious General Staff Academy in Moscow, which trains senior Soviet officers for important joint service positions:

> *Under present-day conditions when only conventional weapons are used in the* conduct of the offensive, effecting a penetration could require the application of large masses of artillery, aircraft, and tanks; thorough suppression of the enemy's numerous anti-tank weapons; and protection of the attacking force from air strikes, including strikes by combat helicopters. To increase the tempo of the offensive and stop the approach of enemy reserves toward the penetration sectors, it will be necessary to make air and missile strikes throughout the depth of the enemy's defenses and make wide use of airborne (air assault) landings.[33]

To see how this capability has been developed operationally and structurally, it is helpful to begin at the level where a strategic offensive would be controlled, the High Command in the theater of military operations (TMO). In a conventional offensive, the commander at this level must be able to destroy quickly most of NATO's theater and tactical nuclear weapons, the greater part of NATO's air capability, and as much as possible of NATO's command and control. He would strive for preemptive conventional destruction of NATO's nuclear weapons and aircraft, since the Soviets recognize that early conventional success would put extreme pressure on NATO to respond with whatever nuclear systems it had. Two trends in Soviet TMO-level operations, one in theater "fire support" and the other in maneuver, strongly indicate Soviet movement toward development of such a conventional capability.

In fire support, the Soviets have been accelerating refinement of what they term "the air operation" (*aviatsionnaya operatsiya*) within the context of their overall concept of the strategic offensive operation (*strategicheskaya nastupatelnaya operatsiya*). The air operation is critical to the success of a conventional offensive for two reasons. First, the air operation, in its effect, substitutes for an initial mass nuclear strike against military targets in the TMO.[34] Second, the air operation involves much more than its name alone would indicate to a Western military analyst. In fact, it involves strikes by conventionally armed surface-to-surface missiles and artillery, as well as attacks by airborne, air-assault, and special-purpose troops coordinated with strikes by frontal and strategic aviation.

[33] Colonel General F. Gayvoronskiy, "Razvitiye operativnogo iskusstvo" [The development of operational art], *Vizh.*, no. 12, 1981, pp. 28-29.

[34] When aircraft deliver nuclear weapons the Soviets consider their activity to be part of the nuclear strike plan. This may sometimes be discussed as air activities (*aviatsionnye deystviya*—often translated as "operations") but never the air operation (*operatsiya*). "In a nuclear war, depending on the situation and the quantity of aviation still viable, air operations can be conducted after the belligerents have used their basic stocks of nuclear weapons." Colonel Pilot Alexander Musial, "Charakter i znaczenie operacji powietrznych we wspolczesnych dzialaniach wojennych" [The character and importance of air operations in modern warfare], *Przeglad wojsk lotniczyeh i wojsk obrony powietrznej kraju* (Polish air and air defense review—hereafter, *Polish Air Review*), no. 3, 1982, p. 11.

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The air operation would be controlled by an air forces officer who would be the deputy commander for aviation to the overall "combined-arms commander" in the theater of military operations.[35]

To reduce Soviet aircraft losses, the air operation commander would seek to attack NATO's air defenses with means *other than aircraft*, preferably with artillery and missiles armed with improved conventional munitions (*cassettnye snaryady*—literally, cassette warheads).[36] Electronic warfare systems would be used to "blind" NATO air and air-defense radar and associated communications to facilitate the destruction by aircraft of systems that survive missile and artillery attacks.[37] Frontal aviation aircraft would attack through selected sectors of NATO's air defenses to establish air penetration corridors.[38] Longer-range aircraft allocated by the Supreme High Command to the air operation commander would then attack critical targets throughout the depth of the theater, constituting, in effect, the "shock force" of the operation.[39] Because the purpose of the air operation is to establish, from the outset, overall fire superiority in the theater of military operations, the operation would normally precede attacks by first echelon armies on the ground by at least a couple of hours.

In the event that NATO were able to launch its aircraft first against the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets would counter with what they call an "antiair operation" (*protivovozdushnaya operatsiya*), in order to establish air superiority. This operation—extremely offensive in character—makes use of virtually all of the deep-striking combat forces seen in the

[35] Ibid., p. 12.

[36] See, for example, ibid., pp. 11-12; Colonel M. Skovorodkin, "Some Questions on Coordination of Branches of Armed Forces in Major Operations," *V.M.*, no. 2, February 1967, in *Selected Readings*, Part I, pp. 145-46; Major General Kh. Dzhelaukhov, "The Infliction of Deep Strikes," *V.M.*, no. 2, February 1966, in *Selected Readings*, Part I, p. 113; and Colonel N. Semenov, "Gaining Supremacy in the Air," *V.M.*, no. 4, April 1968, in *Selected Readings*, Part I, pp. 205-6.

[37] "Vozdushnaya operatsiya" [Air operation], *S.V.E.*, vol. 2, p. 282. See, also, Colonel L. Kuleszynski, "Some Problems of Surprise in Warfare," *V.M.*, no. 5, May 1971, in *Selected Readings*, Part II, p. 87; A. I. Paliy, "Radioelektronnaya Borba" [Radioelectronic combat], *S.V.E.*, vol. 7, pp. 29-30; and "Radioelektronnoye podavleniye" [Radioelectronic suppression], *S.V.E.*, vol. 7, p. 30.

[38] Colonel E. Tomilin, "Chto vzyat iz boyevogo opyta" [What to take from combat experience], *Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika* [Aviation and cosmonautics], no. 11, 1980, pp. 8-9, trans. in *USSR Report: Military Affairs*, no. 1568, JPRS 77416, February 19, 1981, pp. 16-19; and Lieutenant General of Aviation G. Federyakov, "Kakim byt klassu takticheskoi podgotovki" [What should the tactical training classroom be?], *Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika*, no. 10, 1981, p. 5.

[39] Several Soviet authors have made the point that the experience of maneuvering of aviation during World War II "has vital significance to the development of the military art of the air forces in the modern era." As one of them has noted, "the know-how of mass employment of the Supreme High Command's reserve aviation *soyedineniye* [corps, division, or brigade] and control over them and the constant availability of a specific number of aviation reserves directly under the orders of the Supreme High Command Headquarters to execute unforeseen missions retains its significance." A. Pervov, "Manevr aviatsionnymi rezervami stavki VGK" [Maneuver with the aviation reserve of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command], *Vizh.*, no. 2, 1977, p. 100. See, also, E. Simakov, "Sovershenstvovanie organizatsionnoy struktury voennovozdushnykh sil" [Perfecting the organizational structure of the air forces], *Vizh.*, no. 9, 1979, pp. 25-31.

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air operation (with the exception of troops landed in the enemy rear).[40] Even if the Warsaw Pact succeeded in pre-emptively launching the air operation, they would still initiate a smaller scale, more defensively focused antiair operation for the purpose of protecting its forces and installations from deep strikes by NATO's surviving offensive air capability.[41]

The major change in maneuver at the TMO level has been a shift toward broader employment of airborne forces for early deep penetration to important targets. In Soviet thinking, airborne assaults would represent the selective use of "troop strikes" (*udary voysk*) in lieu of nuclear strikes (*yadernye udary*) against critical targets.[42] Hence, airborne units would be used against the same objectives targeted by the air operation and, as mentioned above, some airborne operations would be integrated directly into the air operation plan. Airborne troops would focus on objectives like airfields, which the Soviets would sometimes try to seize for their own use rather than to destroy. The airborne forces also would play a vital role in accelerating the conventional ground offensive by dropping ahead of advancing armies and holding important terrain features such as river crossing sites and major road junctions. Moreover, they would attempt to sow confusion in the enemy rear through extensive disruption of enemy command and control and interdiction of lines of communication needed for reinforcement and resupply.[43]

At the operational (front and army) and tactical (division and below) levels, Warsaw Pact commanders carrying out offensive operations by means of conventional weapons would require substitutes for three major tasks otherwise accomplished by nuclear strikes. These tasks would include: first, suppression of NATO weapons systems such as aircraft and nuclear-armed missiles that would threaten the survival of attacking Pact forces as they advanced to contact, penetrated NATO's defenses; second, establishment of penetration corridors through NATO's forward defenses;

[40] Colonel Witold Pokruszynski, "Operacja przeciwpowietrzna wojsk OPK" [The national air defense force antiaircraft operation], *Polish Air Review*, no. 5, 1982, pp. 5-7.

[41] The antiair operation has been receiving considerable Warsaw Pact attention in recent years, reflecting to some extent Warsaw Pact concern about NATO's growing interest in "deep strikes" against Pact follow-on forces and rear areas.

[42] The chief of Soviet airborne forces made explicit what has become evident throughout recent Soviet military literature. In commenting on airborne employment in exercise West-81, he declared the vertical envelopment to be "an important maneuver without which modern offensive operations are not possible." See Captain A. Oliynik, "Vysokoye masterstvo vozdushno-desantnykh voysk" [High mastery of the airborne troops], *Krasnaya zvezda [Red star—hereafter, K.Z.]*, September 11, 1981, p. 2. The term "troop strike" (*udar voysk*) was introduced in January 1982. See Major General I. Vorobyev, "Oruzhiye i taktika: kommdir i sovremennyy boy" [Weapons and tactics: The commander and modern combat], *K.Z.*, January 12, 1982, p. 2. See, also, note 52.

[43] "Desant" [Assault landing], *S.V.E.*, vol. 3, p. 152. See, also, James Brusstar, *The Soviet Airborne Forces* (Unclassified), Defense Intelligence Report DDB-1110-2-82 (Washington: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1982), p. 4.

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and third, suppression of NATO resistance at critical junctures such as river-crossing sites and terrain bottlenecks to ensure a high rate of advance.

At this level, the Soviets also sought solutions through major improvements in both fire support and maneuver. In the case of fire support, it must first be remembered that advancing fronts and armies would be the primary beneficiaries of successful theater air and antiair operations described above. The overall combined-arms commander in the theater of military operations would be a general or marshal of the ground forces; he would directly control the air, antiair, and front offensive operations. This officer has the authority and experience to direct the execution of all three major components of the strategic offensive and thereby to optimize their mutual support and ensure the maximum contribution of each to the strategic mission in the theater.[44] Through the air operation the theater combined-arms commander strives to minimize the NATO air and nuclear threat to his advancing fronts. At the same time, his TMO-scale antiair operation would marshal air- and ground-based air defenses to protect his lines of communication and follow-on armies and fronts from deep strikes by those NATO aircraft that survive the air operation.

Complementing and supplementing the TMO fire support plan, each advancing front would have its own fire plan to coordinate strikes by frontal aviation and all front artillery, missile, and air-defense assets. These forces would be controlled by the front combined-arms commanders. Here again we see a significant shift in emphasis toward a conventional solution to the nuclear problem. Soviet fire support (air, artillery, missile) doctrine has been built around a concept called "fire destruction of the enemy" (*ognevoye porazheniye protivnika*), which by definition includes only conventional fires.[45] Traditionally, this concept has included three phases related to the activities of the supported maneuver forces as they attack. These phases include: "fire preparation of the attack," executed shortly before attacking forces make contact with enemy defenses; "fire support of the attack," executed as the maneuver

[44] This combined-arms commander in the continental theater of military operations would even control naval forces that provide support to his offensive from contiguous seas. This high degree of combined-arms control is foreign to most Western military officers. In the West, for example, the army typically requests support from the air force, which may or may not respond depending upon priority given to the air war versus close air support of the ground war. The Soviet tradition and long experience of the powerful combined-arms commander helps to ensure that all arms are fighting one war. This tradition may prove to be one of their greatest strengths in combat.

[45] "Ognevoye parazheniye" [Fire destruction], *S.V.E.*, vol. 6, p. 11. A nuclear strike plan against essentially the same target set is to be prepared and kept updated. If the nuclear strike plan were implemented, the targets in the conventional target set would be reduced significantly. See Lieutenant Colonel Kerry Hines and Major John Hines, *Front Fire Support* (Unclassified), Defense Intelligence Report DDB-1130-8-82 (Washington: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1982), p. 70.

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units actually penetrate enemy defenses; and "fire accompaniment," executed as required to support maneuver units as they exploit deeper into the enemy rear areas.[46]

In recent years, this concept has been modified significantly in its basic structure and in the quality and quantity of fires required in each phase to compensate for the reduced likelihood of nuclear support of the offensive. The first change involved the addition of a new preliminary phase, "fire support of advance from the depths," which requires support of attacking units as they move from departure areas located deep in the rear areas of a Warsaw Pact front to the point where they actually begin the attack against NATO forces.[47] Similar in function to the antiair operation at the TMO level, this new phase has major offensive and defensive components. Because Soviet planning no longer assumes early nuclear suppression of NATO's deep-striking aircraft and nuclear missiles, the offensive component of this new initial fire support phase requires front-subordinated longer-range missiles and fighter-bomber aircraft to strike deep-based NATO systems immediately as the attacking Warsaw Pact units begin to depart their assembly areas. Destruction of shorter-range NATO artillery by medium- and short-range front artillery follows this preliminary phase as the attacking Pact unit advances closer to defending NATO forces.[48] As insurance against deep strikes by surviving NATO aircraft, the defensive component of the new first phase includes heavy fighter and ground-based air defense of the advancing force.[49] Without question, correct timing of front offensive operations with the

[46] "Ognevaya podgotovka" [Fire preparation], "Ognevaya poderzhka" [Fire support], *S.V.E.*, vol. 6, p. 9. See, also, "Ognevoye soprovozhdeniye" [Fire accompaniment], ibid., p. 11. For a more complete translation and explanation of these concepts see Hines and Hines, *Front Fire Support*, pp. 27-32.

[47] Colonel Alexander Musial, "Szialania bojowe lotnictwa na korzysc operacyjych grup manewrowych" [Aviation combat operations on behalf of operational maneuver groups], *Polish Air Review*, no. 7-8, 1982, pp. 12-13. For an application of the concept to amphibious operations see Musial, "Rola lotnictwa vderzemiowego w zabezpieczeniu desantow morskich" [The role of air support in protecting landing detachments], *Polish Air Review*, no. 5, 1982, p. 12.

[48] This sequence is explained as part of the new integrated character (*kompleksnyy kharacter*) of contemporary fire destruction. See Colonel R. Portugalskiy and Major A. Vorshchov, "Sovershenstvovaniye metodov raboty komanduyushchikh i shtabov po organizatsii ognevogo porazheniya v nastupatelnkh operatsiyakh" [Perfection of the work of commanders and staffs in the organization of fire destruction of the enemy in offensive operations], *Vizh.*, no. 3, 1982, pp. 11, 12, 18, and 19. See, also, I. Vorobyev, "Destruction of the Enemy by Fire," *S.M.R.*, no. 3, 1982, pp. 16-18.

[49] Like the improved antiair operation, the addition of this new fire support phase was almost certainly accelerated if not inspired by NATO's focus on deep strikes against "the second echelon" of the Warsaw Pact as a solution to reducing the weight and momentum of the Pact offensive. Soviet military scientists noted this trend in NATO thinking at least as early as 1973. By August of that year, it had already been concluded that "in considering the increasing role of the reserves in achieving the aims of modern offensive operations, the NATO armies envisage the execution of measures to isolate the area of combat operations. In this an important place is assigned to the air forces which will attack crossings, bridges, railway stations, road junctions, troop columns, and enemy reserves in the concentration areas." Anticipating conventional technology that would be pursued a decade later, the same author noted that aside from aviation, conventionally armed missiles could also be utilized for neutralizing reserves. Colonel A. Poltavets, "Use of Support Echelons and Reserves in Offensive Operations," *V.M.*, no. 8, August 1973, in *Selected Readings*, Part II, p. 202.

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TMO-wide air and antiair operations is critical. Most, if not all, of the aviation assigned to the combined-arms fronts in a given theater of military operations must initially support the overall theater air and antiair plans. Since each front commander needs those same air, missile, and artillery assets to support his attacking armies, the theater commander would strive to release as much frontal aviation as possible back to the fronts early in the offensive.

Changes in the quality and quantity of fires called for in every phase of the Soviets' conventional fire support represent an even more direct move toward a real capability to execute offensive operations without nuclear strikes. The scope and extent of these changes are suggested by the fact that the Warsaw Pact has modified the term they apply to conventional fire support. Specifically, they have added the word "integrated" (*kompleksnoye*) to the concept of "fire destruction of the enemy."[50] The Soviet military is almost obsessed with the precision of military terminology, definitional accuracy, and the continuity and consistency of military concepts over time. Hence, the entire military establishment is extremely sensitive to the renaming of a concept that has remained virtually unchanged for decades. Therefore, it is certain that the word "integrated" is an educational "codeword"; its application to the term "fire destruction" reflects a serious effort at the highest levels to ensure that all fires are intensely and continuously coordinated to achieve maximum simultaneous destructive effect upon the enemy.

To appreciate the significance of Soviet efforts to "integrate" fires at every level, it is important to realize that, whereas in the West fire support was equated with artillery support, the Soviet concept of fire destruction by definition already included air-, missile-, and artillery-delivered fires as well as air defense and—at the tactical level—fire from tanks and antitank weapons.[51] If conventional fires alone were to carry the burden of supporting the advance of Warsaw Pact armies against NATO, the concept of well-coordinated, perfectly timed fire from aircraft, missiles, and artillery had to be translated into real capability. Hence, addition of the word "integrated" represented a much greater effort to bring all components of fire support together against the enemy in selected sectors with such intensity and simultaneity that the effect would differ little from that of a nuclear strike (*yadernyy udar*).

[50] The term "integrated fire destruction of the enemy" (*kompleksowie porazenie ogniowe przeciwnika*) has been used in the Polish military press in the manner described. See Musial, "Aviation Combat Operations on Behalf of Operational Maneuver Groups," pp. 12-13, and "The Role of Air Support in Protecting Landing Detachments," p. 12. The Soviets have described the same concept and have also applied the word *kompleksnoye* (integrated) to fire destruction in Portugalskiy and Vorshchov. (See note 48.)

[51] "Ognevoye porazheniye" [Fire destruction], *S.V.E.*, vol. 6, p. 11.

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In fact, in 1981, after much debate at the highest military levels, the Soviets adopted the term "fire strike" (*ognevoy udar*), using a word (*udar*) that had previously been used almost exclusively to describe nuclear fires.[52] Under the "integration" concept, the Soviets have been attempting to coordinate strikes from *all* types of fire support systems through improved command and control and better internalization of the combined-arms concept by officers of all arms and services. But beyond these conceptual and command-and-control improvements, Soviet planners have been taking definite steps to increase the volume and density of fire required to achieve the effect of "integrated fire destruction." This requires a tremendous amount of fire from fire support platforms that have greater range and mobility. Longer range allows for concentration of fires without concentration of the weapons that do the firing, and greater mobility ensures continuous, voluminous fire support to rapidly advancing maneuver forces, whether they are advancing to contact or exploiting deep in enemy territory.

Under the concept of "integrated fire destruction," the volume of fire to be used against sectors of NATO defenses selected for penetration is likely to be overwhelming. Warsaw Pact planners would expect 50-60 per cent destruction of all major enemy weapons systems (antitank weapons, tanks, and artillery) by the time the supported maneuver unit has begun the attack. More important, fire destruction must be sufficient to destroy the stability and recovery capability of the defense and to establish and maintain fire superiority over the enemy.[53] In recent revisionist discussions of World War II, Soviet generals have determined that divisions and army corps committed to early penetration had the support of as many as 18 to 20 heavy guns or mortars for every supported

[52] Even the chief of rocket troops and artillery, Marshal of Artillery G. Peredelskiy, initially opposed adoption of the term "fire strike," to describe increasingly more dense conventional fires, arguing instead for increases in the intensity of fire but retention of the old term *ognevoy nalet*, which literally means "fire raid" or "fire attack" but which is often translated into English as "fire strike," causing non-Russian readers to miss the point of the debates entirely. He published his argument in December 1980, but by the end of 1981 the term "fire strike" (*ognevoy udar*) was used without question in Soviet military articles about fire support. By January 1982, the effort to preserve the term *udar* for description of the effects of nuclear attack alone was openly and finally defeated when a doctor of military science, Major General I. Vorobyev, published an article in *Red Star* on military doctrine in which he explained that there are now three types of *udar*: nuclear, conventional fire, and troop (*udar voysk*, as mentioned earlier). The sequence of events clearly suggests that even an officer of the rank of marshal was openly overruled by the Soviet General Staff (Vorobyev is a professor at the General Staff academy in Moscow), which held a somewhat broader view of the changing character of modern warfare. Peredelskiy's argument was published in a "capper" article to an eighteen-month-long debate on fire support. See Marshal of Artillery, G. E. Peredelskiy, "O roli i meste artileriyskogo diviziona v boyu" [On the role and place of the artillery battalion in combat], *V.V.*, no. 12, 1980, pp. 62-74. Vorobyev's position is published in Vorobyev, "Weapons and Tactics: The Commander and Modern Combat," p. 2.

[53] Marshal of Artillery G. Peredelskiy, "O nepreryvnom ognerom porazhenii v sovremennom boyu" [On uninterrupted fire in modern combat], *V.V.*, no. 6, 1977, pp. 82-87; and Major General of Artillery G. Biryukov, "Nadezhnoye ognevoye porazheniye protivnika—osnova vysokikh tempov nastupleniya" [Reliable destruction of the enemy by fire—the basis for high rates of advance], *V.V.*, no. 5, 1977, pp. 78-80.

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maneuver battalion, and one self-propelled gun for every 3 to 4 tanks.[54] Up to 70 per cent of frontal aviation was dedicated to the destruction of enemy antitank guns and tanks in the sector where early penetration was to be achieved.[55] Translated into fire support systems for a modern, first-echelon Soviet tank division (16 maneuver battalions) on the main axis of attack of a Soviet front, the integrated fire destruction plan would call for at least 16 battalions of tube artillery and mortars (almost 300 tubes) and more than 2 regiments (about 80 aircraft) of fighter-bombers.[56] In addition, the modern division would also probably have the support of at least a battalion of multiple rocket launchers (18 launchers, 720 tubes), a battalion of surface-to-surface missiles with improved conventional munitions, and perhaps a regiment of attack helicopters. The concentration of such a mass of fire throughout the enemy's tactical depths in a sector sometimes narrower than 6 kilometers is likely to achieve the 60 per cent destruction norm required by Soviet doctrine.[57] Because potential antitank guided-missile (ATGM), tank, and artillery positions are to receive special attention within the sector, the combat effectiveness of unprotected ATGM and artillery crews is likely to be drastically reduced if not completely destroyed.

At the tactical level, the Soviets have tried to reduce the vulnerability of attacking armored fighting vehicles to NATO's increasingly more sophisticated ATGMs. In a pamphlet published in 1978 entitled *Overcoming Antitank Defenses*, the Soviet authors detailed the technical characteristics of NATO's ATGM inventory and methods of employment and prescribed "solutions" to the problem. The easiest solution, nuclear strikes, was mentioned first and required only a very brief discussion.[58] The remaining pages were given over to the much more complicated task of suppressing ATGM defenses without nuclear strikes. Predictably, the core of the solution involved improvements in the volume and responsiveness of conventional fire support, along with better tactical re-

[54] Colonel A. Tsynkalov, "Borba s protivotankovymi sredstvomi protivnika v tretem period voyny" [The battle against enemy antitank systems in the third period of the war], *Vizh.*, no. 7, 1979, pp. 22-23. These divisions (corps) were normally acting in the capacity of mobile groups, the World War II antecedent to the modern operational maneuver group.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Major Overton Day, *Soviet Divisional Organization Guide* (Unclassified), Defense Intelligence Report DDB-1100-333-82 (Washington: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1982), pp. 27, 80, 84. See, also, Army Field Manual FM-100-2-3, *Soviet Army Troops Organization and Equipment* (Draft), August 1982, p. 4-173.

[57] A division on such a mission would advance in prebattle or, if possibly, approach march formation headed by as few as two and possibly as many as four battalions. The width of the zone of advance is determined by the frontage or zone of advance of the lead battalions, which could vary between 1.5 and 2 kilometers. See Reznichenko, *Tactics*, pp. 266-72; and Sidorenko, *The Offensive*, p. 83. For fire support planning and firing norms see Hines and Hines, *Front Fire Support*, pp. 3, 77, 80-83.

[58] A. V. Tonkikh, *Preodoleniye protivotankovoy oborony* [Overcoming antitank defenses] (Moskva: Voyenizdat, 1978), pp. 89-91.

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connaissance and more extensive use of helicopters for fire support, observation, and reconnaissance.

Articles published later in tactical journals offered more specific operational and technical solutions. The single most significant solution was the adoption of a concept of "density of fire" (*plotnost ognya*).[59] In the absence of nuclear strikes, it was necessary to be able to destroy quickly mobile armored targets and ATGMs manned by personnel who could find shelter, then recover and still be effective. The old method of bombarding a target over a long period of time was no longer adequate. The number of rounds required for destruction would have to be fired in four minutes or less to have the instantaneous effect of a strike (*udar*). Therefore, simple qualified norms of rounds per type of target were supplemented with "density norms" that called for no less than 25-30 rounds per minute per hectare on most targets, and even greater densities on highly mobile targets.[60] To achieve these densities and the necessary "strike" effect, however, at least a battalion of artillery (18 tubes) would be required to fire missions previously fired by a single battery (6 tubes). As a result, this operational decision created a demand for at least triple the amount of artillery available to commanders of maneuver forces.[61]

In addition to changes in fire support, Warsaw Pact fronts and armies have also made major adjustments in how forces are to maneuver in order to achieve the same high rates of advance in a conventional offensive as with nuclear strikes. An offensive plan that does not rely on nuclear strikes but does seek to prevent NATO nuclear use cannot accept a slow advance. Warsaw Pact forces must move quickly enough to pre-empt NATO militarily by physically destroying as much of NATO's nuclear weaponry and associated command and control as possible. More important, the Pact must strive to pre-empt NATO politically by denying the alliance leadership sufficient time to agree on nuclear release at a point when nuclear strikes might shift the military balance enough to alter the outcome of the conflict. But, if Pact armies do not "blow through" NATO's defenses with nuclear weapons, how are they to get to the heart of NATO quickly? As impressive as the air operation and integrated fire destruction may be in terms of volume and density of fire, logistic constraints alone dictate that the Pact simply could not, with conventional

[59] Colonel E. V. Stroganov, "Ognevoy udar" [Fire strike], *V.V.*, no. 11, 1980, p. 68.

[60] This issue was discussed in ibid. and a previous study by the same author. See Colonel E. V. Stroganov, "Osnovnoye ognevoye podrazdeleniye artillerii [The basic firing unit of artillery], *V.V.*, no. 8, 1979, pp. 55-60.

[61] This whole issue of fire density and the need for more artillery was part of an educational debate summarized by the chief of rocket troops and artillery of the Soviet ground forces in December 1980. See Marshal of Artillery G. Peredelskiy, "On the Role and Place of the Artillery Battalion in Combat," p. 63. For a discussion of the debate and a translation and portrayal in English of the principal contributing studies see Hines and Hines, *Front Fire Support*, pp. 82-92.

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weapons alone, create enough holes of adequate depth and width in NATO's defenses to duplicate the effect of widespread use of nuclear strikes. Hence, fire support improvements alone could not provide for an adequate rate of advance.

The essence of the maneuver adjustment the Warsaw Pact has made to solve this problem is as simple in concept as it must be difficult in execution. Since the main body of the attacking force (front, army, and division) cannot penetrate enemy defenses in time to destroy the nuclear weapons that would threaten its survival, it would instead "insert" into NATO's depths a relatively small part of its main force. This smaller force, which we will call the "advanced raid element,"[62] would be so well endowed in terms of leadership, training, firepower, and mobility that, once "inserted," it could rapidly fan out like a barbed spear in the body of NATO's defenses, cutting through nerves and destroying coordination, thereby facilitating rapid advance by the main attacking force that follows. Specifically, even though it would be under unified control, this raid element would break down into smaller units and quickly move out in several directions at once to accomplish preplanned tasks: destroy NATO air and nuclear capability; destroy and disrupt command, control, and logistics; and seize river crossing sites and other terrain needed to facilitate rapid advance of the main body.[63] Accomplishment of these tasks would serve the larger mission of shifting the focus of battle by turning NATO's attention to numerous small but critical battles and reconstitution efforts deep in NATO territory and away from Pact forces attacking from the east.[64] Several such advanced raid elements inserted ahead of attacking Pact armies along the line of advance would open several corridors, or at least create major soft spots, in NATO's defenses, which the main attacking forces could rapidly exploit.

[62] In Western usage, the term "raid" conjures up an image of a small "hit and run" squad covertly inserted behind enemy lines and then "extracted" immediately after mission completion. The Soviet raid (*reyd*) differs markedly from this concept. The Soviet raiding force would not normally be smaller than a battalion and could be as large as an army. It would move over a preplanned route toward preplanned objectives and would not normally return to friendly lines. "Friendly lines" are instead expected to catch up with the raiding element. As in the Western concept, however, the raiding element is to avoid decisive engagement with large enemy forces. For the basic definition see *"Reyd"* [Raid], *S.V.E.*, vol. 7, p. 94.

[63] The best summary of these missions can be found in Major Michalak, "Aviation in the Raid-Maneuver Operations of Ground Forces," p. 5. See, also, "Peredovoy otryad" [Forward detachment], *S.V.E.*, vol. 6, p. 282.

[64] Discussion of this mission and its component parts may be found in Colonel Jan Lachiewicz and Lieutenant Colonel Ryszard Rajmanski, "Potrzeby wojsk ladowych w zakresie rozpoznania i wsparcia ogniowego przez smiglowce w dzialaniach nocnych" [Helicopter reconnaissance and fire support of ground forces requirements in night operations], *Polish Air Review*, no. 6, 1981, p. 21; Marshal of Tank Forces O. A. Losik, "Sposoby vedeniya vysokomanevrennykh deystviy bronetankovymi i mekhanizirovannymi voyskami po opyty belorusskoy i vislo-oderskoy operatsiy" [Methods of conducting high-maneuver combat operations with tank and mechanized troops according to the experience of the Byelorussian and Vistula-Oder operations], *Vizh.*, no. 9, 1980, p. 25; and Krupchenko, "Methods of Exploitation," p. 12.

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Because such a raid element acting on behalf of a front would probably be larger than a tank division, the question of how these forces would be "inserted" into NATO territory is central to the feasibility of the concept and is the basis for skepticism among some Western analysts. Basically, the raid may go around, over, or through NATO's defenses. Because the raid mission begins in the depths of NATO's defenses, the Soviet commander would seek to avoid spending combat power on the penetration of those defenses. The preferred method of penetration would be to maneuver around enemy forces. If possible, the raid would begin at night[65] along at least two separate routes of advance to confuse the enemy, to reduce its own vulnerability to nuclear and air strikes, and to minimize the time required to pass the entire body of the raiding force through the densest portion of NATO's forward defenses.[66] On a coastal axis, at least part of the raid element might advance by sea.

The second best route would be over NATO defenders. This method has clear limitations, however: the restricted amount of combat power that can be lifted at any one time, and the requirement to defend the force from air attack during the lift and assault phases of insertion. Despite these drawbacks, the Soviets see enough advantages to vertical envelopment (*okhvat sverkhu*) to include a heliborne air assault unit of some kind in the raid element. The air assault component gives the raid force an internal strike component for use against difficult pockets of resistance and for vertical assaults on airfields, nuclear facilities, and command-and-control sites in NATO's rear area.[67] Moreover, the raid element is likely to act in coordination with larger scale airborne operations initiated by the larger formation to which both the airborne and raiding forces are subordinated. For example, a front operation plan may call for an airborne regiment to seize two or three crossing sites over a major

[65] Colonel P. Konoplya, "V otryve ot glavnykh Sil" [Separated from the main forces], *V.V.*, no. 10, 1982, p. 46. Night operations in general are receiving a great deal of emphasis in the Soviet military press. Soviet military scientists appear to believe that darkness will help the attacker in offensive operations, especially in operations by mobile groups/OMGs. Lieutenant General Reznichenko has written that "wide use of mobile groups and forward and special detachments for the conduct of night operations in the enemy's rear areas was an important trend in perfecting methods of conducting the offensive." V. Reznichenko, "Razvitiye taktiki nastvpatelnoyo boya" [The development of tactics of offensive combat], *Vizh.*, no. 12, 1981, p. 37. His attitude is also reflected in the Polish press: "It is believed that night creates conditions which favor penetration of enemy dispositions by the army-level operational maneuver group." Lachiewicz and Rajmanski, "Helicopter Reconnaissance and Fire Support of Ground Forces Requirements in Night Operations," p. 20. Night infiltration of the front-subordinated OMG is less likely to be possible or necessary.

[66] See Krupchenko, "Methods of Exploitation," p. 17. See, also, Marshal of Tank Forces O. A. Losik, *Stroitelstvo i boyevoye primeneniye sovetskikh tankovykh voysk v gody velikoy otechestvennoy voyny [Development and combat employment of Soviet tank forces in the years of the great patriotic war] (Moskva: Voyenizdat, 1979), p. 142.*

[67] Major Wojciech Michalak, "Lotnictwo w dzialaniach rajdowo-manewrowych wojsk ladowych" [Aviation in raid maneuver operations of ground forces], *Polish Air Review*, no. 2, 1982, p. 8.

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water obstacle, and the raid force for that same front would be required to link up with the airborne forces within twenty-four to forty-eight hours.[68] The goal of the entire effort is to pave the way for the rapid, unobstructed advance of the front itself, even without nuclear support.

The least favored but most common route would be through enemy defenses. This method requires further examination. First of all, the raid force would not normally attempt to "make its own hole" through prepared NATO defenses for the same reason it would try to avoid NATO defenses altogether. First-echelon units would seek to create a penetration corridor for the raid element as quickly as possible.[69] However, because of the great importance of this element to the combined-arms commander of the division, army, or front from which it would be detached, the commander would devote much, if not most, of his resources to getting the raid element through NATO's defenses as quickly as possible. Specifically, the intense fires called for by the "integrated fire destruction" plan would certainly be applied to any sector of NATO's defense where a raid element seeks to penetrate.[70] The tremendous expenditure of ordnance required for "integrated fire destruction" would be easy to justify if it speeded the advance of the raid element.

The Warsaw Pact calls a battalion or regiment carrying out the raid mission for a division a "forward detachment" (*peredovoy otryad*), and more recently a tactical "raiding detachment" (*reydovoy*

[68] See Oliynik, "High Mastery of the Airborne Troops," p. 2. For a more complete discussion see note 89 in Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Hines, *The Soviet Conventional Offensive In Europe* (Unclassified), Defense Intelligence Report DDB-2622-4-83 (Washington: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1983).

[69] Colonel Musial explains that "they [operational maneuver groups] are usually committed to battle after the enemy defenses have been penetrated as conditions arise for the conduct of maneuver operations on selected sectors where the enemy does not have extensive forces available." Musial, "Aviation Combat Operations on Behalf of Operational Maneuver Groups," p. 9. It is clear from an earlier article by Lachiewicz and Rajmanski that the army-subordinated OMG will not necessarily wait for forcible penetration of the enemy's defenses by the first echelon. The authors are clearly describing infiltration of enemy defenses that are essentially still intact in the following passage: "Penetration by the army operational maneuver group into the depths of the enemy formation is generally difficult under both daytime and nighttime conditions, especially in the tactical zone, because it is there that the greatest density of troops, weapons, and transport exists. The army's OMG, seeking to penetrate into the depth of the enemy formation at night, will be forced to bypass major enemy groupings, avoid engaging in combat against them, avoid marching along main roads and utilize during the penetration field tracks and roads that are used less frequently by the enemy. At night it is more difficult to identify where the OMG is located and its direction of march, and it is not easy to organize countermeasures to destroy it. Therefore, it is considered that night provides favorable conditions for penetration by the army-level OMG into the depth of the enemy grouping." Lachiewicz and Rajmanski, "Helicopter Reconnaissance and Fire Support of Ground Forces Requirements in Night Operations," p. 20. Numerous Soviet sources mention commitment of the mobile group on the first or second day of the offensive. See, for example, "podvizhnaya gruppa" [Mobile group], *S.V.E.*, vol. 7, p. 373. Soviet General Krupchenko explains that unlike the second echelon, the World War II mobile group was "introduced at the beginning of an operation." Krupchenko, "Methods of Exploitation," p. 12.

[70] Musial, "Aviation Combat Operations on Behalf of Operational Maneuver Groups," pp. 12-13.

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otryad).[71] They call a division or corps acting on behalf of an army or front an "operational maneuver group" (*operativnaya manevrennaya gruppa*, or *OMG*).[72] The raiding detachment and OMG have deep conceptual roots in Soviet military strategy and, in that sense, are not new. The forward detachment has been around since the 1930s, if not earlier, and the OMG is a reincarnation of the mobile group (*podvizhnaya gruppa*), which has also existed in Soviet strategy in various forms since the 1930s. Both types of combat formation, especially the mobile group, however, fell into disuse with the introduction of nuclear weapons in the late 1950s, at which time the Soviets assumed early nuclear use by both sides. If nuclear strikes were to be used early to destroy NATO's most threatening weapons systems and to "make the holes" needed for exploitation by tank forces, special raiding elements designed to help achieve those objectives were largely unnecessary.

Moreover, when the Soviets used the mobile group extensively (in the Second World War), it differed from other forces by virtue of being motorized at a time when most Soviet troops were still walking. By the early 1960s, when virtually all Soviet ground forces were motorized, the mobility of the mobile group was no longer a distinguishing characteristic and the term was dropped from usage.[73]

However, by the mid to late 1970s, tactical raiding detachments once more received considerable attention, leading to a somewhat sensationalized, but not entirely unjustified, discussion of "daring thrust" tactics and a "tactical revolution" in Soviet military affairs.[74] By the late

[71] See "*peredovoy otryad*" [forward detachment], *S.V.E.*, vol. 6, p. 282. An excellent discussion of the tactical separate raiding detachment may be found in two articles by a Polish military scientist, Lieutenant Colonel Ryszard Konopka, "Wprowadsenie oddzialu wydzielonego do walki" [Introduction of the separate detachment into battle], *Przeglad wojsk ladowych* [Review of ground forces—hereafter, *Polish Ground Review*], no. 5, 1982, pp. 21-24, and "Wspoldzialanie rzutv ladowego oddzialu wydzielonego z rzutem powietrznym" [Joint action of the ground and air components of the separate detachment], *Polish Ground Review*, no. 6, 1982, pp. 29-33. More recent Soviet articles have used the term "raiding detachment," although the terms "special" and "enveloping" are still applied. See Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Chumakov, "Stremitelnost i nepreryvnost nastupleniya" [The speed and continuity of the offensive], *V.V.*, no. 1, 1983, p. 26.

[72] The Soviets continue to refer to the operational-sized raiding force by its historical predecessor, the "mobile group" (*podvizhnaya gruppa*), even though Polish military writers have clearly stated that the "new" operational concept is called the "operational maneuver group" and that this modern concept "derives its origin from the so-called mobile group (*gruppa szybka* in Polish) . . . widely applied by the Soviet army in the Second World War." Michalak, "Aviation in Raid-Maneuver Operations of Ground Forces," p. 5. See, also, corrections to this article later published in *Polish Air Review*, no. 5, 1982, p. 88. It is clear from the Polish literature that the OMG is Soviet, not Polish, in its origin. For a more extensive discussion of the evidence that supports this statement see note 56 in Petersen and Hines, *The Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe*, pp. 34, 35. The raiding detachment would normally be a *podrazdeleniye* or subunit from battalion to regiment in size. The analysis and evidence that supports our conclusions concerning the much larger size of the OMG is explained in considerable detail in note 58 in ibid., pp. 35-36.

[73] "Mobile Group," *S.V.E.*, p. 373.

[74] See Philip A. Karber, "The Soviet Anti-Tank Debate," *Survival*, May-June 1976, pp. 103-11, and "The Tactical Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine," *Military Intelligence*, October-December 1977, pp. 7-12.

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1970s the Soviet military press began to carry enthusiastic discussions about the relevance of the old mobile group "in contemporary conditions."[75] Because the accounts of how it was employed during World War II were selective, however, the mobile group came to be portrayed as an oversized forward raiding detachment rather than as a motorized second-echelon exploitation force—the role it normally played during the war.

In May 1981, the Polish military press first revealed the contemporary name of this mutant mobile group in an article about helicopter support to the "operational maneuver group" (*operacyjne grupy manowrowe*).[76] That we first learned of the OMG in conjunction with its helicopter support was especially helpful. Use of the helicopter for command and control, reconnaissance, fire support, and rapid movement of the air assault component of the group gave the OMG a mobility edge over other forces required to "break away" from the main body and "raid" in the depths of the enemy's defenses.[77] Hence, through the application of modern technology the Soviets recaptured the mobility differential that characterized the old mobile group and applied it to a somewhat different end—pre-emptive raiding in the enemy's rear area rather than subsequent exploitation of first-echelon success. Thus, even though present Soviet emphasis on tactical and operational scale raiding does not represent a new or revolutionary concept, it does update an old concept with the newest military technology to help solve an important contemporary problem—how to improve Soviet chances for rapid conventional success against a nuclear-armed enemy.

Structural Changes

In themselves, operational changes in fire and maneuver that better support conventional offensive operations would lack meaning if the structure of the force did not change to meet the new operational demands. The structural refinements the Soviets have made to support the new operational concepts are too numerous to list completely, much less discuss in any detail. However, a few of the most significant developments must be mentioned.

The air operation must pre-emptively establish fire superiority in the TMO. Execution of the operation, however, requires frontal aviation

[75] The number of articles on the mobile group in the *Soviet Military Historical Journal* have at least tripled since 1977. More important, the "relevance statements" have become so strong that the pretense that the concept is no longer current in any form has become a ludicrous charade.

[76] Lachiewicz and Rajmanski, "Helicopter Reconnaissance and Fire Support of Ground Forces Requirements in Night Operations," p. 20.

[77] Ibid. See, also, Konoplya, "Separated from the Main Forces," p. 49.

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to achieve two basic missions in the first several days of the war: suppression of NATO's air and nuclear assets; and aerial fire support of the troops. In order to meet the increasing demands of the air operation and still provide close support to maneuver forces, the Soviets have refined the structure of the air forces.

Specifically, in order to free fixed-wing frontal aviation to participate in deep attacks in a theater of operations, the Soviets resurrected the concept of army aviation.[78] At army level, there is now an attack helicopter regiment, and each division has a squadron of 18 helicopters.[79] In addition to helicopters subordinated at the front, army, and division levels, the new ground attack Su-25/Frogfoot might be subordinated to army aviation. With helicopters and the Su-25 providing the requisite aerial fire support for maneuver forces, frontal aviation can be allocated to support an air operation in which aircraft held in reserve by the Supreme High Command provide "shock action."

The notion of aviation reserves of the Supreme High Command has received increased attention in recent Soviet historical writings. As noted in an October 1980 Soviet article, "the role of the aviation reserve as proven by the experience of the past will rise further in a future war."[80] Historically, these reserves have consisted of fighters (MiG-23), fighter-bombers (MiG-27), tactical bombers (Su-24), and bombers (Backfire).[81] Such reserves, apparently organized into air armies,[82] make it possible to maneuver aviation broadly, to create powerful aviation groupings quickly in the main TMO, and to alter the ratio of forces sharply in favor of Soviet aviation. The structuring of such strategic aviation assets, along with the reorganization of air defense forces, significantly enhances Soviet flexibility in air power.

The new air and air defense structure provides the Soviets with a peacetime organization that closely approximates their anticipated wartime structure. Each command echelon, from the division at the tactical level to the High Command in the TMO, has its own aviation assets. Through centralized control at the level conducting the mission, operational flexibility and coordination is enhanced. In addition, the air defense mission of frontal aviation can be supplemented by subordinating some fighter-interceptors to the front commander. Such flexibility between as-

[78] "Armeyskaya aviatsiya" [Army aviation], *Voyenno-entsiklopedicheskiy slovar* [Military encyclopedic dictionary] (Moskva: Voyenizdat, 1982), p. 43.

[79] Army Field Manual FM-100-2-3, pp. 4-162, 4-173, and 4-174.

[80] Colonel General N. Dagayev and Colonel V. Chernetskiy, "Trends in the Development of the Organizational Forms of Frontal and Long-Range Aviation During the Great Patriotic War," *Vizh.*, no. 10, October 1980, as translated in *USSR Report: Military Affairs*, No. 1557 (JPRS no. 77187), January 16, 1981, p. 75.

[81] E. Simakov, "Sovershenstvovanie organizationnoy struktury Voyenno-Vozdushnykh Sil" [Perfection of the organization and structure of the air forces], *Vizh.*, no. 9, 1978, p. 30.

[82] Musial, "The Character and Importance of Air Operations in Modern Warfare," p. 12.

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sets participating in offensive and defensive activities is another dimension of the reorganization.

The antiair operation must protect Warsaw Pact conventional and nuclear forces from NATO air power to ensure their survivability throughout prolonged conventional operations. To streamline the air defense effort, Air Defense of the Ground Forces (*PVO sukhoputnikh voysk*), which controlled the tactical surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and the National Air Defense (*PVO strany*), which controlled fighter-interceptors and strategic SAMs, were consolidated into a single command called Air Defense Forces (*voyska PVO*).[83] Battlefield coordination of all air defense assets required to execute the antiair operation should benefit from the consolidation.

Airborne and air assault operations now comprise a major part of the "maneuver solution" of the nuclear problem in a conventional offensive at the theater and front levels as well as within the combat organization of the OMG. Since the mid 1970s the Soviets have more than tripled the mobility and tank-killing capability of their seven airborne divisions by equipping all three regiments of each division with infantry fighting vehicles.[84] In effect, once landed, airborne units are now capable of functioning as motorized rifle or light armored units in the NATO rear area. In addition, to support the OMG and tactical raiding detachments, the Soviets have formed air assault brigades at front level capable of both air mobile and airborne operations.[85]

Concurrently, the Soviets have been expanding their capability to lift and support airborne forces. Soviet Military Transport Aviation (MTA) has over 600 medium- and long-range cargo transports. MTA is already equipped with more than 150 of the IL-76/Candid long-range jet transports. The Candid has twice the payload capacity and five times the radius/range of the turboprop An-12/Cub, which it is replacing. It is also noteworthy, perhaps, that most Soviet air transport units are based in the western Soviet Union.[86]

New fire density norms, integrated fire destruction, and even the air operation all require tremendous increases in the volume of rocket and artillery fire available to commanders at every level. Moreover, the OMG and the tactical raiding detachment require more mobile and responsive fire support in the form of self-propelled artillery and attack helicopters. Since 1978, Soviet tank divisions have been reorganized to include the addition of a self-propelled artillery battalion to every tank

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[83] *Soviet Military Power* (Washington: GPO, March 1983), p. 43.
[84] Brusstar, *The Soviet Airborne Forces*, pp. 4-5.
[85] *Soviet Military Power*, 1983, pp. 40-42.
[86] *Soviet Military Power* (Washington: GPO, 1981), pp. 35-36; and "The Military Balance 1982/83," *Air Force Magazine*, December 1982, p. 70.

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regiment (whereas the tank regiment previously had no organic artillery).[87] At the army level, artillery regiments have expanded to brigades involving an increase of 30 to 80 per cent over their previous strength.[88] At the front level, the addition of a long range (21-24 miles) weapon such as the 16-tube, 220-mm (almost 9 inches) BM-27 has given the front commander an area suppression weapon with the reach required to support OMG and air assault operations.[89] In the TMO, the commander would now have available heavy brigades of self-propelled 203-mm howitzers and 240-mm mortars.[90] Warsaw Pact attack helicopters have doubled in number from 400 to 800 in the region opposite NATO since 1978.[91] Clearly, the Soviets have been building and deploying the fire support weapons required to substitute voluminous conventional fires for nuclear strikes and provide mobile support platforms for pre-emptive raid forces.

This summary indicates that the Soviets have already done a great deal to expand and adjust the structure of their armed forces to accommodate operational concepts that support the conventional offensive. In fact, the extent of these structural changes strongly suggests that this latest phase in the evolution of Soviet strategy is already quite mature. In Soviet thinking, force structure changes are essentially the last stage of any new phase in the force development cycle. The early conceptual stage of this most recent phase took form at least as early as the beginning of the 1970s. By 1978, the Soviets had already begun to implement force structure changes, and the time required to develop, test, and field new weapons and weapon support (C^3I) systems is seven to ten years. This analysis confirms the statements by senior Soviet military scientists cited earlier which indicate that these changes did not simply happen, but have been self-consciously directed toward a specific goal.

Nuclear Insurance—Refining the Response

No matter how extensive and powerful the Warsaw Pact's conventional pre-emption of NATO's nuclear capability might be, Soviet military planners could never be assured that they could prevent NATO nuclear use. However, they might succeed in achieving a long conventional phase, which would in turn pose special problems and opportunities.

The first problem was the reduced likelihood that theater- and tactical-nuclear weapons would survive an extended conventional phase.

[87] David C. Jones, *United States Military Posture for FY 1982* (Washington: GPO, 1981), p. 104.
[88] *Soviet Military Power*, 1983, p. 40.
[89] Hines and Hines, *Front Fire Support*, p. 104.
[90] Jones, *U.S. Military Posture for FY 1982*, p. 103.
[91] *Soviet Military Power*, 1983, pp. 40, 41.

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Second, tactical and operational nuclear missiles were perhaps too cumbersome to accompany high-speed raiding forces such as the OMG. Also, these missiles might have warheads of too great a yield to be readily usable once NATO and Warsaw Pact forces were deeply interpenetrated in the advanced stages of a conventional war. Finally, even if a conventional offensive did succeed in destroying much of NATO's nuclear and conventional combat capability deployed in-theater, NATO might still attempt to escalate to nuclear war using surviving theater or tactical weapons. In such an extreme case the Soviets would be especially anxious to dominate the escalation process at a level of intensity less likely to provoke U.S. retaliation with global systems. This would require weapons sufficiently powerful to destroy the remaining military target set but not so powerful as to be considered indiscriminate and escalatory (if used in response to a NATO first strike) by U.S. decisionmakers.

Conversely, solutions to these problems would present great opportunities to the Pact. The most important solution, improved nuclear systems survivability, could put the Soviets in captured NATO territory late in their offensive, still armed with a large tactical nuclear arsenal, against an alliance disarmed of most of its weapons and reluctant to use surviving weapons on their own territory. Development of more accurate (smaller but more numerous) nuclear weapons systems would enable the Pact to achieve escalation dominance rather cheaply if NATO did not have—or had lost—the capability to challenge such a tactical nuclear capability. A threat by NATO to use global nuclear systems against battlefield targets or against the Soviet Union itself might not be credible at that point in the conflict.

Once again we see the Soviets building and deploying the capability to solve problems and take advantage of opportunities. A look at more recent developments in deployed weapons systems is revealing.

At the theater level, the Soviets have been replacing their old fixed-site Eurostrategic missiles, the SS-4 and SS-5, with mobile, hence much more survivable, SS-20s. The SS-20 is much more likely than the SS-4 and SS-5 to survive a prolonged conventional phase and still be available to pre-empt any NATO use of its surviving nuclear weapons.[92] The SS-20 deployment constitutes a nuclear insurance policy for the conventional offensive in Europe.

At the operational and tactical levels, the Soviets are replacing the old Scaleboard, Scud, and Frog missiles with the SS-22, SS-23, and SS-21, respectively. The two major characteristics that differentiate the new systems from the old are greater range and improved accuracy.[93]

[92] Ibid., pp. 36, 37.
[93] Ibid., pp. 36, 38.

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Because of the missiles' greater range, commanders can keep them in areas farther behind the forward edge of the battle area and still use them to support or cover maneuver forces such as the OMG as they advance deep into NATO territory. At the same time, improved accuracy would enable Pact commanders to use smaller yield nuclear warheads to achieve the same destructive effect as would be possible only with larger yield warheads on the older, less accurate missiles. As a result, these new missiles could be more readily used in support of Pact forces already interpenetrated with NATO.

Finally and most recently, we have even seen significant changes at the tactical maneuver unit level. In an article published in the July 1982 tactical journal *Military Herald*, the Soviet author discussed a nuclear strike against a target as small as an "enemy" company strong point less than 600 meters in diameter.[94] Artillery was the only weapon system shown in the diagram that accompanied the article. Considered in conjunction with the precision of the planned nuclear strike, this fact strongly suggested that the Soviets were training their lower-ranking artillery officers in the use of dual-capable (conventional and nuclear) weapons. In January and February of 1983, a series of articles in the same journal dealt explicitly with the need for tactical maneuver commanders (regiment, battalion, and even company) to be able to maintain a high rate of advance by fully exploiting both conventional and nuclear strikes.[95] Finally, the March 1983 edition of the Defense Department publication, *Soviet Military Power,* revealed that the Soviets were, in fact, deploying dual-capable artillery in the forward area.[96]

Dual-capable artillery solves many of the problems generated by a serious commitment to a conventional offensive. First of all, self-propelled nuclear capable artillery would provide the maneuver commander with the responsive, accurate, short- and medium-range nuclear strike capability he would need if he were suddenly to find himself in a nuclear war after opposing forces had already become thoroughly interspersed in a prolonged conventional phase. Because he must bring artillery with him for conventional operations, the commander would also have with him his own nuclear support without having to burden his maneuver unit with large, cumbersome missile systems. Moreover, through deployment of dual-capable artillery, the Warsaw Pact has greatly enhanced the survivability of their nuclear capability at the tactical level by greatly

[94] Colonel I. Kireyev, "B vzaimodeystivii c artilleriey" [In coordination with artillery], *V.V.*, no. 7, 1982, pp. 9-11.

[95] Chumakov, "The Swiftness and Continuity of the Offensive," *V.V.*, no. 1, pp. 22-26. In February, March, and April a series of articles was published in "response" to the Chumakov lead article. See *V.V.*, no. 2, 1983, pp. 20-37; no. 3, pp. 33-37; and no. 4, pp. 22-28.

[96] *Soviet Military Power*, 1983, p. 40.

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increasing the number of mobile nuclear systems and dispersing them throughout the force. As a result, at least some tactical nuclear capability would probably survive even an extended conventional offensive. Finally, nuclear-capable artillery reinforces the Soviet goal of escalation dominance at the lowest level of nuclear conflict. Even nuclear artillery could fulfill this need in the TMO if most of NATO's larger systems have already been destroyed by conventional weapons.

The Soviets have invested heavily in their nuclear insurance, with impressive results. They now have a large inventory of nuclear systems that give Soviet political and military leaders a wide range of potential responses to attempted nuclear use by NATO. Moreover, many of the new systems are likely to survive several weeks of conventional war and still allow Soviet leaders to choose the level of nuclear response required to dominate escalation without precipitating a global nuclear exchange with the United States.

It is ironic that some Western analysts have interpreted recent Soviet discussions of nuclear use by small tactical units to mean a comforting return to their old nuclear ways. The introduction of nuclear artillery has reinforced this long-standing misperception of Soviet preferences. Only a superficial analysis driven by unexamined preconceptions and expectations has led to such an erroneous conclusion. The analysis is not only wrong, it is harmful. It constitutes a simplistic nuclear diversion for Western decisionmakers, who are already reluctant to deal with the much greater danger of a Warsaw Pact conventional offensive that would place the burden of escalation on the NATO alliance—a conventional offensive backed up by the most impressive array of survivable nuclear weapons the Soviets have ever possessed.

The Soviets are not simply doing more of the same in service of some peculiarly communist penchant for nuclear war, as some analysts would lead us to believe. Instead, the Soviets are building more of the kind of nuclear weapons that best support an offensive strategy adjusted to reflect new objective conditions, a strategy aimed at the political and military weaknesses of the NATO alliance. Western leaders must be prepared to deal with the paradox that the Soviet Union is deploying more usable, more survivable nuclear weapons in a strategy that seeks conventional victory or, if necessary, victory requiring delayed nuclear use.

How the Soviets Would Put It All Together—The Strategic Offensive

In the preceding discussion, we have examined the various operational and structural "pieces" of Soviet theater strategy in order to

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explain how it has evolved. While such piecemeal analysis may sometimes be necessary, it is also misleading. Perhaps the single most noteworthy characteristic of Soviet military thought is the comprehensiveness with which it deals with the subject of war. This is attributable, in part, to the Soviets' monistic ideology, which seeks to explain in detail every aspect of human behavior. But it also has operational significance, for the Soviets "put things together" in the strategic offensive operation with a conceptual and definitional comprehensiveness that is difficult for Westerners to appreciate. More significant is the possibility that, because the structural unity of Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces reflects the conceptual unity of their doctrine and ideology, the Warsaw Pact may be able to duplicate in the execution of war the all-encompassing intensity with which they think about it. To help the reader to appreciate the totality of the Soviet concept of how to fight a theater war, we provide a brief description of the Soviet concept of the strategic offensive.

First of all, Soviet military planners define objectives and allocate forces on a regional basis. These regions, large, geographically defined areas used for the planning of combat operations, are called theaters of military operations. The Soviets envision combat operations against NATO taking place in the northwestern, western, and southwestern continental TMOs, and in the Arctic and Atlantic Ocean TMOs. The western TMO, which includes the NATO central region plus Denmark and the Danish Straits, is considered by the Warsaw Pact to be the main TMO.[97]

By Soviet definition, the strategic offensive operation in a continental TMO would include all or some combination of six different types of operations, each of which would itself be joint or combined-arms in character. These six would include: the air, antiair, front, airborne, amphibious, and naval operations. All or a selected combination of these operations would be prepared and carried out in accordance with a single plan under direction of the High Command within the TMO. The strategic offensive operation could also include missile- and air-delivered nuclear strikes although, by Warsaw Pact definition, air-delivered nuclear strikes would be part of the nuclear strike plan, not of an air operation. Whether or not all or any combination of these operations would be executed would depend on the actual battlefield environment, particularly upon whether and how soon nuclear weapons were used. The particular selection and subsequent repetition of the various operations would also be determined by the developing military and political situation.[98]

[97] Musial, "The Character and Importance of Air Operations in Modern Warfare," pp. 12-13.

[98] Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of the General Staff N. V. Ogarkov, "Strategiya voyennaya" [Military strategy], *S.V.E.*, vol. 7, p. 564.

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In the Soviet view, the successful execution of a short conventional war would require a high-speed offensive operation. Deep penetration of NATO's defense in the first days of the war would paralyze NATO politically. To launch the air operation before offensive operations on the ground would pre-emptively neutralize NATO aircraft, nuclear capability, and command and control throughout the depth of the TMO. Within hours, leading echelons of the Warsaw Pact would exert pressure across the entire front of the theater of operations. Combined-arms and tank formations would advance in dispersed march formations and on multiple axes to engage deployed or deploying NATO forces. By that means, the Soviets would hope to conceal the location of their main effort and thereby delay or prevent NATO's lateral redeployment to the most threatened axes. Once weak sectors were identified, the Soviets would hope to quickly penetrate NATO forward defenses and send raiding detachments and division-sized operational maneuver groups into the rear area to destroy nuclear weapons, to disrupt command and control, and to seize critical terrain to speed the advance of the main force. Attacking Soviet forces would quickly seize or destroy critical military and political objectives through a combination of integrated fire strikes and deep raid maneuvers executed in close coordination with airborne, heliborne, and — when possible — amphibious assault landings. From the outset of the offensive, NATO forces would have to fight in two directions, front and rear. Warsaw Pact penetrations would have to be of sufficient number, force, and speed to seriously disrupt NATO C^3 and logistics and could inhibit re-establishment of an organized defense. As early in the offensive as possible, advancing fronts would send large corps-sized OMGs into the depths of the theater of military operations, far ahead of the main forces, to destroy surviving weapons and command-and-control centers, and to seize major river crossing sites to expedite the advance into the operational-strategic core of NATO's defenses. Through early destruction or seizure of objectives deep in NATO territory, and the rapid fragmentation of NATO's forward defense on a broad front, the Soviets would seek to make the NATO allies see that continued resistance or nuclear escalation would be futile. Throughout the offensive, the antiair operation would bring to bear ground- and air-based air defense systems to protect aircraft and missile systems, advancing maneuver forces, and Pact nuclear weapons systems that would ensure the viability of a nuclear operation should NATO attempt nuclear use or should conventional operations fail. As NATO forces turned their attention to defense in the depths of their own territory, Warsaw Pact follow-on forces would exploit to the depth of the theater of operations to ensure a rapid conclusion to the war.

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As noted earlier, Warsaw Pact planning assumes that NATO will attempt to use nuclear weapons early. Therefore, attacking forces would attempt to maintain the dispersion required under nuclear conditions; each level of command would maintain a nuclear strike plan against the same target set attacked under their respective conventional fire plans. Should the Soviets fail to neutralize NATO nuclear capabilities or find themselves confronted with a NATO decision to conduct a nuclear strike, the Soviets would probably attempt to pre-empt with a nuclear strike of their own. Although Moscow might be willing to accept some limited battlefield use of nuclear weapons by NATO without responding in kind, absorption of nuclear strikes without response would probably not extend to strikes that would prevent a Soviet victory or nuclear strikes against the Soviet homeland itself.

A mass Soviet nuclear strike would be achieved by staging a TMO-wide nuclear strike against NATO's remaining air and nuclear assets. An initial theater mass nuclear strike would probably be followed by subsequent strikes to prevent NATO from reconstituting its nuclear strike forces and command-and-control systems and to support Soviet maneuver forces.[99] Within the framework of nuclear use, rocket and missile forces would be used principally to destroy main fixed sites such as airfields, while the air forces would be directed primarily against mobile targets.

If nuclear weapons were used, all elements of advancing armies and fronts would be potential exploitation forces. In most cases, the Soviets would still divide major operational formations into OMG, first echelon, and reserves (or second echelon), in order to bring fresh forces to bear against the enemy and maintain the high rate of advance they would anticipate under nuclear conditions. It is noteworthy that, although the OMG was apparently developed primarily to maintain the tempo of advance in conventional offensive operations, it is especially well suited for exploitation of nuclear strikes. In fact, the introduction of nuclear artillery into Soviet maneuver forces should provide the OMG itself with considerable nuclear firepower in the event of transition to nuclear operations. Nuclear strikes by the OMG could be especially effective if the maneuver group has already penetrated deep into NATO territory during conventional operations.

[99] Evidence of Soviet plans for nuclear warfighting can be found in a Soviet text which states that ballistic missile "combat actions are represented as a series of conservative strikes, as a result of which both sides suffer losses. The losses may be partially recovered by means of reserves and undamaged missile sites are re-equipped during the course of combat." V. I. Varfolomeyev and M. I. Kopytov, *Design and Testing of Ballistic Missiles*, JPRS-51810, November 19, 1970, p. 318.

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Would They Do It? Could They Do It?

This picture of a Warsaw Pact attack across Europe instills a mixture of anger, despair, and denial in the minds of most Western readers. Let us emphasize, however, that this is how the Warsaw Pact would hope to achieve victory in the event that a crisis were out of control and they were convinced that war was inevitable. Despite the planning and resources the Soviets have devoted to the conventional strategic offensive concept, they are hardly sanguine about their ability to prevent NATO nuclear use. The Pact is not poised in the starting blocks waiting for the proper moment of NATO weakness to launch itself across Europe. For whatever gruesome comfort it might offer, the Soviets would much prefer to establish "peace" on the European continent without resorting to war.

Unlike most Western political and military leaders, the Soviets believe that because war could actually occur, and because the consequences of failure would probably be catastrophic for themselves and their system, nothing has greater claim to resources, time, and planning than strategy and forces to provide for their survival and success in that eventuality. In an autocratic system like the Soviet Union, such an extravagant approach to defense is possible because the populace that bears the real costs has neither the information nor the vote needed to influence the decision process.

Because the Soviets constantly and intensely review and prepare for the many variations of war that might occur in Europe while we in the West are preoccupied with finding an inexpensive way to prevent it from happening, we typically have difficulty assessing the rationale behind Soviet actions and hence misinterpret the actions themselves. For example, the West often asserts that the Soviets are building a much larger force in Europe than they would need simply to defend themselves; therefore, they are preparing to attack. The first part of the statement is true. The Soviets believe that it would be irresponsible for a state merely to prepare to fight a war; it must prepare to win a war. Winning involves being able to attack in a way that would minimize the risk of an unpredictable outcome, i.e., nuclear war. Hence, they continue to refine a conventional offensive strategy and to build the masses of tanks, artillery, airplanes, and survivable nuclear missiles needed to make it work.

In the context of thinking about the possibility of war, the Soviets regard peacetime as the prewar period, which they further divide into the time when normal peacetime readiness obtains and the crisis period that immediately precedes the outbreak of war. War itself they

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divide into two periods, the beginning period of war and subsequent/concluding operations.[100]

In evaluating the transition from peace to war, the Soviets have noted several trends. The time when the most critical preparations for war must occur has shifted from the crisis period and wartime itself to the period of normal peacetime readiness. In an article on strategic deployment published in 1981, the Soviet author noted that "the combat experience (of World War II) teaches us that, before the start of war, we must possess forces and resources in a state of combat readiness which would ensure repulsion of a surprise attack without additional mass mobilization, without major regroupings, and without the need for reorganizing troops in the beginning period of war." The author then explained that "this experience is being accounted for today."[101] This conviction is driven by the perception that the beginning period of a major modern war would be shorter, larger in scope, and much more decisive than has previously been the case. As a result, the relative levels of readiness of the opposing sides at the beginning of a war will largely determine its outcome. Soviet military scientists believe that this change is due not only to the development of modern nuclear missile weaponry, but also to dramatic increases in the mobility, maneuverability, and lethality of air, missile, and ground general-purpose forces.[102]

As a result of their belief in the critical importance of peacetime readiness and their obsessive concern with security, the Soviets are continuously investing tremendous amounts of time and resources in preparation for a war they do not want to fight. This is not to say they would never launch the strategic offensive operation. But they would probably do so only in an extreme crisis, when they perceived that their most important national security interests were at stake or they were convinced that a NATO attack was imminent.

Even if they were to launch a conventional offensive, the question remains: Could they do it? At the very least, we believe the Soviets are serious in their efforts to attain that capability. In June of 1982 the late Brezhnev announced the Soviet Union's unilateral renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons. The following month, the minister of defense, Ustinov, explained:

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[100] Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Bagramyan, "Kharackter i osobenosti nachalnogo perioda voyny" [The nature and peculiarities of the beginning period of war], *Vizh.*, no. 10, 1981, pp. 20, 21. See, also, S. P. Ivanov and M. M. Kiryan, "Nachalnyy period voyny" [The beginning period of war], *S.V.E.*, vol. 5, pp. 557, 558.

[101] S. Alferov, "The Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War: Strategic Deployment of Soviet Troops in the Western Theater of Military Operations in 1941," *Vizh.*, no. 6, 1981, translated in *USSR Report: Military Affairs*, no. 1620, JPRS 79083, September 28, 1981, p. 38.

[102] "Beginning Period of War," *S.V.E.*, p. 558.

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This means that now, in the preparation of the armed forces, even more attention will now be devoted to the task of preventing the development of a military conflict into a nuclear one; and those tasks, in all their diversity, are becoming an unalterable part of our military activities. . . . This establishes an even stricter framework for the training of troops and staffs, for the determination of the composition of armaments, and for the organization of still tighter control so as to exclude non-sanctioned launch of nuclear weapons, from tactical up to strategic.[103]

Nevertheless, because the conventional capabilities and concepts the Soviets have been developing or modifying to substitute for nuclear strikes (integrated fire destruction, the air operation, airborne and air assault strikes, OMGs, etc.) all require intense coordination of numerous disparate elements of the attacking force, the single most telling constraint on Soviet ability to execute a high-speed conventional offensive would probably be lack of command, control, and communications capability needed to make it work. This is a technical and a training problem that the Soviets should be able to solve over time.

The second possible brake on such an offensive would be the inability of the Warsaw Pact logistics systems to sustain a conventional offensive machine of the type envisioned. Heavier reliance on massive conventional fires and maneuver would result in consumption of ammunition and fuel at a much faster rate than would be necessary were nuclear strikes used. This potential problem could be solved through increases in the availability of vehicular and airlift capacity to maneuver and fire support elements.

Whatever the potential problems, they do not appear to be insoluble, and the Soviets seem satisfied that the major structural requirements have already been met. In a book published in 1983 entitled *Military-Technical Progress in the Armed Forces of the USSR* the authors concluded:

The organizational forms of the army and navy have been improved in relation to the character of a probable war, the organization of the forces of the probable enemy, the conditions in the theaters of military operations, the requirements of military art, and other factors. The basis of the structure of military formations lies in the possibility of conducting combat operations both with the use of nuclear weapons and with only conventional weapons. Consequently, a well-proportioned military organization has been created, permitting the accomplishment of missions of any scale under any conditions.[104]

The final, and possibly most controversial, issue relevant to the likelihood of success of such an offensive is the issue of surprise. The

[103] Marshal of the Soviet Union and Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov, "Otvesti ugrozu yadernoy voyny" [Removing the threat of nuclear war], *Pravda*, July 12, 1982, p. 4.

[104] M. M. Kiryan, ed., *Voyenno-tekhnichenkiy progress i voorvzhennyye sily SSSR* [Military-technical progress and the armed forces of the USSR] (Moskva: Voyenizdat, 1982), p. 326.

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Soviets believe that vastly improved technology not only promises to make the beginning period of war shorter and more decisive, it also makes the initiation of war a more important determinant of its outcome. In the Soviet view, because of the power and speed of modern weapons, first use of force and first use of greater levels of force can cause significant and possibly decisive shifts in the military, economic, and political "correlation of forces" in a matter of hours, if not minutes.[105] The side that is to succeed must manage the perceptions and the actions of the opponent so as to avert initiation by the enemy at an unfavorable time and to ensure initiation by one's own forces at a time when one's relative advantage is greatest.

Despite Soviet appreciation of the importance of initiative and surprise, they do not envision their initiation of war as a "bolt from the blue" or a "standing start" charge from garrison to the border with little or no preparation. Strategic surprise is virtually ruled out since the Soviets anticipate that a major international crisis would precede hostilities. Attainment of even operational surprise would be a challenge because, as the Soviets have noted, modern technical reconnaissance would make it extremely difficult to deny information about one's activity to the enemy.[106] Surprise must instead be achieved through manipulation of the enemy's interpretation of the activity he observes. Major exercises and deployments ostensibly intended to suppress political unrest (e.g., Poland) might be one means of explaining to NATO at least partial mobilization of Warsaw Pact forces. Incremental upgrades of low-readiness divisions carried out at a rate too slow for the West to detect or interpret as significant might be another. At a time of political crisis, the Soviets might succeed in deceiving NATO into thinking that the crisis had passed its most acute stage when in fact they were preparing to attack. Surprise might also be achieved by attacking at a time when the enemy does not yet believe the crisis has reached a point that justifies overt military action.

Whatever the means, Warsaw Pact leaders would probably hope at most to deny NATO knowledge of precisely when rather than whether the Pact would attack. In addition, they might hope to mislead us as to the main directions of their advance. Given the character and timing of the strategic offensive operation itself, however, surprise measured in days or even hours might be adequate to give the Pact the initiative and momentum they would need for success. The air operation is largely modeled on the 1967 Israeli air operation against the Syrians

[105] Tyushkevich, "The Methodology for the Correlation of Forces in War," p. 65.

[106] Marshal of Tank Troops. O. A. Losik, "Lokalni valky a vojenskeumeni" [Local wars and military art], *Lidova Armada* [People's army] (in Czech), vol. 16, 1982, pp. 746, 747. See, also, M. M. Kiryan, "Vnezapnost" [Surprise], *S.V.E.*, vol. 2, pp. 161, 163; and V. A. Efimov and S. G. Chermashentsev, "Maskirovka" [Camouflage], *S.V.E.*, vol. 5, p. 177.

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and Egyptians. Immediately after Soviet surface-to-surface missiles have blown corridors in our air defense belt, Pact air is to destroy NATO's air forces while they are still on the ground. This achievement, the Soviets believe, would give them initial fire superiority in the TMO. Pact armies under fighter cover would then begin their movement towards the border with a great deal more freedom to maneuver against NATO's ground armies. Airborne forces and OMGs would seek to seize NATO airfields or at least to deny them to NATO's air reserves before the latter could be deployed in any numbers. Surprise, adequate to the needs of the Warsaw Pact, would have been achieved.

Implications for NATO

NATO is a democratic alliance of free peoples that maintains the minimum (largely nuclear) deterrent force thought necessary to prevent a war its members hope will never occur. The Warsaw Pact is an autocratic alliance that maintains the conventional and nuclear forces thought to be required to fight a war its leaders hope will never occur. If this brief comparison is true, then, on the face of it, NATO's defense posture would appear to be the most sensible. Neither side wants war and NATO is investing far fewer resources than the Warsaw Pact to avoid it. Unfortunately, the apparent reasonableness of NATO's posture would be called into question under two conditions: a major crisis that tests the credibility of NATO's deterrent; and the use by the Warsaw Pact of its military superiority to extract political and economic concessions from NATO members. The problems suggested by both situations relate to the content, if not the concept, of NATO's deterrent strategy.

In its classic expression, nuclear deterrence prevents war by causing the opponent to perceive that any serious aggression (armed attack) will inevitably result in his being struck with nuclear weapons that would inflict damage far in excess of any benefit he could derive from the aggression. The key to the success of the concept is the credibility of the nuclear threat. In the NATO–Warsaw Pact context, credibility is a function of the Pact's conviction that NATO will use its weapons and that the weapons themselves are usable and survivable. Officially, the NATO deterrent is comprised of three components: the conventional, theater nuclear, and global nuclear, although, in reality, deterrence has rested on U.S.-controlled theater-nuclear forces and the expectation that their use would be "linked" (by Soviet response, if nothing else) to the U.S. launching its global systems.

Over the past fifteen years the credibility of the NATO deterrent has been weakened by NATO's loss of global and theater-nuclear

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superiority, which the Soviets estimate had occurred by 1969. More recently, the age and reduced reliability of U.S. tactical and theater-nuclear weapons may have eroded the credibility of the linkage between U.S. TNF employment and use of global systems.[107] NATO's frustrated attempt at modernization of its tactical-nuclear capability with neutron warheads was vehemently opposed by the Soviets, precisely because they were more usable and would have helped to establish a more credible linkage to global systems.

NATO is seeking to reverse this erosion of credibility through deployment of 108 Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe over the next three years. At the same time there has been considerable pressure within NATO to reduce, if not eliminate, "battlefield" nuclear weapons such as nuclear artillery rounds and warheads for short-range tactical missiles. As a result, the potential NATO response to a Warsaw Pact conventional attack could be polarized into two rather extreme alternatives: defense with conventional weapons only at a marked disadvantage or almost immediate launch of Pershing IIs and GLCMs to avoid their destruction by the Warsaw Pact air operation. Some theorists reason that this extreme "Pershing IIs or pistols" defense posture would enhance deterrence because it would force the United States to launch its theater-strategic missiles immediately. This U.S. action, given Soviet assurances of a strategic response against the United States itself, would reconfirm the linkage between U.S. theater- and strategic-nuclear systems, which should greatly enhance the credibility of NATO's overall deterrent. Such a linkage, in turn, should significantly reduce the likelihood of a Warsaw Pact conventional offensive, so that NATO would have less need to acquire a wider range of more expensive conventional and tactical-nuclear weapons systems or to increase the number of NATO divisions.

While this line of reasoning is as seductive as it is convoluted, perhaps we should examine it from the Soviet perspective before we accept it as valid. Deterrence, after all, is in the eye of the one to be deterred. If the Soviets do not assess our actions in accordance with our expectations, deterrence may not be achieved.

Conventional wisdom in the West holds that the Soviets do not have a concept of deterrence. As with most conventional wisdom, this idea contains some truth. The Soviets explicitly reject the Western concept of deterrence, which they consistently translate into Russian as *ustrasheniye*, which essentially means "frightening" or "terrorizing." They

[107] "Most of them are junk, just plain junk," former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara has said of the 6,000 U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. "They're old, they're unreliable, there's no way they can be used efficiently." See Fred Hiatt, "McNamara Suggests Eliminating A-Arms From NATO Defense," *Washington Post*, September 15, 1983.

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attack it as a concept that threatens an opponent with nuclear punishment for military misbehavior, administered after it is too late to have any major military effect. On the other hand, the Soviets have a concept of deterrence which they consistently express with the word *zderzhivaniye*, meaning "restraint."[108] Unlike the punitive killing called for by the Western concept of *ustrasheniye, zderzhivaniye* restrains the enemy through his perception that his opponent is actually prepared to do battle at every level of conflict. In other words, the ability to restrain an enemy is the by-product of one's readiness to fight, unlike nuclear "terrorizing," which tends to serve as a substitute for the capability to fight.

All of this is purely academic if the Soviets are properly terrorized, regardless of whether they officially accept the concept. As already mentioned, the Soviets are certainly concerned about nuclear war and, to date, they have not attacked Western Europe. However, this does not necessarily mean that deterrence has worked; as we explained earlier, the Soviets would much prefer to achieve their goals in Europe without war. The only real test of deterrence would be a major crisis that drove NATO and the Soviets to extreme choices.

What have the Soviets done to prepare for such an event? Essentially, they have developed their armed forces in an attempt to restrain NATO. The Soviets have been developing a range of conventional, tactical-nuclear, and theater-strategic weapons systems that give them greater flexibility than they have ever had. They have developed a nuclear capability for conventional artillery and they have apparently refined a conventional capability for their tactical "rocket-nuclear missiles." In the event of a crisis that appeared to be leading to war, the Soviets would have a wide range of choices—including the capability to strike NATO's Pershing IIs and GLCMs with mobile, survivable SS-20s. In such a scenario, an eventual NATO posture of nuclear suicide or conventional surrender might do more to deter the West's leaders than it would to restrain the Soviets.

In the event of a major crisis, what would restrain the Soviets? If the Soviets project as we do, they might be held back by the conviction

[108] Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, in his recent book, identifies the strategic nuclear forces as the main component of the combat power of the Soviet Army and Navy, "which serves as the principal factor in restraining the aggressor." N. V. Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* [Always in readiness to defend the fatherland] (Moskva: Voyenizdat, 1982), p. 31. Ogarkov's use of the word "restrain" (*sderzhivat*) is typical of the way the Soviets relate their own concept of the utility of military power. In contrast, the Soviets always translate the U.S. concept of deterrence as *ustrasheniye*, a derivative of the Russian verb for "frighten" or "scare." A recent example of this usage is Defense Minister Ustinov's discussion of President Reagan's June 9, 1982 speech in Bonn. Ustinov quotes the president's statement on the subject of "preventing any war with the help of deterrence [*ustrasheniye*]," which is, Ustinov charges, based upon the concept of "balance of fear" (*ravnovesiye strakha*). D. F. Ustinov, "Otvesti ugrozu yadernoy voyny" [Removing the threat of nuclear war], *Pravda*, July 12, 1982, p. 4.

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that NATO had the capability to blunt their offensive at the conventional level and the flexibility to challenge their attempt to dominate escalation at the tactical-nuclear level, thereby forcing them into a choice between abandoning their offensive or precipitating what they most fear—a global nuclear exchange.

If this assessment is correct, then a different posture for NATO is needed to restrain the Soviets. To counter the SS-20, NATO must have survivable theater-strategic nuclear weapons. Modernized nuclear artillery rounds and tactical missile warheads should be deployed in sufficient numbers to convince the Soviets that we have a substantial usable tactical-nuclear capability with which to stop a conventional offensive without resorting to possibly self-deterring theater-strategic nuclear weapons. NATO should enhance the quantity and quality of its conventional forces to convince the Soviets that we can slow their attack—at least long enough to mobilize reserves from the U.S. or to come to agreement on release of tactical nuclear weapons. The two improvements in NATO's conventional forces that would probably have the greatest impact on Soviet perceptions would be: substantial upgrades in air defense of NATO's airfields, which should seriously undermine Soviet confidence in the TMO air operation; and deployment of large (several divisions) reserves behind NATO's forward defenses, which should greatly reduce Soviet hopes of quickly taking apart NATO's defenses with deep penetrating raids by large OMGs. The Soviets have already noted France's much greater involvement in Europe's defense[109] and are perhaps deterred as much by the prospect of the French providing operational reserves to the alliance as they are by concern over French use of the *force de frappe*.

European members of the NATO alliance are understandably sensitive to the application of the terms "battlefield" and "theater of war" to the place where they live. Not surprisingly, they are more reluctant than their U.S. partners to think of NATO security except in terms of classic nuclear deterrence. But European members should consider that in a serious crisis, a NATO defensive posture capable of implementing flexible response almost certainly would be a more credible deterrent to Soviet attack than threats of catastrophic nuclear retaliation. Our analysis indicates that a wide range of usable, survivable weapons and feasible defensive concepts backed by survivable theater-strategic nuclear weapons would probably have a much greater deterrent effect on the Soviets

[109] Boris Ponomarev noted that the Soviets were "astonished by the fact that France, which advocates détente, has recently been in the vanguard of those West European countries which are increasing their military spending most. This is all the more surprising since even some NATO military organization member countries such as Denmark, Belgium, and The Netherlands have announced that they are going to freeze or even reduce their military spending." See "Strong Criticism from Ponomarev," *L'Humanité*, December 18, 1980, p. 7.

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than would the deployment of nuclear missiles alone. NATO would not need to match the Warsaw Pact's investment in force structure to achieve the kind of defense posture required. NATO could probably continue to avert war indefinitely by building forces sufficient to create reasonable doubt in the minds of Soviet leaders about their ability to win a conflict. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, is burdened by the conviction that, to avert war, it must deploy sufficient forces to be able to attack.

Finally, NATO members must make the necessary investment simply to thwart the Soviets' hopes for attainment of Andropov's "Finnish solution" to the Soviet quest for "peace" and security in Europe. Soviet efforts to establish hegemony in Europe without war would be accelerated by the expectation that they could achieve hegemony with war. The European populace apparently understands this application of Soviet military power very well. Public opinion surveys conducted in five West European countries in April and June of this year found that "sweeping majorities (from 71% to 83%) in every country believed a Soviet attack on Western Europe in the next five years is unlikely." Among those same respondents, however, "concern was more substantial that the U.S.S.R. will pressure their government into adopting policies against its interest."[110]

[110] Stephen M. Shaffer, "West European Public Opinion on Issues Related to INF," *USIA Research Memorandum* (Washington: United States Information Agency, August 12, 1983), p. 5.

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NONPROLIFERATION ILLUSIONS: TARAPUR IN RETROSPECT

by Peter A. Clausen

In November 1982 the United States and India arranged for France to assume the U.S. fuel-supply role for India's Tarapur Atomic Power Station, thereby all but ending perhaps the most contentious and disappointing case of nuclear cooperation to emerge from the Atoms for Peace era. The substitution arrangement neatly reconciled two potentially conflicting U.S. policy objectives: termination of U.S. nuclear exports to India, a nation that has refused to accept comprehensive or "full scope" safeguards on its nuclear program as required by the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA); and avoidance of a confrontation on the fuel issue, which would put at risk existing controls on the Tarapur reactors as well as the improvement in bilateral relations sought by both nations since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Even though the United States attained these immediate goals, however, the Tarapur outcome is in other respects less neat and satisfying. A number of loose ends remain, including unresolved disputes over the reprocessing of Tarapur fuel, the status of the safeguards after the original Indo-U.S. agreement expires in 1993, and the supply of spare parts for the reactors.[1] Moreover, a strong case can be made that the fuel switch violates the spirit if not the letter of the NNPA and that the credibility of U.S. nonproliferation policy has suffered accordingly. Finally, the threat of a nuclear weapons program in India remains, particularly in light of Pakistan's ongoing pursuit of the bomb. The proliferation dynamics of South Asia are scarcely affected by the Tarapur fuel settlement and continue to elude the control of the United States or other outside powers. This point is underlined by reports in the months since the settlement of possible preparations in India for a second underground nuclear test.

[1] The issue of spare parts became critical during the spring and summer of 1983, when India was forced to shut down the Tarapur station because of severe radiation leaks. On June 30, Secretary of State Shultz announced in New Delhi that the United States was prepared to supply the components needed to repair the reactors if alternate sources could not be found. U.S. supply would require an NNPA waiver by the president or legislative action, certain to be controversial in Congress. See *Nucleonics Week*, July 7, 1983, p. 1; and August 4, 1983, p. 5.

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If India's proliferation future remains very much open, the ending of the U.S. fuel-supply role at Tarapur is nonetheless an important watershed in U.S. nonproliferation policy. During almost twenty years of Tarapur cooperation, India occupied a special place as an object of and focus of controversy about that policy. Despite its unique features, Tarapur acquired a special symbolic quality as a kind of test case of U.S. policy.

Tarapur therefore offers an important case study in the theory and practice of U.S. nonproliferation policy, and a microcosm of some of its persistent problems and dilemmas. Throughout its history, the Tarapur relationship embodied conflicting national interests, perceptions, and expectations. After India's nuclear test in 1974, it became the arena for a prolonged test of wills with overtones of mutual blackmail. Played against a background of generally poor political-security relations between the two nations, the Tarapur story reveals a consistent pattern of U.S. self-delusion and self-inflicted wounds. As such, it raises questions about the use of peaceful nuclear cooperation to advance nonproliferation interests and about the integration of nonproliferation and broader foreign policy interests, which have relevance for policies toward other potential proliferators.

India and Atoms for Peace

From the start, India's nuclear program presented both an opportunity and a challenge to U.S. nonproliferation policy.[2] Begun under the direction of Homi Bhaba even before independence in 1947, the program was viewed by the national leadership as a vital element in India's economic development and was heavily imbued with the symbolism of modernization. By the time of the U.S. Atoms for Peace proposal in 1953, it was the most advanced nuclear program in the developing world.

In some respects, then, India was a model of the logic behind the shift in U.S. nuclear policy from the denial approach pursued in the early postwar period to the policy of peaceful nuclear cooperation. On the one hand, the prominent role of nuclear energy in India's development aspirations epitomized the idealistic aspect of the Atoms for Peace policy. On a more pragmatic level, India's nuclear sophistication seemed to

[2] On the motivations and historical development of India's nuclear policy, see Ashok Kapur, *India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision-Making* (New York: Praeger, 1976). A useful summary of the main features of India's policy is contained in Paul Power, "The Indo-American Nuclear Controversy," *Asian Survey*, June 1979, pp. 574ff. On Indo-U.S. nuclear relations, see, also, Shelton Williams, *The U.S., India, and the Bomb* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969); and Roberta Wohlstetter, " 'The Buddha Smiles': Absent-Minded Peaceful Aid and the Indian Bomb," report for the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics, 1977).

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confirm the basic U.S. premise that the spread of nuclear capabilities was inevitable and that a denial-oriented policy was therefore futile.

Atoms for Peace assumed that while the United States could not prevent the development of nuclear programs by other nations, it might through cooperation gain influence over such programs and channel them in peaceful directions.[3] Technology and materials were to be offered on the condition that they would be used only for peaceful purposes, and, in the most novel aspect of the policy, recipients would submit to safeguards (inspections and accounting of materials) to confirm their adherence to the obligation of peaceful use. However, no commitment barring pursuit of nuclear weapons through separate, unassisted efforts was required of recipient nations. The nonproliferation logic of the policy thus rested essentially on co-optation and the shaping of incentives through nuclear interdependence rather than outright prohibition of military programs.

Viewed in these terms, India was a less auspicious candidate for nuclear cooperation. Indeed, India's nuclear policy challenged U.S. assumptions both explicitly, by resisting the idea of safeguards, and implicitly, by emphasizing nuclear self-sufficiency as its eventual goal. These two aspects of India's policy were closely related, and both reflected the mix of anticolonial ideology and practical security calculations that underlay Indian foreign policy generally.

India planned a three-stage nuclear development program leading ultimately to an independent breeder-reactor fuel cycle based on the nation's abundant reserves of thorium. The first stage would involve conventional uranium-burning reactors whose fuel would be reprocessed to supply plutonium for the fueling of breeders blanketed with thorium in the second stage. Finally, fissile uranium 233 bred during the second stage would be used to refuel the breeders, freeing India from external dependence on fuel or technology.

This strategy called for a pragmatic acceptance of foreign nuclear assistance, including imported equipment and fuel and the overseas training of nuclear scientists, but on terms that minimized foreign control or leverage over the course of India's nuclear development. The strategy was demonstrated in 1955 when India acquired the Cirus research reactor from Canada and successfully resisted safeguards to verify its commitment to peaceful use of the facility. Heavy water, used as the moderator material for the natural uranium-fueled reactor, was supplied by the United States, also on the basis of a simple, unverified assurance

[3] A good statement, by a participant, of the rationale and development of U.S. policy on nuclear cooperation is the testimony of Myron Kratzer in U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Improving Safeguards,* Hearings, 97th Cong., 2d sess., March 3 and 18, 1982, pp. 19-53.

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that it would be used only "in connection with research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes."

In the negotiations leading to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the next few years, India was a leading critic of U.S. safeguards objectives, arguing that controls on the civil nuclear programs of nonnuclear-weapon states were a discriminatory attempt by the haves to erect an "atomic colonialism" over the have-nots. With France and the Soviet Union, India was instrumental in limiting the reach and intrusiveness of the IAEA role and was especially resolute in opposing supply conditions that involved controls of indefinite duration or the spillover of controls into indigenous nuclear activities. Thus Bhaba opposed the concepts of "pursuit" and "perpetuity," which he claimed would place "not only the recipient of aid . . . under bondage, but his children, his grandchildren, and all succeeding generations for ever and ever."[4]

The Tarapur Agreement

Against this background, General Electric contracted in 1963 to build two 210-megawatt light water reactors (LWRs) at Tarapur, near Bombay. This was the first power reactor export outside the industrial countries, and it was regarded as an important U.S. breakthrough in both commercial and foreign policy terms. Commercially, the sale helped ratify the ascendency of U.S. LWR technology in the emerging world reactor market, especially since India had been predisposed to favor the Canadian type of heavy water reactor (HWR). (The HWR is fueled with natural as opposed to low enriched uranium and so does not entail dependence on foreign enrichment services.) Politically, the export was seen as an avenue for improved bilateral relations and for countering Soviet economic and political influence in India. The perception of these wider stakes helps explain why the United States settled for a cooperation agreement that contained significant ambiguities and U.S. concessions.

As expected, the negotiation of safeguards for Tarapur involved hard bargaining. After preliminary discussions, U.S. officials observed, "India wishes to avoid safeguards in all forms and to the maximum extent feasible, and will accept them as a matter of expediency only when it derives some advantage from doing so."[5] The avoidance of safeguards

[4] Cited in Arnold Kramish, *The Peaceful Atom and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 65. "Pursuit" refers to the application of safeguards to successive "generations" of nuclear material produced from the originally supplied material, and to nuclear facilities in which this material is used. "Perpetuity" means that safeguards remain in effect regardless of the fate of the supply agreement that originally brought them into force.

[5] Cited in Wohlstetter, "The Buddha Smiles," pp. 73-74.

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altogether was no longer an option, but India did succeed in protecting its position on several vital issues. Not the least of these issues was preserving the safeguards-free status of the Cirus reactor. In contrast to other U.S. Atoms for Peace agreements, which established a general framework for nuclear cooperation, the Indo-U.S. agreement was project-specific, dealing only with Tarapur. As such it could not be used retroactively to bring the Cirus project under controls.

The major issue regarding controls on Tarapur was whether safeguards would apply to the reactors per se, as the United States maintained, or only insofar as they were operated on U.S.-supplied fuel, as India argued. Unable to resolve their difference on this point, the two nations resorted to a formula that seemed to render it moot: During the thirty-year life of the agreement, the United States would guarantee the supply of low enriched uranium fuel for Tarapur, and the reactors would be operated only on U.S. fuel or material derived from it. This solution permitted each side to retain its interpretation, and the disagreement was even recorded in Article VI of the text.[6] However, it begged the question of the reactors' safeguards status at the expiration of the agreement or in the event it should be terminated prematurely. India insisted that its acceptance of safeguards and the assurance of U.S. fuel supply were reciprocal obligations that were inextricably linked. The U.S. position was that safeguards "by their very nature continue . . . irrespective of whether the agreement for cooperation is suspended or terminated for any reason."[7]

The disposition of spent fuel from the reactors was also dealt with in terms destined to become a source of controversy. Article II-e of the agreement provided for reprocessing by India in its own facilities, subject to a "joint determination" that safeguards could be effectively applied. Whether the joint determination was to be simply a pro forma technical finding or implied a U.S. veto right on broader policy grounds was unclear. The question itself was academic at a time when reprocessing and the recycling of plutonium were expected to become normal steps

[6] The text of the agreement can be found in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *International Agreements for Cooperation,* Hearings, 88th Cong., 1st sess., September 5, 1963, and 2d sess., April 22 and June 30, 1964, pp. 37ff. Article VI reads in part, "The Government of India emphasizes, in contrast to the position of the United States, that its agreement to the provisions of this Article [i.e., safeguards] in relation to equipment or devices transferred pursuant to this Agreement has been accorded in consideration of the fact that, as provided in this Agreement, the Tarapur Atomic Power Station will be operated on no other special nuclear material than that furnished by the Government of the United States and special nuclear material produced therefrom, in consequence of which the provisions of this Article in relation to equipment or devices in any case ensue from the safeguards on fuel."

[7] Cited in Warren Donnelly and Joseph Pilat, "Nuclear Exports: Termination of U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India," CRS Issue Brief IB81087, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April 1983, p. 5.

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in civil nuclear power programs and had not yet emerged as a focus of proliferation concern.

Another safeguards issue was particularly controversial during the Tarapur negotiations, although later it proved less troublesome than the Article VI and reprocessing questions. This was the question of whether the bilateral safeguards provided for in the agreement would be transferred to the IAEA after the agency's procedures covering large power reactors were established. Such transfers were called for by U.S. policy in support of the IAEA, but India was hostile to inspections by the agency and refused to commit itself to an automatic transfer. Instead the agreement called for subsequent negotiations on the issue and provided that either party was free to end the cooperation if unsatisfied with the terms for transfer. The failure of U.S. negotiators to commit India to eventual IAEA safeguards was widely criticized as undercutting U.S. support for the agency. Already in 1963, Tarapur was being viewed as a test of the credibility of U.S. nonproliferation policy.

In retrospect, it seems inevitable that Tarapur should have become a persistent source of tension and recrimination between the United States and India. Future conflicts were foreshadowed in the tough bargaining and the papering over or deferral of contentious issues. Even more fundamental, the two nations had implicitly irreconcilable expectations about the longer-term implications of their cooperation and about the significance of safeguards in this context. In effect, two conflicting theories of incrementalism were at work.

For India, guided by a strategy of independence, nuclear cooperation and the controls it entailed were a temporary expedient and not to be permitted to prejudice future autonomy and freedom of action. As indigenous capabilities increased and foreign dependence declined, India's program would become progressively freed from external constraints; safeguards would wither away.

In contrast, the United States, operating on a strategy of interdependence, viewed Tarapur as a foothold for expanding cooperation that would not only bring commercial and political dividends but would also give the United States influence over India's nuclear development. Cooperation would reinforce the peaceful thrust of India's program and temper India's hostility to international controls. From this perspective, U.S. officials viewed the 1963 agreement as marking an important shift in India's attitudes toward safeguards: "The Indians have begun to recognize that the desirability of safeguards . . . outweighs these psychological hesitations that they have had in the past."[8]

[8] Statement of U.S. IAEA Representative Henry Smyth, in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *International Agreements for Cooperation,* p. 30.

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Estrangement and Cooperation, 1963-74

The course of India's policy during the next several years proved disappointing to U.S. hopes both for growing nuclear cooperation and for drawing India more fully into the international nonproliferation regime. For the subsequent development of its nuclear power program, India turned to Canada and the HWR fuel cycle. Tarapur became not an entering wedge for the United States but an island of cooperation divorced from the mainstream of India's program and affording little leverage over India's policy.

Meanwhile, political and security considerations were forcing the United States and India still farther apart on proliferation issues. The Chinese nuclear test, coming just a year after the Tarapur agreement, acted on the two nations' incentives in opposite ways: While the United States began to press for an international nonproliferation treaty (NPT), India began to consider the weapons option seriously and to take steps that would lead to a nuclear explosive capability.

In the NPT negotiations, India dissented strongly from the approach of the treaty sponsors and argued for a nondiscriminatory regime linking nonproliferation to nuclear-weapon-state disarmament and to security assurances for nonweapon states.[9] The treaty, completed in 1968, required nonweapon states to renounce nuclear explosive devices of any kind and to accept safeguards on all their nuclear activities, indigenous as well as foreign-assisted. Security assurances were notably lacking, and it was evident that the United States, deeply involved in Vietnam, was not going to take on new commitments for the sake of winning signatories like India. Indeed, with the advent of the Nixon administration and its affinity for Pakistan and China, U.S. policy seemed calculated to aggravate India's insecurities.[10]

By the end of the decade, it was becoming clear not only that India would not sign the NPT but also that it was moving deliberately toward testing a "peaceful nuclear explosive" (PNE), using plutonium extracted from the Cirus fuel at its unsafeguarded, though not secret, Trombay reprocessing plant. As these signals became stronger, the United States informed India in November 1970 that it would consider a test inconsistent with the peaceful-use assurances under which it had assisted

[9] On India and the NPT, see Shelton Williams, *The U.S., India, and the Bomb;* George Questor, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), chap. 4, pp. 56ff.; and K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Nuclear Policy," in *Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries,* ed. Onkar Marwah and Ann Schultz (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975).

[10] See, for example, Christopher Van Hollen, "The Tilt Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia," *Asian Survey,* April 1980; and Baldev Raj Nayar, "Treat India Seriously," *Foreign Policy,* Spring 1975.

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the Cirus project. India rejected this position as a retroactive reinterpretation of its commitments.[11]

Remarkably, the Tarapur collaboration was virtually unaffected by these storm signals. Construction was completed, and the reactors became operational in early 1969. At about the same time, India announced its plans to build a plant to reprocess the Tarapur fuel and was assured that the United States foresaw no problems with the "joint determination" called for in the agreement.[12] Negotiations on the transfer of safeguards to the IAEA began soon thereafter and resulted in a trilateral agreement in 1971 that carried forward without modification the 1963 provisions and their ambiguities. The United States made no attempt at this time to link Tarapur to the other nuclear issues between the two nations, such as India's rejection of the NPT and the conflicting U.S. and Indian positions on PNEs. Nor did it consider ending the cooperation by invoking the 1963 "escape clause" in connection with the safeguards transfer.

India's Test and the NNPA

India's nuclear explosion of May 1974 finally made this compartmentalized situation untenable. Tarapur could no longer be fenced off from the larger proliferation issues between the United States and India, especially when it developed that American-origin heavy water had in all likelihood figured in the test despite the U.S. warning of November 1970. Nevertheless, the initial U.S. reaction was mild. The Nixon administration deliberately chose to play down the significance of the test and not to impose sanctions, nuclear or otherwise. U.S. fuel shipments for Tarapur were briefly held up but were resumed when India gave assurances that the fuel would be "devoted exclusively to the needs of" the Tarapur reactors — an assurance that in effect simply reiterated the provisions of the 1963 agreement and was therefore not a new concession on India's part. In contrast, Canada responded to the test by suspending all nuclear cooperation with India.

Over the next two years, however, pressures built for a tougher U.S. line against India and on nonproliferation policy generally. The Tarapur issue was engulfed in the larger rethinking of U.S. policy in the mid 1970s that was prompted not only by India's explosion but also by the emerging export market in sensitive nuclear facilities and by growing concern about the proliferation dangers of reprocessing and the use of

[11] The text of the U.S. aide-memoire is contained in N. Ram, "India's Nuclear Policy: A Case-Study in the Flaws and Futility of 'Non-Proliferation,'" paper presented at the annual meeting of the Asian Studies Association, Chicago, 1982, pp. 53-54.

[12] Ibid., p. 61.

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plutonium fuels.[13] In this context, U.S. fuel shipments for Tarapur were increasingly challenged by public-interest groups, in Congress, and in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the U.S. agency responsible for issuing nuclear export licenses.[14]

In 1977 the Carter administration supported fuel exports to India — in part as a goodwill gesture to the Desai government, which had also recently assumed power and had disclaimed interest in further nuclear tests — but with two significant qualifications. The United States would not approve the reprocessing of Tarapur fuel, and a resumption of testing by India would trigger an automatic cutoff of U.S. cooperation. For the first time the United States was explicitly using the Tarapur relationship as a lever to deter proliferation on the part of India.

With the passage of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act in 1978, U.S. policy moved beyond deterrence to "compellence." Section 128 of the act required that after a two-year grace period all nonweapon-state recipients of U.S. nuclear exports accept comprehensive, NPT-type safeguards. The Carter administration opposed making this "full-scope" safeguards provision applicable to existing U.S. supply agreements such as Tarapur but failed to persuade a Congress that had India foremost in mind in drafting the requirement.[15]

The full-scope safeguards requirement of the NNPA represented both a carrot and a stick — an inducement for nations like India to agree to upgraded nonproliferation conditions in order to qualify for continued U.S. exports, and the threat of a cutoff otherwise. (The cutoff was not automatic, since the law provided for a presidential waiver, subject to congressional veto, of Section 128.) It thus raised the question of whether U.S. assistance was sufficiently valuable to India to force a fundamental change in nuclear policy. While there was a range of opinion on this issue on the U.S. side, the preponderant view was that the chances of India's acquiescence were remote. It was well understood when the act was passed that it was likely to mean an end to U.S.-Indian nuclear ties.

There were several reasons to assume this was the case. First, as a matter of security policy it was unlikely that India would unilaterally accept additional nuclear controls that, while not ruling out a future weapons program, would significantly raise the political barriers to such

[13] On the change in U.S. policy, see especially Michael Brenner, *Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation: The Remaking of U.S. Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[14] Documents pertaining to post-1974 Tarapur export licenses are reproduced at length in U.S. House, Committee on International Relations, *Export of Nuclear Fuel to India,* Hearings and Markup, 95th Cong., 2d sess., May 23, June 8 and 14, 1978, pp. 55ff.

[15] See Warren Donnelly and Richard Cronin, "Congress and Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," in U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Congress and Foreign Policy, 1980* (Washington committee print, 1981), pp. 91-92.

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an effort. Second, the cutoff threat would inevitably be seen by India as a kind of blackmail and a default on the 1963 agreement to which it would be politically difficult to submit. Finally, the availability of alternative sources of low enriched uranium (in particular from France and the Soviet Union), as well as the possibility of fueling the reactors with recycled plutonium obtained by reprocessing the Tarapur spent fuel, diminished the force of the cutoff threat.

Talks between the United States and India during the grace period confirmed this bleak outlook. Although the administration at times expressed mild optimism, there was in fact never any real flexibility in India's position. In these circumstances, the question of what the United States would do in the face of resistance by India became at least as interesting as the question of what India would do in the face of U.S. pressure.

India's intractability presented the United States with a no-win situation and posed a variant of a perennial dilemma of deterrence theory: If deterrence (or, in this case, compellence) fails, is it necessarily rational to carry out the threat of retaliation? To fail to do so would damage U.S. credibility and undercut a vital provision of the NNPA on its first test. On the other hand, it was clear that a cutoff would not be without cost to the United States. It would obviously strain U.S.-India relations and might carry proliferation risks as well. Specifically, India would regard a U.S. cutoff as rendering the 1963 agreement null and void, ending India's obligation to safeguard the reactors and freeing it to reprocess the accumulated spent fuel.

The relationship thus gave India substantial counterleverage to deter a U.S. cutoff, leverage which ironically was due in part to the carefully circumscribed nature of the commitments given in 1963. The situation was made more interesting still by the possibility that India's threat to abrogate safeguards was a bluff and might not be carried out if the United States made good on the NNPA threat to terminate fuel supplies.

Moment of Truth: 1980

While not abandoning all hope of resolving the nuclear question on U.S. terms, U.S. policy increasingly focused, as the March 1980 NNPA deadline approached, on managing the downside risks of a termination. This emphasis on damage control became more pronounced in the wake of the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. These developments created a strong interest on the part of the United States in improving the U.S. strategic and political

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position in South Asia and reinforced a growing conviction in the administration, but not in Congress, that a break with India over the nuclear question was highly undesirable.

The moment of truth came in May 1980, when the NRC voted unanimously against issuing two new export licenses for Tarapur fuel. President Carter then exercised his prerogative to overrule the NRC and issued an executive order authorizing the exports. The president prevailed when a resolution of disapproval, adopted by a wide margin in the House, was defeated by two votes in the Senate following an intensive administration lobbying effort. As a compromise with Senate opponents of the exports, the administration agreed to release only the first of the two shipments and to hold the second, pending "assurances" of progress toward achievement of U.S. nonproliferation goals with India. Hence the administration's victory, however impressive as a display of presidential influence, merely postponed what continued to appear as an inevitable severing of the Tarapur relationship.

In addition to the foreign policy arguments against precipitating a crisis in U.S.-India relations, the administration made its case in the Senate on legal and nonproliferation grounds. On legal grounds, it argued against the NRC interpretation of Section 128, maintaining that the exports should be considered as falling within the grace period since, if it had not been for U.S. bureaucratic delays, they might reasonably have been expected to occur within that period. Under this interpretation, the shipments in question would be the last that could occur without a waiver of Section 128 and did not constitute a precedent for future exports.

But this argument was somewhat disingenuous. Implicitly the administration strongly suggested that the retroactive aspect of Section 128 was both politically and legally dubious and that India was justified in considering itself the aggrieved party. For example, Deputy Secretary of State Christopher argued that "the conditions the U.S. would like to see India accept were imposed by U.S. law in 1978, fifteen years after our original international obligation was entered into. If we were to cut off our fuel shipments, India could plausibly ask whether the United States is a country that abides by its commitments."[16]

On nonproliferation grounds, administration arguments were dominated by the threat that safeguards at Tarapur would be abrogated by India if the United States defaulted on its 1963 fuel supply commitment. In addition, it was feared that India would reprocess the fuel already supplied and fabricate plutonium fuel to continue operation of the power

[16] U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Resolutions of Disapproval Pertaining to the Shipment of Nuclear Fuel to India,* Hearings and Markup, 96th Cong., 2d sess., June 26, July 23, and September 10, 1980, p. 24.

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station. In light of these risks, it was argued, a fuel cutoff would be self-defeating — a case of refusing to accept half a loaf (continuation of the existing Tarapur controls) because the whole (full-scope safeguards) was unattainable.

Against these arguments, opponents of the exports likened India's threats to blackmail. To acquiesce, allowing India to deter the United States from implementing its declared nonproliferation policy, would send a signal of weakness to other problem nations and erode U.S. credibility, especially since Section 128 had been aimed at India in particular.

The merits of the case were far from clear-cut. They turned largely on the relative magnitudes of two kinds of costs — the India-specific proliferation risks associated with terminating fuel supplies, and the more general, regime-level costs of retreating on a basic policy principle. On these terms, it can be argued that the administration's definition of the stakes overstated the risks of a cutoff and thereby gratuitously enhanced India's bargaining position. The basis for this judgment is two-fold. First, the United States gave insufficient weight to the possibility that India's threats were a bluff. Second, even if the threats were carried out, the proliferation costs would have been essentially symbolic and would not have significantly increased India's weapons capabilities.

Had the United States followed through with a cutoff, India would have faced two choices — one regarding a new fuel source and one regarding safeguards. The alternatives in the first case were to contract with a new external supplier or to reprocess the Tarapur spent fuel and run the power station on domestically produced mixed oxide fuel (containing plutonium and uranium). The latter approach was preferred by India's nuclear establishment, which was anxious to demonstrate the technology involved and was given prominence in India's declaratory policy. However, a new outside source of supply, probably the Soviet Union, was not ruled out and was clearly recognized by the United States as one possible consequence of a U.S. cutoff.

Although this outcome would have removed the threat of safeguards abrogation (since no supplier would have offered to replace the United States without a continuing safeguards commitment by India), it was defined primarily in negative terms by the United States. That the Soviet Union might step in was seen as one of the risks of a U.S. cutoff, serving the cause of Soviet influence, rather than a way of mitigating those risks. The U.S. ambassador to India felt that a cutoff would "play into the hands of the Soviet Union."[17] Similarly, in an op-ed piece urging

[17] Robert F. Goheen, "Problems of Proliferation: U.S. Policy and the Third World," *World Politics*, January 1982, p. 200.

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approval of the exports, McGeorge Bundy argued that "the likeliest alternative supplier is the Soviet Union; would such a switch be a gain for the good cause?"[18]

But if the "cause" was safeguards, then the answer to Bundy's rhetorical question was yes. A substitution of the Soviet Union for the United States would not only have preserved safeguards at Tarapur, it would also have upgraded them. A new supply contract would have bound India to current IAEA safeguards provisions, including pursuit and perpetuity, in place of the ambiguous terms negotiated with the United States in 1963. Such an upgrading was achieved in 1977, when India was forced to turn to the Soviet Union for heavy water supplies when Canadian assistance was cut off.[19] The apparent U.S. blind spot on this issue in 1980 strongly suggests the primacy of anti-Soviet foreign policy motives over nonproliferation motives in the decision to continue fuel shipments.

A more substantial case for real proliferation costs existed if India followed through with its declared intention to reprocess and recycle the Tarapur fuel in preference to finding a new supplier. Even in this case, though, there is good reason to discount the threat to renounce safeguards. There were certainly powerful disincentives to India's taking such action. An abrogation of safeguards would have been an unprecedented step and, notwithstanding India's own interpretation of its obligations under the 1963 agreement, would have been widely regarded as legally questionable. As such it could have prejudiced the willingness of other nuclear suppliers to deal with India in the future. Equally important, the removal of safeguards from Tarapur would have fed the momentum of Pakistan's nuclear program and reduced to the vanishing point the chances of bringing that program under improved international controls.

Ironically, two years earlier the administration itself had professed optimism on this issue, playing down the threat that India would remove external controls at Tarapur in the event of a U.S. cutoff. At the time of the first exports to be considered following passage of the NNPA, NRC commissioners Victor Gilinsky and Peter Bradford had argued that the strong likelihood of a cutoff at the end of the grace period, coupled with India's stated position on the link between safeguards and fuel supply, meant that the future safeguards status of any further U.S. exports (and indeed of the fuel previously supplied) was in doubt. Accordingly, they claimed, India did not meet even the existing U.S. export conditions, quite apart from the full-scope safeguards criterion, and exports should

[18] McGeorge Bundy, "Ship the Fuel to India," *Washington Post,* June 13, 1980.

[19] See, for example, Rodney Jones, "Nuclear Proliferation: Islam, the Bomb, and South Asia," *The Washington Papers,* no. 82 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 28-29.

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be terminated immediately. To continue shipments for two more years would simply add to the material at risk.

In rebuttal of the Gilinsky-Bradford argument, administration officials noted that India had not removed safeguards from material supplied by Canada following the latter's cutoff, and expressed confidence in a "reasonable prospect" that the same would be the case if the United States terminated assistance.[20] By 1980, however, this confidence had eroded. The administration now argued the case for continued exports not on an optimistic reading of India's intentions but on an opposite, worst-case, set of assumptions. In doing so, it implied that India held the high cards in this poker game, and the United States had no choice but to acquiesce. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher put the matter plainly: "India expects us to act on these applications and if we fail to act, we do so at our very considerable peril."[21]

Yet the grim tone of Christopher's warning seems disproportionate to the actual stakes of the Tarapur conflict. Even in the worst case, in which safeguards were renounced, the cost would have been a symbolic setback to the IAEA system (admittedly a severe one) rather than an increased prospect of proliferation in India. It was most improbable that the Tarapur fuel would be used by India as a source of fissile material for weapons, given the availability of higher-quality plutonium, already free of safeguards, from India's research reactors and, in the future, from its indigenous heavy water power reactors.[22] As Senator John Glenn argued, "The real Indian threat is not the removal of safeguards from Tarapur, it is the lack of safeguards at its other facilities."[23]

The administration did not dispute the marginal weapons relevance of the Tarapur fuel. But its inordinate preoccupation with the maintenance of controls on that fuel — even the disputed and ambiguous controls of the 1963 agreement — fostered a distorted picture of the stakes and conceded leverage to India that was unwarranted by the merits of the case.

Endgame, 1981-82

The 1980 Senate vote, for all its drama, settled very little. The fate of the second of the two shipments was left hanging, and on the day

[20] U.S. House, Committee on International Relations, *Export of Nuclear Fuel to India*, p. 48.

[21] U.S. Senate, Committees on Foreign Relations and Governmental Affairs, *The Tarapur Nuclear Fuel Export Issue*, Joint Hearings, 96th Cong., 2d sess., June 18 and 19, 1980, p. 97.

[22] See, for example, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment, *Analysis of Six Issues About Nuclear Capabilities of India, Iraq, Libya, and Pakistan*, report prepared by the Congressional Research Service, January 1982 (Washington: GPO, 1982), p. 37.

[23] John Glenn, "No Fuel for Tarapur," *Washington Post*, September 22, 1980.

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of the vote India applied to the NRC for yet another export license. President Reagan thus inherited a situation in which another round of confrontation was unavoidable.

As the new administration took up the issue in 1981, the chances that Congress would uphold further fuel exports, in the event the president chose to authorize them, seemed remote. The NNPA grace period had now unambiguously expired, and no progress was evident in narrowing the two nations' differences. On the contrary, there were reports that India might be preparing to conduct a second nuclear explosion. The impression that the end of the road had been reached was reinforced by the fact that the Republican election platform had opposed President Carter's action on the 1980 exports.

On the other hand, President Reagan was no less concerned than his predecessor about the risks of a cutoff, and damage control therefore continued to be the main theme of U.S. policy. In three rounds of negotiations during 1981, the administration sought a negotiated disengagement that would extricate the United States from its supply responsibilities — for example, by arranging for a surrogate supplier — while leaving controls on the fuel and reactors intact.[24] India predictably rejected this approach and warned that in light of the apparent U.S. default on fuel supply it was prepared to declare the 1963 agreement null and void. It further announced its intention to begin reprocessing the Tarapur fuel, alleging that the United States had effectively reneged on the joint determination called for in the agreement.

Toward the end of 1981, however, India signaled an interest in avoiding a showdown. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stated in December that the Tarapur question would be decided in the context of "national interest and overall bilateral relations with the United States," and for the first time she indicated receptiveness to the idea of a substitute supplier. These overtures brought an eager response from the United States, and on the eve of Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to the United States in July 1982 the two nations agreed to invite France to assume the U.S. supply role under the 1963 agreement. Following negotiations between France and India, the arrangement was formalized on November 30.

India's reversal represented a triumph of foreign policy calculations over the wishes of the nuclear community. Mirroring U.S. motives, Gandhi drew back from the brink of a unilateral severing of the Tarapur connection because of a broader interest in better relations with the United States and fear of a backlash that might jeopardize economic aid and draw the United States and Pakistan closer together. In the end,

[24] These negotiations are traced in detail in Ram, "India's Nuclear Policy," and are summarized in Donnelly and Pilat, "Nuclear Exports."

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then, both sides found the Tarapur link a convenient channel for improving their relationship and were reluctant to sacrifice it to the demands of their respective declaratory nuclear policies.

Whether the hoped-for foreign policy benefits will materialize remains to be seen, but in nonproliferation terms it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that India got the best of the bargain. Not only had it successfully defied U.S. policy on full-scope safeguards, it also escaped having to accept upgraded safeguards on Tarapur itself as the price of arranging an alternate source of fuel. France attempted during the 1982 negotiations to bring the new arrangement into conformity with current supplier requirements regarding safeguards pursuit and perpetuity but ultimately backed down in face of India's intransigence. As a result, India is to receive fuel until 1993, at which point it will be free of any external constraints on the fuel or the reactors. In the meantime, it asserts the right to reprocess the U.S. fuel previously supplied. Although the United States disputes India's view on these issues, the pattern of U.S. behavior over several years implicitly concedes that in the final analysis India's interpretations are the controlling ones where Tarapur is concerned.

The Lessons of Tarapur

In defending the French substitution arrangement, the State Department argued that it would not only preserve existing controls on Tarapur, but "also help retain a line of influence with the Indians to discuss other nonproliferation matters."[25] Yet the twenty-year history of Tarapur cooperation belies this hope. During this time, Tarapur has proven essentially irrelevant either as a deterrent to steps toward proliferation by India or as a lever to elicit stronger nonproliferation commitments.

Before India's 1974 test, the United States had consistently abstained from using Tarapur as a channel for discussing "other nonproliferation matters," despite growing apprehensions about the lack of safeguards on Cirus and India's evident advance toward a nuclear explosives capability. After the test, when the United States belatedly asserted a linkage, it found that Tarapur conferred little leverage. On the contrary, Tarapur gave India a lever for deterring sanctions and resisting U.S. attempts to upgrade controls on India's program. For four years after 1978, U.S. policy was dominated by efforts to cope with this reverse leverage.

Granted the unique features of the case, there are lessons in the Tarapur experience for policies toward the other problem nations of the nonproliferation regime, such as Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. Tarapur epitomizes three kinds of dilemmas that regularly confront

[25] Cited in Donnelly and Pilat, "Nuclear Exports."

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nonproliferation policy: the choice between cooperation and denial as a strategy for dealing with regime holdouts; the tension between regime-level consistency and the demands of individual cases; and the trade-offs between nonproliferation and other foreign policy interests toward particular nations and regions.

With respect to the first dilemma, one clear lesson of Tarapur is the limits of nuclear supply policy, whether used as a carrot or a stick, as an instrument of influence over the policies of problem nations. Peaceful nuclear cooperation is, quite simply, a weak reed when set against the political and security motives that dominate the decisionmaking of countries like India that are deliberately preserving a weapons option. Both sides in recent debates on nuclear export policies — those who have faith in the Atoms for Peace strategy of "control through cooperation" and those who look to cutoff threats as a source of leverage against proliferators — have sometimes tended to overlook this point.

But this does not relieve nuclear suppliers of the need to make hard choices. On balance, the Tarapur experience supports the case for a policy of noncooperation with holdout nations, contrary to the assumptions that have guided U.S. policy. Given that neither cooperation nor denial is likely to affect India's proliferation prospects fundamentally, denial at least imposes a price on India's instransigence. The contrast between the U.S. and Canadian policies toward India is instructive here. It suggests that while the threat to cut off exports does not confer much leverage, actually implementing a cutoff can impose significant costs on the recipient. More important, it may impose on the latter an unwelcome choice (but an entirely salutary choice from the standpoint of nonproliferation policy) between delays and setbacks in its nuclear program and the acceptance of stronger controls.[26] India paid a price in both areas as a result of the Canadian embargo. In contrast, U.S. policy has had the perverse result of confronting the United States with the choice between evils while giving India cooperation on its own terms.

There are also important regime-level reasons for noncooperation with nations that refuse full-scope safeguards or that actively pursue a nuclear weapons capability. Continued supply to a nation like India sends the wrong signals to three relevant audiences: other problem nations, who are encouraged to resist pressures for stricter controls; other suppliers, who may become less insistent on strong controls in their own export policies, especially in the depressed and highly competitive nuclear market that now prevails; and to NPT parties whose commitment to

[26] The high cost of India's attempted self-reliance in nuclear power is discussed in Ravinda Tomar, "The Indian Nuclear Power Program: Myths and Realities," *Asian Survey*, May 1980.

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nonproliferation is devalued if suppliers continue to conduct business as usual with holdouts.

These regime-level considerations raise the second policy dilemma illustrated by Tarapur. A degree of tension between the interests of regime consistency and predictability and the need for flexibility in dealing with the unique features of particular cases is unavoidable in nonproliferation policy. (Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that in the Tarapur case the U.S. predicament was to a large extent self-induced. The NNPA was passed in full awareness of the box it risked putting the United States in. In retrospect, a clean break at the time of the 1974 explosion would have been less controversial and less damaging to U.S. credibility than the path actually followed.) Critics of the NNPA have a point when they argue that the rigid application of universal rules makes little sense if it proves counterproductive to the management of proliferation risks in a given nation. But this is a hypothetical point that poorly fits the case of India. Using this argument to justify exports to India exaggerates both the likely impact of a cutoff on India's proliferation dynamics and the influence to be gained by continuing assistance. The prudent rule of thumb should be to make policy exceptions in favor of particular problem nations only where the risks of sticking to the general norm are overriding or where there is a realistic hope of obtaining improved nonproliferation assurances from the recipient in return. A more liberal approach to exceptions risks bringing about the worst of worlds — a weakening of regime rules without the progress on problem cases that might justify it.

The third policy dilemma is the tension between nonproliferation and other foreign policy interests. As suggested above, this tradeoff was ultimately the critical one in shaping U.S. decisionmaking on Tarapur after 1979. Again there is an unexceptional argument in principle for sometimes subordinating or adjusting nonproliferation policy to broader geopolitical and strategic interests, but again the argument is suspect as applied to relations between the United States and India. Unlike U.S. policy toward Pakistan, where nonproliferation rules have been modified in the interests of building a close security relationship, policy toward India has existed in a relative political vacuum. Tarapur policy has been guided less by a coherent design for dealing with India's part of the South Asian security equation than by a desire to minimize short-term diplomatic friction.

Weakness at the level of political-security relations is perhaps the most striking feature of U.S. nonproliferation policy toward India.[27]

[27] See Richard Betts, "India, Pakistan, and Iran," in *Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Joseph Yager (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1980), pp. 353ff.

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The disproportionate importance Tarapur has assumed in Indo-U.S. relations is itself a symptom and a measure of this weakness. Throughout the years of cooperation on Tarapur, bilateral relations between the two countries were typically cool and often strained. At critical periods, especially during the NPT negotiations and in years preceding the 1974 test, U.S. foreign policy offered India little incentive to moderate its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. In this adverse environment, peaceful nuclear cooperation was burdened with unrealistic expectations. It is hardly surprising that U.S. attempts to use the Tarapur link to exert influence — whether on India's foreign policy generally or on nuclear issues — consistently proved illusory. In effect, the United States used Tarapur as a surrogate for serious efforts to deal with India's challenge to nonproliferation policy. The result of this habit was to trivialize that challenge.

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review essays

THE ARMS RACE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000. By William H. McNeill. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982. 405 pp. $20.00.

ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

William H. McNeill, the Robert A. Millikan Distinguished Service Professor of History at the University of Chicago, is a scholar who enjoys painting with a broad brush. *The Pursuit of Power,* he tells us, is intended as a companion volume to his *Plagues and Peoples,* and as a footnote — a four-hundred-page footnote — to his National Book Award-winning work, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community.*

There is more than a touch of the Toynbee about Professor McNeill in that he is as impressively learned as he is indulgent of his own sweeping generalizations. Though devoted to factual detail, he tends to exploit it in support of his theses while ignoring what should modify and refine those theses. So keen is he, for example, to establish a causal connection between a society's economic structure and the technology it produces that he asserts that feudalism in Europe resulted simply from the heavily armored cavalry it had to sustain.

There is also a good bit of the Braudel about the professor. Despite his book's title, no one actively pursues power on its pages: no statesman, no strategic thinker, no masses inflamed by reformist ideology, no dedicated interest group, no feuding elites. In a monograph that purports to explain how and why power is pursued in the modern world, there is not a mention of Karl von Clausewitz, next to nothing about Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin and their ambitions, and no serious consideration of the precepts and effects of Marxist, communist, fascist, or even Nazi ideology. In fact, though he never says so explicitly, McNeill assumes that politics has nothing much to do with the pursuit of power. For him power means military power. It seems simply to accumulate provided the conditions are right, and the conditions are what T. S. Eliot once

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called "those vast impersonal forces that be." Power may ultimately come from the barrel of a gun, but McNeill is far more interested in the kind of gun it is and in the number of such guns produced than he is in knowing why, at a given moment, someone decides that the triggers should be pulled. Wars, he believes, are the products of demographic changes, of shifting economic structures, of technological innovations — all of which allow and incline men to pursue power.

Indeed, McNeill comes dangerously close to depersonalizing the historical process altogether. He argues, for instance, that the pressure of an expanding population was the root cause not only of the French revolution but also of the Industrial Revolution and World War I as well. The problem is that McNeill has adopted his earlier volume on plagues, which he terms "microparasites," as a model for his analysis of war, which he insists is a "*macroparasitism among human kind*":

> Hence a study of macroparasitism among human populations turns into a study of the organization of armed force with special attention to changes in the kinds of equipment warriors used. Alterations in armaments resemble genetic mutations of microorganisms in the sense that they may, from time to time, open new geographic zones for exploitations, or break down older limits upon the exercise of force within the host society itself. (p. vii.)

Whatever truth there may be in McNeill's analogy, his attempt to make it the whole story fatally flaws his work. Such a narrow focus excludes much that is essential and distorts the picture he uses to make his sweeping generalizations. Plagues happen to people. Men consciously decide to develop weapons systems and make war against each other. Because decision and action do not figure in Professor McNeill's calculations, the only individuals who are discussed in any serious way are inventors and innovators, and they, too, are seen as simply responding to contemporary conditions.

The distortion is obvious from the beginning. McNeill provides no analysis of the Roman Empire in his first chapter, "Arms and Society in Antiquity." How can he exclude history's most determined and successful pursuers of power from a book on the subject, especially when what they achieved, universal government, is precisely McNeill's prescription for current ills? The Romans were never renowned as innovators, but they did exercise hegemony over a land area approximately two-thirds the size of the continental United States and governed a population approaching 60 million for five centuries, at a conservative estimate. Whether or not McNeill's failure to mention any of this is inadvertent, an analysis of the Roman achievement would certainly create insurmountable difficulties for his central thesis.

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According to that thesis, the "industrialization of war," which led to the modern arms race, began as a response to the creation of a market (as opposed to a "command") economy in eleventh-century China. This market economy, in turn, required other new markets that only a solution to the problem of overland transportation could make possible. Since the ancients never solved that problem and never had the kind of extensive market economy envisaged by McNeill (as M. I. Finley and his disciples have definitively demonstrated), he simply remains silent about what the Romans achieved. If he has read them, he nowhere cites the analyses by contemporary specialists such as Ernst Badian, W. V. Harris, and Edward N. Luttwak, who try to explain how and why the Romans managed to project power so successfully, for such great distances, and for so long. Those analyses are of course political at heart and so do not fit easily into McNeill's conceptual framework. They also suggest that an analysis of the "industrialization of war" will not, on its own, provide an adequate historical explanation of the pursuit of power. Even though McNeill himself eventually claims that the Roman military system served as a model for those in seventeenth-century Europe who sought to maintain royal or aristocratic control over the great proletarian armies they were creating, he never describes the Roman system and how it functioned. Instead, his excursus into antiquity confines itself to an examination of the interplay between social and economic structure, technological advances and military power. It sets the pattern that he follows through the remainder of his chronological treatment. He spends a good deal of space, here as elsewhere, telling us what we already know — that iron weapons are better than bronze, that chariots when used properly can wreak havoc with foot soldiers (McNeill does not realize, incidentally, that Homer did not understand how chariots had been used in the Mycenaean period), that cavalry mounted astride are more formidable than those who ride sidesaddle, that armored cavalry are more formidable yet, provided that the horses are large and strong enough to carry the extra weight, and that armored cavalry with stirrups are best of all.

Specialists will find throughout the book their own equivalents to the examples above: inevitably, in casting his net so widely McNeill is reproducing other scholars' research much of the time. The extent to which he has mastered that research and the sheer breadth of his learning are admirable. As he covers succeeding periods, he amazes the nonspecialist with how much he knows and worries the expert with the gaps in his knowledge and understanding. This is in fact a disconcerting book, for the author has with great dedication sought out and displayed for his

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readers thousands of pieces of information, only to piece them together with too little care and discrimination.

Despite McNeill's flawed vision, *The Pursuit of Power* offers some brilliant insights. What is more, the reader who takes the trouble to work through it and to ponder the broad conclusions will be rewarded. As happens with Toynbee and Braudel — and Marx, too, for that matter — the breadth of McNeill's knowledge and the boldness of his analyses inspire and challenge the reader through the opposition they generate and the rethinking and counterargument they require.

For all the book's wrongheadedness, the difficult journey through its dense pages is worth the effort. The use McNeill makes of his knowledge of Chinese medieval history in developing his central thesis is a good example. As we have seen, he believes that the Chinese invented the Industrial Revolution circa A.D. 1000. He bases this startling conclusion on his interpretation of the relationship between technical, economic, and governmental developments at the time. The elaborate system of canals that the Chinese devised to solve for the first time in history the problem of overland, mercantile transportation made accessible countless new markets, which in turn furnished the incentive to expand production on a truly modern scale. The final yet critical factor was, McNeill says, governmental restraint. A normal, unimaginative authoritarian regime would have reacted to this dynamic economic activity by taxing it out of existence before it was fully recognizable. Not so China's administrators who, instead, imposed only a moderate excise tax. They then hopped on the free enterprise wagon themselves, investing directly in, and so sharing the incentives for and the profits of, this boom.

Once the profit motive was unleashed and officially subsidized by the government, the entire economy was swept into an upward spiral. The motive to increase production endured and allowed greater consumption, which in turn meant that the population grew, providing still more markets. Urban centers prospered and duly expanded, generating even more customers for yet further agricultural and industrial production. These expanding markets created not only an incentive for technological advance but also, as McNeill sees it, the necessity for a military establishment to protect and promote them. The combination of technical innovation and military expansion during the Sung dynasty produced an army of more than a million men that achieved its successes not simply by its numbers, but thanks to technically sophisticated weaponry. McNeill presents some impressive facts. In 1281 the Chinese launched 4,400 ocean-going warships against the Japanese, a fleet that could be defeated only by the weather, and in the final decades of the fifteenth century their largest (Indian) ocean-going vessels displaced some 1,500 tons, as

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compared to 300 for Vasco da Gama's flagship. This mighty naval and military regime could not long survive the collapse of the commercial system that sustained it. McNeill sees the torch of power as passing to the West Europeans who, he obliquely implies, consciously aped their Chinese contemporaries.

As McNeill progresses from the ancient world through the medieval, the pattern that he wishes to find in history leads him to insinuate a connection that, however useful to his thesis, has little justification. There is insufficient evidence to decide whether the city-states of the Italian littoral were the first European community to "commercialize violence" because, as he thinks, they had firsthand knowledge of the Chinese market system, or because they were simply the least feudal of European communities, or for both reasons. McNeill is right, almost by definition, to insist that feudal society had to be dismantled before a truly commercial society could replace it. He is wrong to argue that the feudal system was designed for local defense and therefore failed to ensure the safe passage required by commercial enterprise. In fact, the mercenary system that replaced feudalism also emphasized local defense. The mercenary armies of fourteenth-century Italy resulted from wedding private enterprise to the security requirements and the competitive conflicts of the city-republics. McNeill correctly shows that the new international merchants and bankers needed the services of professional armies to protect their investments by ensuring their cities' safety. A good deal of time would pass, however, before those military establishments came to concern themselves with the protection of commerce itself. McNeill is on safer ground when he shows how the new capital now in circulation allowed the Italians to choose to be taxed rather than plundered. In the course of the fifteenth century, contracts with ever-lengthening terms of military service were drawn up between state capitalists and the private armies that protected them, and thus the path to "commercialized violence" was opened.

In tracing the development of the arms race, McNeill turns from the competing armies of the Italian city-republics to the larger nation-states of the interior. They would become richer, and wealth was the critical factor because Europe's military establishments would henceforth have to accommodate themselves to open-ended and costly improvements in weapons design. Although improvements in the design of the crossbow invariably tended to be offset by improvements in the design of defensive armor, this mini-arms race ground to a halt in about 1370. At approximately the same time, simultaneously in both Europe and China, a new discovery was made that would change drastically the shape of things to come. While gunpowder had been available for some centuries,

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its propulsive properties had gone unnoticed. That they were now noticed, that the gun was finally invented, meant that the arms race had begun in earnest. Its technical refinements over the next five centuries would require invention and ingenuity and, above all, cost a great deal of money.

Following his basic pattern, and in intricate detail, McNeill examines the relation between Europe's new market economy and the technical breakthroughs in weapons design that its great wealth has been able to sustain. He takes his study to the present day, so that we see the history of Western civilization through the ever-lengthening, ever-widening barrel of a gun. Since he has a mechanical, deterministic view of the historical process, McNeill's description of the march from the incipient "commercialization of violence" in Renaissance Italy to the nuclear capabilities of today's superpowers has a distinct aura of inevitability.

In his pages we watch a perpetually moving, military machine that proceeds ineluctably toward the end for which it was originally programmed. Certainly we find no analysis of how things might have happened differently, of why at a given moment one weapons system was preferred to its competitors, of why some but not all nations chose to sink their wealth into their navies, of how the unique historical development of the individual nation-states of Europe led them to choose the various paths they took in their search for security and empire. Instead, we read about the conversion of armored and courtly cavalry to professional infantry, about improvements in the range, accuracy, and mobility of artillery, about balancing improvements in fortifications design, about the development of the naval cannon and the greater opportunities it created for overseas empire. Above all, we hear how it was that private enterprise and a degree of political autonomy made it all possible.

Whatever the reader may think of McNeill's grand tapestry as a whole, he weaves into it some interesting ideas. For instance, he believes that close-order drill, reinstituted in Europe during the seventeenth century, constituted a watershed in the development of the West's military structure. Drill was now employed not only to make soldiers more effective on the battlefield, but also to solve what might have become a major domestic problem. In the early decades of the century, military entrepreneurs such as Albrecht von Wallenstein were building standing armies that numbered in the tens of thousands. Monarchs such as Gustav Adolf of Sweden and Louis XIV in following suit recruited from their own society's lower classes. They therefore needed to ensure that their armed proletariat should remain obedient to the king's own officers and loyal to the crown. As part of a comprehensive effort to create an esprit de corps that would reinforce a sense of dedicated military professionalism and bind the army to the authority of the state, they tore a leaf from the

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ancient Roman army manuals and reinstituted drill. Standardized drill was accompanied by standardized weapons and uniforms, so that seventeenth-century soldiers came more and more to resemble their modern counterparts: they were all replaceable parts of a well-oiled machine. Such armies were easier to manage and less costly to maintain. Because they had acquired this new psychological character, McNeill explains, Europe enjoyed an extended period of domestic tranquillity and increased wealth. That it failed to settle into centuries of stable routine was due only to international rivalries, which kept the arms race alive.

McNeill fits the modern period also into his mold. The wealth generated by overseas empire and by the Industrial Revolution naturally goes to build ever more devastating weapons. Free market ingenuity invariably serves the cause of the warmakers, sometimes consciously, sometimes inadvertently. Napoleon's armies could move their lighter, more accurate artillery over better laid roads, guided by more precise maps. His *levée en masse* did not produce an uncontrollable mob because someone had thought to subdivide it into smaller, more manageable, autonomous units (divisions). Most of what McNeill has to say about the period after 1815 has been said already, and in more digestible form, in studies such as William McElwee's *The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons.* The neophyte military historian, for whom the first half of this book is clearly not intended (it assumes expertise), will nevertheless find its second half interesting enough as it touches all the obvious bases. He or she will learn about the military and especially the naval ramifications of the invention of the steam engine, the Bessemer process, mass production (gun and ammunition manufacture being particularly affected), the railroads, the breech-loading rifle, the telegraph, and the machine gun. We find also retold the story of the Anglo-German naval race and of the development of warships that can clock thirty-six knots. The list goes on — deadly accurate, quick-firing naval guns, the invention of the submarine, the introduction of air power, soaring military budgets and deficit spending, foreign arms sales and, at last, nuclear weapons.

So where does this inexorable escalation lead us? McNeill concludes, in his final chapter, that the Warsaw Pact is a "mirror image" of NATO. He has only a superficial understanding of the strategic and political issues of the Vietnam War. He misses the significance of both the ban on antiballistic missiles and the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. The ability to draw difficult distinctions should be the mark of the well-trained mind, but McNeill even obscures the differences between the capitalist economies of the industrialized democracies and the totalitarian economic systems of the Soviet Union and its satellites:

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Among the great majority of Americans, west Europeans, and Japanese, freedom collapsed into obedience and conformity to bureaucratically channeled behavior. The springs of obedience and conformity within the Communist lands were similar inasmuch as most Russians and east Europeans, together with the enormous Chinese population, also willingly accepted goals defined by their bureaucratic superiors and behaved accordingly. Their rewards were smaller than in the West and Japan, where living standards rose rapidly and soon surpassed prewar levels. But standards of consumption rose in Communist lands too, so the difference was only one of degree. (p. 364.)

Finally, we come to McNeill's solution to the dilemma that the nuclear arms race presents to our world. We must establish, he says, a single world government:

To halt the arms race, political change appears to be necessary. A global sovereign power willing and able to enforce a monopoly of atomic weaponry could afford to disband research teams and dismantle all but a token number of warheads. Nothing less radical than this seems in the least likely to suffice. . . . An empire of the earth could be expected to limit violence by preventing other groups from arming themselves so elaborately as to endanger the sovereign's easy superiority. War in such a world would therefore sink back to the proportions familiar in the preindustrial past. (pp. 383-84.)

What does history show us that could make us treat this as a serious suggestion? Is this all the wisdom that two thousand years of the past can shed on the present? Do all the dedication and learning in *The Pursuit of Power* lead only to the absurdity of Jonathan Schell's *Fate of the Earth?* This last, most unhistorical conclusion surely demonstrates the extent to which the discipline of history loses its utility when decision, action, and politics are excluded from its analysis.

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WORLD POLITICS

The West German Social Democrats, 1969-1982: Profile of a Party in Power. By Gerard Braunthal. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. 334 pp. $25.00. This detailed monograph examines the domestic programs and party organization of the SPD during its thirteen-year rule of the Federal Republic from 1969 to 1982. There is only one chapter, however, on Bonn's foreign policy during this period of *Ostpolitik*. Moreover, the author's conclusion — "that the SPD should move leftward if it expects to gain more of the crucial youth vote, that it should formulate not only Keynesian but socialist solutions to the current economic crisis, and that it should abandon a moderate posture that hardly differs from that of its archrival, the CDU/CSU" — is more likely to be a prescription for electoral defeat than a program to regain power for the SPD in Bonn.

North-South Debate. By L. K. Jha. Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1983. 153 pp. $12.00. A collection of a series of lectures presented in 1982 by Dr. Jha, a noted economist and diplomat. By analyzing major events and developments, such as the Algiers Summit meeting of 1973 and the emergence of the Group of 77 and of OPEC, the author describes the institutional and conceptual evolution of relations between the industrialized West and the countries of the Southern Hemisphere. Possible avenues for resolving conflicts and improving North-South dialogue are also explored.

Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United Nations. By Michla Pomerance. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. 154 pp. No price given. Critically analyzes the new UN "law" of self-determination as it has developed since 1960. The author notes that "every demand for self-determination involves some countervailing claim" and that recognition of the rights of one "self" entails a denial of the rights of a competing "self." A searching exploration of the legal complexities surrounding the Wilsonian concept of self-determination relevant to contemporary issues from the western Sahara to the Palestinians.

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The Moral Dimensions of International Conduct. Edited by James A. Devereux, S.J. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1983. 110 pp. $4.95 (paper). Four lectures on topics of international concern which together make up the Jesuit Community Lectures for 1982. Shirley Williams, head of the British Social Democratic party, writes on Western relations with the Soviet Union. She is of the opinion that "the West will lose its moral position in the world if it does not give the same degree of priority to arms control and limitation as it has up to now given to defense." The second essay, by Denis Goulet, deals with the relationship between rich and poor nations. This essay is a valuable taxonomy of thinking about development concepts and a storehouse of pithy quotations taken from other writers. The third essay, on human rights and the moral dimensions of international conduct, is by Jose Zalaquett, a Chilean exile and former chairman of the executive committee of Amnesty International. Zalaquett thinks that the recognition of "human rights" has evolved in stages, from the "civil and political," to the "social, economic, and cultural," and finally to the "right to peace, the right to development, and the right to a clean environment, among others." Finally, J. Bryan Hehir, the moving force and main author of the pastoral letter, expostulates on the use of force in the international system. This essay is very useful for anyone trying to understand the bishops' thinking on deterrence and nuclear war.

Managing International Political Risk: Strategies and Techniques. Edited by Fariborz Ghadar, Stephen J. Kobrin, and Theodore H. Moran. Washington: Ghadar and Associates, 1983. 183 pp. No price given. Published under the auspices of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and supported by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, this volume includes conference papers focusing on legal, financial, and insurance approaches to managing political risk to multinational investors, trading companies, and technology licensors. The papers and discussion represent the state of the art in the field of applied political risk management.

The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949: A Study in Crisis Decision-Making. By Avi Shlaim. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. 466 pp. $38.00. This superb monograph, based on a wide range of published and unpublished sources, examines the decisionmaking behavior of U.S. policymakers during the international crisis caused by the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948. The author's conclusion, based on his study of this particular superpower confrontation, that "there is sufficient evidence here to at least call into question the universal validity

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of the premise that high and protracted stress seriously and adversely affects decision processes and outcomes," challenges many of the precepts underlying contemporary theories of decisionmaking in times of international crisis.

Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West. By Sheldon Gellar. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. 145 pp. $16.50. A detailed examination of the impact of Islam, Western imperialism, and French colonial rule—elements that have been instrumental in shaping the political, economic, and social evolution of Senegal since its independence in 1960. In this well-written book, the author offers a good deal of information on Senegal's political system, especially about the struggle to maintain political stability and democracy in the face of the socio-economic difficulties confronting this small west African nation. Gellar concludes on an optimistic note, acknowledging that even though the road to the twenty-first century may be a rocky one, it is by no means beyond the capacity of the Senegalese to find solutions to their problems. Another in the Profiles, Nations of Contemporary Africa series.

China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968-1971. By John W. Garver. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. 174 pp. $19.95. This carefully researched book analyzes the Chinese decisionmaking process that led to its policy of rapprochement with the United States. The book is based on solid research and intelligent analysis of the Chinese mass media, although the author probably makes too much of what he calls the pro-Soviet tilt of 1970. Nevertheless, this carefully documented work can be highly recommended to all students of China and Chinese foreign policy.

The Chancelleries of Europe. By Alan Palmer. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983. 275 pp. $19.95. An overview of the opulent age of European diplomacy between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of the First World War. While this book gives the highlights of nineteenth-century diplomacy, A. J. P. Taylor's *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe* remains a better introduction to the subject.

MILITARY, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND ARMS CONTROL

Clausewitz. By Michael Howard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. 79 pp. $12.95 ($3.95, paper). Professor Howard has written a wonderfully lucid essay on the writings of the great Prussian military theorist and

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historian Karl von Clausewitz. The heart of this essay is to be found in the three chapters entitled "Theory and Practice in War," "Ends and Means in War," and "Limited and Absolute War," where Howard provides his interpretation of Clausewitz's writings, especially the monumental study *On War.* If this volume has any drawback, it is its brevity. While Howard does provide a biographical sketch of Clausewitz in the first chapter of this essay, readers interested in a more detailed account of his life should turn instead to Peter Paret's biography *Clausewitz and the State.* In addition, the last chapter, entitled "The Legacy of Clausewitz," is much too brief in its treatment of the subject. Howard's essay must be supplemented, then, by other works, like Jehuda Wallach's study *Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht,* which traces the influence of Clausewitz's teachings on German military thought during the era of the two world wars. Since Wallach's study has not been translated into English and is in any case difficult to find in the United States, perhaps Professor Howard can be persuaded to return to the subject of Clausewitz's influence on the evolution of modern strategic thought in another volume.

Facing the Threat of Nuclear Weapons, with an Open Letter on the Dangers of Nuclear War from Andrei Sakharov. By Sidney D. Drell. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1983. 118 pp. $10.00 ($4.95, paper). Drell's Danz Lectures on aspects of the "nuclear danger" whose receipt by Andrei Sakharov prompted his famous and surprising — at least to Drell — response. Drell's lectures are wide ranging in their treatment of the subject; generally, they espouse an approach to deterrence emphasizing the role of arms control and the inevitability of the mutual hostage relationship. But Drell is aware, from his long experience, of the issues, their complexity, and their inherent open-endedness. His presentations are even tempered and well reasoned. Except for the publication of Sakharov's response in the summer 1983 issue of *Foreign Affairs,* this is the only place one can find the full text of his stirring and masterful synopsis of the choices currently before us.

First Strike! The Pentagon's Strategy for Nuclear War. By Robert C. Aldridge. Boston: South End Press, 1983. 325 pp. $8.50 (paper). Formerly an aeronautics engineer for the Defense Department, Robert Aldridge is now a prominent proponent of a nuclear freeze and the author of j'accuse-style articles about the Pentagon. *First Strike!* is a technically well-versed discussion of all those U.S. weapons systems that Aldridge opposes: MX, cruise missiles, the B-1 bomber, the Trident II submarine, ASAT technologies, ballistic missile defense systems, weapons for antisubmarine warfare, and so forth. Specifically, Aldridge argues that stable deterrence

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precludes counterforce-capable forces of all kinds, and that all counterforce missions have as their aim not deterring war but fighting one. In fact, the declared purpose of all U.S. counterforce-capable forces is deterrence, not warfighting, by convincing the potential adversary that no military advantage could be gained by *his* first strike. This requires survivable forces capable of striking hard targets in a retaliatory mode, lest these enemy assets hold U.S. industrial and population centers hostage. That the freeze movement persistently obscures this, and other, distinctions is testimony either to its simple-mindedness or its mendacity.

The Arms Race. By Michael Sheehan. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983. 242 pp. £16.50, £5.95 paperback. An overview of the arms race by a British scholar, designed evidently for classroom use. The book, if somewhat uninspired, is competent and fairly well balanced. The first chapter concerns the relationship between arms races on the one hand and the function of military power and the frequency of war on the other. Chapter 2 reviews the superpower strategic balance; chapter 3 takes up the topic of nuclear proliferation among states; chapter 4 considers the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new environments, particularly outer space. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the arms race in Europe in both its nuclear and conventional aspects, and chapter 7 considers the problem of chemical-biological arms. The final chapter discusses arms control and disarmament; it is less a history or an analysis than a short taxonomy of terms. The book offers neither great offense nor great insight; most probably it will meet the same fate as MacArthur's proverbial old soldier.

We Can Avert a Nuclear War. Edited by William Epstein and Lucy Webster. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983. 180 pp. $20.00. ($9.95, paper). Books whose grammar and tone are reminiscent of Soviet propaganda slogans rarely have much of scholarly worth to offer the reader, and this is no exception. This volume, the proceedings of a Canadian Pugwash conference held in 1982, consists of a series of short presentations, each characterized by a high level of abstraction and an even higher moral tone, followed by the printed transcripts of a number of subsequent discussions. Participants included Linus Pauling, Theodore Hesburgh, Alfonso Garcia Robles, Bernard Feld, James Leonard, Sergei Kapitza, and Alexander N. Yakovlev, the Soviet ambassador to Canada. The content of the book is rather predictable: it supports without objection the nuclear freeze, the comprehensive test ban treaty, the banning of weapons from space, and the efforts of the United Nations. It also praises the efforts of the conference participants to such a degree that it verges on organizational narcissism; reading the book, however, produces only narcolepsy.

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Arms Deal: The Selling of the F-16. By Ingemar Dörfer. New York: Praeger, 1983. 287 pp. No price given. Ingemar Dörfer has written the first book on the arms deal of the century: the decision of the United States and a number of European countries to buy the F-16. The book will be of particular interest to students of the weapons acquisition process in the United States. It is one of the first books to discuss in depth the politics of a multinational arms procurement decision, and it also provides an important discussion of the military and political behavior of the smaller NATO countries. Dörfer has admirably reconstructed and summarized a very complicated process, much of which took place behind the scenes. The book is not without some minor flaws, however. Dörfer deals exclusively with the weapons acquisition process itself and not with the military requirements behind the decision by the U.S. Air Force to procure a light-weight fighter, which is discussed in James Fallow's *National Defense*. The complexity of the events discussed does not make for easy reading, a problem that is made even more difficult by a heavy dose of Pentagonese and a liberal use of acronyms. Finally, Dörfer does not offer any theoretical observations or conclusions on the weapons acquisition process (as has been put forward, for example, by James Kurth, Robert Coulam, Jacques Gansler, Ronald Fox, and others). This excellent study is recommended for those interested in the weapons acquisition and procurement policy and national security.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution. Edited by Nikki R. Keddie. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. 258 pp. $22.50. The published proceedings of a scholarly conference held in the summer of 1980 consisting of ten essays, an introductory note, and a very useful bibliographic appendix on Shi'ism and politics, with special reference to Iran, compiled by the editor. The volume is divided into three sections: (1) the history of Shi'ism and politics, containing essays by W. Montgomery Watt, Juan R. Cole, Azar Tabari, and Willem M. Floor; (2) recent religio-political leaders, with essays by Yann Richard, Shahrough Akhavi, Homa Katouzian, and Gregory Rose; and (3) images of the revolution, with essays by William O. Beeman and Mary Hegland. The contents of this volume are best suited for those with a fairly good background in Islamic studies and Iranian studies. Those essays of most interest to the generalist, both by virtue of their subject matter and the writing skill of their authors, are Tabari's "The Role of the Clergy in Modern Iranian Politics," Rose's "*Velayet-e Fagih* and the Recovery of Islamic

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Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini," and Beeman's "Images of the Great Satan: Representations of the United States in the Iranian Revolution." For those sincerely interested in understanding modern Iran, these three essays and the editor's bibliography justify the price of the volume.

A Land of Two People: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs. Edited with a commentary by Paul R. Mendes-Flohr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. 314 pp. $29.95. A comprehensive collection of Martin Buber's essays, letters, and notes on the subject of Arab-Jewish reconciliation and coexistence in Palestine. Covering the period from 1918 to 1965, some sixty-five selections are offered, including letters to Buber by others (Gandhi, for example) when appropriate. Mendes-Flohr's introduction and short annotations throughout the text are astute and helpful; the editor is also responsible for translating much of the material, most of which has never been available before in English. Together with Arthur A. Goren's work on Judah Magnes (reviewed in ORBIS, Spring 1983, p. 234), we now have seminal documentary reference works on two of the most powerful spokesmen within early Zionism who sensed the dangers and tragedy of the Arab-Israeli conflict to come.

The Middle East Today. 4th ed. By Don Peretz. New York: Praeger, 1983. 575 pp. No price given. This is an updated edition of Peretz's well-known and justly praised text on the Middle East. As in earlier editions, the volume begins with six historical and topical chapters, followed by eleven country-specific chapters. Also as before, Peretz is more interested in grounding the reader historically than in applying social science models and theories at every turn. But the history is not lifeless; at its best it is sophisticated social analysis. New material concentrates, naturally enough, on revolutionary Iran, changes in Palestinian nationalism, new developments in U.S. policy, and the lingering war in Lebanon. Perhaps the best news about the book is that, after the transfer from Holt, Rinehart and Winston to Praeger as publisher, it is now available in paperback. Many university students will be grateful for the change.

The Politics of Indecision: Origins and Implications of American Involvement with the Palestine Problem. By Dan Tschirgi. New York: Praeger, 1983. 341 pp. No price given. A treatment of U.S. policy on the Palestine question from roughly 1939 to 1948. The study is richly documented and makes use of archival sources; it is thus one of the few studies of this period that can claim to involve serious historical research. The author's conclusions, however, bespeak a revisionism absent from

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other accounts. It is claimed that U.S. "indecision" was "callous and irresponsible" and that "the nature and form of American support of partition was consciously devised in light of a virtual certainty that it would lead to an anarchic bloodbath in Palestine. Underlying this development was a temporary conviction that American interests would be less harmed by an intercommunal explosion than by efforts to achieve a more orderly settlement." A final curiosity: though the author admits that U.S. anti-Zionist groups had little impact on American policy in this period, he nevertheless devotes a chapter to them. The author cites "interviews and correspondence" with eight people, and of these three were with prominent U.S. Jewish anti-Zionists (Elmer Berger, Alfred Lilienthal, and Benjamin Freedman) and three with anti-Zionist Americans of Arab descent (Philip Hitti, George M. Barakat, and Faris S. Malouf). Another was with Loy Henderson, a key U.S. State Department official at the time, who had little sympathy for Zionism.

Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s. By Shai Feldman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. 309 pp. $25.00 ($9.95, paper). A policy brief by an Israeli scholar recommending that Israel adopt an explicit deterrence posture based on nuclear weapons. The argument is multifaceted and sophisticated — this no doubt a consequence of Kenneth Waltz's influence on the author — but whether it is convincing must be decided by the reader. One of the author's premises is that nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is probably inevitable, and that the surreptitious nuclearization of many states in the area is more dangerous than an explicit, putatively more predictable and stable process. As for the functioning of deterrence in the Middle Eastern context, Feldman may follow early U.S. strategic thinkers in the error of relying too heavily on the assumption that "rational man" will triumph in times of great stress. Those interested in the gist of Feldman's argument are advised to read his Spring 1981 *Foreign Affairs* article before spending $25.00 on the hardcover edition.

The Politics of Middle Eastern Oil. Edited by J. E. Peterson. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1983. 529 pp. $14.95 (paper). Thirty-three articles on the international petroleum market and the countries of the Middle East whose economic and political prospects have become indistinguishable from it. The first part of the volume, on oil, the Middle East, and the international economy, features articles by Peter Odell, Edith Penrose, Walter J. Levy, William R. Brown, and others. Part two, on the development prospects of the producers themselves, features essays by Jahangir Amuzegar, Eric Rouleau, James Bill, J. E. Peterson, Sa'id Salman Abu

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'Adhirah, and others. The last section covers a broad spectrum of topics under the rubric of "The Producing States and International Politics." Authors include Herman Eilts, Adeed Dawisha, John Duke Anthony, Charles Yost, Harold Brown, and Christopher Van Hollen. There are also useful appendices, maps, and a bibliography. If this book has any flaws, they are less in content than in conception: nearly all of the articles have appeared elsewhere, and some of the essays seem to have only the most tangential relevance to the politics of oil. Nevertheless, this collection is convenient and available in paperback.

The Middle East in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects. Proceedings of a Conference. Edited by Philip H. Stoddard. Washington: The Middle East Institute and the Defense Intelligence College, 1983. 189 pp. $7.50 (paper). **Perspectives on the Middle East 1983: Proceedings of a Conference.** *Edited by William G. Miller and Philip H. Stoddard.* Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1983. 150 pp. $7.50 (paper). The proceedings of two conferences, the first held last winter at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and the second at the National Defense University in Washington in June 1983. Despite their modest cost, neither one of these volumes is really worth buying. This is not because there is nothing of scholarly worth here, but rather because both of these books suffer from the plague of intellectual diffusion so common to conference and symposium volumes. Those represented here — including Charles McC. Mathias, Walid Khalidi, Haim Shaked, Hanna Batatu, and Harold Saunders in the Fletcher conference, and Richard Dekmejian, Michael Dunn, Dankwart Rustow, J. E. Peterson, and Herman Eilts in the NDU conference — have all presented their views elsewhere in more comprehensive fashion.

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